

TRUTH IS STUBBORN

Selected Articles

THE REALITY OF HISTORY
AND
THE MYTHS OF POLITICS



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Selected Articles
From
Lenin's political testament:
The reality of history
and
The myths of politics
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Selected articles from the book “Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics” by Sakharov, Valentin Alexandrovich, a Russian historian who has more than 50 scientific and educational works on the history of the Russian revolution. One of the few who has access to declassified Soviet Archives and made extensive research of Archives.

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INTRODUCTION

The 20th century has ended. A century that has passed for Russia under the sign of major reforms and grandiose revolutions, in which the country was looking for a solution to the problems facing it. An important turning point in this process was the Great October Socialist Revolution, which is inextricably linked with the name and work of V.I. Lenin and the organization of revolutionaries he created a hundred years ago, in 1903, the Bolshevik Party. 1917 was the year of the triumph of V.I. Lenin. The tactics he proposed enabled the Bolsheviks, whose authority and influence as far back as the summer of 1917 could not be compared with the political strength of their opponents, in September-October to lead the rising people's revolution and give it a socialist character.

In the course of the struggle to retain power and implement the program for the socialist reorganization of society, the Bolsheviks accumulated vast political and social experience, which allowed Lenin to significantly refine and develop the concept of building socialism. An important place in this process is occupied by the latest works of V.I. Lenin, known as his "Political testament".

Decades have passed. A socialist society was formed in the USSR, which had a huge impact on world development in the 20th century. However, having failed to defend the political, social, and moral-psychological positions it had won in the struggle against modern capitalism, Soviet socialism itself became the property of history. The cycle of the country's historical development has come to an end.

The political and ideological battles of the times of "perestroika" died down, during which the authority of V.I. Lenin and his "Political Testament" were used as a weapon to crush socialism. In society, the former interest in the history of the October Revolution, the Bolshevik Party and its main figures has faded. The problems of the "Testament" of V.I. Lenin, which excited the minds, has lost its former political relevance. Now other problems worry society.

The political interest of the new government forced it to slightly open the archives of the defeated enemy - the CPSU and the Soviet state and open access to previously inaccessible documents. It became

possible to explore not only the archival texts of the Testament, but also those problems that had previously been covered only by memoir sources. And it immediately became clear that with these documents, not everything is as simple and unambiguous as it seemed before, that Lenin's Testament, which had great potential for ideological and psychological influence on Soviet people, was for a long time considered by the leadership of the CPSU as a means to achieve political goals that had nothing to do with an objective analysis of historical experience.

Unfortunately, newly discovered documents are used by historians mainly to argue for positions long accepted in historiography, so the study of the problem, despite the abundance of literature and the success achieved in clarifying individual issues, should be recognized as insufficient. Insufficient both in terms of the possibilities that the currently available sources provide, and the range of problems to be investigated, as well as the argumentation of many conclusions and assessments.

The most important problem left without due attention of historians and being the key to the entire problematics of the Testament is the establishment of the Lenin's authorship of each of the texts included in it.

The grounds for posing this question appeared already in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when new documents became available to a wide range of historians, from which a **picture emerged that was significantly different from that which was accepted in historiography**. The need to study the Testament became obvious in the context of the political struggle that took place in the leadership of the RCP (b) and which in many ways still remained unexplored. A need arose in historical science and it became possible to carry out a comprehensive analysis of Lenin's latest works.

An attempt by the author of this book to draw the attention of researchers to these problems, undertaken at the international conference "Russia in the 20th century", caused a sharply negative reaction. The authors of the book "Confrontation: Krupskaya - Stalin" V.A. Kumanev and I.S. Kulikova wrote:

"The statement of one "researcher" at the International Conference "Russia in the 20th Century" (1993) that "Krupskaya forged some provisions in the Testament" [1] looks completely groundless and absurd.

The words attributed to me have nothing in common with what I said at this conference, but they quite accurately convey the reaction of most of its participants to the question of the **dubiousness** of the Lenin's authorship of some texts of the Testament [2].

Awareness of the need to establish the Lenin's authorship of individual texts of the "Testament" radically changes the general approach to the study of both each of the texts included in it, and their entire complex as a whole.

The texts of the Testament, with their assessments and proposals, should turn from the starting point of all discussions about Lenin's views and intentions, from an indisputable "verdict", as was the case in traditional historiography, into an object of comprehensive source study. First of all. And only after that will it be possible to study their content in order to study Lenin's views, attitudes, moods, etc.

The scientific relevance and significance of the topic chosen by the author are determined, firstly, by the fact that it, as a focus, collects many of the most important questions of the history and theory of the socialist revolution, and, secondly, by the fact that it itself organically enters into a wide range of problems of national history. The political significance of the topic is determined by the importance of the intellectual process in which Lenin's "Testament" turns out to be inscribed - the process of comprehending the grandiose socio-economic, political, and spiritual experience of the Russian revolution.

The book offered to the reader is an attempt at a systematic analysis of the history of the creation of the "Political Testament", its content and use in the political struggle of the 1920s.

We did not initially question the Lenin's authorship of any of the texts of the Testament and therefore did not intend to prove that they do not belong to V.I. Lenin. The scientific formulation of the problem, in our opinion, consists in the need to prove that this or that document

belongs to V. I. Lenin. In other words, only a document whose Lenin's **authorship has been proven can be considered Lenin's.**

The source base available to historians, despite certain shortcomings, **makes it possible** to conduct a study to establish the Lenin's authorship of each of the texts of the Testament. The author considers the main condition for success to be the identification of a **real connection** between the content of the texts of the Testament and the political struggle that took place within the Central Committee of the RCP (b), as well as a comprehensive analysis of all available sources.

The immediate objectives of the study are to study the political conditions in which V.I. Lenin; studying the history of the creation of each of his texts; analysis of their political content; clarification of the circumstances of the promulgation of the texts of the "Testament" and their use in the course of the inner-party struggle.

The methodological basis of the study is dialectical materialism in an organic combination with the so-called "civilizational approach", which, as the author believes, does not oppose dialectical materialism, but organically combines with it [3].

It is impossible for a historian in the course of his research to abstract from the views, feelings, predilections inherent in him, like any other citizen. In world outlook, ideological, and political terms, the author is also not indifferent. However, in our opinion, a conscious and, if possible, clear delineation of political and scientific interests makes it possible to increase the independence of scientific conclusions from political predilections. This is important, because **deceit in historical science** for the sake of political gain can only give tactical advantages, but predetermines a strategic loss. To achieve strategic goals in the political struggle, it is **necessary to have the most accurate knowledge** of the historical past and an understanding of the laws governing the development of society.

The specific features of the complex of documents under study pose a difficult task for us to establish a conceptual apparatus. In political everyday life and in historiography, no consensus has been developed regarding the name of Lenin's last works. The complex of Lenin's last documents, dictated by him in the period from December 23, 1922 to

the beginning of March 1923, entered the historical science under different names: "Last Letters and Articles", "Political Testament" (or "Testament"). It includes texts published in 1923 and called articles, **regardless of whether Lenin prepared** them for publication or not. These include articles published in January-March 1923 in accordance with his will, "Pages from a Diary", "How We Can Reorganize the Labor Committee (Proposal to the XII Party Congress)" and "Better fewer, But Better", as well as texts presented by N.K. Krupskaya in May 1923 in the Politburo and published in the newspaper Pravda with the titles given by the publishers: "On cooperation", "On our revolution (on the notes of N. Sukhanov)".

Calling these texts "articles", we will use this word in quotation marks to set off the conventionality of the title, which **does not belong to Lenin**, and the purpose and nature of these materials.

The other part of the texts was not published for various reasons: either in view of an official ban, or because the question of their publication was not raised at all.

The former include the dictations of December 24-25, 1922 (the so-called "characteristics") and January 4, 1923 (the "addition" to them), as well as the text known as the notes "On the question of nationalities or on "autonomization"" (other names of these notes are also used in historiography: letter, article).

To the second - dictations on December 26-29, 1922, devoted to the issues of reforming the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (RKI), as well as notes on the State Planning Commission, known as "On giving legislative functions to the State Planning Commission." These texts, which were not published as articles in 1923, are usually called "Letter to the Congress." The set of texts included in this "letter" varies from author to author. Often, under "Letter to the Congress" they mean only the dictations of December 24-25 and January 4. Sometimes it includes all the dictations from December 23 to 31, 1922 (including the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization""). Sometimes notes on the national question are not included in it. Thus, there is no established system in the use of these terms.

Since a number of documents published as articles were not such, they were not letters, but represent primary studies of individual problems, it would be more correct to call this entire set of documents, taking into account the accepted in historiography and well-established terminology, Lenin's last letters, notes, and articles.

At the same time, by "Letter to the Congress" we will mean only the so-called "characteristics" and "addition" to them - texts dated December 24-25, 1922 and January 4, 1923. Using the term "Political testament" ("Testament") and keeping in mind the conventionality of this name, we will have in mind all the texts traditionally considered to be Lenin's, regardless of whether they really belonged to Lenin.

This is justified, since it was under this name that they entered the political life of the country and, as such, influenced the position of the members of the Communist Party, the public consciousness of the Soviet people and world public opinion.

Notes:

[1] Kumanev V.A., Kulikova I.S. Confrontation: Krupskaya - Stalin. M., 1994. S. 58.

[2] Sakharov V.A. Historical legends in the political struggle // Russia in the XX century: The fate of historical science. M., 1996. S. 649-669.

[3] See: Sakharov V.A. Formational and civilizational approaches to the study of the features of the historical development of Russia in the works of K. Marx // Civilizational and formational approaches to the study of national history: theory and methodology (Concrete historical problems). Issue. 4, part 1. M., 1996. S. 110-120.

IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE DURING THE FORMATION OF NEP (1921-1922)

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION OF NEP

Lenin's "Testament" is an organic part of the process of working out the theoretical and political problems of the development of the socialist revolution that arose in connection with the transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP). There was intense discussion about these issues in the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). At the center of it was the problem of the prospects for the socialist revolution in the current foreign and domestic political conditions, the ability of the new economic policy to ensure the development and victory of the revolution. The main front of the struggle was between Lenin and Trotsky. In the historical literature, this stage of their relationship has not been sufficiently developed.

Trotsky spoke with a special position on almost the entire spectrum of the most important political and theoretical issues and proposed his own, different from Lenin's, new economic policy, and an alternative program of action. Representatives of other political forces and party leaders also made their assessments and proposals (the "workers' opposition", N.I. Bukharin and others), but their influence was not strong enough to pose a danger to the Leninist concept of the NEP adopted by the Communist Party. Most of the members of the Politburo—Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev—supported Lenin in this struggle.

In this chapter, we will consider those aspects of the ideological and political struggle that are important for the analysis of the problem of interest to us, since in recent letters, notes and articles by V.I. Lenin, this struggle found its manifestation and continuation.

1. TWO CONCEPTS OF NEP

Overcoming the crisis that followed the civil war was first conceived by the Bolshevik leadership within the framework of the former policy - the so-called "war communism" - and the already adopted tactics of restoring the national economy. It was supposed to raise large-scale industry with the help of withdrawing funds from the countryside, and then begin to transform agriculture with the help and on the basis

of equipment supplied by industry. Changes had to undergo only methods of management and the system of management of the national economy. Such views were developed by V.I. Lenin, for example, in the report of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on foreign and domestic policy at the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December 22, 1920[224] However, attempts to stimulate the work of the peasants, undertaken on the basis of the policy of "war communism", did not create an economic incentive for the development of the peasant economy. The discontent in the village continued to grow. The Soviet government found itself in the face of peasant uprisings, which objectively turned into a counter-revolution in relation to the proletarian socialist revolution.

Lenin, assessing the situation that had arisen, spoke of a "peasant (petty-bourgeois) counter-revolution":

"Such a counter-revolution is already standing against us.", and the fate of the socialist revolution in Russia "will be decided by the struggle, which will take place according to the principle "Who wins?"[225].

To prevent an undesirable development of events, V.I. Lenin proposed a deep tactical maneuver. On February 8, 1921, he submitted a proposal to the Politburo to meet the needs of the working peasantry, for which, firstly, to replace the seizure of bread according to the apportionment with a tax in kind; secondly, to reduce the size of the tax in comparison with the apportionment; thirdly, to introduce incentives for the work of the peasant by lowering the percentage of tax; fourthly, "to expand the freedom of the farmer to use his surplus in excess of the tax in the local economic turnover, provided that the tax is paid promptly and in full"[226]. This was supposed to bring down the wave of counter-revolution, to restore political understanding with the peasantry, establish cooperation with him in the economic field and create political conditions for the continuation of the socialist revolution. Here is the minimum of tasks that were solved by this proposal. The 10th Congress of the RCP(b) accepted Lenin's proposals.

Trotsky challenged Lenin's right to authorship of the NEP [227]. The question of these claims by Trotsky is very important for understanding the depth of the differences between Lenin and Trotsky on the issue of the NEP. At the 11th Congress, Trotsky, for example, said that it was he who proposed "in February 1920, on the eve of the 9th Congress, to switch to the food tax from allotment and to contractual relations in industry" [228]. Trotsky, indeed, at the beginning of 1920, made proposals that in many respects echoed those of Lenin in February 1921, but were not identical to them, as he claimed.

What did Trotsky propose? At the beginning of 1920, when a peaceful respite during the civil war made it possible to bring to the fore questions of economic development, Trotsky proposed to make adjustments in relations with the peasantry. Speaking at a meeting of the Moscow Committee of the RCP (b) on January 6, 1920 with a report "The main tasks and difficulties of economic development", he stated:

"While we have a shortage of bread, the peasant will have to give the Soviet economy a tax in kind in the form of bread under pain of merciless reprisal. The peasant will get used to this in a year and will give bread. We will allocate proletarian units, a hundred or two thousand, to create food bases. And then, having created ... the possibility of a common labor service, as compulsory, with the great importance of the educational factor, we will be able to organize our economy." [229].

As can be seen, in Trotsky's proposal the tax is inscribed in the former system of economic relations and does not play the economic and political role that it had in Lenin's proposals.

In February 1920, Trotsky sent to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) the theses "Basic Questions of Food and Land Policy", in which he developed his proposals:

"The current policy of egalitarian requisitioning according to food standards, mutual responsibility for dumping and egalitarian distribution of industrial products is aimed at lowering agriculture, at

dispersing the industrial proletariat and threatening to completely undermine the economic life of the country." "Food resources threaten to dry up, against which no improvement in the requisitioning apparatus can help. It is possible to fight against such tendencies of economic degradation by the following methods:

1. Replacing the withdrawal of surpluses with a certain percentage deduction (a kind of income-progressive tax in kind) in such a way that a larger plowing or better cultivation of the land still represents a benefit;
2. By establishing a greater ratio between the issuance of industrial products to the peasants and the amount of grain poured by them, not only in volosts and villages, but also in peasant households [230].

"Lenin strongly opposed this proposal," writes Trotsky. — It was rejected in the Central Committee by eleven votes to four;

"As the further course of things showed, the decision of the Central Committee was erroneous", "the transition to market relations was rejected", "the economy was at an impasse for a whole year after that"[231].

The last statement is, of course, true. But Trotsky obscures the fundamental difference between his own and Lenin's proposals. The proposals of Trotsky and Lenin have only one thing in common - a tax instead of a surplus appropriation. But in the NEP, it is not only the tax that is important, but also how it is built into the economic system: in allowing trade. In Trotsky there is not even a hint of the market, while in Lenin his assumption is the essence of the new economic policy. Trotsky's proposal refers to the "issuance" of industrial products to the peasants and there are no hints of "market relations". Trotsky's "innovation" boils down to using the tax for economic stimulation, first of all, of the kulak, whose economy could more quickly and to a greater extent satisfy the conditions proposed by Trotsky, and not only be able to pay a lower tax, but also be encouraged by a large number of manufactured goods. The farms of the middle and poor peasants could not seriously compete with the

kulak. Trotsky's proposals thus led to the stimulation of the kulak, the enemy of Soviet power, at the expense of the poor and middle peasants, which could not but complicate their relations with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, if the Leninist NEP led to the expansion of the social base of the socialist revolution, then Trotsky's proposals led to its narrowing.

Significant for Trotsky's position is the letter he sent to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) a year later, in February 1921,[232] at the same time that Lenin made his proposals on the New Economic Policy. Ascertaining the crisis and the poor performance of the economic apparatus, Trotsky saw a way out of this situation in the reorganization of the management system and in the strengthening of planning principles in the national economy, like a year ago, he did not see the problem of interclass relations, did not believe that something should be radically changed in them. With Lenin, this is the main thing, and administration only ensures the success of the new policy.

These differences made themselves fully felt in the course of the development of the general idea and the creation of an appropriate economic mechanism for it, as well as in assessing the possibilities of the NEP to ensure the successful development of the socialist revolution.

Soviet historiography shied away from comparing them, and as a result, the question of the existence of various models of the NEP, which were proposed by Lenin and his political opponents in the party, primarily Trotsky, escaped its attention. As a result, the internal party struggle of the early 1920s was greatly impoverished and distorted.

N.A. Vasetsky, pointing out the existence of serious differences in the views of Lenin and Trotsky on the NEP, at the same time believes that "in principle, Lenin agreed with Trotsky"[233]. This statement cannot be accepted. The situation is more complicated: a number of fundamental issues of the NEP were interpreted by them in the same

way, and a number of others differently, so it is impossible to bring a common denominator under their views.

Trotsky accepted Lenin's proposals for a transition to a tax in kind and voted for them at the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b). This is understandable: Lenin's proposals, although not identical to his own, went in the same direction and pursued one goal - strengthening the economic and political positions of the Soviet government, overcoming the political opposition to the power of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. During this period, their views on the NEP still had a lot in common.

The NEP, as Lenin saw it in the spring of 1921, included some of the fundamental ideas formulated by him in the spring of 1918 (hence his repeated references to the continuity of the NEP and the policy of 1918), adjusted so as to make it acceptable to the peasantry and aim for the restoration of agriculture. In the Trotskyist interpretation, the NEP is largely Lenin's program for the spring of 1918[234], adjusted by his own proposals (February 1920, February 1921) in order to ensure the priority and rapid restoration of large-scale industry, without stopping before a violent confrontation with the peasantry. Hence the coincidence of Trotsky's views and assessments with Lenin's in the interpretation of many important problems of the NEP.

However, since Lenin and Trotsky disagreed on issues relating to the essence of the NEP, over time, the differences between them grew. It is significant that in his comments on Lenin's theses on the role and tasks of trade unions under the NEP, written a year after the adoption of the NEP (January 8, 1922), Trotsky argued that "the new economic policy consists, on the one hand, in restoring the market as foundations of purely capitalist forms of economy. On the other hand, in the use of market forms of exchange, calculation and accounting for the development and self-testing of the socialist economy. He emphasizes that we are talking about "forms and norms of relationships created by capitalism" [235]. Thus, speaking about the content of the NEP, Trotsky did not identify the problems of the peasantry in any way, either in social, or in political, or in economic aspects. Only in this: to find a link between the new economy, which

we are creating with enormous efforts, and the peasant economy" [236]. There is practically nothing in common between the views of Lenin and Trotsky on the essence of the NEP.

Different understanding of the essence of the NEP is associated with a different understanding of its purpose. For Lenin, the NEP is a class maneuver, a desire to change the movement of the revolution in such a way as to take into account both the new conditions and the accumulated political experience, in order to better rely on real opportunities, an attempt to draw the peasantry into the channel of the socialist revolution, gradually transforming its socio-economic nature. Since the dictatorship of the proletariat failed to adapt the peasant economy to its requirements, now it is precisely it, as the party more capable of maneuvering and adapting, that must take the initiative and adapt the state sector of the economy to the peasant economy in order to later be able to gradually transform the petty-bourgeois peasant economy into a socialist one. [237]. Trotsky, on the other hand, insisted on maintaining the old tactics, which assumed the adaptation of the peasant economy to the needs of large-scale industry [238]. In fact, he saw in the NEP a more effective form of exploitation by the socialist sector of the petty-bourgeois countryside and the capitalist sector.

If Lenin has a clearly expressed "peasant" orientation of the NEP, then Trotsky (and the "workers' opposition") have an "urban" one. Therefore, the NEP as a retreat in the system of views of Lenin and Trotsky is also read quite differently. For Lenin, a retreat is a tactical maneuver towards a strategic ally. And with Trotsky, there is a retreat from the methods of economic management characteristic of socialism, a corresponding strengthening of bourgeois elements and relations in society, threatening the degeneration of the revolution.

The different interpretations of the NEP by Lenin and Trotsky are clearly visible in the question of the tactics of restoring the national economy.

Before the transition to the NEP, there were no serious disagreements regarding the tactics of restoring the national economy. It was taken

for granted that, first of all, large-scale industry should be restored as the basis of the socialist economy, and only then should the technical reconstruction of agriculture be carried out. But even Lenin's first sentence (February 8, 1921) actually contained the recognition of the need and inevitability of a change in tactics - the priority restoration of agriculture as a completely urgent task, in the solution of which large-scale industry could not immediately help. The time has come to adopt a new tactic for the restoration of the national economy, in which the restoration of industry follows the restoration of agriculture and does not precede it.

Lenin called for abandoning the previous plan for restoring the national economy, which was correct in principle, but unrealistic in the real conditions of the early 1920s[239]. In the draft decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee "Order of the STO (Council of Labor and Defense) to local Soviet institutions" (May 1921), Lenin defines the priorities in the restoration of the national economy as follows:

"The primary task of the Soviet Republic is the restoration of productive forces, the rise of agriculture, industry and transport" [240].

As you can see, among the main tasks, he puts the restoration of agriculture in the first place. Accordingly, the "measure of economic success" was also determined, first of all, the success of collecting agricultural tax, then the success of trade and product exchange, the turnover between agriculture and industry. Here Lenin actually disputes the assessments and proposals made by Trotsky [241].

Trotsky insisted on maintaining the old tactics: first, the peasantry must pay for the restoration of large-scale industry, which would then return this debt to the peasantry, providing it with its products. On August 7, 1921, he proposed to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) "Theses on the implementation of the principles of a new economic policy", in which, in particular, he wrote:

“Under the new course, as under the old one, the main task is to restore and strengthen the major nationalized industry” [242] (see Appendix No. 3).

The Plenum did not support Trotsky's proposals. For Lenin, the interests of the immediate normalization of relations with the peasantry determined the meaning and real content of the NEP, were the reason for the transition to it and its justification as a means of saving the revolution from death and providing it with the opportunity to develop further with the hope of success. And for Trotsky, the normalization of relations with the peasantry, the satisfaction of its economic interests should have been the result of a long process of restoration of large-scale industry.

Lenin actually entered into a polemic with Trotsky. In the article “On the Significance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism” (November 1921), which had programmatic significance, he wrote:

“Let us restore large-scale industry and organize its direct exchange of products with small peasant landownership, helping to socialize it. In order to restore large-scale industry, we will borrow a certain amount of food and raw materials from the peasants through apportionment. This is the plan (or method, system) we carried out for over three years, until the spring of 1921. It was a revolutionary approach to the task in the sense of a direct and complete destruction of the old in order to replace it with a new socio-economic structure.

The transition to the NEP meant that “we are replacing this approach, plan, method, system of actions ... with a completely different ...of the old socio-economic order, trade, small farming, small business, capitalism, but to revive trade, small business, capitalism, carefully and gradually mastering them or getting the possibility of their state regulation only to the extent of their revival. And on this basis to raise the industry. “A completely different approach to the problem” [243].

From a different understanding of the essence and purpose of the NEP, from different ideas about the tactics of restoring the national economy, Lenin and Trotsky disagreed on the role and place of the plan and the market, on the corresponding restructuring of the economic mechanism. If agriculture was to be restored in the first place, then, naturally, planning would lose its former importance, its scope would shrink, and tasks would change. The role of market levers in the economy, on the contrary, increased to the extent that it was required to revive agricultural production and establish an economic bond between town and countryside. If large-scale nationalized industry was restored first of all, then the methods of directive planning retained their significance, and not only because that this was required by the task of distributing raw materials (including agricultural), but also (mainly) by the task of subordinating the work of all sectors of the national economy to the interests of the work of large-scale industry. The problem of combining planned and market methods of managing the national economy placed the State Planning Commission, its tasks, methods of work and organization at the center of the discussion.

It is known that Lenin highly appreciated the GOELRO plan - a long-term plan for the development of the country, calling it the second program of the party [244]. Regarding operational planning, he believed that in the conditions of granting economic independence to industrial enterprises and the use of market, capitalist methods by them, the role of planned control levers would inevitably be reduced.

In accordance with the new economic conditions, he proposed to rebuild the State Planning Commission. From the body of operational planning, as it was originally conceived, after the transition to the NEP, with the active participation of Lenin [245], it began to turn into an expert commission under the Council of Labor and Defense (STO), which was a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, which was given a central place in management national economy [246].

Lenin demands when planning "the foundations of a nationwide economic plan for the next period, a year or two", take "foodstuffs",

which limits the development of other industries, “as a starting point”, and “pay special attention to the industry that provides items suitable for exchange for bread” [247].

Trotsky demanded that the plan be structured differently, so that it would ensure the priority development of large-scale industry. Trotsky rated the GOELRO plan very low, denying it precisely as a plan. Soon after the adoption of the GOELRO plan by the VIII Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR, in February 1921, he wrote to the Central Committee of the RCP (b):

“Delegates from all of Russia receive in the Moscow Center in the form of a thorough economic plan the “idea” of electrification for 10 years, and then, when they go home, they have to make sure that we do not have enough fuel for the next 10 months, but for the next 10 days, and the center did not warn anyone about it” [248].

Trotsky was against the transformation of the State Planning Commission from an organ of operational planning into an advisory body, not entitled to make final decisions, into a commission of experts working on instructions from the government. Trotsky thus insisted on restructuring the existing economic mechanism in accordance with his ideas about the NEP. He launched an attack on the entire system of government, proposing to eliminate the Central Committee of the party from participating in solving economic issues, and to withdraw the solution of current issues from the jurisdiction of the STO, in which Lenin presided, and to concentrate both promising and current issues of development of the national economy in the State Planning Commission.

Prior to the introduction of the NEP, Trotsky recognized that SRT must ensure “a systematic, correct, vigilant coordination of economic work in its main factors”[249]. Now, in his theses on the implementation of the beginnings of the New Economic Policy (August 7, 1921), he proposed a variant of the reorganization of the economic mechanism, in which the role of the “real economic political center” was no longer to be played by the STO, but by the State

Planning Committee, which should develop a state plan and ensure its implementation "from the point of view of large state industry." Trotsky wrote that the State Planning Commission "is subject to complete reconstruction in terms of the composition and methods of work; the economic plan must be built around large-scale industry as a pivot ... Whoever practically directs industrial life must ideologically, organizationally direct the development, verification, regulation of the implementation of the economic plan from day to day, from hour to hour" [250] (see Appendix No. 3).

Such a formulation of the question can be fully regarded as a request that this work be entrusted to him, Trotsky, as the author of this project. On August 9, 1921, members of the Politburo assessed Trotsky's actions in precisely this way:

"Comrade Trotsky actually placed himself before the party in such a position that ... the party must provide comrade Trotsky an actual dictatorship in the field of economy" [251].

The plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) rejected Trotsky's proposals and adopted the draft "Theses on the implementation of the principles of the new economic policy", prepared in June-July 1921 in the Supreme Council of National Economy, the Council of People's Commissars, and the Central Committee of the RCP(b) under the leadership and with the active participation of Lenin [252]. On the same day, the theses were approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR as "Instruction of the Council of People's Commissars on the implementation of the principles of the New Economic Policy"[253].

Trotsky retained his adherence to these views later. This was manifested in a very sharp clash in the spring of 1922 during the discussion of Lenin's proposal to improve the work of the STO of the RSFSR. At this time, Lenin had already created a management system that fully corresponded to the new economic policy. Lenin responded to the demands of the supporters of further restructuring (Trotsky was among them) with criticism of the perestroika itch and explained that the existing mechanism needed not to be restructured, but to be improved [254]. He associated the latter with the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (RKI), which determined its special position in

the system of state authorities. The NEP forced in many respects to take a fresh approach to the question of the work of RCT and to think about its reorganization. Lenin proposed reorganizing the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection "in the direction of combating bureaucracy and red tape, improving the conditions of workers and peasants, and attracting non-party people to Soviet work"[255]. Trotsky opposed. The front of struggle on the issues of reorganization of the management system has expanded even more.

Immediately after the XI Congress of the RCP (b), at the beginning of April 1922, Lenin submitted to the Politburo the "Draft Resolution on the Work of the Deputies of the Pred SNK and STO", which contained proposals for the redistribution of work between the Chairman of the STO and his deputies, which, according to Lenin, was supposed to improve the work of the service station and ensure that it fulfills its tasks [256].

Trotsky replied on April 18 with a letter sharply criticizing the existing system of government and the measures proposed by Lenin.

"The tasks set are so universal that it is tantamount to as if no tasks were set. The deputies must strive for everything to be good in all spheres and in all respects—that is what the draft resolution boils down to. The points give, as it were, some semblance of indications on how to achieve that everything and everywhere is good. "The Rabkrin is indicated as the apparatus for the implementation of these universal tasks. Meanwhile, in its essence, the Rabkrin is not suitable for this and cannot become suitable ... And most importantly, I still don't see the body that actually directs economic work from day to day ... There must be an institution on the wall of which hangs an economic a calendar for the year ahead, an institution that foresees and agrees in order of foresight. Such an institution should be the State Planning Commission" [257].

On April 19, Trotsky sent an addendum to this letter, in which, assessing Lenin's plans for establishing the work of the state apparatus as utopian, he threw an accusation against Lenin himself:

“We need a system at work. Meanwhile, an example of unsystematic- and this is the most important and most dangerous thing - it comes from above. All economic and organizational issues are resolved hastily and always later than necessary.”

On May 5, 1922, Lenin responded with such a sharp attack against Trotsky, which he had not done for a long time in his address or in the address of any member of the Politburo:

“Comrade Trotsky’s remarks are partly also vague... and do not require an answer, partly they renew our old disagreements with Comrade Trotsky, which have already been observed many times in the Politburo. I will briefly answer them on two main points: a) Rabkrin and b) Gosplan.

a) Comrade Trotsky is fundamentally wrong about the Rabkrin. With our desperate "departmentalism" even among the best communists, with a low level of employees, with intra-departmental intrigue (worse than any Rabkrinovsky), it is impossible to do without the Rabkrin now. We can and must work systematically and persistently on it in order to turn it into an apparatus for checking and improving all state work. Otherwise, there is no practical means to check, improve, teach work...

b) Comrade Trotsky is not only fundamentally wrong about the State Planning Commission, but he is also strikingly unaware of what he is judging. Gosplan not only does not suffer from academicism, but, on the contrary, suffers from congestion from too small, topical "vermicelli". [259]

Lenin confirmed this reproach with statistics characterizing the work of the State Planning Commission.

On Trotsky’s second letter, Lenin responded as follows:

“Comrade Trotsky’s second paper ... contains, firstly, an extremely excited, but deeply incorrect “criticism” ... secondly,

this paper contains the same, in fundamentally wrong and diametrically opposed to the truth, accusations of State Planning Committee in academicism, accusations that reaching to the next, downright unbelievable due to ignorance, Comrade Trotsky's statement that State Planning Committee "has nothing to do" with the distribution of funds between departments. The State Planning Commission has a financial and economic section that works precisely on these issues" [260].

Lenin did not hope to convince Trotsky and, apparently, was not bothered by his objections. He continued to work on his project, as evidenced by numerous documents from the second half of 1922.

On November 2, 1922, V.I. Lenin discussed the problems of reorganizing the RCT with I.V. Stalin and L.B. Kamenev; based on the results of this conversation, he formulated his proposals in the directive of A.D. Tsyurupa, who, as deputy chairman of the STO, was instructed to work out specific issues within the framework of the general installation:

"Make it (i.e. NC RCT. - BC) strong and independent while maintaining the same functions plus normalization" (i.e., problems of labor rationing . - V. S.) [261].

In accordance with this attitude, Tsyurupa began to prepare practical proposals, which he informed Rykov in a letter (copy to Lenin, Stalin, Kamenev).

Trotsky bent his line: in a letter dated December 13, addressed to Lenin, Kamenev, Rykov, Tsyurupa, Pyatakov, Stalin, he wrote:

"Under the conditions of a market economy, the "workers' and peasants' inspection" is absolute and unconditional nonsense, and accounting is everything. Now the workers' and peasants' inspectorate is the workers' and peasants' market. This inspection is solid, business-like, not deceitful. It is only necessary to be able to write down the conclusions of this inspection, that is, to

calculate the expense and income and deduce the loss or profit” [262].

Of course, the RCT could not control the movement of all funds and goods on the market and thus influence the work of the apparatus, trade, and manufacturing enterprises. But it is also true that the “workers’ and peasants’ market” cannot check the work of accountants or officials at their workplaces and thus increase the efficiency of the apparatus as a whole and in its individual parts. This (Trotsky’s comment) is a resonant but empty phrase.

In a letter to the Central Committee dated January 20, 1923, Trotsky agreed to “attach serious importance to the Workers’ and Peasants’ Committee,” “of course, not as a universal educator of the entire population, but as Soviet state control” [263]. In those very days, Lenin was completing his work on his article “How We Should Reorganize the Rabkrin” — on the reorganization of the RKI and its merger with the Central Control Commission in order to improve the state apparatus and its work, identify capable personnel, select, and deploy them, which is both conceptually and in particular its provisions opposed Trotsky.

The disagreements between Lenin and Trotsky on the questions of the State Planning Commission and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection were closely connected with deeper contradictions - on the questions of the place and role of the Communist Party in the system of government.

After the transition to the NEP, the problem of separating the functions of the party and economic bodies in the management of the national economy became the focus of attention. The party’s substitution of Soviet organs led not only to the weakening of the state, but also confronted it with tasks that, due to their nature and gigantic volume, could not be solved by the party’s forces. It was clear. On the other hand, a clear separation of the functions and spheres of activity of the party and the state would inevitably lead to the restriction of the party to questions of ideology and would weaken its position in the political system, and, consequently, its ability to

effectively influence the state of affairs in the country, would make it impossible to implement the program of socialist transformations.

At first, party leadership was thought to be exercised through communist factions in the soviets, through communists working in responsible positions, through party organizations. By the end of the civil war, in connection with the crisis of the former system of government and the prominence of questions of the restoration of the national economy, the differences between Lenin and Trotsky on these issues took on a sharp form in the course of the discussion about trade unions. Some believed that the party should limit itself to the development of a political line and ideological work. Trotsky also belonged to them. Others believed that the party, in addition, should have a leading position in all spheres of the state and public life of the country, including the economy. This point of view was supported by Lenin and his supporters. At the 10th Party Congress, which summed up this discussion, Lenin's point of view prevailed. Experience has shown that these measures did not solve the problem.

Obviously, therefore, after the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b), Lenin began to nurture the idea that the delimitation of the functions of the party and the state should be balanced by a certain connection, a merger of the party and state apparatus, party, and state functions. The fact is that the task of improving the quality of decisions made required an ever-greater concentration of real power in the hands of economic bodies that were under the strong influence of specialists, most of whom did not share the ideas of the socialist revolution and could use this influence for the detriment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin said that the main thing in the NEP was politics, not economics, which was designed to ensure the achievement of the desired political result. Naturally, that in this case, the political leadership should have been retained and strengthened the leading position in solving all problems in the management of the country's economy. Consequently, the RCP(b) had to play a crucial role not only in the development but also in the implementation of economic policy.

Trotsky took a different view. He continued to argue for the clearest and most definite delimitation of the functions of party and state

bodies, for the transfer of all management functions into the hands of specialists who, to a large extent, were hostile to the Soviet regime and did not share its political plans. He began his attack on the role of the party by criticizing the work of the Politburo, which, according to him,

“decided in one meeting ten or twelve of the most important practical economic issues, without the slightest preparation, after ten minutes of discussion, by ear, by eye” [264]

The problems in the work of the Politburo were indeed great, and the organization of its work left much to be desired. But they could be solved in different ways - by fundamentally restructuring the entire system, as Trotsky insisted, or within the framework of its preservation.

Supporters of different views were preparing for a struggle over the question of delimiting the functions of the party and the state at the forthcoming XI Congress of the RCP(b). The Politburo instructed Zinoviev to prepare a draft thesis "On the Strengthening of the Party". On March 9, Lenin approved them, and Stalin and Kamenev, in a letter dated March 10, 1922, suggested that "we wait with Zinoviev's theses," since "in our opinion, they are insufficient and need to be supplemented." In particular, they considered it necessary to "establish as accurately as possible the difference between Party and Soviet institutions, determine the scope of work of the first and second, obliging party institutions to refrain from administrative orders in the field of Soviet work," and also "to recognize as expedient the distribution of functions between individual branches of the Party-Soviet trade union work, minimizing the frequent redeployment of party workers"[265].

On the same day, the Central Committee received a letter from Trotsky, in which he noted that the question of delimiting the functions of the party and the state, which is one of the most important, was bypassed in Zinoviev's theses, and its raising in connection with economic work and the proposed solution "pushed on the wrong path ". "Unless the party is freed as a party from the functions of direct management and control, it is impossible to cleanse

the party of bureaucracy, and the economy of licentiousness. Such a "policy", when questions about the sowing campaign, about leasing or not leasing the plant, are resolved in passing at meetings of the provincial committee, is pernicious."

Trotsky proposed to deprive party organs of the right to interfere in economic work in the same way that trade unions were deprived of this right. The NEP demands that "trade unions be trade unions" and "a party be a party". The Party must ensure "sustainable leadership" of economic bodies and give them "the opportunity to select workers, educate them without random and incompetent intrusions from outside." It "explains to the working masses the importance and significance of commercial transactions as a method of socialist construction... fights against prejudices that hinder the proper development of economic activity... fights against attempts to use the New Economic Policy to instill bourgeois morals in the Communist Party itself... firmly establishes what is possible and what is not. But the party does not direct commercial operations. The Party does not educate for economic activity, and in particular for commercial activity, because it is incapable of this... At the same time, the Party is concentrating to a much greater extent than before, their attention on the theoretical education of party youth" [266].

Let us sum up Trotsky's proposals:

it is necessary to carry out rigidly the division of labor on a functional basis. The party, like the trade unions, must completely withdraw from the management of the economy and the selection of personnel. Its functions are ideology and education. The entire economy, including the question of personnel appointments, is being handed over to non-Party specialists. In fact, it is recognized that the party cannot nominate personnel from its midst who are capable of leading the economy, as well as integrating a part of specialists into its ranks. Behind it remains control, actually turned into a fiction.

On March 21, Lenin notified Stalin and Kamenev by letter of his intention to write a letter to the Plenum of the Central Committee and

outline in it the plan of his report at the forthcoming congress. In particular, he reported on how he intended to respond to Trotsky's proposals. "I will refer to Trotsky's letter: basically, I'm for it" [267]. This "de- «де» " is the whole point. It speaks of Lenin's true attitude towards Trotsky's proposal. He fulfilled his intention on March 24 in a letter to Molotov for the Plenum of the Central Committee, in which he so generally formulated his position, which apparently did not contradict Trotsky:

"it is necessary to distinguish much more precisely the functions of the party (and its Central Committee) and the Soviet power; to increase the responsibility and independence of the co-workers and co-institutions, and to leave to the party the overall direction of the work of all state agencies together, without the present too frequent, irregular, often petty interference" [268].

At the XI Congress of the Party, Trotsky, Preobrazhensky, Osinsky criticized Lenin, against the existing system of government [269]. Trotsky declared:

"The ruling party does not mean at all the party directly managing all the details of the matter" [270].

There is a clear exaggeration in these words: the RCP(b) never managed "all the details of the case", if only because it was practically impossible. The main direction ("nail") of all party work, Trotsky believed, was the education of the younger generation. He assessed this work as a matter of life and death for the Soviet government, since young people do not have the social experience of the older generation, and this shortcoming, in his opinion, could only be filled with theoretical work. Consequently, according to Trotsky, the task of ensuring the tomorrow of the revolution had to be solved by the party by pedagogical methods, which is doubtful, because life experience cannot be replaced by theoretical study. Having taken this position, Trotsky also retreats from the well-known thesis of Marxism that being determines consciousness.

In speeches at the congress, Lenin reduced the matter to the fact that the combination of the functions of the party and state went through him, and he connected the failures and shortcomings that took place with his illness, which tore him away from everyday work, as well as with the insufficiently organized work of his deputies, Stalin's workload [271]. About the main thing, Lenin said, as it were, casually, but quite definitely. Recognizing that with all sorts of issues that should be considered in the Council of People's Commissars and the STO, they go to the Politburo, he noted that this cannot be formally banned, since the ruling party and any decision can be appealed to the Central Committee. Lenin did not propose to break this order, he only proposed to free the Politburo and the Central Committee from trifles, for which purpose to increase the responsibility of Soviet workers, primarily people's commissars, to reduce the number of commissions of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO, accordingly expand the activities of regional economic conferences (ECOSO), as well as increase the duration of the sessions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee so that its work becomes more systematic [272].

Preobrazhensky made specific organizational proposals aimed at withdrawing economic questions from the Politburo. He proposed, along with the Politburo and the Orgburo, to create an Economic Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)[273]. Lenin rejected this proposal on the grounds that it was impossible to separate political and economic issues, and at the same time criticized the desire for endless restructuring of the apparatus, which could well have been addressed to Trotsky [274].

Lenin approached this problem differently. He saw the main task in the selection and placement of personnel. As for the class education of the younger generation, it takes place in the process of socialist construction. Trotsky's position is understandable: if the revolution is not yet socialist, but only moves in the direction of socialism, then, naturally, one will not learn socialism in the course of it. Lenin's assessment is also understandable: the construction of socialism is already underway, in the practice of this construction people cannot but learn socialism. Hence the thesis about the trade unions as a "school of communism", hence the difference in the formulation of the

question of education. Lenin called for learning in the process of work and without interrupting it, while Trotsky considered the combination of work and study impossible and demanded that they be separated - either work or study [275].

This particular issue reveals the fundamentally different views of Lenin and Trotsky on the Russian revolution.

The 11th Congress of the RCP(b) supported Lenin and adopted decisions that would strengthen the position of the party in all spheres of state activity, including economic management. The principle of the division of labor between the party and the state proposed by Lenin, which did not detract from the leading role of the party, was enshrined in the resolutions; "According to the report of the Central Committee" and "On the strengthening and new tasks of the party" [276].

* Evaluation of the NEP as a concession to the peasant. Evaluation of the NEP not as a return to capitalism, but as a specific method of using the methods of capitalism in the interests of the socialist revolution. Recognition of the decisive importance of commanding heights for determining the measure of concessions to anti-socialist forces. Recognition of the possibility of abandoning the NEP and returning to product exchange in the event of revolutions in other countries and the need to abandon it in the event of war. In recognition of the fact that the NEP does not abolish the party program, but only introduces serious changes in the methods of work. Recognition of the international significance of the NEP as a policy necessary as a transitional one on the path to the socialist organization of production. Recognition of the NEP as a tactical maneuver, etc. (See: Eleventh Congress of the RKB(b). March-April 1922. Verbatim report. S. 130, 133, 135-136; Vasetsky N.A. Trotsky. The experience of political biography. pp. 168-170, 186).

Notes:

[224] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 42. S. 148, 150–151, 155–156.

[225] Ibid. T. 43. S. 371.

[226] Ibid. T. 42. S. 333.

[227] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. S. 174; Trotsky L. My life. Autobiographical experience. T. 2. M., 1990. S. 195–199.

[228] See: Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). March-April 1922 Stenograph. report. M., 1961. S. 270.

[229] Trotsky L.D. The main tasks and difficulties of economic construction. From a report at a meeting of the Moscow Committee of the RCP(b). January 6, 1920 // On the history of the Russian revolution. M., 1990. S. 160-161.

[230] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. S. 174; Trotsky L. My life. Autobiographical experience. T. 2. M., 1990. S. 198–199; Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. pp. 793–794.

[231] Trotsky L. My life. Autobiographical experience. T. 2. S. 199.

[232] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 21. L. 9–12.

[233] See: Vasetsky N.A. Trotsky. The experience of political biography. M., 1992. S. 172, 186.

[234] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. pp. 128–129.

[235] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 17. L. 41.

[236] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 75.

[237] Ibid. pp. 77-78.

[238] Trotsky's archive. Communist opposition in the USSR. 1923–1927. M., 1990. T. 1. S. 16.

[239] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 43. S. 151, 153–155, 351–352, 354, 357.

[240] Ibid. S. 266.

[241] Ibid. S. 357.

[242] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 88. L. 1, 2, 5.

[243] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 222.

[244] Ibid. T. 42. S. 157; T. 45. S. 51–52.

[245] Ibid. T. 43. S. 260–263.

[246] Ibid. T. 42. S. 155–156.

[247] Ibid. T. 43. S. 263.

[248] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 21. L. 9, 10.

[249] Ibid. L. 12.

[250] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 88. L. 1, 2, 5. See also: Trotsky Archive. Communist opposition in the USSR. 1923–1927 T. 1. S. 16–17.

[251] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 7. S. 179.

[252] RGASPI. F. 7. Op. 2. D. 70. L. 1; Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 73, 537–538.

[253] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 538.

[254] Ibid. T. 54, pp. 131–133.

[255] Ibid. T. 43. S. 410.

[256] Ibid. T. 45. S. 152–159.

[257] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 44–45.

[258] Ibid. L. 47.

[259] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 180–181.

[260] Ibid. pp. 181–182.

- [261] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2662. L. 100–104.
- [262] Ibid. D. 1406. L. 14; F. 325. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 72.
- [263] Trotsky's archive. Communist opposition in the USSR. T. 1 S. 13.
- [264] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 307. L. 3; Trotsky archive. Communist opposition in the USSR. T. 1. S. 14.
- [265] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 24.
- [266] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 50. L. 35–38.
- [267] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 57, 511.
- [268] Ibid. S. 61.
- [269] Eleventh Congress of the RCP (b). Stenographer. report. pp. 83 - 85, 87, 88, 133, 134.
- [270] Ibid. S. 134.
- [271] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45, pp. 103–104, 113–114, 122.
- [272] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 115–116.
- [273] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. S. 85.
- [274] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 121–122.
- [275] Eleventh Congress of the RCP (b). Stenographer. report. S. 134.
- [276] Ibid. pp. 481–482, 507–509; CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences, and plenums of the Central Committee. Ed. 9th. T. 2. M., 1983. S. 481, 501–509; T. 3. M 1984. S. 95.

2. THE FIRST CRISIS OF THE NEP

The original version of the NEP proceeded from the fact that the retreat in the economy as a whole would be limited: from the use of methods characteristic of the socialist economy (the plan, the absence of commodity-money relations, etc.), the Soviet government would switch to the widespread use of state capitalism [277].

State capitalism in bourgeois society is represented by enterprises belonging to the state, which acts as an aggregate capitalist, and the enterprises themselves are an organic part of the capitalist economy, a sector of its. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the situation changes. State capitalism is represented by enterprises owned by the state but leased to domestic (NEPmen) or foreign (concession) capitalists, cooperation of small commodity producers, as well as those through which the state has to enter into economic relations with the world capitalist market, for example, to exercise a monopoly foreign trade [278]. All other enterprises that remained under the control of the Soviet state, Lenin considered socialist. That is, state capitalism under the dictatorship of the proletariat is a socio-economic structure.

But this did not end the characterization of state capitalism under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Based on the ideas expressed by K. Marx and F. Engels, V.I. Lenin developed a view of state capitalism as a "kind of redemption" by the proletariat, which had taken political power into its own hands, of the economy from those capitalists who were ready to cooperate with the dictatorship of the proletariat on the condition of turning them into specialists. This made it possible to "intercept" enterprises from the capitalists on the go without stopping or destroying production [279]. State capitalism was assigned an important role in the social transformation of the petty-bourgeois strata (artisans, merchants, peasants), who, unlike the proletariat, capable of directly passing from capitalism to socialism, pass from capitalism to socialism through state capitalism [280], which acts as a means, a means of curbing the petty-bourgeois elements (grain monopoly, cooperation, controlled private capital) [281].

Thus, according to Lenin, state capitalism is such a socio-economic structure of a society that has begun socialist transformations, which is capable of transforming the private capitalist, petty-bourgeois and patriarchal structures into a socialist one. Thanks to this ability, state capitalism also acts as a method used by the dictatorship of the proletariat to carry out socialist transformations of the economy and society.

Forced by the conditions of the civil war, the nationalization of industry, railway and water transport made state capitalism both as a socio-economic structure and as a specific method of socialist construction unnecessary. But with the transition to the NEP, state capitalism again gained relevance. At this time, Lenin was interested, firstly, in his nature, which made it possible to ensure this socio-economic evolution of the non-proletarian strata of the population, and secondly, in the practical issues of the development of state-capitalist enterprises (monopoly of foreign trade, cooperation, concessions, rent, etc.) and, finally, thirdly, the problem of their transformation into socialist [282]. Lenin's concept of state capitalism made it possible to see the prospects for the growth of the socialist sector under the NEP and to build up the socialist sector of the economy.

In the autumn of 1921, it became clear that the concession made was insufficient, that the elements of capitalist relations could not be kept within the framework of state capitalism, and that economic life was overflowing beyond the limits set for it. It was necessary to recognize what happened – freedom of trade, the possibility of admitting which was categorically denied in the spring of 1921.

A choice had to be made: to retreat further or to fight on previously occupied positions. Since Lenin connected the salvation of the revolution with the relations between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry [283], this determined his attitude towards further events: he proposed to retreat further. However, the prospect of new concessions increased the party's skepticism about the possibility of the new economic policy to serve the victory of the socialist revolution. The time has come for a deeper understanding of

the entire experience of the revolution, ideas about the ways and methods of building socialism.

Lenin devoted his most important public speeches of late 1921 and early 1922 to justifying the need for a new retreat, explaining its political meaning, and identifying economic opportunities. In them, he reassessed the entire experience of socialist construction. At the same time, he focused not so much on the forced devastation of the nature of the NEP, but on the fact that it manifested a de facto recognition of the fallacy of previous ideas about the process of development of the socialist revolution.

On October 17, 1921, speaking with a report "The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Enlightenment" at the Second All-Russian Congress of Political Enlightenment, Lenin recognized that capitalism had been restored to a large extent, that for the sake of the survival of the Republic, capitalism must be given the opportunity to develop, it would have to be allowed to strengthen, that the limits retreats are not yet known. This puts the revolution before new tasks, for which the communists are not ready, because they do not know how to manage, that this must be learned from the capitalists and, having learned from them, defeat them with their own weapons [284]. Although Lenin expressed complete confidence in the victory of the revolution, in the sufficiency of the state's political and economic levers, the future is by no means painted in bright colors. Under these conditions, Lenin admitted, "teaching cannot but be severe – on pain of death." "We must remember that we must either have the greatest exertion of strength in daily labor, or inevitable death awaits us" [285]. The most difficult war had just ended, in which, it seemed, the question "to be or not to be" had already been removed, during a policy was found and tested that fully corresponded to Marxist theory. And now, it appears, all it is necessary to begin all over again. Lenin noted that under these conditions "inevitably... some people... fall into a very sour, almost panicky state, and on the occasion of a retreat, these people will begin to indulge in a panic mood"[286]. Lenin's speech at the congress of political enlightenment made a painful impression on many members of the party. After all, quite recently at the X All-Russian Party Conference (May 1921), at the III

Congress of the Comintern (June-July 1921), he expressed the idea that the NEP was needed only for the period until a new upsurge in the world revolution, which was expected in the coming years [287]. October 27 G.I. Petrovsky, by direct wire from Kharkov, informed Stalin:

"In Kharkov ... V.I. Lenin caused a feeling of despondency among the workers, like a speech that is losing ground," and asked for "an explanation from Vl[adimir] Ilyich, otherwise the Central Committee of the Communist Party [of the country] is in a confused state." Sending this text to Lenin, Stalin expressed his opinion:

"C. Lenin. I read it and I think that it is necessary to soften the form a little (I mean the future speech at the Moscow conference)" [288].

Speaking at the 7th Moscow Provincial Party Conference on October 29, 1921, Lenin admitted:

"The exchange of goods has failed: it has failed in the sense that it resulted in purchase and sale ... the private market turned out to be stronger than us, and instead of commodity circulation, ordinary purchase and sale, trade »[289].

He proposed to retreat once again, this time from state capitalism to state regulation of buying and selling and money circulation. Lenin considered this path "longer, but more durable, and now the only possible one for us" and, in spite of everything, quite acceptable since it could ensure the possibility of restoring large-scale industry [290].

At the same time, Lenin, apparently, took into account the reaction to his previous speech and heeded Stalin's advice. Frank recognition of past and new mistakes Lenin compensated for by a more detailed justification of the possibility of overcoming the difficulties that had arisen. Lenin dwelled in detail on the evolution of views on the process of building socialism, setting up a calm, business-like attitude to new turns in politics, a critical attitude to experience [291]. At the beginning of 1918,

“we had ... the idea that the development of the revolution ... could take either a relatively short path or a very long and difficult path.” But then they didn’t think about the worst option:

“when assessing possible development, we proceeded ... from the assumptions of a direct transition to socialist construction ... we already opposed the methods of a gradual transition such methods of action as a method of struggle, mainly aimed at the expropriation of the expropriators. Then “it was supposed to carry out a direct transition to socialism without a preliminary period adapting the old economy to the socialist economy. We assumed that having created state production and state distribution, we thereby directly entered into another, in comparison with the previous, economic system of production and distribution. We assumed that both systems—the system of state production and distribution and the system of private trade production and distribution—would come into conflict with each other under such conditions that we would build state production and distribution, wresting it step by step from the hostile system. We said that our task now is not so much the expropriation of the expropriators, but accounting, control, increasing labor productivity, and improving discipline. At that time, “we did not at all raise the question of what ratio our economy would be to the market, to trade.” The question of state capitalism was then raised not as in the NEP period, when it meant a step backwards, but as a step forward in the establishment of socialist relations. Even then, Lenin admitted, “on a number of points we had to go back”, even then we were “must take a step back and recognize the well-known” compromise “”. Lenin considered these circumstances important “for understanding what the change in our economic policy consisted of and how this change should be assessed” [292].

With such ideas about the historical experience of the revolution and the tasks facing the Bolsheviks, Lenin approached the time when the deep meaning of replacing the old economic policy with a new one became fully clear, much better than at the beginning of 1921, when the need to resort to much more difficult and lengthy maneuver for the sake of establishing an economic bond between town and country,

between the proletariat and the peasantry. If at first after the transition to the NEP, Lenin spoke more about retreat, about concessions to the peasantry, etc., although he expressed confidence that the NEP would ensure “the success of our entire socialist construction”, now, six months later, he expressed firm confidence not only in success, but in the fact that after the maneuver, “our victorious movement forward will be stronger, faster, and wider”[293].

Not everyone shared the hopes and calculations of Lenin, as indicated by the speeches of some delegates to the 11th Congress of the RCP (b) and the notes submitted to Lenin. Trotsky continued to be Lenin’s main opponent. He agreed with Lenin on the use of state capitalism, both in 1918 and under the NEP [294], but “free trade”! For him, this meant a return to capitalism. And he struggled with this prospect as best he could. The front of disagreements between Lenin and Trotsky expanded considerably: in addition to the differences of tactical nature mentioned above, new ones were added – on fundamentally important political and theoretical problems. As a result, the struggle between them on the basis of the NEP became even more acute, and the political distance between them increased.

Trotsky did not share Lenin’s assessments and hopes. His own prediction was different.

On August 25, 1921, at a meeting of the Politburo [295], Trotsky declared that “the days of Soviet power are numbered”, that “the cuckoo has already crowed” (see Appendices No. 8, 9), that the death of Soviet power is inevitable if the course of economic policy proposed by him, Trotsky, is not adopted and the management of the national economy is restructured in accordance with it [296].

The question of why Trotsky decided to give such a forecast at this particular time has not been specially studied. He himself did not give a direct answer to it either. Judging by the material known to us, the reason lies, firstly, in the internal difficulties that the country was experiencing (famine, peasant uprisings, paralysis of industry, etc.), and secondly, in the realization of the fact that in the near future the

proletarian revolution Europe does not count. This became clear by the middle of 1921.[297]

Moreover, Trotsky believed that there was a real threat of a new intervention, about which he never tired of warning the Politburo [298]. In his forecast, the characteristic features of the theory of “permanent revolution” are clearly visible, which meant Trotsky’s resurrection of it as a theoretical basis for developing a policy alternative to Lenin’s NEP under the new conditions of the development of the revolution. New concessions to the principle of free trade within the framework of the NEP, apparently, further strengthened his faith in the correctness of the theory of “permanent revolution”. At the 11th Congress, Trotsky answered all of Lenin’s arguments in the following way: a bond with the peasantry is necessary “until it is possible to rely on the victorious working class of Europe” [299]. Consequently, later it will be possible to abandon the bond, the political and economic union with the peasantry, and build socialism without the participation of the peasantry, ignoring the will of the majority of the country’s population and suppressing it?

At the beginning of 1922, Trotsky began to republish his old works, in which the Russian socialist revolution was analyzed from the standpoint of the theory of “permanent revolution”. Thus, disagreements on NEP questions gave birth to a new discussion—on fundamental questions of the theory of socialist revolution.

The first to appear in March 1922, on the eve of the XII Congress of the RCP(b), was a collection dedicated to the revolution of 1905. Trotsky prefaced it with a preface written in January 1922, in which he confirmed the validity of all its main assessments, which opposed the Leninist theory of the outgrowth of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one. Explaining the meaning of the theory of “permanent revolution”, he wrote: “The revolution will not be able to solve its immediate bourgeois tasks otherwise than by placing the proletariat in power. And this latter, having taken power into his hands, will not be able to limit himself to the bourgeois framework in the revolution ... in order to ensure its victory, the proletarian vanguard will have to make the deepest intrusions not only into

feudal, but also into bourgeois property in the very first stages of its rule. At the same time, he will come into hostile clashes not only with all groups of the bourgeoisie ... but also, with the broad masses of the peasantry, with whose assistance he came to power. The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country (with an overwhelming majority of the peasant population) can only be resolved on an international scale, in the arena of the world revolution of the proletariat". Further, Trotsky wrote that "although with a break of 12 years (i.e., not in 1905, but in 1917 – BC), this assessment was fully confirmed" [300].

The conclusions suggested themselves: in the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917, the working class came to power in Russia. The October Revolution is political, proletarian, but not social, not socialist in character, and the power of the working class in peasant Russia can be maintained only if the world proletarian revolution is victorious.

In the same 1922, Trotsky republished his 1917 pamphlet *The Peace Program*, prefaced it with a specially written preface, in which, again from the standpoint of 1922, he openly challenged Lenin's conclusion about the possibility of successfully building and building socialism in Russia under conditions capitalist encirclement:

"Having defended ourselves in the political and military sense as a state, we have not come to the creation of a socialist society and have not even approached ... As long as the bourgeoisie is in power in other European states, we are forced – in the fight against economic isolation – seek agreements with the capitalist world; at the same time, it can be said with certainty that these agreements, at best, can help us heal certain economic wounds, take one step or another forward, but that a genuine upsurge of the socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe"[301]. Thus, socialist construction as such can begin in Soviet Russia only after the decisive victories of the world proletarian revolution.

The propositions he formulated pointed to the disagreements he still had with Lenin on the most important proposition for Marxism—the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky countered Lenin’s thesis that the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat lies in the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry under the leading role of the proletariat: the dictatorship of the proletariat is the power of the working class directed against all non-proletarian strata of society. It can also be seen that, unlike Lenin, in 1922, as in 1905, and in 1917, Trotsky gave primacy to external factors in the development of the socialist revolution in Russia over internal ones. It is clear that the differences between Lenin and Trotsky on the question of the socialist revolution have intensified over the past years, that they have proposed to the party two completely different concepts of the Russian socialist revolution.

The return to political use of the theory of "permanent revolution" is a well-known fact. But in historical literature, due attention was not paid to the fact that its political orientation was now completely different than in 1905-1917. The term "revival" of the theory of "permanent revolution" correctly conveys the external side of the matter but does not fix the internal political evolution that this theory underwent during the socialist revolution due to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, therefore it does not convey the political meaning of this "revival". Previously, it contained a call to move the revolution forward, despite the possible danger of its defeat. Now it served to assess the path traveled by the revolution and to substantiation of the forecast about its inevitable death outside the framework of the victorious world proletarian revolution. And along with this, Trotsky from the "absurdly left" (as Lenin defined it) turns into an ordinary social democrat.

As an appendix to the collection, Trotsky placed his article "Our Differences", containing a polemic with Lenin on the place and role of the peasantry in the socialist revolution, on the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. In comments to it, written from the standpoint of 1922, he wrote:

“The anti-revolutionary features of Bolshevism [302] threaten with great danger only in the event of a revolutionary victory.”

Since 1917 brought victory to the Bolsheviks, then, according to Trotsky's logic, the time has come when Lenin and his supporters become dangerous for the revolution. It is impossible to say this directly, but the hint is more than transparent. The facts of the victory of the Bolsheviks in 1917, the victory in the civil war and the development of the revolution connected with this had to be “reconciled” with their thesis about the “anti-revolutionary essence of Bolshevism.” Trotsky “removes” this contradiction between his forecast and the fact of history with the help of the assertion that “under the leadership of Comrade Lenin, Bolshevism accomplished (not without an internal struggle) its ideological rearmament in the spring of 1917, that is, before the conquest of power” [303].

In other words, he declared that in October 1917 it was not the Bolsheviks themselves who took power, but the newly minted Trotskyists, who had not yet realized themselves in this capacity and, by inertia, retained their former name and loyalty to the former theoretical and political schemes. From here it is not far to the assertion that they took power with the participation of Lenin, but under the ideological (and organizational) leadership of Trotsky, who allegedly was the real leader of the October Revolution. This has not yet been directly stated here (it will be said later – in the article “The Lessons of October”, in October 1924), but a quite definite application for this role has already been made.

These speeches marked the beginning of Trotsky's political attack on the historical front. He had to show that he, Trotsky, as a theoretician and politician was superior to Lenin, that he was the true leader of the “de-Bolshevik” Bolshevism – the party that took power in October 1917, therefore it is to him that the revolution owes all its best achievements and victories. The political subtext of this attack is this: Bolshevism came to power in 1917 only because it had “become Bolshevikized”, and therefore there was no point in clinging to it in 1922. The attack directed against Lenin personally was lightly covered by the thesis that Lenin led the process of “de-Bolshevikization”.

Trotsky placed the “history” of the struggle against Lenin at the service of the interests of his contemporary struggle against him. The reader was moving towards a relevant political conclusion: although Trotsky came to the Bolshevik Party, in fact, Lenin, in the main questions of the socialist revolution in Russia, went over to Trotsky’s position. If the Bolshevik Party won thanks to the fact that they went over to the positions of Trotsky, then he, Trotsky, is its true inspirer and organizer of this victory.

Trotsky’s tactic in the fight against Lenin and Bolshevism—publishing his old articles with appropriate comments—was superior to publishing a new article outlining old differences. This made it possible to show the origins and depth of disagreements more fully, to give a detailed argumentation of the anti-Leninist position, to criticize Lenin and at the same time does not provoke criticism of their previous views. You can’t rewrite history! What is written is written. This tactic allowed him to combine criticism of the New Economic Policy, Lenin, and Bolshevism, point out their previous mistakes as the cause of the current mistakes and substantiate the thesis about the danger to the fate of the revolution of the Leninist course and Bolshevism as a whole. Trotsky got the opportunity to unobtrusively lead the party to the idea that he was always right in the struggle against Lenin, and Lenin, accordingly, was always wrong. Thus, Trotsky asserted himself as the main theorist of the party and a natural but underestimated leader of the party.

Although at this time Trotsky avoided openly opposing his views to Lenin’s as an integral system, he publicly declared his commitment to his former theoretical and political views. Together with them, Trotskyism was “resurrected” as a political trend openly opposed to Lenin and Bolshevism. Trotsky later claimed that the term “Trotskyism” was coined later, in 1924.[304] This is not true. The term “Trotskyism” was in use among the Bolsheviks even before L.D. Trotsky joined the Bolshevik Party, and after joining it [305]. At the XI Congress of the RCP (b), the representative of the “workers’ opposition” Kutuzov directly said that after the X Party Congress and at the XI Congress there were, and are fighting “both the workers’ opposition, and Trotskyists, and Leninists, and dozens, and anything

else" [306]. And no one was surprised – what is Trotskyism and what is the Trotskyists they did not ask, L.D. Trotsky did not object. Lenin was well aware Trotskyism as a system of political and theoretical views and a political trend in the party. He perceived Trotskyism as an existing political trend. So, outlining the speech of V.V. Kosior at the XI Congress of the RCP (b), who complained that former supporters of Trotsky were bypassed during personnel appointments, "overwritten", Lenin wrote for himself:

"the elite in the Urals was Trotskyist" [307].

Already at this phase of disagreement, Lenin and Trotsky were separated by an assessment of the nature of the Great October Socialist Revolution. For Lenin, it was socialist. Trotsky assessed it differently.

At the 11th Congress, he declared that the NEP is a maneuver of the "class (of the proletariat. – BC), which is moving towards socialist revolution" [308]. According to Trotsky, it turns out that four years after the start of the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks do not make a socialist revolution (i.e., they do not carry out their program), but only go to the point from which the construction of a socialist society will begin.

Of course, one can find many statements about the socialist revolution in Trotsky. But this statement is not accidental. Perhaps, against his will, he said here what he had previously preferred to keep quiet. This assessment of the October Revolution echoes his longstanding position on the question of the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a workers' government under the bourgeois system:

"The social revolution (meaning socialist. – BC) presupposes such a state of capitalist society when the proletariat is in power" (1916)[309].

This thesis is only a development of Trotsky's long-standing ideas that the dictatorship of the proletariat can be established in the course of a bourgeois-democratic revolution ("without a tsar, but a workers' government")[310]. Consequently, at that time, the contradictions

between Lenin and Trotsky on the issue of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the main thing in Marxism [311], became politically actual. No coincidence of views, assessments, positions on other issues could cover these differences, which determined both the state and the dynamics of their relations.

These public speeches by Trotsky not only sharpened the discussion between him and Lenin, but also gave it the character of a principled struggle of Trotskyism against Bolshevism (Leninism). Trotsky later claimed that Lenin did not oppose his book 1905 and therefore agreed with him [312]. This is not true. Speeches by V.I. Lenin at the 11th Party Congress, at the 4th Congress of the Comintern, at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet, as well as a number of texts of his "Testament" contained criticism of these views and assessments of Trotsky. Lenin gave it the place it deserved – it was carried out in parallel with Lenin's substantiation of the new concept of the socialist revolution in Russia.

The need for a new concession to the principle of free trade within the framework of the NEP raised a number of difficult not only political but also theoretical questions. It was necessary to find solutions to problems where they had not been looked for before, to take them into account in new theoretical concepts and political conclusions. Thus, the NEP stimulated a new search and led to the creation of a new concept of the socialist revolution in Russia, based on accumulated experience and taking into account the specific conditions of Russia more fully than before. The novelty of the task in this case did not mean its absolute political surprise and theoretical unpreparedness. It is no coincidence that, speaking of the complexity of the situation and the tasks ahead, Lenin was not inclined to dramatize the situation. The political and theoretical surprise of the NEP cannot be overestimated, if only because it actually implemented a fundamental scheme, embedded in the Leninist theory of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one. It fundamentally allowed for a situation where the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry grew into the dictatorship of the proletariat, while the economy remained for a time the same – capitalist. So, it was at the very beginning of the revolution when Soviet power was

established. This was also the case during the transition to the NEP. Therefore, this situation in itself is not evidence of a catastrophe and an insurmountable barrier to a new attempt [313].

The surprise of the NEP is the surprise of a partial solution to the problem, while there were hopes for its complete solution. Such an outcome is not planned, but its probability is implied.

Partial victory is not what was hoped for, but there is no reason to absolutize this failure if the cause of the error is understood and there is a possibility of correcting it [314].

Difficult or easier in comparison with 1917-1918 was the cause of the socialist revolution? It was difficult in the sense that it forced the use of detours and methods of a market economy alien to socialism, by necessity allowing the strengthening of the economic and, consequently, political positions of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sections of the city and countryside. But at the same time, it was facilitated, since some of the important and difficult problems were solved completely (taking power, retaining it) or partially (creating mechanisms, developing management methods, forming new managers, etc.). The solution of the problems at hand took place on the basis of incomparably greater experience, knowledge, and in more favorable foreign policy conditions – the military action of the counter-revolution and the interventionists was repulsed, peace was secured for a number of years. For this reason alone, the starting position for a new attempt is better than it was during the first, and the hopes for success based on one's own strength are greater than before. The difficulties are great, but there is no reason to panic.

In the light of what has been said, the problem of “Thermidor” begins to take shape in a completely different way, which in Trotsky's reasoning regarding the fate of the Russian revolution occupied one of the central places. What Trotsky saw as a manifestation of “Thermidor”, in the system of views developed by Lenin, was the normal policy of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. Perhaps that is why Trotsky did not accept the Leninist NEP, because he denied the Leninist theory

of the socialist revolution. After all, within its framework, a partial victory was still a step forward and therefore a victory, but for Trotsky, within the framework of his own theory of “permanent revolution”, a partial victory was equal to defeat. Obviously, it was no accident that he resurrected this theory after the transition to the NEP and formed on its basis his own concept of the New Economic Policy. Lenin’s new views and proposals were reflected in the decisions of the XI Conference of the RCP(b)[316] and the IX Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR. The retreat made and the understanding of the new situation and politics from the point of view of the prospects for the development of the socialist revolution allowed Lenin to conclude that the limit of the retreat had already been outlined and that it did not threaten the revolution with inevitable death or rebirth. At this time, Lenin expressed the idea that only now the New Economic Policy “is sufficiently and clearly established “[317]. Lenin soon issued an important political statement calling for an end to the retreat.

The NEP led Lenin to the problem of creating a new concept of the socialist revolution in Russia and confronted the party with tasks that no one had seriously thought about before. Trotsky did not accept this version of the NEP. Trotsky’s assessment of the meaning and purpose of the NEP, its place in the socialist revolution was different. He assessed the NEP as a step backward “compared to the idea of an all-plan all-socialist economy.” He saw a step forward only in the pacification of the country [318]. It is clear that Lenin and Trotsky viewed the NEP differently.

Notes:

[277] It is no coincidence that Lenin at that time often referred to his pamphlet *The Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power* and other works of this cycle, in which much attention was paid to state capitalism as a form of management with which one could move on to a socialist economy. During the Civil War, he occasionally turned to these works (see: Reference volume to the Complete Works of V.I. Lenin. Part 2. M, 1970. S. 374, 380).

[278] Lenin V.I. Full coll. Op. T. 43. S. 223-228.

[279] Ibid. T. 36. S. 304.

[280] Ibid. T. 43. S. 228.

- [281] Ibid. T. 36. S. 295–307.
- [282] Ibid. T. 43. S. 223, 228.
- [283] Ibid. T. 44. S. 160–161.
- [284] Ibid. pp. 156–169.
- [285] Ibid. pp. 167, 168.
- [286] Ibid. S. 158.
- [287] “Of course, if a revolution occurs in Europe, we will, of course, change our policy ... it is difficult to determine the duration of the civil war in other republics, but when it ends in victory, we will change our policy in the sense that, perhaps, we will say: do not take anything with a tax, but everything with an exchange of goods” (V.I.Lenin. Complete collection of works. T. 43. P. 336).
- [288] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5191. L. 1, 2.
- [289] Lenin V.I. Full coll. Op. T. 44. S. 207–208, 212.
- [290] Ibid. T. 45. S. 213.
- [291] Ibid. T. 44. S. 197–205, 295.
- [292] Ibid. pp. 197–200.
- [293] Ibid. T. 43. S. 360; T. 44. S. 229.
- [294] Eleventh Congress of the RCP (b). Stenographer. Report. Pp. 128–129.
- [295] The date is set on the basis of information about the composition of the participants in the meetings of the Politburo and the circumstances of the discussion of this statement by Trotsky, reported by I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov . _ 10. P. 265; One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. From the diary of F. Chuev. P. 206–207).
- [296] Trotsky’s archive. T. 1. S. 13–14.
- [297] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. Report. Pp. 209–210.
- [298] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 89. L. 1–3.
- [299] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. Report. S. 135.
- [300] Trotsky L.D. On the history of the Russian revolution. Pp. 147–148.
- [301] Ibid. S. 145.
- [302] Anti-revolutionary is not just insufficient revolutionaryism, it is “anti-revolutionary”, therefore, a position bordering on counter-revolutionary. And Trotsky repeats this statement without any reservations in 1922. Speaking of Bolshevism, Trotsky aimed first of all and mainly at Lenin – in 1922, as in 1917.

- [303] Ibid. S. 115; see also: Trotsky L. 1905. M., 1922. S. 285.
- [304] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 8. S. 184; Trotsky L.D. On the question of the origin of the legend of "Trotskyism" (Documentary reference) // Stalin's school of falsifications. Pp. 108-109; He is . The Stalinists are taking action. To the exclusion of Zinoviev, Kamenev and others // Trotsky L. Portraits of revolutionaries. M., 1991. S. 207.
- [305] Lenin spoke about Trotskyism in his concluding remarks on the report "The Tasks of the Day—The Current Moment" at the VII (April) Conference of the RSDLP(b) 1917 (Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP(Bolsheviks) April 1917. Minutes. M , 1958. S. 22).
- [306] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. Report. S. 450.
- [307] Ibid. S. 617.
- [308] Ibid. S. 130.
- [309] Cit. by: Ivanov V.M., Shmelev A.N. Leninism and the ideological and political defeat of Trotskyism. L., 1970. S. 115.
- [310] Ibid. S. 138.
- [311] See: Marx K., Engels F. Selected. Op. M., 1986. T. 4. S. 510; Lenin V.I. Full coll. Op. T. 33. S. 34.
- [312] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 8. S. 185.
- [313] 40 years before the NEP, analyzing the prospects of the Russian revolution, K. Marx (in a letter to V. Zasulich, March 1881) came to similar conclusions, in principle: political power is in the hands of revolutionaries who for a long-time exercise transformation of the economy and the entire life of society on the principles of socialism, using the rural community as a social base, as well as borrowing the achievements of technology and science from developed capitalist countries (K. pp. 58–80).
- [314] In the article "Notes of a Publicist" (February 1922), Lenin wrote: "There is absolutely nothing "terrible", nothing that gives a legitimate reason for even the slightest despondency in recognizing this bitter truth ... that joint efforts are needed for the victory of socialist workers of several advanced countries. And we are still alone, and in a backward country, in a country more devastated than others. There is a combat-ready army, the ability to adjust their actions to the requirements of the moment remains. "Those communists did not die (and, most likely, will not die) who will not allow themselves to fall

into either illusions or despondency, while maintaining the strength and flexibility of the body for the repeated “starting from the beginning” in the approach to the most difficult task” (Lenin V.I. 44, p. 418).

[315] It is interesting that those party leaders who did not fully share Lenin’s theory (Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others) tried to interpret Lenin’s NEP as a retreat or a retreat par excellence, as a policy that allowed the days of Soviet power to last, but did not allow ensure the victory of the socialist revolution. Those who accepted the Leninist theory of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution (like, for example, I.V. Stalin) saw in the NEP a way to ensure the victory of the Russian socialist revolution, and not just a way to prolong its existence.

[316] Lenin V.I. Full coll. Op. T. 4. S. 239; CPSU in resolutions ... T. 2. S. 448 – 451, 452-455, 475.

[317] Lenin V.I. Full coll. Op. T. 44. S. 356.

[318] Trotsky L. How the revolution was armed // Trotsky L. Soch. T. 3, book. 1. S. 284.

3. PROSPECTS OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

Comprehension by Lenin of the experience of the socialist revolution was carried out constantly. A number of important new provisions were formulated by him even before the transition to the new economic policy. The New Economic Policy highlighted their significance in a new way and made them more topical. At the same time, he forced the search for new solutions to those problems that seemed to have already been satisfactorily resolved.

Previously, the Russian Social Democrats conceived the victory of the socialist revolution, firstly, within the framework of the world revolution, which, although not presented as a one-time act, was seen as a dynamic process that did not stretch over decades. And the socialist transformations themselves were presented in the form of a rapid onset of the socialist way of life on non-socialist ones.

The imperialist war, which prevented the consolidation of the international bourgeoisie against the victorious socialist revolution, created favorable conditions for consolidating power and helping the rising revolution in other countries, including by armed means. It was from such ideas that V.I. Lenin in 1915-1916, formulating his conclusion about the possibility of the victory of socialism initially in one, separately taken country [319]. In accordance with these ideas, in October 1917 the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) decided to take power: a revolution in Germany was taken into account, which, as it seemed, would begin in the near foreseeable future, and after the seizure of power, various measures were taken to bring it closer [320].

The possibility of a long-term development of a socialist republic in the conditions of a capitalist encirclement, as well as a political retreat to retain power in practical terms, was not considered and was not worked out even theoretically. This was reflected in the underestimation of the difficulties in the development of the socialist revolution.

The experience of the civil war, foreign military intervention, the war with Poland, the development of the revolutionary process in other countries made it possible and forced to look at many things

differently than before, to evaluate many things in a new way. In a series of speeches at the end of 1920, Lenin began to develop new ideas about the prospects for a socialist revolution in Russia. Although the new assessments are inextricably linked with the previous ideas about the world revolution, but they already show a desire to clarify the previous assessments of the possibilities of the Russian revolution, not only waiting for help and support from the world revolution, but also capable of providing such assistance to it itself.. Lenin said (October 15) that the Soviet republics were able not only to defend themselves against internal and external counter-revolution, but, being the shock detachment of the world proletarian revolution, in the interests of its development they could go on the offensive with decisive goals[321]. These thoughts were developed in a speech on November 6, 1920:

“We have been winning for three years. This is a gigantic victory that none of us would have believed before.” Going on an uprising, we “knew that our victory would be a lasting victory only when our cause conquered the whole world,” therefore “we began our cause solely counting on a world revolution ... Now, after three years, it turns out that we are immeasurably stronger than they were before, but the world bourgeoisie is also still very strong, and despite the fact that it is immeasurably stronger than us, it can still be said that we have won, but with all this the danger has not disappeared, it exists and will exist until the revolution will win in one or some of the advanced countries ” [322].

The position formulated here about the victory of the world revolution as a condition for a lasting victory, and not victory in general, was new. It was not an accidental reservation, since soon in a speech at the Moscow provincial conference of the RCP (b) on November 21, 1920, V.I. Lenin again formulated this position:

“In order ... to win firmly(*italics ours. - BC*), we must achieve the victory of the proletarian revolution in all, or at least in several of the main capitalist countries. “After three years of bitter stubborn war, we see in what respect our predictions did not materialize

and in what respect they were justified. They were not justified in the sense that a quick and lasting solution to this issue did not work out... At the same time, it turned out that if our predictions were not fulfilled simply, quickly and directly, then they were fulfilled insofar as they gave us the main thing, for the main thing was to preserve the possibility of existence proletarian power and the Soviet Republic, even if the socialist revolution drags on throughout the world, we now have not only a respite , but something much more serious ... we have a new period when our ... international existence in the network of capitalist states has been won back. Now we have to talk not only about one respite, but about serious chances for new construction for a longer time."

Regarding help from the international working-class movement, Lenin said:

it supported us "halfway", because it weakened "the hand that was raised against us", but even in this it "helped us" [323].

From then on, V.I. Lenin connects the prospect of a socialist revolution in Russia with the solution of the country's internal problems and the state of the party. he said on January 24, 1921

"No one will break us, neither external nor internal force, if we do not lead to a split, " [324].

The transition to the NEP did not change these estimates. At the 10th Congress of the RCP(b) (March 1921), Lenin, noting the growth of the world revolution, declared that

"the stake on the international revolution does not mean calculation for a certain period ... therefore, we must be able to adjust our activity in such a way to class relations within our country and other countries, so that we can maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat for a long time and, at least gradually, to heal the troubles and crises that beset us"[325].

In the next two years, the idea that the fate of the Russian socialist revolution is decided not in the class battles of the proletariat of the developed capitalist countries, but by the workers and peasants of the Soviet republics, the Soviet government, and the RCP (b), was constantly expressed and argued. Thus, closing the 10th All-Russian Conference of the RCP(b) (May 1921), Lenin said that

“now we exert our main influence on the international revolution with our economic policy ... In this field, the struggle has been transferred on a worldwide scale. We will solve this problem - and then we will win on an international scale for sure and finally” [326].

Lenin associated this victory on the home front with the implementation of the plan for the electrification of the country and 10-20 years of "correct relations with the peasantry" "built on the basis of the NEP [327].

Lenin calculated that under favorable conditions, even with a delay in the world revolution, the Russian revolution would go far ahead in 10-20 years in strengthening its positions, in the socio-economic transformation of the country, and in cultural development [328].

During this time, Lenin hoped, even if there were no proletarian revolution in other countries, the Soviet republics would be prepared so that the socialist revolution could take the next step.

- to move from trade to commodity exchange, and from it, as it was believed, to socialism (product exchange) there was one step left [329].

The success of electrification made it possible to block the dangers emanating from the individualism of the small farmer and free trade, and the failure would mean the inevitable "return to capitalism." Therefore, electrification, together with the NEP, according to Lenin, ensured the victory of the Russian socialist revolution on a "worldwide scale, even if the proletarian revolutions dragged on" [330].

It became possible to take the prospect of a slowdown in the development of the revolution calmly, focus on solving internal problems and complete the “greatest political upheaval ... with slow, hard, difficult economic work” that required “whole decades” [331]. This was supposed to lead to an even greater weakening of the dependence of the socialist republics on the successes of the world revolution (which eventually will happen). The possible victory of the proletarian revolution in such countries as England, Germany, America, Lenin now considered only as a factor in shortening the period for fulfilling the plans for the socio-economic development of Russia [332].

Under these conditions, the question of relations between the Soviet republics and the capitalist countries arose in a new way. They were no longer limited to wars and “respite” between them. There was a need and an opportunity to use relations with them for the benefit of the revolution.

On December 23, 1921, at the 9th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Lenin spoke of these new possibilities:

“However, is such a thing generally conceivable that a socialist republic exists in a capitalist environment? It seemed unthinkable, either politically or militarily. That this is possible politically and militarily has been proved, it is already a fact. And in terms of trade? What about economic turnover? But what about communication, assistance, exchange of services between a backward, ruined agricultural Russia and an advanced, industrially rich group of capitalist powers—is that possible? We were not recognized, we were rejected, relations with us were declared non-existent... but they still exist” [333].

The invitation of the Soviet republics to the international Genoa Conference [334], the conclusion of an agreement with Germany during its work, soon confirmed this assumption of Lenin. In this invitation, V.I. Lenin saw additional opportunities for long-term and successful maneuvering in the international arena and the prevention of a large-scale war with a coalition of bourgeois states [335].

Perhaps Lenin overestimated the degree of interest of the capitalist countries in economic cooperation with the Soviet republics, and this contributed to the revision of previous ideas about the dependence of the socialist revolution in Russia on the victory of proletarian revolutions in the developed capitalist countries. One way or another, but from about that time he was less and less inclined to talk about the dependence of the Russian revolution on the world one. Lenin came to the fundamental conclusion about the greater autonomy of the socialist revolution in Russia (as well as in other large countries rich in natural, material, and human resources) from the world revolution. In the system of his views and assessments, the significance of international and internal factors of the Russian revolution has undergone major changes.

The revolution in the developed capitalist countries has turned from a condition for the victory of the Russian revolution into a condition for accelerating this victory and easing the hardships associated with the revolution. He built new plans for the development of the Russian socialist revolution on the basis of releasing its internal potential, which, in his opinion, is capable of both strengthening the position of the dictatorship of the proletariat within the country and accelerating the maturation of the revolution in the world.

Without abstracting from the foreign policy conditions of development, relying on an analysis of the internal problems of building socialism in Russia on the basis of the NEP, Lenin gives a positive answer about the possibility of building socialism in the conditions of a continuing capitalist encirclement. The new views found a classic expression in the well-known thesis that from NEP Russia there will be socialist Russia. It is clear that this was a break with previous ideas about the rigid dependence of the Russian socialist revolution on the world proletarian revolution.

So, with the transition to peaceful construction in the conditions of a change in the previous ideas about the dependence of the Russian socialist revolution on the world revolution, the issues of ensuring the strengthening and growth of the socialist sector of the economy turned out to be in the center of attention. The very decision to move

from the policy of "war communism" to the NEP did not pose new theoretical questions for the RCP(b).

It was about a political maneuver within the framework of the existing theoretical ideas about the socialist revolution. It was necessary to return to the previous plan for the use of state capitalism. The tax in kind was considered by Lenin as "one of the forms of transition from a kind of "war communism", forced by extreme poverty, ruin, and war, to a correct socialist product exchange. And the latter, in turn, is one of the forms of transition from socialism, with peculiarities caused by the predominance of the small peasantry in the population, to communism. He believed that the NEP did not mean a retreat from the tasks of building socialism, not moving away from socialism, but a step forward towards socialism, in comparison with what was in the period of the so-called "war communism"[336].

An important milestone in comprehending the experience accumulated by the revolution and developing the theory of the socialist revolution was Lenin's political report at the 11th Congress of the RCP (b). In it, Lenin presented to the party a new concept for the development of the socialist revolution in Russia in the conditions of a capitalist encirclement, using market mechanisms to overcome bourgeois relations within the country, capable of building up the base of its success in anticipation of a world proletarian revolution.

Opening the congress, Lenin gave an optimistic assessment of the prospects for the development of the Russian socialist revolution, provided that the unity of the party is preserved and strengthened, and the difficulties of development created by the capitalist environment are overcome, and the party's ability to concentrate all its forces on solving the most important tasks. He noted that the greatest difficulties in the development of the revolution are associated with the NEP[337], but it also contains the key to solving the problems of the socialist revolution, since the NEP allows you to find a measure of concession to the peasants, develop practical forms of interaction in the interests of further implementing the program of socialist transformations and establish a new balance of power between the

socialist proletarian revolution, the peasant democratic movement and the bourgeois counter-revolution.

Lenin's report presented an internally logical picture of the problems being experienced and a system of measures capable of solving them in the interests of the socialist revolution. Lenin connected the transition to the NEP not only with the need to carry out a political maneuver and correct the mistakes made, but also with certain features of the Russian revolution. He emphasized that the NEP is a policy aimed at building socialism while preserving the peasant economy, which the socialist revolution has not yet been able to transform.

Lenin recalled that the Bolsheviks gained power in the country, began to carry out a socialist program, but their activities at first went "to a certain extent on the sidelines" from the processes that were taking place in the countryside, among the peasantry. The peasantry, as a small commodity producer, politically accepted Soviet power, but it could not accept the economic reforms proposed by it, since it could only exist by obeying the laws of its social nature- the laws of the market, with the help of which the peasants had the opportunity to receive from society the product they needed in exchange for what they could produce on their farm.

Therefore, "the bonds between the economy, which was built in nationalized, socialized factories, factories, state farms, and the peasant economy was not." It still does not exist, Lenin believed, we are only approaching it.

In establishing this link, he saw the full significance of the NEP [338] as a tactical maneuver designed to ensure the economic alliance of the proletariat with a strategic ally - the peasantry [339]. These assessments have already been made before. However, V.I. Lenin now went further: he not only spoke of the need to conform the policy of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the interests and possibilities of the peasantry, but also revised the previous ideas about the place of the peasantry in the socialist revolution.

The policy of a lasting alliance with the middle peasants, adopted by the VIII Congress of the RCP (b) (March 1919), meant the establishment of a military-political alliance that did not go beyond the bourgeois-democratic revolution and did not establish their interaction in the struggle for socialism. There was no economic union of the proletariat and the middle peasantry then, and its creation was not put on the agenda. It was conceived in the future, but not at the expense of concessions to the peasantry as a small proprietor, but at the expense of its movement towards the proletariat on the basis of an improvement in its living situation as the socialist revolution develops, the success of large-scale industry, etc. [340]

The NEP meant a radical change in the very formulation of the question of the union - it was achieved through an initial concession to the peasantry on the part of the proletariat, and not through its adaptation to the demands of the proletariat. This meant that the NEP, conceived as a tactical maneuver towards a strategic ally, implied a certain change in views on the position of the working peasantry in the socialist revolution. This change manifested itself in Lenin's report in the form of the thesis that the peasantry would ultimately be their appraiser and "judge". "The peasant in his mass lives, agreeing:

"Well, if you don't know how, we'll wait, maybe you will learn." But this credit cannot be inexhaustible. You need to know this and, having received a loan, still hurry up. You must know that the moment is approaching when the peasant country will not extend further credit to us, when it, if I may use a commercial term, will ask in cash. I repeat, we received a deferment and a loan from the people thanks to our correct policy, and these, to put it in NEP style, are bills, but the terms are not written on these bills, and when they are brought for collection, you will not recognize this with a certificate with the text of the bill »[341].

On the eve of the October Revolution and during the civil war (within the framework of the policy of "neutralizing the middle peasant" and even the policy of "alliance with the middle peasant") there could be no question that the peasantry was the force that would pass

judgment on the socialist revolution, and the Bolsheviks would be forced to accept it.

During the adoption of the decision on the transition to the NEP at the Tenth Congress, Lenin said that the peasant counter-revolution was before us and that the struggle against it was going on according to the principle of "who - whom." The thesis about "bills" speaks of an understanding of the need to find a foothold for carrying out socialist transformations in the petty-bourgeois peasantry, as well as a completely new formulation of the question of the class struggle in the course of the socialist revolution. In connection with the thesis about V.I. Lenin speaks of the

"last and decisive battle" with the domestic bourgeoisie, growing out of the peasantry, which we are forced to accept in the near future and which we can win [342].

This is not at all the battle that he spoke about at the 10th Congress of the RCP (b):

this is no longer a battle with the peasant counter-revolution, but a battle for the peasantry, for it to recognize that the bills issued to the Bolsheviks by them were paid for by improving their, the peasants, life during and as a result of socialist transformations. This battle for the peasantry must be waged against the new bourgeoisie, which also strives to find support in it for the struggle against growing socialism. Correspondingly, the forms, means and methods of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie also change. Previously, this struggle was aimed at the political suppression of the bourgeoisie, which was not difficult, but ineffective because of the presence of a huge mass of petty-bourgeois peasantry. Now this struggle was aimed at ensuring the consent of the peasants to the further implementation of the socialist program by the Bolsheviks.

The new struggle takes the form of competition with the bourgeoisie in the economic field. The dictatorship of the proletariat is leading it, striving to prove to the peasantry that the

Soviet government can organize the economic life of the country and satisfy the interests and needs of the peasantry no worse, but better than the bourgeoisie. Hence the demand to learn capitalist methods of management from the bourgeoisie, to learn how to manage. It is necessary to prove the ability to manage quickly; in a year, the peasantry will not wait long. Either the Soviet government will prove to the peasant that he can help them, "or they will send us to hell. It is absolutely inevitable." [343]

Since the results of this competition with the bourgeoisie will test the successes of the Soviet government, it is not just a competition, but "a desperate, furious, if not the last, then close to that, struggle not to the stomach, but to the death between capitalism and socialism", "still one form of struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat" [344], [345]. And this is understandable, because economic competition is only a way to win an economic, and hence political, victory over the bourgeoisie and destroy it as a class.

Victory in this struggle for the peasantry, paralyzing its anti-socialist potential for a time, would make it possible to use the democratic potential of the peasant movement on the side of the socialist revolution and thereby isolate and defeat the forces of internal counter-revolution. Lenin sees an opportunity to win this battle for the peasantry and through this to realize a peaceful version of the development of the socialist revolution. To pursue such a policy is a difficult task, but not a hopeless one since the experience of the civil war has taught both the proletariat and the peasantry how to measure and harmonize their interests.

Lenin believed that the Bolsheviks could pass this test, that the success of the struggle depended only on themselves. The

"political power" and "economic strength" in the hands of the dictatorship of the proletariat are "quite sufficient to ensure the transition to socialism"[346].

Moreover, Lenin does not connect the question of the victory of the revolution with an assessment of the degree of backwardness or

development of the country. For Lenin, this issue was resolved positively a long time ago - there are at least the necessary conditions for this in Russia. All other conditions for victory are available. Not a word about the world revolution as a condition for victory or a successful solution of the internal problems of the Russian socialist revolution. Moreover, Lenin believes that with the world bourgeoisie "there will be many more 'last and decisive battles'"[347]. And he does not predict the tragic outcome of these battles for the Russian socialist revolution. On the contrary, it expresses confidence in victory, therefore, Lenin positively resolves the issue of the victory of socialism in the conditions of a capitalist encirclement.

Lenin admitted that in the course of the "last and decisive battle" there could be not only victory, but also defeat as a result of an open struggle, and, moreover, a degeneration of the revolution was possible [348]. Lenin saw the main dangers for the revolution not in the external conditions of its existence, but in the internal problems of its development. The New Economic Policy, while removing or blunting some of these dangers, exacerbated others. In Soviet historical literature, there was a certain euphoria about the NEP, expressed in focusing on the opportunities it opens up and leaving the difficulties associated with it unattended. Lenin acted differently, he pointed not only to new opportunities for the development of the socialist revolution in Russia, but also to the dangers for it that the new economic policy brought with it.

Lenin speaks of the threat of a degeneration of the revolution. Trotsky often spoke about it (the threat of "Thermidor"), while radically disagreeing with Lenin on the question of its possible causes. In full accordance with the theory of "permanent revolution", Trotsky saw the reasons in the absence of a world proletarian revolution and, moreover, in the personal qualities of the leader[350].

Lenin developed directly opposite views on this matter. Not only did he not make the threat of a possible degeneration of the revolution dependent on the successes or failures of the world revolution, but, perhaps, objecting to Trotsky, he said that the danger of degeneration does not come from the personal qualities of the revolutionaries, but

from the "giant masses." This danger arises if these masses believe that the policy pursued is not in their interests [351].

The last circumstance in the conditions of the NEP almost entirely depended on the ability of the Bolsheviks to manage. It was clearly lacking due to the lack of "culture of that layer of communists who governs." Lenin drew attention to the experience of history, which testified that "Thermidor" is inevitable if the level of culture of the victors is lower than that of the vanquished [352].

For the Russian socialist revolution, this was a real threat: no matter how low the culture of the new bourgeoisie was, the culture of the proletariat and the peasantry was much lower. Until they learn, the communist administrators will only nominally be leaders, while the real power will belong to those who really know how to manage, - those "specialists" who by no means shared the ideas of the socialist revolution, to whose help the Bolsheviks had to turn.

This problem was solved by creating our own qualified personnel. The task, although difficult, but solvable. If we evaluate Trotsky's proposals on the reorganization of the system of managing the national economy from these positions, we will have to admit that they just carried the threat of "Thermidor".

Neither at the 11th Congress nor later were Lenin's opponents able to oppose anything equivalent to the concept developed by him in terms of the significance of the conclusions and the level of their substantiation. Chief among them, Trotsky, continued to repeat his previous assessments and forecasts. This was shown by the last comparison between Lenin and Trotsky of their views and assessments, which took place at the end of 1922. Speaking at the Fifth Congress of the Russian Communist Youth Union (October 11-19, 1922), Trotsky defined his vision of the prospects for the development of the revolution and the existence of the Soviet republics. He stated that if capitalism resists the threat of revolution for 10 years, then this will mean that world capitalism is "strong enough to once and for all to suppress the proletarian revolution all over the world, of course, to suppress Soviet Russia as well" [353].

As can be seen, Trotsky quite definitely contrasts his assessments with Lenin's. For Lenin, holding the NEP for 10-20 years opens up the possibility of a transition to socialism, while for Trotsky, 10 years of the NEP is tantamount to the death of Soviet power and the revolution. But that's not all. According to Trotsky, the following perspective of the world revolution is obtained: either it will begin and win decisive victories in the next 10 years, or it will be removed from the agenda of the history of the development of mankind. Either all at once, or nothing and never.

As if accepting Trotsky's challenge and engaging in polemics with him, Lenin, in greeting the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, drew a completely different perspective:

"Soviet power ... is stronger than ever before ... Victory will be ours" [354].

In fact, he devoted his report at the congress (November 13) to substantiating this assessment. He, in particular, said:

"I believe that we can all, with a clear conscience, answer this question in the affirmative (about the benefits of a correct retreat. - BC), namely in the sense that the past year and a half positively and absolutely prove that we passed this exam. It was a kind of answer to the question about the ability of the Bolsheviks to show the peasantry their ability to manage. Lenin expressed confidence that the problems at hand (the accumulation of financial resources, above all) would be solved, had already begun to be solved.

"The most important, - Lenin considered,

The peasantry is satisfied with its position. This we can safely say...The peasantry is the decisive factor with us ... we do not have to fear any movement against us on their part. We say this with full consciousness, without exaggeration" (our italics. - BC). Noting the successes of Soviet power achieved on the basis of the NEP, and the mistakes made by the international bourgeoisie,

Lenin states that "the prospects for the world revolution ... are favorable" and they can become "excellent" again [355].

The essentially anti-Trotskyist orientation of these assessments of Lenin is obvious.

At this Congress of the Comintern, Trotsky was able to oppose Lenin's analysis of the possibilities for the development of the revolution under the NEP only with general arguments that indicate that he remained faithful to his previous views and was unable to conduct a reasoned discussion with Lenin on the essence of the problem. They are worth reproducing:

"After the conquest of power, the task of building socialism, above all economic socialism, arises as central and at the same time most difficult. The solution of this problem depends on causes of a different order and different depths: firstly, on the level of productive forces and, in particular, on the relationship between industry and peasant economy; secondly, from the cultural and organizational level of the working class that has won state power; thirdly, on the political situation, international and domestic: whether the bourgeoisie has been finally defeated or is still resisting, - whether there is a foreign military intervention, - whether the technical intelligentsia is sabotaging, etc., etc."

In terms of relative importance, these conditions for socialist construction must be arranged in the order in which we have listed them. The most basic condition is the level of the productive forces; then follows the cultural level of the proletariat; and, finally, the political and military-political situation in which the proletariat finds itself after seizing power. But this is a logical sequence. However, in practice, the working class that has taken power, first of all, encounters political difficulties ... secondarily, the proletarian vanguard encounters difficulties arising from the insufficient cultural development of these working masses. And only in the third place does its economic construction run up against the limits set by the present level of productive forces. In the NEP, Trotsky saw only "a

system of measures that would ensure a gradual rise of the country's productive forces even without the assistance of socialist Europe" [356], i.e. a policy that, in principle, makes it possible to develop "material" for a future socialist revolution, but nothing more. It is significant that even in this programmatic speech, Trotsky found no room for an analysis of the problem of the participation of the peasantry in the socialist revolution. Obviously, because Trotsky had nothing to say about this, since for him this problem boiled down to the struggle against the counter-revolutionary aspirations of the peasantry.

He was concerned about the defeat of the revolution in the countries of Europe, which created "the least favorable conditions for the Soviet Republic and its economic development" "in the ring of economic blockades."

"The main trump cards," said Trotsky, "are clearly on our side, with the exception of one very significant one: behind the back of private capital operating in Russia stands world capital. We still live in a capitalist environment. Therefore, the question can and should be raised: will not our nascent socialism, which still manages capitalist means, be ruined by world capitalism? And answers: "If we assume, in fact, that capitalism will exist in Europe for another century or half a century, and that Soviet Russia will have to adapt to it in its economic policy, then the question is resolved by itself, because by this assumption we presuppose the collapse of the proletarian revolution in Europe and the advent of a new era of capitalist rebirth"[357], [358].

In assessing the prospects for the Russian socialist revolution, Trotsky merged with the Mensheviks (Social Democrats): if the socialist revolution in Europe is delayed (according to Trotsky, this is unlikely, but for the Social Democrats it is a matter of course), then the NEP will lead to the collapse of the socialist revolution in Russia. Both sides agree that this will happen through an inner rebirth ("thermidor"). It does not save the situation that Trotsky set long terms - 50-100 years. A month ago, he determined this period of 10 years. "Progress" is obvious, but it does not indicate the evolution of Trotsky's views, but

his masking of odious and unpopular conclusions in the Bolshevik Party, and also that these forecasts are emotional and dogmatic. Complete "hopelessness", one hundred percent "pessimism", from which Trotsky always tried to dissuade, but which constantly manifested itself, as it were, independently of his will.

In this speech at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, Trotsky, for the first time since 1917, opposed the Leninist concept of the socialist revolution in Russia with his own system of views and assessments, although not yet worked out in detail, but fully formed in its main provisions and approaches [359].

N.A. Vasetsky assesses Trotsky's report on the NEP at the IV Congress of the Comintern as

"the pinnacle in his political career in the post-war period. Above, from the point of view of the theoretical understanding of the NEP, he no longer rose" [360].

I think Vasetsky is right. But to this assessment it must be added that Trotsky's speech was also the culminating point in his disagreement with Lenin on the fundamental questions of the socialist revolution.

It is known that Trotsky later (for example, at the XV Conference [361]) objected to the opposition of his views, set forth at the Congress of the Comintern, to those of Lenin. At the same time, he referred to Lenin's note sent to him on November 25, 1922:

"I read your theses on the NEP and find them, in general, very good, and some of the wording is extremely successful, but a small part of the points seemed to me controversial."

However, there is nothing in Lenin's text that would make it possible to decipher it in the spirit of Trotsky, since Lenin does not specify either those positions that satisfied him or those that seemed to him controversial. But in this note, there is an indication of the valuable side of these theses:

“they will be successful in familiarizing the foreign public with our new economic policy” [362].

That's all. But if Lenin reduced the “successful” and “useful” part of Trotsky's theses to propaganda, then, consequently, Lenin does not include theoretical assessments and political forecasts among them and, obviously, counts them among the “disputable” points. Thus, this attempt by Trotsky to find in Lenin a witness to the coincidence of their views on basic theoretical and political issues cannot be considered satisfactory.

Trotsky spoke at the Congress on November 13, 1922, immediately after Lenin, so Lenin could not answer him here at the Congress, but he used his first public speech for this - November 20, 1922 at a meeting of the Moscow Council, which became his last speech. Lenin said that

“we had no doubt that we must ... succeed alone ... We must calculate in a capitalist situation how we will ensure our existence; how we will benefit from our adversaries”[363]. The chance for success was given by competition between capitalist states, which opened up the possibility of maneuvering between them, so the task is to become a “strong, independent” state in the face of the capitalist world [364].

And then Lenin directly formulates his, perhaps, the most important anti-Trotskyist thesis:

“Socialism is no longer a matter of the distant future... We have dragged socialism into everyday life, and this needs to be sorted out [365]. This is the task of our day; this is the task of our epoch. Let me end with an expression of confidence that no matter how difficult this task is, no matter how new it is ... not tomorrow, but in a few years, we will all solve this problem together at all costs, so that from NEP Russia there will be socialist Russia [366].

So, Lenin, revealing the new possibilities of the Russian revolution, in 1921-1922 further departed from the old assessments, demonstrating a

creative attitude towards Marxism as a method of knowledge and a guide to action. By the very fact that he began to search for ways to solve the new tasks that confronted the revolution and obtained the first positive results, Lenin made a step forward in the field of the theory of socialist revolution.

He moved towards recognizing the great opportunities for the development of the Russian socialist revolution in adverse external conditions, the greater autonomy of its development by identifying additional internal opportunities and opportunities to use inter-imperialist contradictions.

Lenin substantiated a new vision of the world socialist revolution and the place of the Russian revolution in it: ahead of the world revolution, enriching it not only with new experience, but also with new theoretical conclusions.

The further Lenin went in his views on the path of the development of the socialist revolution in Russia and the more Trotsky believed in the correctness of his theoretical scheme, the more he politically diverged from Lenin, the more his political closeness to the Russian Mensheviks and the European Social Democrats and dogmatic attitude towards Marxism, the inability to approach it creatively, manifested itself.

By the end of 1922, Lenin and Trotsky came up with clearly formulated, completely different political concepts, opposing each other in the most important questions of the theory, strategy, and tactics of the revolution.

Notes:

[319] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 26. S. 354; T. 27. S. 27; T. 30. S. 133; T. 31. S. 37; History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: In 6 vols. T. 2. M, 1966. S.521–526.

[320] Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b). August 1917 - February 1918. M, 1958. S. 85–86, 89–90, 94, 100, 104; Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 41. S. 348.

[321] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 41. S. 354–355.

[322] Ibid. T. 42. S. 1, 3.

[323] Ibid. pp. 21–25.

[324] Ibid. S. 261.

[325] Ibid. T. 43. S. 19.

[326] Ibid. S. 341.

[327] Ibid. pp. 330, 331, 383, 401, 404, 406.

[328] Ibid. T. 44. S. 60.

[329] Ibid. T. 43. S. 336.

[330] Ibid. pp. 382, 383.

[331] Ibid. S. 13, 384; T. 44. S. 326, 327; T. 45. S. 78; and etc.

[332] Ibid. T. 43. S. 228–229.

[333] Ibid. T. 44. S. 301.

[334] Ibid. pp. 581–582.

[335] Ibid. pp. 407–408; T. 45. S. 12.

[336] Ibid. T. 43. S. 219, 222.

[337] Ibid. T. 45, pp. 67–68, 72.

[338] Ibid. pp. 74, 75.

[339] Ibid. T. 44. S. 487; T. 45. S. 93.

[340] No wonder V.I. Lenin spoke of 100,000 tractors as a condition for the peasantry to accept the program of the socialist revolution.

[341] Ibid. T. 45, pp. 77, 81–82.

[342] Ibid. S. 83.

[343] Ibid. pp. 75–77, 79–84.

[344] Ibid. pp. 95, 96.

[345] In this case, not only economic (read - market) levers will be used (as is sometimes claimed), but also political and administrative ones - this is evidenced at least by Lenin's remarks (February 1922) on the Civil Code of the RSFSR (Lenin V. 44, pp . 396-400, 401, 411-412).

[346] Ibid. S. 95.

[347] Ibid. pp. 83, 84, 85–86.

[348] Ibid. pp. 93–95.

[349] Ibid. pp. 80–84.

[350] Related to this was his thinly veiled criticism of Lenin, and later his open criticism of Stalin.

[351] Ibid. S. 94.

[352] Ibid. pp. 95–96.

[353] Fifth All-Russian Congress of the RKSM. Oct 11 – 19 1922 Stenograph. report. M.; L., 1922. S. 31–32.

[354] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 277.

[355] Ibid. pp. 283, 285–288, 292, 294.

[356] Trotsky L.D. Works. T. XII. Basic questions of the proletarian revolution. Moscow, 1925, pp. 305-306, 312-313.

[357] Ibid. pp. 312, 323, 336.

[358] There is no reason to see in these conditions an accurate forecast of the fate of the Russian socialist revolution. First, in the course of the

development of the world revolutionary process, the socialist revolution went far beyond the boundaries of the first Soviet republics, and a socialist society was built in many countries. Secondly, the reasons for the defeat of socialism in the USSR and other countries cannot be reduced to what Trotsky spoke about.

[359] R. Tucker believed that Trotsky developed Leninism (see: Tucker R. Stalin, Path to Power. 1879-1929. History and Personality. M., 1991, pp. 292-294). Comparisons between the positions of Lenin and Trotsky provide no basis for such statements.

[360] See: Vasetsky N.A. Trotsky. The experience of political biography. M., 1992. S. 171.

[361] XV Conference of the All-Union Communist Party (b). October 26 - November 3, 1926 Stenograph. report. M; L. 1927. S. 509-510.

[362] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 314.

[363] Ibid. T. 45. S. 304, 306, 307.

[364] Ibid. pp. 301,307.

[365] What is meant by the words "socialism was dragged through every day" makes it possible to understand Lenin's earlier statement about the socialist sector in industry. In a report on the food tax on April 9, 1921, Lenin said that "we can by no means forget what we often observe - the socialist attitude of workers in state-owned factories, where the workers themselves collect fuel, raw materials, and products, or when - the workers are trying to distribute the products of industry correctly among the peasantry, they are transporting them by means of transport. This is socialism" (Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 43. S. 158, 355). The socialism that entered the daily life of the country. Lenin sees it where Trotsky sees no potential opportunity for the development of socialist production in the future, up to the victory of the world socialist revolution.

[366] Ibid. S. 309.

4. THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION OF LENIN AND TROTSKY

Since a significant place in Lenin's "Testament" is occupied by an assessment of the political and personal qualities of Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Pyatakov, it is necessary to consider the question of political and personal relations within the Politburo in 1921 - early 1923.

The widely held opinion in traditional historiography that Lenin strove and knew how to use the abilities of all his political opponents and adversaries for collective work **does not quite correspond to reality**. It would be more accurate to say that he was forced to work with his opponents and adversaries. Lenin built his working relations with other members of the Central Committee, taking into account not only their work and personal qualities, but also the proximity of political positions. And this is natural for a politician. This determined Lenin's relationship to Trotsky.

The time of their close working contacts dating back to the period of the civil war passed with its end and has never returned. In 1921-1922, the growing confrontation on an ever wider range of theoretical and fundamental political issues, as well as questions of the organization of current politics, were evident. On this basis, in the summer of 1921, political and personal relations sharply escalated **between Lenin and Trotsky**, and an open struggle began for the possession of real levers of power.

Lenin defended his right to remain the political leader of the party and the revolution. Trotsky openly challenged him, effectively declaring his rights to this leadership. For an outside observer, this could be presented as a struggle for power (as it is sometimes assessed in the literature), but it was a struggle for the possibility of carrying out that political course, which each of them considered the only true one. The struggle for power served only as a means to achieve this goal. The question of power rested on the question of leadership in the party, which made it possible to decisively influence the formation and implementation of the political course.

This struggle determined Lenin's search for such a political combination that would allow him and his supporters to win. At this time and under these conditions, a certain regrouping of political

forces took place in the Politburo (and in the Central Committee of the party). A Leninist core was formed, opposing Trotsky and his few supporters. Relying on this political force, Lenin launched an offensive against Trotsky.

Ideas about Lenin's working relations with other members of the Politburo in 1921-1922. can be compiled on the basis of information contained in the registration books of incoming and outgoing documentation of the secretariat of V.I. Lenin[367].

Lenin's contacts with Stalin, Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev

	Total num ber of cont acts	Party- govern ment constru ction*	Econ omic polic y	Dom estic politi cs	Fore ign poli cy	Comi ntern	Ideol ogy	Oth er
Stalin	115 (38.7 %)	35 (53.0%)	36 (45.6 %)	3 (13.6 %)	20 (60. 6%)	2 (4.9%)	4 (33.3 %)	11 (30. 6%)
Trotsky	70 (23.5 %)	18 (27.3%)	17 (21.5 %)	7 (31.8 %)	7 (21. 2%)	7 (17.1 %)	7 (58.3 %)	5 (13. 9%)
Kamenev	59 (19.8 %)	9 (13.6%)	20 (25.3 %)	12 (54.5 %)	5 (15. 2%)	3 (7.3%)	1 (8.3 %)	7 (19. 4%)
Zinoviev	53 (18.0 %)	4 (6.1%)	6 (7.6%)	0	1 (3.0 %)	29 (70.7 %)	0	13 (36. 1%)
Total	297 (100 %)	66 (100%)	79 (100 %)	22 (100 %)	33 (100 %)	41 (100%)	12 (100 %)	36 (100 %)

* Including issues of national-state, military construction, and personnel issues.

It can be clearly seen that Stalin is far ahead of the other members of the Politburo in the total number of registered correspondence, noticeably inferior to Trotsky only in the number of contacts on

domestic politics, the Comintern and ideology, Kamenev on domestic policy, and Zinoviev on Comintern matters. Trotsky and Kamenev follow him, Zinoviev closes the list.

The statistics of contacts speaks volumes (according to a group of cases containing V.I. Lenin's correspondence for 1922) [368], initiated by Lenin.

Contacts made on the initiative of Lenin

Correspondent/addressee	Total number of correspondence	Incl. directed by V.I. Lenin	
		Qty	%
Stalin	47	33	70.2%
Trotsky	59	ten	16.9%
Kamenev	32	twenty	62.5%
Zinoviev	33	fourteen	42.4%

Attention is drawn to the fact that the largest volume of correspondence relates to the contacts between Lenin and Trotsky, but Lenin, on his own initiative, turned to Trotsky much less often than to others. These figures will have to be adjusted downwards, given that among these letters there was a large proportion of those sent on the list to all members of the Central Committee or the Politburo.

At this time, Trotsky began to introduce into the system a new form of communication with members of the Central Committee - mailing letters, which naturally increased the total volume of correspondence that Lenin received from him. It should also be taken into account that a significant part of it was devoted to issues on which there was a heated discussion between him and Lenin, so their **high number** speaks not so much about the **closeness of their political views**, positions, and relations, but about **the problems that existed here**. Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee testified:

“Cooperation between comrade Trotsky and the majority of the Politburo have been going on for more than a year, mainly in the form of mailing comrade Trotsky of letters and declarations in which he invariably criticizes almost all the activities of the Central Committee. For the most part, the majority of the Politburo refrained from responding in writing

to these documents. Only occasionally, in some cases, comrade. Lenin responded with written explanations to one or another of the particularly incorrect statements of Comrade Trotsky"[369].

With regard to the frequency of contacts at the initiative of Lenin, Stalin stands out.

Also indicative is the frequency of references to Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev in separate documents (text, title, addressee) published in the 45th and 54th volumes of the Complete Works of V.I. Lenin: Trotsky is mentioned on page 61, Zinoviev on 62, Kamenev on 112, Stalin on 116. Keeping in mind the well-known conventionality of this calculation, we note that its results are in good agreement with the above data.

Of course, these statistics do not give an absolutely accurate picture of Lenin's actual contacts with other members of the Politburo. Only a small part of them was registered on paper in one form or another. A significantly larger number of contacts took place without registration - in the course of personal conversations, telephone conversations, conversations during meetings of the Politburo, plenums of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), etc., however, if we talk about politically important contacts, then many of them were associated with those problems that are reflected in written contacts. In addition, there is reason to believe that such operational and therefore unrecorded contacts between Stalin and Kamenev and Lenin were more or less the same and much more frequent than with Trotsky.

It is known from other sources that at that time Lenin solved many issues together with them. With Zinoviev, who spent much of his time in Petrograd, contacts were necessarily much more modest than with Stalin and Kamenev. And perhaps even less frequent than Trotsky's. If we take this into account, then there are grounds for believing that the above figures, despite their incompleteness, quite accurately convey the general nature of Lenin's contacts with other members of the Politburo.

The formation of a new alignment of political forces in the Politburo, the lowering of Trotsky's political weight, and the strengthening of Stalin's position in the Central Committee can be evidenced by the

practice of sending information reports from the OGPU on the situation in the country. They were sent every other day to 31-33 addresses. There is a clear system in the mailing list that allows you to see "who is who" in the then political leadership of the party and the country and confirms our observations. From May (it is from this time that reports are kept) until September 26, 1921, the names on the list go in this order: 1) Lenin and Stalin, 2) Trotsky and Sklyansky, 3) Molotov and Mikhailov (secretaries of the Central Committee of the RCP (b); to them sometimes a third secretary was added - Em. Yaroslavsky). Neither Kamenev nor Zinoviev are among the first persons on the list. It is also indicative that the same copy was sent to Lenin and Stalin. It's clear, which is not due to saving paper. Reports were sent one copy each to Trotsky and Sklyansky, as well as to Molotov and Mikhailov. Trotsky's position in this sense is overshadowed by his blocking with Sklyansky, indicating that the report was sent to Trotsky not as a member of the party leadership and leader No. 2 in the party, but as the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. This position of Trotsky did not change even later (lists are available until mid-July 1922) [370].

The expansion of the front of struggle between Lenin and Trotsky on the fundamental issues of the development of the socialist revolution and the implementation of the NEP was reflected in their work and personal relations. Outside of the meetings of the Politburo and other collegiate bodies, in which they contacted out of necessity, these relations were insignificant, intensified only from time to time and, as a rule, were limited to the issues on which they were discussing, i.e. were mostly negative in nature.

Contacts not marked by controversy are increasingly limited to political fluidity. Lenin only occasionally made positive "nods" to Trotsky [371]. Their correspondence suggests that the range of domestic and foreign policy issues discussed by them was narrowing. Lenin tries to avoid personal contacts with Trotsky, even by telephone, preferring to conduct them through intermediaries [372]. Of course, one cannot conclude from this that Trotsky as a politician was ignored by Lenin. But everything that could be decided without direct contact with Trotsky was decided by Lenin in this way. Yaroslavsky, who in 1921 was secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), recalled that

"Lenin repeatedly expressed extreme dissatisfaction with Trotsky, saying that he was 'mortally tired' of Trotsky's hysteria"[373].

Contacts between Lenin and Trotsky at the meetings of the Politburo during this period, especially from the middle of 1921, often took on a conflict character. Molotov recalled that in the first period after the 10th Party Congress, at meetings of the Politburo, "we sat almost next to Trotsky in the Politburo. Or rather, this: I am near Lenin, and Trotsky is opposite, obliquely. Trotsky was the first and constant opponent of Lenin, and during this period he adapted and walked in a common harness, so Lenin appreciated him all the same, "however, in the summer of 1921 the situation changed and "it became impossible to work with Trotsky" [374] .

M.I. Ulyanova recalled:

"At one meeting of the PB, Trotsky called Ilyich a "hooligan". Lenin turned pale as chalk, but restrained himself. "It seems that some people here are playing tricks on their nerves," he said something like this in response to Trotsky's rudeness, according to his comrades, who told me about this case. He did not feel sympathy for Trotsky, and besides that, this man had too many traits that made it extremely difficult to work collectively with him." [375]

A vivid picture of the relationship between Lenin and Trotsky, which excluded joint not only comradely, but also simply impeding the more or less productive work of the Politburo, is a letter given by of 9 members and candidates of the Politburo dated December 31, 1923. Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kalinin, Kamenev, Molotov, Rudzutak, Rykov , Stalin and Tomsy wrote:

"Before Comrade fell ill. Lenin, at the time when comrade Lenin directly supervised the work of the Politburo," it "could not work quietly precisely because comrade Trotsky introduced those elements of factionalism and isolation at the same time, *which he began to introduce to an even greater extent since then, as comrade Lenin fell ill* (our italics. - BC).

Comrade Trotsky, then and now, complains about the absence of a planned element in the work of the Politburo. But if anyone bears the blame for the fact that the work of the Politburo proceeded and to some extent still proceed in an extremely tense and nervous atmosphere, it is Comrade Trotsky. For months and months, Comrade Trotsky appears at the meetings of the Politburo (and this was at the time when Comrade Lenin presided over the Politburo) with a thick English dictionary, and during almost the entire meeting defiantly studied English, from time to time being distracted from this lesson only in order to make an acrimonious remark about the poor system of work in the Politburo. More than once things came to sharp clashes and serious conflicts between Comrade Trotsky, on the one hand, and Comrade Lenin, who presided over the Politburo, and other members of the Politburo, on the other. In view of the extreme nervousness of the situation, Comrade Lenin increasingly turned to the undersigned with a proposal to resolve this or that issue by voting by telephone, in order only to avoid unnecessary scenes, conflicts, etc." [376].

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on January 1, 1926, during Trotsky's polemic with Stalin on the organization of the work of the Politburo and Trotsky's participation in it, Petrovsky stated:

"And by the way, I must say that at one time Vladimir Ilyich complained at meetings of the Politburo that few people work. Here is Comrade Trotsky," said Ilyich, "sitting and reading English books—he doesn't work much." Petrovsky was supported by Yaroslavsky, who in 1921 was secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). None of the Politburo members present protested this statement. Trotsky answered without refuting what was said on the merits [377].

It is not surprising that Lenin began to take measures that could somehow remove or mitigate the problem that had arisen. Molotov talked about the methods that Lenin resorted to during the meetings of the Politburo to conduct a political struggle against Trotsky. In particular, he said that in 1921 he "participated in Lenin's conspiracy against Trotsky":

"Lenin suggested that we gather for meetings of the Politburo without Trotsky. We conspired against him." [378]

Interesting documents confirming Molotov's testimony were cited by D.A. Volkogonov [379]. So, for example, when Kamenev made a proposal to finance the army, Lenin wrote in a letter: "I fully join"; Stalin, Zinoviev and Molotov also wrote their consent, while Trotsky abstained. Then Lenin wrote: "I propose to meet today at my place ... together with Stalin (Zinoviev and Molotov) and agree on the convocation of the Politburo,

*The political conflict that was brewing between Lenin and Trotsky was already in the summer of 1921 became so aggravated that Lenin made an attempt to send Trotsky to work somewhere from Moscow. Various options were discussed, and they settled on Ukraine, where work on the procurement of bread was difficult and needed organizational strengthening. A formal reason was found. The real reason was different: **Lenin wanted to remove Trotsky from Moscow** in order to free his hands to carry out the chosen course, get rid of the importunate critic and get rid of the disruptor of the work of the Politburo. In addition, the absence of Trotsky in Moscow for a long time would eventually raise the question of the need to replace him as head of the military department, since it would be difficult to combine the hard work of preparing food for the People's Commissariat of Food of Ukraine and the leadership of the army outside Moscow. Molotov told about the presence of such an intention in Lenin:*

"Lenin understood that from the point of view of complicating matters in the party and the state, Trotsky acted very corruptly. Dangerous figure. It was felt that Lenin would be glad to get rid of him, but he could not. And Trotsky had enough strong, direct supporters, there were also neither this nor that, but they recognized his great authority ... Lenin, no less than Stalin, understood what Trotsky was, and believed that the time would come to remove Trotsky, Lenin decided to get rid of him: "Let's go to Zinoviev to come to an agreement, what should we do?" Three of us - Lenin, Kamenev, and I ... went to Zinoviev to negotiate what to do with Trotsky. He should have been removed from the post of People's Commissar of the Navy"[381].

Trying to soften the negative impression of this story, Trotsky, in a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated October 23, 1923, tried to create the impression that it was an ordinary business trip,

which he and other members of the Politburo had a lot of and which "had nothing to do with to internal disagreements in the Politburo, but were caused by urgent business needs. Trotsky described this story as a "ten-degree episode"[382].

Many of his explanations were accepted willingly. Volkogonov supported this version by **ignoring archival materials** to which he had access and could not have been unaware of this story. Calling Trotsky Lenin's "magic wand" who was sitting in the Kremlin all the time, he assured the reader that this time Trotsky refused to travel because of his overburdened business and managed to convince Lenin "of the correctness of his position" [383].

This version is also supported by the publishers of Trotsky's letter to members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the RCP(b) dated October 23, 1923, who made an attempt to smooth out the conflict between Lenin and Trotsky and present this story, if not for the benefit of Trotsky's political authority, then at least without prejudice for him. This is achieved by referring to the Politburo's agreement "not to enforce this decision until the convening of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)"[384].

In the Bio-chronicle of Lenin, the **fact of the conflict is not hidden**, but its history is presented in a distorted form, hiding the severity of the conflict varnishes the true relationship between Lenin and Trotsky and thus supports the legend of Lenin's desire to rally all his political opponents and opponents around him[385]

What actually happened? Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in a letter dated October 19, 1923 said:

"No one else but Comrade. Lenin, by the end of 1921 (the date is indicated erroneously. - BC) passed a decision in the Politburo on the appointment of comrade. Trotsky to Ukraine as authorized by the People's Commissariat of Food"; this decision, later canceled, "was caused precisely by the intolerable situation that was created by the constant declarations of comrade Trotsky against the majority of the Central Committee"[386].

In solving this problem, Lenin personally did not connect any special hopes with Trotsky. The so-called "Pomgol", which included Trotsky, was directly involved in the fight against hunger. All work was under the control of the Politburo, in which these questions went mainly through Lenin and Kamenev. A good harvest was expected in Ukraine, and great hopes were placed on it in the fight against hunger. Questions were discussed about how to organize the harvest and tax in kind, the size of the possible seizure of grain [387].

On July 16, 1921, Lenin submitted a proposal to the Politburo "on the appointment of comrade. Trotsky NKProdom of Ukraine. **Trotsky protested.** How he argued his refusal, we do not know; the protest, apparently, was energetic enough, but unconvincing for the Politburo, because the decision made read:

"a) Appoint Comrade Trotsky to the NKProdom of Ukraine.

b) In view of Comrade Trotsky's protest, this decision should not be carried out until the convening of the Plenum.

Instruct the Organizing Bureau to convene the Plenum as soon as possible"[388].

It is no coincidence that Trotsky and the historiography following him are trying to mitigate the acuteness of the problem that has arisen. There is a "state of emergency": **a member of the Politburo refuses to comply with the decision of the Politburo**, and in order to solve the problem that has arisen, it is decided to speed up the convocation of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the party. This is not an ordinary case. No matter how he argued his act (he was not sick), this refusal of Trotsky to obey meant a gross **violation of party discipline**. It is clear from the resolution that Trotsky did not convince the Politburo that he was right. Measures were even taken to quickly bring the issue to the discussion of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party and resolve it there in a positive way. This decision shows, therefore, that Lenin also did not abandon his intention to "send" Trotsky to the Ukraine.

But Trotsky is not so simple either. Well, if he does not want to get bread in Ukraine for the starving Russia (he has other plans!), Then he

will find the necessary arguments. What exactly happened is not entirely clear. Trotsky later described what happened as follows:

"I got in touch by phone with Comrade Rakovsky, who stated that all the necessary measures to provide the workers' centers with bread had already been taken[389]. Vladimir Ilyich at first insisted on my trip, but then abandoned this idea. [390]

This is such a good picture. However, later he offered another version of events:

"Comrade Lenin was afraid in the autumn (*an error in determining the time.* - V.S.) that the Ukrainians would not show sufficient energy in collecting the tax in kind (and during this period this issue was very important) and offered to send me (not from the People's Commissariat for Food, but from the Central Committee (*this is a direct lie.- BC*)) for the appropriate "pressure".. since I got the impression from my previous visit to Ukraine that the Ukrainian comrades would do what they needed themselves, I considered my trip unnecessary. The disagreement was purely practical. Comrade Lenin's proposal was accepted. Then, in order to avoid confusion in relations, I proposed to appoint me temporarily (it was about 4-6 weeks) as People's Commissariat for Food of Ukraine. This was accepted (without exemption, of course, from other duties) [391].

The next day, Lenin himself, having received more reassuring information from Kharkov, came to me at the military commissariat and offered to cancel yesterday's decision, which I met, of course, with sympathy, since I considered the decision made inexpedient. [392]

Trotsky got confused in his versions. In his place, either Lenin himself proposes to appoint him a People's Commissariat for Food, or Trotsky suggested this idea to him. Either Lenin made this proposal, or he himself recognized it as inexpedient. Now Trotsky agrees to go as a People's Commissariat for Food, then he expresses a strong protest.

Now Trotsky agrees to go as a People's Commissariat for Food, then he expresses a strong protest. Either he contacts Rakovsky after the

decision of the Politburo is made and receives assurances from him that they will manage without him, or it turns out that in his objections he relied on his own impressions from a previous trip to Ukraine. Understand who can ... The same can be said about Trotsky's statement that Lenin visited him in the military department, this fact does not find confirmation in other documents, Lenin's Biochronicle is silent about him. It records Lenin's conversation with Trotsky on July 27, 1921, about sending him to Ukraine and about the upcoming Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), but nothing is said about the fact that Lenin went to Trotsky for this [393].

The only constant element in Trotsky's stories is that Lenin admits his ignorance, the incorrectness of his assessments, the irrationality of his proposals, and Trotsky's superiority over himself. Moreover, he considers it necessary to record this not only orally before Trotsky, but also in writing before the Politburo, and to testify his respect for Trotsky by a personal visit to him in the military department.

Impressive picture! But Trotsky cannot be trusted! The documents that these days came to Lenin from Ukraine indicated that the problem of collecting the food tax remained very complex and acute, requiring full effort. The available documents show that Lenin himself communicated with the leaders of Ukraine, was aware of all the affairs and did not need Trotsky's mediation[394]. On August 2, Lenin's appeal to the international proletariat with a request to help Soviet Russia[395] suggests that he assessed the complexity of the situation in a completely different way than Trotsky.

Trotsky found some other arguments to get Lenin to abandon his original plan. It is possible that Lenin could be persuaded to make a concession to Trotsky by a threat to present his departure to the Ukraine as a manifestation of political struggle, a manifestation of factionalism, etc., and on this basis to begin a new round of intra-party struggle. Lenin believed that the time for an open battle had not yet come, the conditions for it had not yet ripened. There are grounds for such an assumption. It is known that the matter was decided in the course of a private conversation between Lenin and Trotsky between July 16 and 23. Lenin wrote about this on July 23, 1921, in a note to Molotov:

"I already told you about my conversation with him."

And that's all. Lenin is silent about its content. Molotov did not mention it either. Lenin's intentions are indicated by his other note to Molotov, in which he reported on the same conversation:

"I think that on this attempt at "Peace and Concessions" (at least for a while - peace is still better than a quarrel, publicity at the Plenum, etc.) - we could all come together. "Let's try," Lenin concluded. He also informed Molotov that Kamenev and Zinoviev agreed, Trotsky "also, as I understand it, agrees"[396].

On July 28, 1921, Lenin wrote a draft resolution of the Politburo, which he sent to Trotsky and other members of the Politburo. Lenin proposed an interesting and unprecedented document in the history of the party: "*The draft unanimous resolution* of the Pburo" (emphasis added. - V.S.). It read: "

1. The decision of the Pburo to appoint Comrade Trotsky to party work in Ukraine is cancelled.

2. It is decided that Comrade Trotsky, in connection with the aggravation of the international situation (signs of the aggressive policy of France; something like the "experience" of intervention in Murmansk, etc.), devotes more energy to military work (strengthening the combat training of the army) [397].

3. It is decided that Comrade Trotsky has the right to take (at a distance not too far from Moscow, so as not to break away from work in the center) one or more state farms under the jurisdiction of the military department; to these state farms, in the form of an experiment, the law on the expansion of the financial and material independence of large enterprises is applied; these state farms lease neighboring industrial enterprises in order to combine agriculture with industry and create an economic whole with the special task of checking from below the correctness and expediency of our decrees, analyzing the conditions for hiring and employing non-military labor, etc. This experiment must be carried out under conditions which, for the sake of the pure conduct of this experiment, exclude any privileged position for these

enterprises and state farms. Not excluding the leasing of state farms of other departments for the same purposes,

By special decree:

It is recognized that it is necessary to put on the agenda the question of a more intensive transfer of the army to economic work, and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic [of the Republic] is instructed to specifically discuss and put this in a series of meetings"[398].

Let's think about the title, it deserves special attention: **the draft unanimous resolution**. What can this more than strange name coined by Lenin speak about? The fact that the "unanimous decision" of the Politburo on August 9, 1921, to which Trotsky refers, **was not the result** of a discussion and recognition by the members of the Politburo as erroneous of their own decision to send Trotsky to the Ukraine by the People's Commissariat for Food (July 16, 1921), **but the result of some agreement reached by Lenin and Trotsky**, a compromise between them. The demand for unanimity was addressed by Lenin both to his supporters and to Trotsky. The former had to be pushed to change their minds, and Trotsky to compromise.

In order to understand the real reasons that prompt Lenin and his supporters to send Trotsky to work in Ukraine (or rather, to remove him from Moscow), two letters from Molotov to Lenin are invaluable, from which it becomes clear that the real reason for the question about Trotsky's work was the desire to remove him from Moscow. **Anywhere! Under any acceptable pretext!** And this whole story appears in its true light as a manifestation of one of **the most acute phases of Lenin's political struggle against Trotsky**.

On July 30, 1921, Molotov informed Lenin of Trotsky's reply to Lenin's draft "unanimous resolution" which was being discussed in the Politburo. It is clear from Molotov's letter that Trotsky had objections. He considered that "the third point is worded ... incorrectly. What does it mean:

"Trotsky has the right to take one or more state farms under the jurisdiction of the military department." Since the state farms are in the military department, there is no need for any

resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee. We are talking about state farms and enterprises that are not in the hands of the military department. I believe that the third point should have been worded as follows: the Politburo proposes that the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat for Food (or their Moscow bodies) come to an agreement with the military department represented by Comrade Trotsky on the transfer of several state farms and industrial enterprises to the military department on one or another contractual basis. [expected] x enterprises within the Moscow province, which in their totality could create a combined enterprise, on the basis of which it would be possible to study and apply new decrees, the correctness and expediency of various economic methods, etc., etc., when establishing contractual relations, be guided by the decrees that exist on this account and are to be followed on leasing, etc., and at the same time provide all possible assistance to the specified economic experience"[399].

On the same day, Molotov wrote another letter to Lenin:

"I will give my opinion:

I believe that your proposal ("draft unanimous] resolution]") did not provide any desirable way out of the situation that had arisen, and most importantly, could create an aura of "persecuted" comrade Trotsky. "Experiments" such as those proposed by you and Comrade Trotsky, in addition to their dubious value, are unlikely to be *intelligible* to the majority of party members [400].

It seems to me that one of the following solutions would be the best way out:

First (*best*). Trotsky is chairman of the Petrograd Soviet with a directive to pay attention to economic work. Or Trotsky, [formally *deputy* chairman of the *Petro[grad]* Soviet (temporarily, for 1/2 year, in view of the need for Comrade Zinoviev to take up the Comintern after the congress, and therefore temporarily stay in Moscow). Or another combination of this kind (for example, Trotsky, chairman of

the economic] meeting] of the Northern [northern] region, while remaining *in the RVSR*).

Second. Trotsky deals with both the army and the people's commissariat of labor in view of the connection of the armies with economic work and special assignments in the field of preserving the proletariat, protecting the main cadre from being dissipated, and so on. There are two (main) inconveniences here: 1) associated with his participation in the SRT in his current mood, 2) the possibility of sharp conflicts in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Third. Tr[otsky] chairman of the economic conference] in the Urals or the Ukraine. But it is again possible that it will be accepted as expulsion, etc.

All such combinations would, it seems to me, be more durable than others. [401]

During the preparation of the Plenum of the Central Committee, Lenin himself supplemented the agenda with a paragraph on Trotsky:

"15. Decision [Pb about comrade. Trotsky[om]]"[402].

This means that he wanted to bring the decision about Trotsky to the end. On August 9, 1921, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) canceled the decision of the Politburo to send Trotsky to Ukraine by the People's Commissariat for Food and adopted the draft "unanimous resolution" prepared by Lenin (July 28, 1921).

The **attempt to remove Trotsky failed**. It was necessary not only to continue to work with him in Moscow, but also to take measures to counteract his attempts to get to the levers of economic management, which, combined with his position in the army, would **turn him into** an economic and, therefore, political dictator.

By allowing Trotsky to start the "economic experiment", Lenin, apparently, pursued political goals. Molotov recalled Lenin's reaction to the decision of the Plenum:

“Lenin shook hands! He said: “Try to do something in agriculture in one year! Nothing is impossible!”[403].

Some of today's critics of Lenin may say: behold, he has given a man a hopeless cause and rejoices at the inevitable failure. It's not friendly. Answer: do not rush! Lenin had reason to put the question in this way. Trotsky believed that Lenin was procrastinating, organizing things poorly, so the revolution was losing momentum, and so on. Lenin, on the other hand, believed that in matters of economics it was impossible to go so fast and get such quick results as Trotsky spoke about.

Members of the Politburo spoke about this: “Already at the very beginning of the “economic” speeches of Comrade. Trotsky against the majority of the Central Committee, two or three years ago, none other than Comrade Lenin explained Comrade Trotsky dozens of times that economic questions are among those where quick successes are impossible, where years and years of patient and persistent work are required in order to achieve serious results. More than once Comrade Lenin explained that in the field of raising our economy, nothing serious can be achieved by impudent, swooping, strong words, and even more so by panicky exaggerations. [404]. Taking into account these discussions, the meaning of Lenin's words, transmitted by Molotov, will be as follows: try to show yourself in practice how to do it. The experience will do you good, maybe.

In the second half of 1921 - 1922. the **process of exclusion of Trotsky from party and state work took place quietly, but steadily**. Step by step, Lenin advanced in this direction. This was also noted by D.A. Volkogonov, who provided extensive material characterizing this process. His attempts to impose his scheme of reorganization of management were rejected, Trotsky's desire to obtain key levers of power in the economy (to become an "economic dictator") was blocked.

Outside the framework of the Politburo and the military department (where his independence began to be severely limited), "leader No.2" working along the lines of Pomgol and ARA, took part in the discussion of certain issues of industrial development [405].

Over time, in his correspondence with Lenin, the flow of *regarding* secondary and even minor issues relating to the Comintern, issues of foreign and domestic policy, individual issues of personnel appointments, which he either raised before Lenin or participated in their solution increased [406]. The sphere where he continued to maintain more or less regular contact with Lenin was ideology and propaganda, the Comintern, foreign policy, in particular the organization and holding of the Genoa Conference [407].

Lenin's desire to sideline Trotsky from managing the economy, to load him with political fluidity, is especially pronounced if we consider that at the same time the process of expanding authority upon Stalin and Kamenev was underway.

Notes:

[367] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. Case 3. Sheet 4 rev., 9, 10 rev., 11, 32 rev., 35, 41 rev., 43, 45 rev., 49, 49 rev., 51, 53, 55–57, 59, 60, 60v, 67–68v, 74–75, 77v, 78, 80v, 81, 83v, 84, 92v, 93, 94, 94v, 95v., 97–102, 104, 104v, 106–106v, 107v, 108, 109, 110, 111–111v, 112v, 114–116v, 118; D. 7. L. 4, 4v., 5v., 8, 10v., 11, 14v., 24v., 36v., 38, 40, 45–47, 49, 53v., 57 rev., 61 rev., 62 rev. –65, 68v, 69, 70v, 72v, 73v, 76, 83–84v, 86v, 94v, 114v, 116, 116v, 118, 121v, 123v, 124v, 125, 126 rev, 127, 127 rev, 129, 133, 134 rev-136, 137 rev, 139; D. 8. L. 6, 6 rev, 8, 9 rev, 11, 13, 13 rev, 18-19 rev, 25 rev, 26 rev, 33 rev, 34 rev, 38, 39 rev, 45 rev.- 46 rev, 64 rev - 65 rev, 73 rev, 76 rev, 80, 94 rev, 96, 96 rev, 101, 102 rev, 141, 159 rev; D. 9. L. 2, 4v, 7, 8, 8v, 18-21, 23, 24, 24v, 30v, 31,

[368] Ibid. D. 26, 28, 30, 32–35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43.

[369] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 7. S. 176.

[370] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2623. L. 146; D. 2624–2636.

[371] *Lenin V.I.* Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 6, 7.

[372] Ibid. T. 54. S. 131.

[373] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 189.

[374] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 205.

[375] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 197.

[376] Ibid. 1991. No. 3. P. 212. Lenin's documents confirm this. Lenin often suggested to Molotov that a decision be made on this or that issue by polling the members of the Politburo, "in a round-robin fashion" (see: V. I. *Lenin* , Complete collection of works, vol. 54, pp. 57, 58, 70; One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov. From the diary of F. Chuev, p. 200.

[377] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 209. L. 9-11.

[378] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. pp. 201-202, 204-208.

[379] *Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 23.*

[380] *Lenin V.I.* Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 305.

[381] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. pp. 182, 207.

[382] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. S. 173.

[383] Cit. by: *Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. P. 21.*

[384] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. S. 182.

[385] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 11. S. 127-128.

[386] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 7. S. 187.

[387] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 179. L. 5; D. 184. L. 1; D. 186. L. 1; *Lenin V.I.* Full coll. op. T. 44, pp. 67-69.

[388] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 190. L. 4.

[389] It turns out that all the emergency measures that Trotsky himself voted for, taken at that time and later by the Politburo, were useless?

[390] Questions of history. 1989. No. 8. S. 138–139.

[391] Trotsky also links his appointment with the fate of his other duties, the main of which are: member of the Politburo, People's Commissar of the RSFSR, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.

[392] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. S. 173.

[393] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 11. S. 105, 106; Lenin collection. T. XXXIX. S. 359.

[394] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2723. L. 1–1 rev.; Op. 2. D. 42. L. 3, 4, 7v.

[395] *Lenin V.I.* Full coll. op. T. 44, pp. 75–76, 77.

[396] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 71. L. 5, 24; F. 2. Op. 1. D. 20015. L. 1–1 rev.

[397] References to the danger of war cannot be taken seriously because Lenin himself did not consider such a danger to be serious. In Lenin's project, this was expressed in a proposal to speed up the transfer of the army to economic work in the context of ongoing demobilization, which Trotsky objected to in the Politburo and which Lenin and Stalin insisted on (see: RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24619. L. 1–2, F. 5. Inventory 1. D. 1954. L. 12; *Lenin*, V. I. Complete collection of works, vol. 44, pp. 3–4, 35–36; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. S. 182).

[398] Ibid. L. 5, 24–25.

[399] Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24608. L. 1–2 rev.

[400] From this we can conclude that Molotov took a tougher line with regard to Trotsky than Lenin. Or maybe he showed more impatience in this struggle.

[401] Ibid. L. 2–3.

[402] Ibid. D. 24613. L. 1.

[403] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 207.

[404] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 7. S. 177.

[405] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 7a; *Lenin V.I.* Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 176.

[406] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 293. L. 1; F. 17. Op. 3. D. 303. L. 1–7.

[407] *Lenin V.I.* Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 148; RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 297. L. 1; F. 17. Op. 3. D. 247. L. 3.

5. LENIN CORE OF THE POLITBURO

During 1921, in parallel with the aggravation of the political confrontation between Lenin and Trotsky, there was a process of strengthening the positions of the "Lenin core" in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the RCP (b). It began to take shape on the eve of the 10th Party Congress during the "discussion about trade unions". The Leninist core, or, as it was sometimes called, the "Leninist group"* included, in addition to Lenin, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and also Molotov, who was then secretary of the Central Committee and the first candidate for membership in the Politburo.

In the literature an opinion that was not entirely accurate, has been established about the nature of political relations within the Leninist group. It is usually believed that Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev were completely dependent on Lenin, and if they showed independence, it was only in the form of political intrigue. This, of course, was not true.

Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev were established and authoritative party leaders. It is also believed that the closest people to Lenin were Zinoviev and Kamenev [408]. The statistics of Lenin's contacts cited in the previous paragraph tell a different story: Lenin's closest political contacts were with Stalin, and the favorite of traditional historiography, Zinoviev, turned out to be the least connected with Lenin by constant political work. The same is indicated by the mailing list of information reports of the OGPU, which was also discussed above. Only for a short time (from July 26 to September 26) Zinoviev was listed third on this list, and then disappears from it [409].

From September 27, 1921, the beginning of the list takes the following form: 1) Lenin, 2) Stalin, 3) Trotsky and Sklyansky, 4) Molotov and Mikhailov [410]. Kamenev appears in it only on March 9, 1922, at number five [411], soon moving to fourth place, immediately after Trotsky [412].

LENIN AND ZINOVIEV

The foregoing indicates that Zinoviev, as part of the core of the Leninist group, had the weakest position. Volkogonov records the cooling of Lenin's relations with Zinoviev after October 1917, but he does not know the reasons for this [413]. Indeed, the reasons are not

clear in the historical literature. Even M .I. Ulyanova spoke very vaguely on this score:

“I think that for a number of personal reasons ... towards Zinoviev] the attitude of Vladimir] [Ilyich] was not good. But even here he again restrained himself for the sake of the interests of the cause. According to Molotov, “Lenin valued him as a journalist ... because he often did not have a suitable person at hand who would quickly write, catching his thoughts ... Lenin did not trust Zinoviev ... The correspondence between Lenin and Zinoviev shows that Lenin was dissatisfied with Zinoviev every now and then, because he swayed, although he pretended to be a Leninist” [415].

Apparently, this is correct. The reasons for Lenin's cool relationship with Zinoviev apparently go back to the period of emigration, to the disappointment associated with the position he took in October 1917, as well as during the civil war (during which Zinoviev again showed himself as a person subject to panic moods). No wonder Zinoviev became a member of the Politburo only in 1921, at the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b), after he actively supported Lenin against Trotsky during the discussion on trade unions. It is possible that Zinoviev's isolation from Moscow affected, as well as the heavy workload of the Comintern, which in 1921-1922. as the importance of domestic politics and economic issues gradually lost their importance. At the same time, the contacts between Lenin and Zinoviev on these issues lost their former significance. Perhaps the leader's habits of the ambitious Zinoviev, associated with his position in the Comintern, had an effect.

In the autumn of 1921, Lenin was greatly troubled by the conflict that broke out in the Petrograd party organization, which was facilitated by Zinoviev's political pretensions. Zinoviev accused the secretariat of the Petrogubkom RCP (b) of insolvency, and the secretary of the Petrograd provincial committee of the RCP (b) N.A. Uglanova in violation of the terms for convening the provincial party conference. Uglanov and his supporters accused Zinoviev of wrong methods of work, of violating the principle of collective leadership [416]. Party activists supported Uglanov [417].

On September 20, 1921, Zinoviev reported to the Central Committee of the party that a "serious party conflict" had broken out in Petrograd,

and asked for a call to Moscow to settle it [418]. The Politburo summoned the leaders of the Petrograd organization "for comradely negotiations" and created a commission to resolve the conflict, consisting of Lenin, Stalin, and Molotov. As Uglanov recalls, at Lenin's insistence, an informal discussion of this problem was held without Zinoviev and secretly from him in Stalin's apartment [419].

On September 22, Lenin wrote the "Resolution of the Politburo Commission on the Question of the Petro[grad] Organization", Stalin and Molotov signed it. The commission actually supported the "young" against Zinoviev [420].

On September 23, the Politburo heard a resolution prepared by the commission on the question of the Petrograd party organization and approved it with one addition [421].

This conflict had another facet, which is indicated by Zinoviev's letter sent on September 29, 1921 from Petrograd to Lenin. Trying to bring the conflict, which was based on disagreements in matters of organizational and party work, to the level of fundamental political differences, Zinoviev reported bad moods in Petrograd, seeing the reason for them in the activities of his opponents. Zinoviev believed that the mood in St. Petersburg, which is a "barometer", "foreshadows something new and extremely dangerous inside parties." If he often leaves St. Petersburg for Moscow, then the influence of this group in the city will increase.

The reader must have concluded that the danger to the party and the revolution would also increase. And then another, perhaps the main twist of the theme followed. "Frightening" Lenin with the prospect of a threat to the revolution, Zinoviev offers a choice:

"Either transfer the Comintern to St. Petersburg, or I leave Petrograd and move to Moscow."

Further, he gave weak arguments against the transfer of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to Petrograd and formulated the main thesis of the letter:

"I can't imagine who in St. Petersburg could replace me now in such a difficult period." With substitution goes badly. The workers don't like it. I don't know how to be. It will be necessary to raise the issue at the Plenum and decide in principle"[422].

Zinoviev's desire is quite easy to read - to transfer the apparatus of the Comintern from Moscow to Petrograd and get more free hands in Comintern issues, to strengthen his positions in the Comintern, and in Petrograd, and, consequently, in the Politburo.

On September 29, Lenin, on behalf of the Politburo commission, wrote a letter to Zinoviev (it was also signed by Stalin and Molotov), which testifies that Zinoviev's innermost intention was clear to him and that he could not count on the support of the Politburo:

"The three of us (Molotov, Stalin, and I) discussed your letter as a commission chosen by the Central Committee.

As before, we cannot agree with you... There are no differences of principle in St. Petersburg, there is not even a bias to bias. Neither Komarov nor Uglanov, who were the most reliable at the Tenth Congress of the RCP, also at the Metal Workers' Congress, have none of this. These comrades could not have gone downhill so suddenly. We have not seen a shadow of facts to prove this. There is a legitimate desire of the majority to be the majority and replace the group through which you "ruled" with another. People have grown up and therefore their desire is legitimate. There is no need to push them into a deviation, speaking of "fundamental differences". It is necessary to carefully carry out ideological leadership, fully allowing the new majority to be the majority and govern.
[423]

Zinoviev's proposal to move the ECCI to Petrograd was rejected, but the conflict continued and was not settled soon [424]. This story suggests that Lenin "did not bet" on Zinoviev and, therefore, did not value him as highly as his other associates.

How dissatisfied Lenin was with Zinoviev at that time is evidenced by the fact that on November 16, Lenin, while preparing a collection of his articles for publication, decided to recall the old story about how Zinoviev and the "St. Petersburg" people "tricked" him with the publication of his pamphlet:

"St. Petersburg residents are extremely fond of showing their independence at all costs, even to the point of not fulfilling the author's request, which is binding on all other people, comrades, and

citizens, in all countries and in all republics, even Soviet ones (with the exception of independent St. Petersburg)... cunning was added to "independence", and I was finally left in the cold"[425].

Lenin was preparing a public rebuke, but for some reason he decided not to publish this preface and, apparently, soon regretted it. In any case, on November 22, 1921, Stalin sent a note:

"C. Lenin This document once again shows that it was not necessary to refuse to publish the well-known preface to Lenin's latest pamphlet, On the New Economic Policy. I. Stalin"[426].

Of course, Zinoviev occupied a prominent position in the leadership of the party. This is evidenced by the fact that at the Eleventh Congress he makes two reports (on the strengthening of the party and on the Comintern). At the same time, at the congress, he was subjected to rather harsh criticism by both opponents and supporters of Lenin [427]. Lenin did not say a word in defense of Zinoviev.

The fact that there was a certain distance between Lenin and Zinoviev in personal and political relations is indicated by the practice of Lenin's visits. There is a group of cases in the fund of Lenin's secretariat, which contain notes to Lenin with requests to accept their authors. A lot of people made such requests, among them Lunacharsky, Pyatakov, Nogin, Mezhlauk, Menzhinsky, V. Obolensky, Preobrazhensky, Serebrovsky, Semashko and others. There are no notes only from Stalin, Trotsky, and Kamenev. But there are notes from Zinoviev [428].

Obviously, Zinoviev belonged to the group of those who asked for a meeting, and did not come to Lenin when necessary. For example, in a note dated October 9, 1922, Zinoviev asked to be informed when Lenin would be able to receive him to discuss the issues of the Urquhart concession, the Stalin commission, the Plenum of the Central Committee, and others. [429] The absence of close relations between them is also evidenced by the fact that in the summer of 1922, during Lenin's illness and his stay in Gorki, Zinoviev visited Lenin only twice (August 1 and September 2) **, i.e. much less than Stalin and even Kamenev [430].

LENIN AND KAMENEV

Kamenev's political and power positions were much stronger than those of Zinoviev, which was determined primarily by his political closeness to Lenin as one of the main developers of the NEP and an active participant in the creation of a new economic mechanism. This is evidenced by a comparison of the statistics of contacts with Lenin, the nature of their correspondence, and the practice of sending out OGPU reports. Being one of the developers of the NEP, Kamenev, together with Lenin, opposed Trotsky. I.P. Donkov states:

“The range of problems on which Vladimir Ilyich spoke with Kamenev was extremely diverse. Only in 1922 did Lenin have a detailed conversation with him about the work of the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO, about the work of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), discusses the problems of establishing prosecutorial supervision, the state of finances and prospects for the harvest, the work of the Finance Committee, issues of tariff policy, position in the People's Commissariat of Railways, monetary reform, the development of economic ties with the business community of America, the provision of concessions to L. Urquhart, the estimate of the People's Commissariat of War, the creation of the Union of Socialist Republics, the strengthening of the monopoly of foreign trade”[431].

This list can be expanded, but in general it correctly conveys the spectrum and nature of Lenin's constant contacts with Kamenev. It is clear from the documents that they were not only trusting and respectful, but also warm and comradely. According to Molotov, Lenin “loved” Kamenev more than Zinoviev, and highly valued his business qualities [432]. He said this in his last speech at a meeting of the Moscow Council on November 20, 1922 [433] At the same time, it is noteworthy that Lenin noted not the political, but precisely the businesslike qualities of Kamenev. Obviously, this is no coincidence, anyway, in their daily contacts, economic issues dominate over party and general political issues. The available documents say that the current economic work overwhelmed Kamenev more and more, there was less and less time left to participate in solving other issues, which is probably why his participation in the affairs of the party management is barely visible, and participation in solving issues that go beyond purely economic (except for those that were discussed

collectively in the Politburo) can, without fear of making a mistake, be characterized as episodic.

D.A. Volkogonov believed that "Kamenev could influence Lenin gradually, imperceptibly"[434].

This is a correct observation; we must agree with it. In any case, a number of his letters on the question of the principles of unification of the Soviet republics allow us to admit the idea of an attempt to play a card of contradictions between Lenin and Stalin: he wrote to Lenin about his fundamental solidarity with him, and to Stalin as if they had no disagreements with Stalin. .

LENIN AND STALIN

Documents available to historians allow us to say that it was no accident that Stalin occupied a special place in the Leninist group. With the exception of Lenin, compared to other members of the Politburo, Stalin had much stronger, more reliable, stable ties with the party organizations, which was a good help to Lenin, strengthening his position in the face of Trotsky's attacks.

That gave Lenin at his disposal additional knowledge of local conditions, workers, their strengths and weaknesses, and the relationship between them. Of course, Lenin could have received this knowledge not only from Stalin, but in the person of Stalin he received both knowledge and one of the most prominent members of the party leadership, whose political positions were always close to Lenin's on all major issues, an ally capable of successfully fighting against Trotsky. No one but Stalin could provide Lenin with such a combination of political qualities in the Central Committee of the RCP (b), therefore, in this situation, Stalin was indispensable for Lenin in leading the party and in the fight against Trotsky.

The experience of the political struggle during the years of the Civil War (especially the background and the course of the discussion of the military issue at the Eighth Party Congress) said that Stalin was capable of not only "taking the blow" of Trotsky, but also "taking" him with a "stranglehold."

In the course of the discussion on trade unions, Stalin once again showed the ability to wage a successful struggle against Trotsky. In

historiography, Stalin's participation in the trade union discussion is usually silent, it is only noted that he supported Lenin and signed the "platform of 10". This is true, but, in addition, Stalin not only actively spoke during the discussion (article "Our Differences", January 5, 1921) [435], but was one of the organizers of the struggle against Trotsky and other anti-Leninist groups in Moscow. Trotskyist R. B. Raphael, knowing this firsthand, at the Tenth Party Congress said that in St. Petersburg the campaign against Trotsky (discussion) was led by Zinoviev, and in Moscow - under the leadership of Stalin [436].

That which separated Lenin from Trotsky politically also separated Trotsky from Stalin. In particular, Stalin not only understood and accepted the NEP (which is sometimes denied), but was also an active promoter of it. A good ally in the fight against a serious enemy never hurts, and in the conditions of the onset of an illness that reduced Lenin's efficiency, Stalin turned for Lenin from an important ally into the main support. It is not surprising that Stalin's political positions during 1921, especially from the middle to the second half of 1921, were rapidly strengthening.

According to Molotov, "Lenin had no friends in the Politburo... Lenin had closer relations with Stalin, but more on a business basis. He ... not only raised Stalin - he made him his support in the Central Committee. And trusted him. In the last period, Lenin was very close to Stalin, and Lenin was perhaps, the only one visited him at his apartment" [437]. The most indicative of Lenin's personal relationship with Stalin at that time is the human concern that Lenin showed for him - his health, rest, organization of work, life, and family.

In historiography, such concern is regarded as an important indicator of a warm comradely attitude towards this or that person. It's right. There are numerous manifestations of Lenin's concern for Bukharin, Rykov, Tsyrupa, Dzerzhinsky and others.[438] Russian historiography, with rare exceptions, spoke about these cases willingly. Only historians were unanimously silent about Stalin. Meanwhile, the documents testify that, firstly, in the last years of Lenin's life, perhaps no one [439] was honored with such an attentive and caring attitude from Lenin as Stalin, and, secondly, the manifestation of this care has been growing since 1921.

At the end of 1920, Stalin fell ill, Lenin writes: "Comrade Butt! I beg you to send Stalin 4 bottles of the best port wine. Stalin must be reinforced before the operation. And after that, he writes to Fotieva, so that she can follow up on the fulfillment of his request [440].

In April 1921, during Stalin's illness, Lenin expressed a desire to visit him and received an invitation [441]. In May 1921, Stalin went on vacation to the Caucasus. A number of telegrams have been preserved, which were exchanged between Lenin and G.K. in May-July 1921. Ordzhonikidze, who was then chairman of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), about the rest and treatment of Stalin. They testify to Lenin's close attention to the organization of rest and treatment of Stalin [442]. Lenin showed similar care later, being interested in his health, talking with the attending physician. On December 28, 1921, already seriously ill himself, Lenin wrote to Fotieva Butt (doctor) about Stalin"[443].

It is interesting to compare the manifestations of Lenin's concern for Stalin and for Trotsky. There is little documentary evidence of Lenin's concern for Trotsky, but most importantly, they are dry, formal, similar to necessary replies [444].

On May 14, 1921, Lenin received a note from People's Commissar of Health Semashko about Trotsky's deteriorating health (colitis due to overwork and non-compliance with the diet) with a request to take the necessary measures. Lenin, in response to this letter and to Molotov's statement that problems in supplying Trotsky with food arose in view of the fact that there was no one responsible for his supply, wrote to Molotov: "Wasn't there someone in charge"? It is absolutely necessary to always appoint them in order to know exactly who is to be reprimanded, who is to be arrested. This is the only way to work." [445] Apparently, Lenin was interested not so much in the problems of Trotsky as in the organization of supply in general.

A different attitude towards Zinoviev. On May 15, 1921, due to overwork, another "heart attack" occurred, which lasted about a day. Information about this came to Lenin from the Kremlin hospital. Lenin responded with a note to Molotov, suggesting that the Politburo give Zinoviev a rest [446].

Concerned about improving Stalin's living conditions, Lenin at least twice (in November 1921 and in February 1922) wrote letters to the relevant authorities with a request to find a more suitable (warmer and quieter) housing for Stalin's family [447]. The head of the Kremlin museums, N. Sedova-Trotskaya (Trotsky's wife), sent a letter to Lenin regarding this request:

"Dear Vladimir Ilyich, I am not angry, but you, forgive me, show unjustified softness. Of course, Comrade Stalin must be provided with a quiet apartment, and we must do this. But Comrade Stalin is a living person, not a museum rarity and does not want to live in a museum himself, he refuses the premises that are being imposed on him, just as Comrade Zinoviev refused the same premises last year."

Comrade Stalin would like to occupy the apartment in which Flaxerman and Malkov are now staying: Flaxerman (youth) could be transferred to Comrade Stalin's apartment, and Comrade Malkov to the 2nd House of Soviets, where 60 rooms are being vacated .. .

If you, Vladimir Ilyich, do not agree with all this, and even with the protest of Comrade Stalin himself, then I ask you to order the surrender of 4 (four) rooms, leaving the other four rooms behind the Main Museum, where we will transfer everything ... " [448].

The underlining in the text, which belongs to Lenin, indicates that **he did not agree with her arguments and continued to insist on his own**. Since the fulfillment of his request was delayed, Lenin again writes, reminds, gets angry, demands an urgent solution to the housing problem [449]. In the end, Stalin got a new apartment***.

And one more small but revealing manifestation of Lenin's concern for Stalin's family, and possibly for his political prestige, which could have suffered due to the exclusion of his wife N.S. Alliluyeva from the party during the purge due to her insufficiently active participation in party work. At the same time, the fact that at that time her first child, Vasily was born, was ignored. Lenin considered this circumstance a good reason and petitioned for her reinstatement in the party [450].

If this is not the only, then, in any case, an extremely rare case of such a petition.

Of course, there was no idyll in the relationship between Lenin and Stalin. Stalin did not lose his own political face, and his political temperament and writing differed in many respects from Lenin's. Stalin had an independent political position, his own view of all problems. Hence the disagreements with Lenin arose from case to case, but did not touch on fundamental issues. Documents have been preserved showing that on a number of issues they took somewhat different positions and **openly pointed out to each other their disagreement.**

So, in the autumn of 1921, disagreements arose over the policy that G.I. Safarov. Lenin believed:

“In my opinion, Safarov is quite right,”

and Stalin objected:

“In my opinion, Safarov is wrong, and his policy is harmful”[451].

In November 1921, a conflict arose, fraught with complications, but, apparently, successfully settled. He was associated with Krupskaya, who almost turned a political problem into a problem of personal relations. Stalin, heading from August 1921 the Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), began the reorganization and reduction of its apparatus by combining the duties of its employees [452].

It was assumed that Agitprop would put Glavpolitprosvet (the structure of the People's Commissariat of Education, which was headed by Krupskaya as deputy people's commissar) under its control. The leadership of the People's Commissariat of Education agreed only to send a member of the Central Committee to their department and saw in Stalin's actions a threat to the former independence of the Glavpolitprosveta. Krupskaya sharply opposed, while resorting to the means available to her - direct pressure on Lenin, presenting to him the forthcoming reorganization as the creation of a new people's commissariat. Lenin, apparently, believed her and wanted to raise this issue to the Orgburo without first

explaining to Stalin. Stalin, having learned about this, sent a letter to Lenin (November 1921), which is very revealing and important for revealing the political and personal relations that existed between them.

"Comrade Lenin", wrote Stalin.

"We are dealing either with a misunderstanding or with frivolity. Comrade Krupskaya read Comrade Solovyov's draft, which **I had not reviewed** and the Organizing Bureau had not approved, and decided that they were creating a new Commissariat Comrade. Krupskaya was in a hurry She was in a hurry again (our italics. - B.C.).

Stalin wrote that Agitprop was going to be reduced, not expanded, he proved this on concrete material and explained the functions of the reorganized Agitprop. And most importantly:

"Today's note from yours addressed to me (*it is not yet available to researchers.* - BC) I understood in such a way that you are raising the question of my leaving agitprop. You remember that work in agitprop was imposed on me (I myself did not aspire to it). It follows that I should not object to leaving. But if you put the question right now, in connection with the misunderstandings outlined above, then you will embarrass both yourself and me (Trotsky and others will think that you are doing this "because of Krupskaya", that I agree to be a "victim", etc.), which is undesirable."

Stalin suggested creating a commission (Stalin, Krupskaya, Lunacharsky) and in it, in a working order, to remove the misunderstanding that had arisen, and not to submit the issue to the Organizing Bureau without this [453].

For our topic, it is important to note the definite nature of the relationship between Lenin and Stalin, between them and Trotsky, between Stalin and Krupskaya. The difficult relationship between Stalin and Krupskaya apparently already had its own history, in which Krupskaya's "hurriedness" had already led to problems between them. Lenin was well aware of this, and therefore Stalin does not consider it necessary to reveal his remark ("again"). Judging by the

letter, Stalin knew that Trotsky was eyeing the relationship between him and Krupskaya, who was not averse to using it to aggravate personal relations between Lenin and Stalin. Lenin knew about it too.

One way or another, but this story had no visible consequences for the relationship between Lenin and Stalin. Stalin remained until the XI Congress of the RCP (b) the head of Agitprop and carried out the reform he had begun, and at the congress itself he became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party with the active participation of Lenin.

* Hereinafter, when using the expressions "Lenin's core" or "Lenin's group", the author does not mean a factional group, since Lenin's supporters constituted **an absolute majority**, determined the political course, and therefore, in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism, had every right to speak on behalf of the whole — Politburo and Central Committee. A fraction, as you know, is a part of it that opposes the whole.

** At that time he was in Moscow and participated in the work of the XII Conference of the RCP(b).

*** Later, Trotsky claimed that Stalin encroached on part of the royal palace in the Kremlin, wanting to settle down in it, and only thanks to the vigilance and integrity of N. Sedova-Trotskaya, these intentions were thwarted (Trotsky L.D. Joseph Stalin. Characteristics experience / / Portraits of revolutionaries, pp. 54-55). In 1935, A. Barbusse described Stalin's apartment:

"Here, in the Kremlin ... there is a small three-story house. This house ... used to be a service room at the palace; some royal servant lived in it.

We go up the stairs. There are white linen curtains on the windows. These are the three windows of Stalin's apartment. In the tiny front hall, a long soldier's overcoat catches the eye, a cap hangs over it. Three rooms and a dining room. Furnished simply, as in a decent but modest hotel. The dining room has an oval shape ... In a capitalist country, neither such an apartment nor such furniture would be satisfied with an

average employee ... "(Barbusse A. Stalin. A man through whom a new world is revealed. M., 1936. P. 5-6).

Notes:

[408] Likhodeev L. A battlefield where there were no wounded // Friendship of peoples. 1988. No. 9. S. 171.

[409] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2622. L. 85; D. 2623. L. 141.

[410] Ibid. D. 2623. L. 146; D. 2624 - 2636.

[411] Ibid. D. 2629. L. 61; D. 2630.

[412] Ibid. D. 2631. L. 136; D. 2632 - 2636.

[413] Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 56-57.

[414] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 197.

[415] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. pp. 182-183.

[416] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 2, pp. 117-119.

[417] Uglanov N.A. About Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (in the period 1917-1922). January 5, 1925 // News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 196.

[418] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 206-207.

[419] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 196.

[420] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 223-224.

[421] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 207. L. 1.

[422] Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24631. L. 2-3.

[423] Ibid. D. 24636. L. 1-1 rev., 3.

- [424] Ibid. D. 24645. L. 1; D. 24647. L. 1.
- [425] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 247–248.
- [426] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 4676. L. 1.
- [427] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. pp. 430, 431.
- [428] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 791.
- [429] Ibid. L. 6.
- [430] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 201.
- [431] Donkov I.P. Lev Borisovich Kamenev // Issues of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 4. S. 95.
- [432] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 183.
- [433] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 300.
- [434] Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 61.
- [435] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 4–14.
- [436] Tenth Congress of the RCP(b). March 1921 Stenograph. report. M., 1961. S. 98.
- [437] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 193.
- [438] Such documents are available in relation to Tomsy (late 1920 - early 1921), Rykov, Smilga, Zinoviev and Bukharin (autumn 1921) (see: Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU: 1989: No. 4: pp. 161-168 No. 9, pp. 161–167, RGASPI, F. 2, op. 24638. L. 1–1v., D. 24657. L. 1–1v.).
- [439] The only person other than Stalin who received Lenin's close systematic attention was Rykov. An interesting correspondence on this subject, which lasted almost a year and a half, from May 1921 to

the end of 1922, was published in Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. P. 161–168; No. 9. C: 161 - 167). True, unlike Stalin, Rykov was seriously ill.

[440] RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24278. L. 1, 2.

[441] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1009. L. 1.

[442] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 10, 39; Lenin collection. T. XXXIX S. 299; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 10. S. 639; T. 11. S. 92; RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1250. L. 1.

[443] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 99.

[444] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 5. S. 177–178.

[445] RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24546. L. 1–2.

[446] Ibid. D. 24543. L. 1–1 rev., 3 rev. - 4 about.

[447] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 45.

[448] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1417. L. 1–1 rev.

[449] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 162.

[450] Ibid. pp. 82–83; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 8. S. 150.

[451] RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24622. L. 1.

[452] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2176. L. 1–5 rev.

[453] Ibid. D. 5193. L. 1–2.

6. STALIN - ASCENT TO "IMMEDIATE POWER"

To ensure the implementation of the course of the new economic policy, it was necessary to reorganize the mechanism of political power accordingly.

“Flexibility is now needed to the maximum, and for this flexible maneuvering the greatest hardness of the apparatus” [454]. It was necessary to create a management system that would allow not to miss the prospect of development during the flood of current affairs [455].

Trotsky stood in the way of this reform. He insisted on his version of the reorganization of the management system, the implementation of which actually meant the removal of real economic, and therefore political power from Lenin and the Central Committee of the party. It was clear that the development and implementation of the new economic policy would take place in an environment of acute political struggle with Trotsky, so Lenin, while reorganizing the management system, simultaneously sought to strengthen the political positions of his supporters in the power structures of the party and state.

The new system also had to take into account the realities of the time. Firstly, the growing illness of Lenin, who actually headed the entire system of power, and secondly, the political struggle in the field of the NEP with Trotsky, who proposed both his own version of the NEP and the corresponding version of the management organization.

Lenin's health began to noticeably deteriorate from the end of 1920, more and more fettering his political activity. Already during the discussion about trade unions, he was forced to spend a significant part of his time outside the city. Working capacity remained limited in February-March 1921 [456]. He also felt bad during the days of the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b). A new and stronger exacerbation of the disease began with Lenin in the middle of 1921. Since that time, a special regime of work, rest and treatment began to be established for him, which was considered not as a problem relating only to Lenin personally, but as an important political issue affecting the interests of the entire party. In June-mid-August, the Politburo granted Lenin leave and limited his work [457].

These measures seem to have helped little. In August 1921, in view of the exacerbation of Lenin's illness, doctors, not yet understanding any of its causes, no character, they again recommended that he be granted leave for rest [458].

On August 9, in the presence of Lenin, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided:

"To oblige Comrade Lenin to continue his vacation exactly at the time and on those conditions, as will be indicated by the doctors (Prof. Getye), with the involvement of Comrade Lenin at meetings (Soviet and party) , as well as for that work, for which there will be a preliminary formal consent of the Secretariat of the Central Committee "[459].

Lenin himself was well aware of his condition, the need to rest and shift part of the work that he had previously done himself to assistants. He wrote to A.M. Gorky: "I'm so tired that I can't do anything" [460].

Returning to work, Lenin soon again felt bouts of illness, manifested in severe headaches, constant insomnia, and decreased performance. Thus passed September and half of October. In mid-October, the disease began to manifest itself with new threatening manifestations (loss of consciousness) [461].

In early December, even limited work became completely impossible. From then on, Lenin's illness turned into an important political factor in the life of the party and the state. On December 5, on the advice of doctors, Lenin applied to the Politburo with a request for leave for medical treatment. On December 3, the Politburo granted him leave between December 2 and 17 for a period of 10 days, while at the same time entrusting the chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars during Lenin's absence to his deputy for STO A.D. Tsyurupu [462]. On December 6, Lenin left for Gorki, and on December 8, 1921, the Politburo adopted a resolution:

“Recognize it necessary to observe absolute peace for Comrade Lenin and forbid his secretariat from sending him any papers so that Comrade Lenin could make a short (at least half an hour) speech at the Congress of Soviets” [463].

Lenin was in Gorki until January 13, 1922 (on December 16, he was again forced to ask for an extension of his leave for up to two weeks) [464]. But the additional rest did not bring improvement. The inability to take an active part in the work of the IX Congress of Soviets and in the current work of the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars depressed him greatly.

On December 31, 1921, the Politburo granted him "a 6-week vacation from 1/1-22 with a ban on coming to Moscow to work without the permission of the Secretariat of the Central Committee" and limited the time of working contacts by telephone "on the most important issues" to an hour a day . According to M.I. Ulyanova, Lenin at that time was "gloomy, exhausted ... he felt so bad that it was scary for him"[465].

The efficiency fell, there was no improvement, moreover, fainting began. He came to Moscow only for meetings of the Politburo and some other important meetings. On January 31, he was no longer able to come to the meeting of the Politburo [466]. February did not bring relief either. His state was unpredictable. In a letter to Kamenev and Stalin on February 21, he wrote:

“Today, after a beautiful night, I am completely ill”[467].

Under these conditions, on February 23, 1922, the Politburo extended Lenin's vacation until the party congress [468].

The congress was approaching, a number of the most complex political and organizational problems had to be solved, and the illness more and more limited Lenin's ability to systematically participate in the affairs of government. He had to refuse meetings with senior officials of the party and the state, even to discuss the most important issues: he could hardly endure conversations and meetings. Decreased

ability to communicate. Increasingly, they had to be supported with short notes [469].

By Lenin's own admission, the main thing that weighed him down lately was the impossibility of reading the way he read before. This made it impossible to follow the information and "constantly draw all the necessary conclusions from it." "In the old days, it was easy for him, which does not cause him any emotional excitement and never required him such an amount of time that would not be enough for all other things. Now it's different: "the moment he overworks any extra time, he begins to have severe headaches." The situation was aggravated by insomnia:

"His sleep is generally bad, but lately, when he has to work hard, he completely sometimes loses sleep. A night doomed to insomnia is a truly terrible thing when in the morning you have to be ready for work. On March 6, speaking at the committee of the All-Russian Congress of Metalworkers with a report on the international and internal situation of the Soviet Republic, Lenin publicly admitted: "My illness ... for several months does not give me the opportunity to directly participate in political affairs and does not at all allow me to fulfill my Soviet position, on which I am placed" [471]. The statistics of his participation in the work of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO [472] also speaks of a significant decrease in his efficiency.

"From March 2, 1922," writes Professor Osipov, "such phenomena began that attracted the attention of others": short-term loss of consciousness with numbness of the right side of the body and arm, accompanied by a speech disorder, as a result of which he lost the ability to "freely express his thoughts." At this time, Lenin wrote to E.S. Varge: "I'm sick. **Completely unable to take on any work.**"[474]

Then the doctors explained it as before - overwork. Hence their recommendations: take a break, take another break, take a break again... And limit the amount of work, etc. With such a diagnosis, Lenin left for the village of Kostino, near the village of Troitse-Lykovo. Here he lived from March 6 to March 25, 1922, preparing for the XI Party Congress [475]. Lenin no longer flattered himself with hopes of

recovery, he was sure that doctors could do nothing to help him, and, losing faith in doctors, believed that they "hid from him the true nature of his illness", that he "won't get better ... I am sure that paralysis will happen to him.

It is not surprising that Lenin began to think about his political future. His thought went in two directions: about how to "outsmart" the disease and how to ensure the future of the revolution - the cause to which he devoted his whole life. In both plans, he linked his calculations with Stalin.

"I don't know," writes M.I. Ulyanov, - how ... Vladimir Ilyich came to the idea that he would have paralysis, but long before May 25 [1922], when he had the first obvious signs of a brain disease, he spoke about this with Stalin, asking for this case, give him poison, since his existence will then be aimless. Stalin promised Vladimir Ilyich to fulfill his request if necessary, apparently being rather skeptical that this could ever happen and wondering where Vladimir Ilyich could have such thoughts. [477].

An interesting testimony about the moods and thoughts of Lenin at that time was left by Professor L.O. Darkshevich. He wrote that on March 4, Lenin confessed to him that "in recent months he has been going through a very difficult condition until he has completely lost the ability to work intellectually in the direction in which he has always worked until recently. With himself, he decided positively that his loss of the ability to work is an irreparable thing," that "he will no longer be able to continue working as before; it is not only difficult for him to conduct some business for two, but also to work for himself alone, he becomes unable to answer for his own business. "I have become completely unemployed," Lenin concluded. "He," Darkshevich wrote, "is close to the idea that he will no longer work the way he worked before ... his song has already been sung, the role has been played, he will have to transfer his work to someone" (emphasis added) - V. S). That he "is inclined to think that his song has been sung," Lenin also told other doctors [478].

These are the conditions under which Lenin came up with the idea of a successor. But this problem cannot be understood in a simplistic way. Within the framework of the existing political system, the political struggle that took place within it, and the political traditions of the Bolsheviks, Lenin could not point directly to his successor. The only thing he could really do was to secure for this potential successor a solid political position that would enable him to pursue the line that Lenin considered necessary for the revolution.

The party congress was approaching, Lenin's state of health did not improve, and this circumstance could only strengthen him in these thoughts. On March 22, he writes a letter to Molotov for the Plenum of the Central Committee, in which he outlines his plan for the political report of the Central Committee at the XI Congress and asks to be released "from participation in the plenum due to illness (and I will not be able to sit at the plenum and report at the congress)", although he expresses his full willingness to come to the Plenum for explanations about the report. He concludes his letter with a request:

"I ask the Plenum of the Central Committee to appoint an additional reporter from the Central Committee, because my report is too general, then I am not absolutely sure that I can do it, and most importantly, I have already lagged behind the current work of the Politburo for months" [479].

For health reasons, Lenin could not even attend the last Plenum of the Central Committee before the congress. Regarding the return to work at this time, he was extremely vague [480].

Under these conditions, Lenin began to form such a system of political management in which, despite the limitation of his ability to work, he would retain key positions that would at least provide general guidance for current work and the ability to decisively influence the formation of policy.

ECONOMY

The growing wave of economic and social problems demanded an urgent improvement in the work of state and economic bodies.

On November 28, 1921, Lenin proposed a plan for the reorganization of the highest bodies of state administration:

"In addition to the position of deputy chairman of the STO Rykov (with the right to vote in the SNK), the position of the second deputy chairman of the STO is established on equal terms" - Tsyurupa. Rights of deputies: casting vote in the Council of People's Commissars and SRT, chairmanship in the absence of the chairman (i.e. Lenin himself). They were given "all the rights of the Chairman in relation to work in collegiums and institutions on issues of unification and direction of the work of economic people's commissariats."

The meaning of this reform was to "unify in practice, tighten up and improve economic work as a whole, especially in connection with and through the State Bank (trade) and Gosplan. "Free SNK from trifles; to distinguish its functions more accurately from the functions of the STO and the small SNK, to raise the authority of the SNK by attracting leading comrades, people's commissars, and not just their deputies to participate in it. The deputies were tasked with personally studying the work of major workers in the center and in the localities, and personally participating in solving various economic issues, and supervising the work. The deputies must conduct their work through the apparatus of the people's commissariats. Tsyurupa agreed, and Lenin raised this issue at a meeting of the Politburo on December 1, 1921, which accepted his proposal [482].

Then the Politburo, according to the report of L.B. Kamenev decided to create the Higher Economic Commission "to unite all economic and financial issues, consisting of comrades Kamenev, Tsyurupa, Kursk, Preobrazhensky and Schmidt ..." Kamenev was appointed Chairman of the Higher Economic Commission [483].

On March 23, 1922, the Politburo approved the leading troika of the Gosplan: Krzhizhanovsky, Pyatakov, Osadchy [484], which personified the Leninist approach to the Gosplan as a commission of experts. Lenin was engaged in the improvement of this system throughout 1922, coordinating the work of deputies with the work of the RCT and using the apparatus of this people's commissariat to ensure the work of deputies, improving the division of labor between deputies, increasing their number [485].

Thus, the system of economic management bodies was formed, which not only relieved Lenin of his current work, but actually began to replace him in everyday economic activity.

Lenin's documents, as well as documents from the records management of his secretariat, show that at that time he exercised general supervision over the progress of these works and, if he considered it necessary, took control of the solution of this or that issue or was directly involved in its solution. Occupying a central position in the system as the leader of the party and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the RSFSR, he, despite the reduction in efficiency, retained full power in the economic sphere. The most significant role in this system was taken by Kamenev, who, as chairman of the Higher Economic Commission, became Lenin's closest assistant in solving current economic issues.

In political terms, this meant strengthening the positions of the Leninist group in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the party and its ability to implement the new economic policy developed under the leadership of Lenin.

THE CONSIGNMENT

At the same time, Lenin was taking steps to strengthen the political positions of his supporters in the Central Committee of the party, to increase the ability of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to lead the party, to direct the activities of state and economic bodies. The key positions here belonged to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), which directed the current organizational and party work

of local party organizations and organized the work of the Central Committee of the party. After the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), it included Molotov, Yaroslavsky and Mikhailov. Molotov was the eldest among them and was considered the responsible secretary.

Lenin wanted the Secretariat of the Central Committee to be a political body. Molotov recalled that Lenin advised him, as secretary of the Central Committee, to "engage in political work," shifting "all the technical work to deputies and assistants." "Here," said Lenin, -

Krestinsky was still our secretary of the Central Committee, so he was the manager of affairs, and not secretary of the Central Committee! He was engaged in all sorts of nonsense, not politics!"[486].

However, setting this task was easier than accomplishing it. According to Molotov, even in the middle of 1921, the Secretariat, overwhelmed with the current organizational and party work, paid insufficient attention to political work, and it was he who represented the Central Committee of the party in contacts with state bodies, economic and other organizations. He carried out the selection and placement of personnel.

Personnel issues related to the highest echelons of power, sometimes associated with conflicts and interests of different political forces, required for their solution significant political experience and authority, **which Molotov lacked**. He was a good assistant to Lenin, but this was not enough, since Lenin could no longer, as before, enter into all these questions. This was the situation that led to personal changes in the composition of the Secretariat, which were of paramount importance for the topic of interest to us. Light on this story is shed by the memoirs of V.M. Molotov.

The secretariat of the Central Committee was inundated with petty economic questions. Molotov asked Lenin to receive the secretaries of the Central Committee in order to solve some of them. Lenin "agreed, appointed a day." They came together. First, minor current issues were resolved. "I said: "It is impossible to work, Vladimir Ilyich, time

is wasted on nonsense." Lenin paused, did not say anything definite to me... And in August, at the plenum, after Yaroslavsky's report, when the plenum was over, Lenin said:

"I have one more question." And suddenly he declared: - I'm talking about Comrade Yaroslavsky. I propose to send him to Siberia. Here we will find a person instead of him, a member of the Central Committee, and in Siberia there are not enough people, we need to help them. Who is against it? There is no one. So the decision has been made. [487]

Since, according to Molotov, Lenin considered him "an insufficient politician" to turn the Secretariat into an organ of political leadership, Stalin [488] was introduced instead of Yaroslavsky, who actually headed the work of the Secretariat. His political experience and authority, according to Lenin, should have been enough to turn the Secretariat of the Central Committee into a full-fledged political body.

The exact time and circumstances of the appointment of I. V. Stalin as Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) are not indicated in the literature. We also failed to find a document fixing the decision of the Party Central Committee on his appointment. The secretariat worked in close contact with the Orgburo of the Central Committee, and in it Stalin occupied a strong position:

he was the only member of the Politburo in the Orgburo, which determined his dominant position [489].

On August 22, 1921, shortly after returning from vacation, the Orgburo instructed Stalin (**despite objections on his part**) to exercise overall leadership of the Agitprop Department of the Party Central Committee, which led all ideological work. A day later, this decision was approved by the Politburo with clarification (**at the request of Stalin**) about the temporary nature of this appointment [490].

This not only expanded the scope of Stalin's activities, but also significantly strengthened his political positions. The center of gravity of his activities was transferred to party work.

On September 13, 1921, the Politburo specially heard the question "On the work of Comrade Stalin" and decided:

"To oblige Comrade Stalin to devote about three-quarters of his time to party work, and at least 1 1/2 hours to the Agitprop department; from the rest of the time, devote most of the time to the Workers' and Peasants' Committee. His work in the positions of People's Commissars of the People's Commissariat of the RKI and People's Commissariat of Nationalities was more and more reduced to the implementation of their general leadership. At the same time, he was relieved from work in the commission engaged in clarifying the availability of the gold fund [491].

On September 26, 1921, Stalin's secretariat was created. Unfortunately, in the documents available to historians, we were unable to find the decisions of the Central Committee of the party on the creation of the secretariat, on its tasks and functions. They can only be judged by individual documents characterizing his work. For example, according to Stalin's letters to the leaders of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs (L.D. Trotsky), the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat of Food, the People's Commissariat of the RCT, containing a request to give "instructions to persons subordinate to you who are in charge of correspondence, about so that correspondence addressed to me, both "personally", "secretly", and general, should be sent to the address: **Secretariat comrade Stalin**, Trubnikovsky lane, 19, 2nd floor, tel. No. 3-08-56" [492].

Since that time, documents have appeared (including those sent to Lenin), on which **Stalin signs as "Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)"** [493].

WHY STALIN BECAME THE SECRETARY OF THE RCP(b) CC?

This question has long been of interest to historians, most often the answer to it is associated with Stalin's good organizational skills,

while emphasizing his political insignificance and Lenin's very critical attitude towards him.

In our opinion, this happened because **Stalin was more suitable** than others for solving the tasks that Lenin set for the secretaries of the Central Committee. Stalin was closer to the party, its organizations, and activists than other members of the Politburo who were part of Lenin's inner circle [494]. Years of underground work, prisons and exile, rough party work gave him knowledge of the organization and cadres of the party. And they, in turn, knew Stalin [495]. They formed the backbone of party leaders with whom the secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) had to work.

During the period of preparation for the October Revolution, Stalin was known to the party as a member of the Central Committee, the Bureau of the Central Committee, a representative of the Central Committee in the Central Executive Committee, one of the editors of Pravda and other newspapers. On behalf of the Central Committee, he made two most important reports at the Sixth Party Congress and made more other delegates to adopt the course of an armed uprising by the congress. When voting for the Central Committee of the party at the 7th Congress of the RCP (b), Stalin (along with Zinoviev and Sverdlov) received one vote "against" (only Lenin and Trotsky received all the votes "for") [496].

His activities at the fronts not only introduced him to a much wider circle of Party and Soviet workers than before, but also gave him knowledge of local conditions and personnel, a mass of new people. The Tsaritsyn Front and Tsaritsyn, the Eastern Front and Vyatka, the Western Front and Petrograd, the Southern and Southwestern Fronts, Central Russia, the Donbass, Ukraine, and finally the Caucasus - this was the geography of Stalin's activities during the Civil War. Stalin's authority was used in resolving all kinds of conflicting political situations in the party [497], which, in turn, brought him new knowledge of working conditions, personnel, and increased his authority.

The letter of V.V. Osinsky (Obolensky) V.I. Lenin (October 16, 1919), in which he wrote:

"We have a great political leader, to whom belongs the indisputable leadership of the party and the revolution-Comrade Lenin. This is a great and tactical politician and an incomparable creator of political and organizational lines and slogans - a political algebraist. But at the same time, he is not an organizer-technician according to individual abilities - not an expert in organizational arithmetic. This has always been acknowledged by them."

Previously, these functions were taken over by Ya.M. Sverdlov, after whose death organizational and party work went wrong. To correct the matter, Osinsky proposed creating a troika, which "can be formed only from Stalin, Serebryakov and Krestinsky (with the replacement of one by Dzerzhinsky)" [498]. Stalin's authority was high in matters of national politics, so almost all these issues went "through him", and this allowed him to get acquainted with the people and problems of other regions of the RSFSR. Thus, in a letter to Lenin from representatives of the communist organization of the peoples of the East (January 20, 1920), noted Stalin's ability to work with people, his attentiveness, accessibility and high authority, his knowledge of the problems of the national life of the peoples of the East, and it was proposed "to withdraw from the front and entrust him with the leadership of the entire internal and the foreign policy of Soviet power in the East, appoint him Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the East, and reorganize the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs accordingly" [499].

At the XI Party Congress V.I. Lenin actually supported all the main characteristics given by I.V. Stalin in these letters, drawing attention to Stalin's ability not to wallow in petty intrigues, but to raise and resolve all issues as political [500].

Describing the political culture and writing of Stalin, it is often pointed out that he did not live long abroad and did not join European culture, like many other party leaders of that time. The long stay of a party worker abroad in the literature is considered exclusively as a positive factor, and people who did not have this experience were actually assessed as relatively second-rate party cadres, intellectually and politically inferior to the first. Lenin was of a different opinion. In the inability to conduct party work, he saw a great shortcoming of the party leader. Thus, he wrote that Sverdlov

“did not have to ... go abroad, this gave him the opportunity not to lose touch with the practical side of the movement”[501].

These qualities of Stalin in this situation were of fundamental importance for Lenin since the main battle with Trotsky was to take place in the party and for influence on it.

Therefore, the **appointment of Stalin as secretary** of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) cannot be attributed to simple personnel movements. It meant not only a measure aimed at increasing the authority and efficiency of the Central Committee Secretariat, but also a major political shift within the Central Committee, the Politburo and within the Leninist group. For Trotsky and other opponents of Lenin, the appointment of Stalin as secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) meant the expansion of the powers of the politician who, more than others, was able to **wage a principled and uncompromising struggle with them** with greater chances of success than others.

A new field of activity - organizational and party work - ensured the growth of his political influence. He gained control over the most important structures of the Central Committee of the party, which were in charge of the daily life of the party, the current work of the central apparatus, the selection and placement of personnel - not only party, but also Soviet, trade union, military, Komsomol, etc.[502] ,[503], as well as party finances.

Stalin became the only member of the Central Committee who was a member of all its governing bodies: he was both a member of the Politburo and a member of the Orgburo (actually heading it as the only member of the Politburo included in its composition), and the secretary of the Central Committee, who took precedence over other secretaries. A number of the most important cases that had previously been under the jurisdiction of Molotov were switched over to him, including a significant part of the contacts between Lenin and the Politburo.

As secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), Stalin became increasingly involved in solving various issues of foreign and domestic policy, state building.

Lenin purposefully and systematically involved Stalin in the solution of specific economic issues. So, on August 18, 1921, he wrote to V.A. Stomonyakov:

"I ask you to assist Comrade. Stalin in getting acquainted with all the economic materials of the Council and the State Planning Commission, especially the gold industry, the Baku oil industry, etc." [504].

Lenin coordinated with him the issues of constituting and organizing the work of the financial committee, the most important body coordinating and regulating the activities of the main sectors of the national economy, and involved him in resolving issues of replenishing and spending Russia's gold reserves. Stalin participates in the discussion of questions of the monopoly of foreign trade and concession policy, lease, restoration of the coal industry of Donbass, issues of organizing agriculture and horse breeding, organization of food procurement, takes part in the work of Pomgol, in the preparation of a decree on salt [505]. Moreover, a number of documents devoted to the discussion of economic and social issues indicate that the business relations that developed at that time between Lenin and Stalin were not of a formal, but of a trusting comradesly character [506].

Stalin traditionally actively participated in resolving issues of military development, reported on them to the Politburo in the absence of Trotsky [507]. But **from the autumn of 1921**, he became a rapporteur on military issues at the Politburo along with Trotsky, and even in those cases when Trotsky was present at the meeting. The fact that Stalin became Trotsky's rapporteur is an indicator of how the position of both in the Politburo has changed. Previously, Trotsky reacted sharply to any attempts to "invasion" into the sphere of his activity, but now he was not only forced to allow such "invasions", but also to reckon with the opinion of Stalin, to put up with those decisions that were taken at the insistence of the latter.

On September 14, 1921, The Politburo decided to reduce the navy and created a commission to monitor the acceleration of the solution of this issue and submit proposals to the Politburo. The convening of the commission was entrusted to Stalin (chairman), it included Gusev, Sudakov and a representative of the RVSR [508]. On September 22, 1921, the Politburo rejected Trotsky's proposal to suspend the demobilization of the army and decided:

"Agreeing with the arguments of Comrade Stalin, as well as Comrade Chicherin (in today's letter on parades), to speak out against Comrade Trotsky's proposal on the issue of suspending demobilization"[509].

The current activities of the military department also fall under his control. So, for example, Trotsky's deputy for the RVSR Sklyansky appeals to the service station with a request for a vacation of 500 thousand rubles in gold "for emergency special expenses of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs.". The letter "passes" through Stalin, which imposes a resolution: "I have no objection"[510].

Another example. The military department wanted to place an order in Germany for the purchase of rifles and machine guns. On October 10, 1921, Krasin wrote a letter from London, in which he protested this intention from all sides (from a political, economic, military-technical point of view). Stalin, having read Krasin's opinion, writes a letter to

Trotsky (copy to Lenin):

"1. - "Comrade Krasin's considerations ... seem serious to me;

2. - Paragraph 3 of your draft telegram about the old twelve million order is not clear to me (I know only about three million allocated for aviation). Therefore, I find it difficult to vote by telephone and propose to consider the issue at the Politburo, at least tomorrow morning, and in view of the initiation of a new question about the previous 12 millionth order (in addition to the ten million), it would be desirable to have at tomorrow's meeting of the Politburo (if it is scheduled) materials relating to the 12 millionth order" [511].

Stalin's participation in solving problems related to the activities of the Comintern, as well as in solving foreign policy issues [512], expanded. He was one of Lenin's main (if not the main) assistants in the political leadership of the Soviet delegation at the international conference in Genoa.

On January 17, 1922, the Politburo instructed him to draw up an appeal in connection with the upcoming international conference. Together with Kamenev, he participated in the formation of a delegation to the Genoa Conference (experts, support staff) [513]. Stalin's note to Lenin dated March 29, 1922 is indicative:

"I agree to send a telegram (addressed to Deputy Krestinsky in Berlin) about Avanesov. Your signature is enough (you can be sure of it). I. Stalin"[514].

On April 27, 1922 Stalin sent a telegram to Chicherin in Genoa with a message of his opinion on the negotiations on mutual financial claims of the Soviet Republics and creditor countries.

"Personally, I think that one could agree with you only under two conditions: If the minimum amount of claims is not very large, but the moratorium is large enough. If our conditions set out in the April 25 directive are met."

At the same time, Stalin asked to be informed of the minimum amount of claims, the maximum term of the moratorium, as well as the term and amount of the loan that the Soviet republics could count on. [515]

In the center of his attention were the problems of improving the management system. On November 29, 1921, he sent a letter to Lenin, in which he informed him of his proposals for the reorganization of the work of the Central Committee, which he intended to submit to the Politburo. He wrote:

"Comrade Lenin! Before putting this question in the PB, I decided to ask you a question: what is your opinion on this matter? It is hardly necessary to prove that the preparation and elaboration of questions of an economic nature (finance, money, cooperatives of all kinds, industry, rent, concessions, trade), which then go to the resolution of the Politburo, proceeds in our country in more than abnormal conditions. To begin with, the various commissions on economic issues (the cooperative commission under the organizing bureau, the Kamenev commission on the cooperative bank, the financial commission under the STO, monetary, tariff, etc.) are not interconnected, they act randomly on the one hand, on the other hand, they are not always directly connected with the Politburo, i.e. not all of these commissions include one or another member of the Politburo.

Further, the Central Committee itself and its top leadership, the Politburo, are structured in such a way that there are almost no experts in economic affairs among them, which also affects (negatively, of course) the preparation of economic questions. Further, the members of the Politburo are so overwhelmed by the current and sometimes extremely diverse work that the Politburo as a whole is sometimes forced to decide questions on the basis of trust or distrust in this or that commission, without entering into the essence of the matter. that in their composition there are almost no experts in economic affairs, which is also reflected (negatively, of course) in the preparation of economic questions. Finally,

the members of the Politburo are so overwhelmed by the current and sometimes extremely diverse work that the Politburo as a whole is sometimes forced to decide questions on the basis of trust or distrust in this or that commission, without entering into the essence of the matter. that in their composition there are almost no experts in economic affairs, which is also reflected (negatively, of course) in the preparation of economic questions. Finally, the members of the Politburo are so overwhelmed by the current and sometimes extremely diverse work that the Politburo as a whole is sometimes forced to decide questions on the basis of trust or distrust in this or that commission, without entering into the essence of the matter.

It would be possible to put an end to this situation by changing the composition of the Central Committee in general, the Politburo in particular, in favor of experts in economic affairs. I think that this operation should be carried out at the 11th Party Congress (because before the Congress, I think, there is no way to fill this gap). In the meantime, it would be possible to carry out the following measures that could more or less streamline the preparation of economic and financial questions: To reduce all existing economic commissions to 4 commissions (financial-monetary, industrial, trade with consumer cooperation), agricultural with the corresponding types of cooperation, defining them along the party line under the Politburo, and along the Soviet line under the STO; Schedule four members of the Politburo for these commissions, obliging them to take the most active part in the work of the commission (the fifth member of the Politburo, Comrade LENIN, not to be bound by the obligation to participate in the work of the commission, giving him the opportunity to link all four commissions into the work of all four commissions through four members of the Politburo or in another order); To relieve as much as possible from any other work of the above-mentioned four members of the Politburo"[516].

A number of proposals formulated here were soon embodied in the system of administration created by Lenin.

As secretary of the Central Committee of the party, Stalin began to act as the official representative of the Central Committee more often at various non-party events: from participating in the work of the Presidium of the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets to attending the laying of a new foundation for the Bolshoi Theater stage. Stalin took an active part in the creation of the **society of old Bolsheviks**. At the organizational meeting (January 28, 1922), when discussing the goals and objectives of the society, the methods of its work, Stalin's opinion had a decisive influence on the nature of the decisions made and many important formulations of the society's charter [517].

All of the above testifies to the rapid growth of Stalin's political influence, authority, and real power even before the Eleventh Congress, before he was elected General Secretary.

Thus, Lenin, **rejecting the scheme proposed by Trotsky** for the reorganization of economic management and a clear delineation of the functions of the party and the state in the matter of administration, carried out the reorganization step by step according to his own scheme [518], securing in it for himself and his closest associates (Stalin and Kamenev) the key positions and main control levers. There is reason to talk about the formation in the second half of 1921 within the Politburo of a "**troika**" consisting of Lenin, Stalin, and Kamenev, which became the **ideological, political, and organizational core** of Lenin's supporters in the Central Committee of the party and concentrated in its hands the main levers of power in the party and the state.

In the system of government being created, Lenin reserved control over the main levers of power and the ability to intervene at any moment in the solution of any issue and control the progress of the implementation of the decision. Stalin received an independent section of work (the party), in whose problems Lenin (as his documents show) did not often enter. Kamenev, acting as Lenin's closest assistant in matters of the current management of the national

economy, to a greater extent than Stalin, worked under the direct supervision of Lenin. Consequently, compared to Kamenev, Stalin was a more independent political figure. Moreover, Lenin involved Stalin in solving many issues that were within the competence of Kamenev, or he participated in their solution on an equal basis with Kamenev. This is evidenced by the clerical documents of the Leninist secretariat (registration books for incoming and outgoing correspondence), as well as Lenin's letters themselves on economic issues, often **sent simultaneously to Kamenev and Stalin**. This almost never happened in relation to questions of party building and others related to Stalin's work in the Central Committee of the party. From this we can conclude that in this "troika" Stalin stood above Kamenev. Since all this happened with the active participation of Lenin and at a time when he was reorganizing the system of government and placing his supporters in key positions in it, these changes in Stalin's position indicate that it was Lenin who gave him a key place in this system.

If we evaluate the reorganization carried out by Lenin in the second half of 1921 from the point of view of the inner-party struggle, then we must admit that Lenin managed to strengthen the positions of his supporters in the Central Committee and central government bodies, and also strengthened the positions of the RCP (b) in the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat by based on their own ideas about the relationship between the party and the state.

Trotsky found no place at all in the mechanism created by Lenin. Zinoviev also turned out to be aloof from him.

The next stage of the struggle in this field was associated with the work of the XI Congress of the RCP (b), at which Lenin not only consolidated these results, but also achieved a significant strengthening of the system of power he was creating. This was due to the introduction of a new highest position in the party - the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which should be considered precisely in the framework of the reorganization of the mechanisms for managing the party and the state carried out by Lenin and in connection with the political struggle that took place in the leadership of the party.

Notes:

[454] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 43. S. 373.

[455] Ibid. T. 44. S. 158.

[456] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 128.

[457] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 174. L. 5; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 129, 130, 137; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biography. T. 11. S. 47.

[458] See: Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 263.

[459] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 71. L. 2.

[460] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 129.

[461] Fire. 1990. No. 4. S. 7.

[462] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 240. L. 1.

[463] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 65; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 137.

[464] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 75; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 137.

[465] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 247. L. 1; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 130.

[466] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 149; Lenin collection. T. XXXVII. S. 347; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 130, 136.

[467] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 176.

[468] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 277. L. 2.

[469] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 411; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 1. S. 215.

[470] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 131.

[471] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 6.

[472] In 1920, only 69 meetings of the Council of People's Commissars were held, all under the chairmanship of Lenin. In 1921, there were 51 and 49, respectively, and in 1922, 83 and 7. There were 107 meetings of the STO in 1921, including 49 under the chairmanship of Lenin, and in 1922, 96 and 5. The number of published decrees written by Lenin or adopted with his amendments and additions, there were 16 and 11, respectively, in 1920, and only 5 and 6 in 1921. STO resolutions, respectively, in 1920, 36 and 1, and in 1921 9 and 1. The number of reports and messages in the Council of People's Commissars, as well as the Council of Defense and the Council of Labor and Defense was 21 and 13, respectively, in 1920, 7 and 7 in 1921, and 1 in 1922 (Genkina E.B. About reports VI Lenin in the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Defense and the Council of Labor and Defense (1917-1922) // History of the USSR, 1973, No. 4, pp. 69, 71, 72).

[473] Fire. 1990. No. 4. S. 6.

[474] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 203.

[475] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 132, 137; Twinkle. 1990. No. 4. S. 6.

[476] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 1. S. 215; 1991. No. 2. S. 132; No. 3. S. 18.5, 188.

[477] Ibid. 1991. No. 3. S. 185.

[478] Ibid. No. 2, pp. 131–132, 185.

[479] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 60, 62.

[480] Ibid. pp. 6, 114, 412.

[481] Ibid. S. 61.

[482] Ibid. T. 44. S. 253–254.

[483] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 238. L. 2.

[484] Ibid. D. 285. L. 8, 9.

[485] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44, pp. 364–370, 522, 579–581; T. 45, pp. 55–56.

[486] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 181.

[487] Ibid. pp. 229–230.

[488] Ibid. S. 181.

[489] Stalin was introduced to the Orgburo during the formation of the new Central Committee at the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) and remained in it after its reorganization on August 8, 1921 by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). The Organizing Bureau included: "members of comrades Molotov, Mikhailov, Zalutsky, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Rudzutak and Rykov. Candidates: comrades Kutuzov, Kalinin, V.V. Schmidt" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 68. L. 1).

[490] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 193. L. 2.

[491] Ibid. D. 201. L. 5, 6.

[492] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 4505. L. 1, 3; D. 1860. L. 1–4.

[493] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 263. L. 1; D. 265. L. 1–2.

[494] According to Molotov, none of Lenin's supporters in the Politburo had such connections with localities more than Stalin:

“Stalin, of course, was simpler and was closer to the top. It was difficult for Lenin, of course. The main ones were very dubious friends. And the character is different” (One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov, pp. 181, 236). Rich material on this problem is available in the book by Yu.V. Emelyanov (see: Emelyanov Yu.V. Stalin: the path to power. M., 2002).

[495] This is evidenced by the course of the discussion of candidates for the Central Committee of the party and the results of the elections to the Central Committee at the VII (April) Conference of the RSDLP, when Stalin received 97 votes out of 109, losing only to Lenin (104) and Zinoviev (101). (Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks). April 1917. Protocols. M., 1958. S. 207–208, 228, 323).

[496] RGASPI. F. 40. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 25–53.

[497] Stalin took part in the settlement of conflicts connected with the “Myasnikov case”, with the appearance of the “workers’ opposition”, conflicts in the Donetsk, Petrograd party organizations, in overcoming the crisis that arose at the IV All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions (May 1921, when the congress rejected the draft resolution of the Central Committee and adopted Ryazanov’s resolution, in which a line was drawn on the independence of the trade unions, while Tomskey did not defend the position of the Central Committee and actually sided with the oppositionists). (Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). March-April 1922. Verbatim report. M., 1961. S. 748, 781; RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24202. L. 1-1 ob.).

[498] Laws of political algebra. (From a letter from N. Osinsky (Obolensky) to V.I. Lenin). October 16, 1919 // Unknown Russia. XX century. M., 1992. S. 17-19.

[499] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 174. L. 1–1 rev.

[500] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 122.

[501] Lenin V.I. Speech dedicated to the memory of Ya.M. Sverdlov. March 16, 1920 // *Kommunist*. 1977. No. 6. S. 5.

[502] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. 54, pp. 51, 73, 106, 112, 126, 127, 144, 155, 162, 177, 199, 247, 265, 573–574; RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24198. L. 1; D. 24201. L. 1–1 rev.; D. 24527. L. 1; F. 5. Op. 1. D. 57. L. 1; Op. 2. D. 1816. L. 11; Source. 1993. No. 2. L. 60; Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 8. S. 28.

[503] This fully corresponded to Lenin's principled attitude, who saw the main task of the party's policy in the period being lived through in "the selection of people and in checking the performance" (V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.* Vol. 45, pp. 109-113).

[504] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 129.

[505] Ibid. T. 53, pp. 125–126, 129, 140; T. 54, pp. 32–33, 81, 137–138, 139, 190, 207; Lenin collection. T. XXXIV C. 427; RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24203. L. 1–3; F. 5. Op. 2. D. 43. L. 33; D. 243. L. 1; D. 267. L. 1–1 rev.; F. 17. Op. 3. D. 276. L. 3; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biography. T. 10. S. 72.

[506] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 266. L. 1; F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2227. L. 1.

[507] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 16; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biography. T. 10. S. 658; RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 211. L. 1; D. 216. L. 4; D. 225. L. 1; D. 289. L. 4.

[508] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 202. L. 3.

[509] Ibid. D. 207. L. 1.

[510] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2126. L. 1.

[511] Ibid. D. 5185. L. 2, 3.

[512] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 43. S. 153; T. 45. S. 41; Lenin collection. T. XXXVII. pp. 333, 334; RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24616. L. 4–4 rev.; F. 17. Op. 3. D. 194. L. 3; D. 210. L. 2.

[513] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1954. L. 16–19; D. 1961. L. 1–2; F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 155.

[514] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5179. L. 1.

[515] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1954. L. 14.

[516] Ibid. Op. 2. D. 263. L. 1–2.

[517] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2240. L. 1.

[518] On December 26, 1921, he wrote the "Instruction on Economic Work" and passed it through the Politburo. "Nakaz" was adopted by the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December 28, 1921 (V. I. Lenin , Complete collection of works, vol. 44, pp. 335-338).

7. GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE RCP(b) CC: STALIN FOR POSITION OR POSITION FOR STALIN?

The documents available to historians do not allow us to find out exactly who, when and under what circumstances had the idea to single out one of the secretaries of the Central Committee as general. It is known, however, that on the eve of the Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b) the hierarchical scheme of organization and functioning of the apparatus, topped by the post of general secretary, became popular in the leadership of the party. As early as December 5, 1921, the Politburo considered and accepted "comrade Zinoviev's proposal to appoint Comrade Kuusinen General Secretary of the Comintern"[519].

Perhaps this decision was due to Zinoviev's rejected proposals to transfer the apparatus of the ECCI to Petrograd, where Zinoviev spent most of the time. The introduction of the post of general secretary made it possible in this case to organize the full-fledged work of the apparatus in Moscow, while the chairman of the ECCI, Zinoviev, was here only on short visits. On February 23, 1922, a month before the XI Party Congress, the Politburo considered the application of Tomsky and Rudzutak "on the General Secretary of the Profintern" and decided "to appoint Comrade General Secretary. Rudzutak"[520].

In both cases, it was about organizing the current work of a political body. Obviously, such a measure seemed expedient. Against this background, the establishment of the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) no longer seems like an unexpected and inexplicable innovation.

At the same time, it must be taken into account that the post of general secretary in the Comintern and the Profintern was included in different political constructions. In the Comintern, the general secretary was included in the scheme: collegiate body - general secretary - chairman. Power here is divided between the two highest posts - the chairman and the general secretary, who was supposed to unload the chairman from the political routine, leaving him with major political issues, and head the work of the apparatus of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. And in the version of the

Profintern, the post of general secretary was included in a different scheme: a collegiate body (the Central Council of the Red International of Trade Unions) - the general secretary (later Lozovsky became it), who was in charge of current work and headed the central apparatus. Here, the Secretary General, as the highest official, did not share this "Olympus" with anyone.

In these schemes, the general secretary plays a different role and has different powers, this circumstance makes it possible to better understand the reason and purpose of the post of general secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), established at the XI Party Congress.

Historians have at their disposal two documents that lead us to the history of the preparation of the question of the Secretariat of the Central Committee at the 11th Congress of the RCP (b). On February 21, 1922, Stalin sent a letter to Lenin, in which he outlined "a program of preparatory work for the congress and a campaign at the congress.

"Tonight (I, Kamenev, Zinoviev) talked about matters in connection with the preparations for the congress and came to the next one ..."

Further, Stalin outlines the proposals worked out on the personnel transfers of prominent party members, accompanying them with assessments of business qualities. It was about Serebryakov, Frumkin, V. Smirnov, Pyatakov, Krestinsky, Sokolnikov, Bogdanov, Smilga, L.B. Krasin and a number of others [521].

Then Stalin communicated his opinion on the new secretariat of the Central Committee:

"7) Secretariat of the Central Committee, Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev. Announce this at the congress in the report of the Central Committee, in order to cover in advance the attacks against - the (current) Secretariat"[522].

Stalin also suggested:

“Release me from the Inspectorate and keep in mind, perhaps, Vladimirov [523] (Ukraine) as People's Commissar of the RKI” [524].

In conclusion, Stalin asked: "Your opinion, Comrade Lenin"[525]. Thus, a month before the Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b), at a meeting of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, the question of a new Secretariat of the Central Committee was worked out and put before Lenin for the first time.

The question of singling out one of the secretaries as the general secretary was not yet on the table, but Stalin's place in the new secretariat is definitely indicated. He was the first on the list, and according to the tradition that has developed in the party, if there were no special reservations, then the primacy in the list of members of a commission, collegium meant an instruction to assemble its members, preside over it, i.e. actually lead its work. This is understandable: as a member of the Politburo, Stalin could not help but have such primacy, so to speak, "in deed." Judging by the further development of events, Lenin agreed with the proposal on the composition of the Secretariat and on the proposal of this composition to the congress delegates.

In a letter from Stalin and Kamenev, sent on March 10, 1922, to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to Molotov, a general idea was elaborated on the nature of the distribution of leading party cadres. In particular, it proposed “to recognize as expedient the division of functions between separate groups of party workers and the possible assignment of the latter to certain branches of the party-Soviet-professional work, minimizing the frequent transfer of workers” [526]. The adoption of this proposal would make it possible to lay a solid foundation for the position that Kamenev and Stalin occupied in the structures of power on the basis of separate decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).

Molotov provides interesting information about Lenin's preparations for the election of Stalin as General Secretary. It is with Lenin that he

connects the first mention of the name of the new position - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).

"At the 11th Congress," Molotov recalled, "the so-called 'ten list' appeared - the names of alleged members of the Central Committee, supporters of Lenin. Next to Stalin's name was written in Lenin's handwriting: 'General Secretary.' Lenin organized a factional meeting of the Ten. Somewhere near the Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin, I found a room, agreed: a factional meeting, Trotskyists - no, workers' opposition - no, democratic centralism - also not to invite, only strong supporters of the 'ten', that is, Leninists. In my opinion, about twenty people gathered from the largest organizations before the vote. Stalin even reproached Lenin, saying that we have a secret or semi-secret meeting during the congress, somehow it turns out factional, and Lenin says:

"Comrade Stalin, you are an old, experienced factionalist! Do not doubt, we cannot do otherwise now [527]. I want everyone to be well prepared for the vote; we must warn the comrades to firmly vote for this list without amendments! The list of 'tens' must be carried out in its entirety. There is a great danger that they will vote according to persons, add: this is a good writer, we need him, this is a good orator - and they will dilute the list, again we will not have a majority. And how then to lead! .."

"And they voted with this note in brackets. Stalin became General Sec. It cost Lenin a lot of work. But, of course, he thought the issue over deeply enough and made it clear who to look up to" [528].

To clarify the issue of the course of the elections to the Central Committee at the XI Party Congress, the archival (typewritten) version of the verbatim report available to historians practically does not give anything, since this question is passed over in silence and only contains a list of elected members and candidates of the Central Committee [529].

There are two types of voting ballots preserved in the archive, including those that Molotov spoke about. Bulletins of the first type

(Lenin's "List") are a sheet with a title printed in the printing house: "List of members and candidates of the Central Committee of the RCP of the XI'th convocation." It is labeled "project". In them, the persons of interest to us are arranged in the following sequence: 1. Lenin, 2. Trotsky, 3. Zinoviev, 4. Kamenev, 5. Stalin, 6. Molotov ... 21. Kuibyshev. Next to the name of Stalin in brackets is printed in the same typographical way: "General Secretary", and next to the names of Molotov and Kuibyshev respectively - "Secretary" [530].

Obviously, the typographical version of this bulletin was preceded by another, with Lenin's handwritten insertion, about which Molotov spoke. Typographic execution means that this question was prepared specially, in advance. Consequently, the congress delegates could not introduce these inscriptions under any influence of Kamenev, as A.V. Antonov-Ovseenko [531]. It is impossible, therefore, to accept the version that Lenin somehow did not understand the essence of the issue under discussion and, due to a misunderstanding or mistake, "missed" Stalin to this position.

The second type of ballot is a blank sheet with the inscription at the top: "I propose the following comrades as members of the Central Committee of the RCP" and filled in by hand by the congress delegates. Ballots of both forms took part in the voting [532], [533]. This fact alone speaks of the unusual course of voting at the congress.

There is nothing surprising that the bulletin printed in the printing house (Lenin's "List") caused surprise, questions and even objections from some of the congress delegates, since the formation of the Secretariat is the prerogative of the Party Central Committee. It was necessary to explain to the delegates of the congress during the elections that the indication on some ballots of the positions of secretaries is only the wish of a certain part of the delegates and cannot hamper the Plenum of the Central Committee in the formation of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. This statement was made at the congress by Kamenev [534]. One way or another, but the vote for the new composition of the Central Committee passed, and its results were adopted by the congress. We do not know how many ballots of the first and second types participated in the voting. The

congress materials contain 167 bulletins of the first type (Lenin's "List"). In them, Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin received "against" by one vote, Zinoviev - 3, Kamenev - 2, Molotov - 10) [535].

There are also 301 ballots of the second type (lists of members of the Central Committee, compiled by delegates to the congress on a blank form, entitled "I propose the following comrades as members of the Central Committee of the RCP") [536]. The arrangement of the first five surnames in them often corresponds to that proposed in Lenin's "List", which may indicate his influence. Lenin and Trotsky were included in all ballots without exception [537]. The names of Zinoviev were not included in 20 ballots, Kamenev - 21 [538]. Stalin's candidacy for membership in the Central Committee was not proposed by 13 delegates. In addition, one, after proposing Stalin to the Central Committee, stipulated: "Just not as a secretary" [539].

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The officially calculated results of the elections to the Central Committee, which were announced by the counting commission, showed that a total of 482 ballots were submitted, 4 of them were declared invalid. Thus, 478 votes were taken into account. Of these, 477 delegates voted for Lenin and Trotsky, 476 for Bukharin and Kalinin, 473 for Dzerzhinsky. Radek and Tomskey received the support

of 472 delegates, Rykov 470, Rakovsky 468, Stalin 463, Kamenev 454, Zinoviev 448. The last of those elected to the Central Committee - Zelensky - received 345 votes [540].

It is striking that the same number of votes were cast for Trotsky as for Lenin, noticeably more than for Stalin, Kamenev, or Zinoviev, although the majority of the congress, like at the Tenth Party Congress, followed Lenin and, consequently, stood politically on anti-Trotskyist positions. Then, at the Tenth Congress, in the elections to the Central Committee, Trotsky received 452 votes out of 479, i.e. much less than Lenin (478), less than Stalin and Rykov (458 each) and Molotov (453). Therefore, 477 votes "for" Trotsky at the XI Party Congress, I think, should be considered not as an absolute indicator of the level of his authority, but as a relative one, due to a number of political and historical reasons. Perhaps the fact that this time the deep disagreements between him and Lenin, hidden even from the bulk of the party's activists, did not yet force the party to make a choice between them, expressing their political distrust of someone by voting. Also noteworthy is the significant separation of Stalin from Kamenev and especially Zinoviev. This circumstance alone makes us skeptical of the deep-rooted thesis that in the party their authority was higher than that of Stalin, and therefore they could "use" him for their own purposes.

As for the proposal to appoint Stalin as General Secretary, 166 delegates agreed with him, voting with ballots of the first type ("Lenin list") [541]. To them must be added 27 delegates who voted by ballots of the second type and listed Stalin as general secretary (and Molotov and Kuibyshev as secretaries) [542]. It turned out that 193 congress delegates with a decisive vote voted for Stalin as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, i.e. 40.4% of their total number. Only 16 delegates to the congress definitely spoke out against this proposal. The remaining 273 (out of 482 voters) did not formulate their attitude to this issue and actually abstained from voting. They didn't say yes, but they didn't say no either. These were good results for Lenin and Stalin, especially considering the circumstances of the voting, as well as the insufficient clarity of the question of the reasons for the introduction of the position, functions and rights of the General

Secretary, a departure from the traditions according to which the election of Central Committee bodies was the prerogative of the Plenum of the Central Committee.

If Lenin proposed to include in the list of candidates an indication of the future general secretary and secretaries of the Central Committee, then he would have planned to discuss this issue at the plenary session of the congress before the Plenum of the Central Committee discussed it. Could Lenin have foreseen the violent backlash from his opponents? Obviously yes. The question arises: why did Lenin need to address this issue to the delegates of the entire congress, if it fell within the competence of the Plenum of the Central Committee? If Lenin took such an unusual step, it means that he considered it fundamentally important. What is the meaning of it? If we proceed from the traditional idea that first a position was created, and then a candidate was selected for it, then the step taken by Lenin looks senseless or imprudent: he would run into a scandal and forced, with the help of Kamenev, to disavow his unsuccessful move. But this step makes a lot of sense if we see what happened: the post of general secretary was created as part of the reorganization of the management system carried out by Lenin and it was created specifically for Stalin. In this case, the meaning of this step could be to force all the congress delegates to speak out about Stalin. The goal was achieved: more than 40% of the congress delegates spoke in favor, and this was much more than the proportion of Central Committee members in the congress. Objectively, this strengthened the moral and political position of Stalin in the party and its leadership and increased his chances in the upcoming political struggle for leadership in the party. Consequently, we have indirect and independent (from Molotov's story) evidence that Lenin looked at Stalin as the person who should replace him as the leader of the party and the revolution.

The same idea is also suggested by the fact that at the 11th Party Congress Lenin defended Stalin against Preobrazhensky's criticism [543], giving Stalin an excellent political characterization in the face of the congress:

"What can we do now to ensure the existing situation in the Narkomnats deals with all Turkestan, Caucasian, and other issues? (it means that V.I. Lenin was quite satisfied with it! - BC). After all, these are all political questions! And it is necessary to resolve these issues ... and we need to have a person to whom any of the representatives of the nations could go and tell us in detail what the matter is. Where to find it? I think Preobrazhensky could not have named another candidate other than Comrade Stalin.

The same is true of Rabkrin. The case is gigantic. But in order to be able to handle the check, it is necessary that a person with authority be at the head, otherwise we will get bogged down, drown in petty intrigues" [544].

At the plenary session of the congress, the question of the general secretary was raised, but not resolved. However, Lenin ensured the majority in the Central Committee of the party for his supporters, and this made it easier for him to promote Stalin to the General Secretaries at the Plenum of the Central Committee. What happened at the Plenum of the Central Committee provides additional arguments in favor of the assumption that Lenin wanted to have not so much the position of General Secretary as Stalin in this position.

The minutes of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) dated April 3, 1922, at which the "constitution of the Central Committee" took place, sparingly and dryly conveys what happened.

The question of "the chairman" of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was considered first. To analyze this proposal, it is important to understand that it was a proposal to use in the RCP (b) the scheme that was used in the Comintern (collegiate body - chairman - general secretary). It is important to know who made the proposal, but, unfortunately, we do not know the answer to this question. One can say with certainty, perhaps, only that this proposal came from an opponent (or opponents) of the plan for reorganizing the control system that Lenin was carrying out. If the chairman of the Central Committee was conceived as the highest position in the party instead of the general secretary, then it can be assumed that it came from

Trotsky and his supporters. This option allowed them to politically torpedo Lenin's plan by placing the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee under the constant political control of the chairman of the Central Committee. It cannot be excluded that the initiative came from Zinoviev, who carried out a similar scheme in the ECCI and whose political interest (the struggle for leadership in the party) could push him to overcome the isolation in which he found himself as a result of the reorganization of the control system carried out by Lenin.

The plenum rejected the proposal to introduce the post of chairman of the Central Committee of the party and decided:

“Reaffirm the unanimously established custom, which consists in the fact that the Central Committee does not have a chairman. The only officials of the Central Committee are the secretaries, while the chairman is elected at each given meeting.’

“To confirm unanimously” means that Lenin was against the establishment of the post of chairman of the Central Committee. Against, even if it was meant for him. Why? Perhaps because he knew that after his retirement, rivalry and struggle would arise in the Politburo, relying on two almost equivalent positions - the chairman and general secretary of the Central Committee? A struggle which, under these conditions, can only become more difficult, sharper, and more threatening to split the party. If Lenin was against the establishment of the post of chairman of the Central Committee, then he advocated that the general secretary does not share his power with him. But it follows from this that It's not about the position, but about the system in which it is inscribed. Lenin's rejection of the proposal for the chairman of the Central Committee of the party says that Lenin wanted a general secretary at the head of the party.

Following the question of the chairman, the question was considered "of the obligation for the Plenum of the Central Committee to make a mark on the list of members of the Central Committee adopted by the XI Congress, on the appointment of comrades Stalin, Molotov and

Kuibyshev as secretaries." Kamenev came forward with an explanation, the content of which we do not yet know. The plenum decided:

"to take note of Comrade Kamenev's explanation that during the elections, with the full approval of the congress, it was stated that the indication on some ballots of the positions of secretaries should not constrain the Plenum of the Central Committee in the elections but is only a wish of a certain part of the delegates" [546].

Both the congress delegates and the members of the Central Committee knew what kind of "known part" it was and who headed it. Information by the Plenum of the Central Committee was taken into account.

This was followed by consideration of the issue of "secretariat". The literature attaches fundamental importance to the fact that this proposal was made by Kamenev, from which it is concluded that it was he who promoted Stalin to this position. However, this assertion is unfounded. Behind the election of Stalin as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) was the political interest of Lenin, not Kamenev. As for the protocol of the Plenum, it does not record this initiative of Kamenev; it is impossible to establish from it who exactly made the proposal on the secretariat. Yes, this is not of great importance, since it does not cross out Lenin's definitely expressed will regarding Stalin's candidacy. The issue of the secretariat was considered in the block with questions about the formation of other bodies of the Central Committee. "Heard: "Constitution of the Central Committee"". And that's it. Further - only the texts of the operative part of the protocol. The points. The issue of the secretariat is marked with a "c": "I. Establish the position of the General Secretary and two Secretaries. Appoint comrade Stalin as general secretary, comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev as secretaries.

II. Accept the following proposal from Comrade Lenin:

The Central Committee instructs the Secretariat to strictly determine and observe the distribution of hours of official receptions and publish it; at the same time, make it a rule that secretaries should not undertake any work other than really principally leading secretaries personally, delegating such work to their assistants and technical secretaries.

Comrade Stalin is instructed to immediately look for deputies and assistants who relieve him of work (with the exception of principled leadership) in Soviet institutions, so that comrade Stalin within a month could be completely released from work in the RKI.

The Central Committee instructs the Orgburo and the Politburo to submit a list of candidates for members of the collegium and deputies of the Rabkrin within 2 weeks. [547]

Let us dwell on this proposal by V.I. Lenin, which was published in the Complete Works [548] in isolation from the context of the minutes of the meeting of the Plenum. This leads to a distortion of Lenin's participation in the election of Stalin as general secretary.

This proposal by Lenin, coupled with his rejection of the proposal to introduce the post of chairman of the Central Committee, indicates that he wanted to see Stalin at the head of the party as general secretary. Indeed, if the scheme of the Comintern is adopted in the RCP(b), then the power and influence of I.V. Stalin as General Secretary of the Central Committee are balanced by the post of Chairman of the Central Committee, and he himself is doomed to play the role of a conductor in the life of decisions taken by a collegial body working under the leadership of the chairman. Lenin rejected this scheme. If the scheme adopted for the Profintern is adopted, then the general secretary of the Central Committee will inevitably play a much more independent political role. Lenin supported a scheme that prevented the fragmentation of power in the leadership of the party, allowing to combine the work of a collegiate body with a significant concentration of political power in the hands of the general secretary

of the party's Central Committee. It was possible to grant such power only to a person in whom you have absolute political trust.

Of course, the task of improving the work of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the party could also stand and, obviously, stood. There were a lot of complaints about the work of the party apparatus at the XI Congress of the RCP(b) [549]. "The horror of the collapse" - this is how Z. Ya. Litvin-Sedoy characterized the situation in the Samara organization [550]. Under these conditions, the organization of the work of the party apparatus can by no means be called a "technical" problem. For the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, this is a political problem of paramount importance. Stalin, like no one else, was able to solve this problem.

The Plenum of the Central Committee of the party also formed the Politburo, the Orgburo and the representation of the RCP in the Comintern. The Politburo included 7 people: "Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Tomsky, Rykov. Candidates for membership in the Politburo were "Molotov, Kalinin, Bukharin. Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev, Rykov, Tomsky, Dzerzhinsky and Andreev were "appointed" members of the Orgburo, and Rudzutak, Zelensky, Kalinin [551] were candidates for membership.

The order in which the names are listed on the list reflects the fact that the 11th Congress was the time when Stalin seriously strengthened his political positions. In the list of members of the Politburo, he took third place, in contrast to fifth in the list of members of the Central Committee, put to the vote.

Among the members of the Orgburo, he occupied the first place, which, according to the traditions of that time, meant chairmanship in a collective body. Zinoviev, Bukharin and Radek became representatives of the RCP (b) in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and Lenin and Trotsky became candidates for representatives [552]. The absence of Lenin among the representatives of the RCP in the ECCI can be easily explained by the workload of Soviet work and illness. As for Trotsky, then, apparently, they did not try to strengthen his position in the Comintern.

Now the reader can appreciate the version of the creation of the post of general secretary and the election of Stalin to it, proposed by Trotsky and picked up by traditional historiography.

There are enough grounds to accept as a working hypothesis the proposition that Lenin brought Stalin to power and ensured his leadership in the party and, therefore, the entire political hierarchy, because, thinking about a successor, he fixed his eyes on Stalin. In traditional historiography, this question is either passed over in silence, or it is answered in the negative [553]. In view of all that has been said above, I think there is reason to trust Molotov's following opinion that Lenin, "of course", "thought it out quite deeply and made it clear who to look up to. Lenin ... made Stalin General. He, of course, prepared himself, feeling his illness. Did he see Stalin as his successor? I think that this could be taken into account.

And what was the Secretary General for? Never was" [554].

Indeed, by shaping Stalin's political position in this way, Lenin gave his supporters a political guideline.

If we consider the position that the party occupied in the political system of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it becomes clear that the post of general secretary, being the highest position in the party, at the same time became the highest position in the political system of the Soviet state. Above that was only Lenin, whose position was determined not by positions, but by his role as leader of the party and revolution. Therefore, the introduction of the post of general secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) actually meant the replacement of Trotsky by Stalin as "leader No. 2" in the party. It may not have been clear to everyone yet, but two years will not pass before it becomes clear even to outside observers.

If we evaluate the establishment of the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) from the point of view of Lenin's desire to strengthen the positions of his supporters in the Central Committee and the party, their ability to ensure the implementation of a jointly developed course, then we must admit that this innovation

was a logical and timely political step, quite in line with in the reorganization of the political system that Lenin carried out.

The fact that Stalin took this political position with the most active support of Lenin was of great importance for Stalin's political future and far-reaching consequences for the alignment of political forces in the leadership of the party, for the outcome of the struggle between Bolshevism and Trotskyism in the RCP(b) and in the Comintern.

At the same time, of course, it is not necessary to talk about Stalin's "immense power", which he received thanks to the post of general secretary. His power was great, but had fairly well-defined boundaries and, most importantly, it was not uncontrollable.

In itself, the post of general secretary added little to the power that was already concentrated in the hands of Stalin by the 11th Party Congress. It would be more correct to say that this position expanded his power opportunities and strengthened his political positions, since now his power was based on the authority of the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee, approved by the party congress, and the position of general secretary itself was already inscribed in the new management system and was its pinnacle.

Now Stalin could enter into the most diverse issues of foreign and domestic policy as the highest official of the ruling party.

Notes:

[519] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 241. L. 2.

[520] Ibid. D. 361. L. 15.

[521] Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24207. L. 2–4, 10.

[522] Ibid. L. 6.

[523] Meaning M.F. Vladimirsky.

[524] It is interesting how some historians represent the dismissal of Stalin from the post of People's Commissar of the RKI. For example, E.E. Pisarenko tried to develop a thesis about Lenin's dissatisfaction with Stalin in connection with his work in the RCI: "Lenin repeatedly considered ... the work of the people's commissar of the RCI Stalin. Then, at the suggestion of Vladimir Ilyich, he was relieved of this post" (E.E. Pisarenko , Alexander Dmitrievich Tsyurupa // Questions of History. 1989. No. 5, P. 144). Similar views were held by Antonov-Ovseenko (Antonov-Ovseenko A.V. Stalin and his time // Questions of History. 1989. No. 1. P. 96).

[525] Ibid. L. 10.

[526] Ibid. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 24.

[527] Judging by the context, this is not about the faction created by Lenin, but about the use of factional methods of struggle. Despite the ban on the Tenth Party Congress, factions continued to exist. The allegations found in the political and historical literature about the existence of a "Leninist" faction at that time do not make sense, since Lenin's supporters constituted the majority at the congress and, thus, according to the principle of democratic centralism, which determined the life and activities of the Bolshevik Party, had the right to speak on behalf of the entire parties. The word "fraction" defines a part that opposes the whole, in this case, the party. As for the methods of factional struggle, they were used by Lenin and his supporters, inasmuch as they were effective in fighting factions. Kuibyshev at the July (1926) joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission recalled, that during the days of the Eleventh Congress, Lenin, together with Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev, discussed the question of how to ensure the passage of a resolution on trade unions at the congress. The discussion was aimed at fending off opposition from Trotsky (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 246. IV issue. P. 84).

[528] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 181.

[529] RGASPI. F. 48. Op. 1. D. 14. L. 85–86; Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. pp. 520, 521.

[530] RGASPI. F. 48. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 1–167.

[531] Antonov-Ovseenko A.V. Stalin and his time // Questions of history. 1989. No. 1. S. 92–93.

[532] RGASPI. F. 48. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 1–469.

[533] In addition to these bulletins, the materials of the congress contain a "List of members of the Central Committee of the RCP and their candidates, proposed by the provinces that are not members of the regional organizations." It proposed 27 people to the Central Committee in the following sequence: Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Rakovsky, Bukharin, Radek, Frunze, Rudzutak, Tomskey, Molotov, Rykov, Smirnov I.N., Petrovsky, Chubar, Dzerzhinsky, Kalinin, Andreev, Yaroslavsky, Ordzhonikidze, Zelensky, Voroshilov, Sokolnikov, Pyatakov, Ufimtsev, Kuibyshev (RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 1). This list is valuable in that it gives us an idea of how the upper echelon of the party leadership was seen by local workers, who may not have taken an active part in the intra-party struggle. The first five are standard, and the "favorite of the party" Bukharin is only seventh. The personal composition of the proposed Central Committee allows us to consider that the political orientation of its authors should rather be considered anti-Trotskyist. This list was not used as a ballot.

[534] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 78. L. 2, 6 - 6v.

[535] Ibid. F. 48. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 1–167.

[536] Ibid. L. 168–469.

LENIN, STALIN, AND TROTSKY

8. LENIN AND TROTSKY - ALIENATION IS GROWING

Information about the political and personal relations between Lenin and Trotsky in the middle and second half of 1922 comes mainly from Trotsky. He assesses the general nature of these relations as follows:

“After our short-term disagreement on the issue of trade unions, he [Lenin] during 1921, 22 and early 23 did not miss a single opportunity not to openly emphasize his solidarity with me he had not personal, but political motives for this. “

Trotsky did not talk about his closeness to Lenin, but on the contrary, emphasizes Lenin's interest in establishing close political relations with him, Trotsky:

“Lenin sought my support and found it” [555].

Detailing this picture, he wrote:

“When Lenin recovered from his first bout of illness and returned to work, the bureaucracy was well entrenched, and Stalin gained great influence over the masses of [party] members. Lenin insisted that I should be the successor in the Council of People's Commissars and discuss with me measures to get rid of the Stalinist bureaucracy. We sought to achieve this goal of ours without causing too much friction.”

Trotsky assures that Lenin was ready to fight with him against his political supporters. After such a “preparation”, the following explanation by Trotsky of the “true” meaning of Lenin's “Testament” will no longer seem incredible:

Furthermore... it pursued the exact opposite goal. As a rule, historians accept this statement without a shadow of criticism. Exceptions to this rule are rare. For example, Vasetsky considers Trotsky's attempt to substantiate the thesis that Lenin saw him as his successor as pointless [558].

In the light of everything that we now know about the difficult political relations between Lenin and Trotsky, about the creation by Lenin of a mechanism of political power in which Trotsky could not find a place, such revelations cannot be taken for granted without the most serious verification, and verification yields negative results.

As a manifestation of his political affinity with Lenin, Trotsky pointed to his report, which he made at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, and Lenin's review of it. We have discussed above the invalidity of this argument. Documents relating to the preparation of the congress and this report on it also do not give grounds for such conclusions. On September 7, 1922, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), discussing the preparations for the Congress of the Comintern, accepted Zinoviev's proposal for a speaker at the IV Congress on the issue of "The Fifth Anniversary of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution.

" The nature of the report was defined by the Politburo as a program speech explaining the NEP, "inserting the NEP into the framework of international development and explaining the entire transitional stage," since the Communist Parties have not yet understood its essence. An extract from the protocol was sent to Lenin [559].

Lenin agreed with this decision, of which Zinoviev was notified on September 28:

"As for the speaker, I agree conditionally: 1) Trotsky should also be for a replacement (and for an independent report)."

At the same time, he stipulated his intention to make a report [560].

To prove the identity of his own and Lenin's positions in matters of state and party building and Lenin's readiness to cooperate with him, Trotsky actively used the question of the threat of bureaucracy, presenting Stalin either as the main bureaucrat, or as the planter of bureaucracy, or as its patron and defender. He left several stories about his conversation with Lenin on this topic, each time relating it to

a different time and describing it in different ways. In a letter dated January 15, 1923, Trotsky argued his refusal to become Lenin's deputy for the Council of People's Commissars by disagreeing with the practice of resolving Soviet issues.

He was especially indignant at the fact that on issues under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense, i.e. him, Trotsky, decisions were made "in fact, apart from the department concerned and even behind his back", which "completely violated the possibility of correct work, selection and education of workers and any correct calculation and foresight, any planned economy.""

In this situation, Trotsky "did not consider it possible to take responsibility for other institutions as well." Lenin, for his part, "pointing out that our leadership apparatus and the selection of workers are really extremely poor and that we need a special authoritative party commission to consider the question of more correct selection, education and promotion of workers and more correct organizational relationships... He suggested that I join one when he had more definitely considered its functions and composition. I readily agreed. However, before his new illness, Comrade Lenin did not raise the issue of this commission anymore" (see Appendix No. 7). This is how Trotsky wrote when Lenin was still able to work and could, in principle, be acquainted with this letter, and, if necessary, protest it.

There is no reason to doubt the very fact of a conversation on this subject. It easily reads the well-known fundamentally different approach of Lenin and Trotsky to criticism of the apparatus. Lenin criticized the state apparatus for the fact that politically it still to a large extent remains a stranger, acting contrary to Soviet laws, and assigns the main role in improving it to the parties.

Trotsky, on the other hand, sees the main danger of bureaucracy in the party apparatus, primarily in the highest organs of the party, in the Politburo, in the Secretariat of the Central Committee and its apparatus, i.e. in "driver". Therefore, he demands that the real power in the economy be removed from the hands of the party and

transferred to the hands of the economic apparatus, in fact moving the party away from the real control of the country.

The objects of criticism are different, and the methods of combating bureaucracy are also different. If, according to Lenin, it was the party that was supposed to organize and lead the fight against bureaucracy, then, according to Trotsky, the party should be attacked as the main source and carrier of the most dangerous forms of bureaucracy. Lenin argues that

the car (the system of organs of power) is good, and the driver (party) is good, but the grass-roots apparatus sabotages and does what it wants, as a result, the car sometimes goes in the wrong direction [561].

It is precisely to eliminate this deficiency that Lenin's critique of bureaucracy is directed. And, according to Trotsky, the "car" is bad, and the "driver" is no good. It is this understanding of the problem that will later become the basis for criticism of the so-called "secretary regime", accompanied by the demand for the defeat of the party apparatus as the main means of defeating bureaucracy.

It is important for us to take into account not only what Trotsky recorded, it is even more important to see what is not in his story: there is not a word about bureaucracy in general, about party bureaucracy in particular, and specifically about the Orgburo as a stronghold of bureaucracy, i.e. what Trotsky would write about later, in October 1923, when Lenin could no longer speak on this subject. At this time, Trotsky, in a letter to the Central Committee, painted a different picture: during one of his conversations with Lenin at the end of 1922, the conversation turned to bureaucracy:

"Yes, our bureaucracy is monstrous," Lenin picked up, "I was horrified after returning to work. .. So, you can shake up the apparatus, - Lenin quickly picked up, alluding to the expression I once used. - I answered that I mean not only the state bureaucracy, but also the party one; that the essence of all the difficulties lies in the combination of two apparatuses (party and state. - BC) and in the mutual harboring of influential groups that

gather around the hierarchy of party secretaries. Lenin listened intently and confirmed my thoughts in that deep chesty tone that appeared in him when, convinced that the interlocutor understood him to the end, and, discarding the inevitable conventions of the conversation, he openly touched on the most important and disturbing. After a little thought, Lenin put the question point-blank: "So you are proposing an open struggle not only against state bureaucracy, but also against the Orgburo of the Central Committee?" I laughed in surprise. The Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee signified the very concentration of the Stalinist apparatus. - Perhaps it turns out like this. "Well, then," continued Lenin, obviously pleased that we had named the essence of the question, "I propose to you a bloc: against bureaucracy in general, against the organizing bureau in particular. "It is flattering to make a good bloc with a good man," I replied. We agreed to meet again after some time. Lenin proposed to consider the organizational aspect of the matter. He planned the creation of a commission under the Central Committee to combat bureaucracy. We both had to get into it. In essence, this commission was supposed to become a lever for destroying the Stalinist faction, as the backbone of bureaucracy, and for creating such conditions in the party that would give me the opportunity to become Lenin's deputy, in his opinion: the successor to the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars" [562].

The positions of the parties, as they are depicted here, have nothing in common with how Trotsky himself characterized them in a letter dated January 15, 1923. Trotsky contrasts the real problems that then worried Lenin and the Central Committee with a far-fetched version of the problem of the struggle against bureaucracy, in which he tried to present Lenin not only as his ally, but also as the initiator of this alliance, a man who viewed Trotsky as his "hope and support" in his planned struggle against the Central Committee.

In the first letter, Trotsky does not even approximately determine the date of this conversation, but in the second he indicates its time quite definitely - in December 1922. And the lie is immediately revealed.

The fact of their meeting is not confirmed by documents, the Diary of Duty Secretaries is silent about Lenin's telephone conversations with Trotsky, and it does not record Trotsky's visits to Lenin's office. This conversation could not have taken place during any meeting, since from the end of November Lenin no longer participated in them. Trotsky himself does not report any external circumstances of this meeting either.

The documents say otherwise. The fact that the events of the last year could and should have set Lenin up for a critical and even distrustful attitude towards Trotsky. Some of them were discussed above, others - ahead.

In the spring of 1922, some details, and results of "economic activity" in the Moscow Combined Bush (MKK) were revealed. Since this story has been completely ignored by historians, and it is absolutely necessary to take it into account when studying the problems of Lenin's political "Testament", let's touch on it briefly. It was said above that the idea of creating the Moscow combined bush as a kind of economic testing ground (or economic experiment) was put forward by Trotsky on the eve of the August (1921) Plenum of the Central Committee, which allowed him to conduct this experiment [563].

Since Lenin understood the true purpose of this organization and considered it as a kind of compromise that he had to make, it is natural that he had strong doubts about this undertaking. Therefore, immediately after the creation of the IWC, he placed Trotsky's new brainchild under special control. In late July - early August 1921, Lenin wrote to Kamenev:

"Please send me an exact list of plants, factories, state farms and all other enterprises taken under the control of Trotsky ... You don't know if he took (and could take) anything else besides you (directly from the people's commissars?)".

A second note followed:

“Please find out and is it possible to make it so that he should tell you everything in cases of leasing immediately” [564].

The notes speak for themselves: distrust, anxiety because of the impossibility or difficulty of keeping Trotsky under control to the extent that one would like. Trotsky was quite autonomous in his actions, and over time, the scope of the IWC's activities began to expand. Thus, on March 9, 1922, the Politburo took note of Trotsky's statement that his activities “spread to enterprises that go beyond the Moscow province” [565].

At the beginning of 1922, the Politburo decided to inspect the ICC [566]. Trotsky resisted it as best he could. On February 18, 1922, he sent a letter to the Politburo, in which he argued his objections by the fact that regulations and instructions for such an inspection had not yet been developed [567]. While agreeing that the issue of control over leased enterprises was very acute, he argued that this did not apply to his economic organization:

“In relation to the enterprise, by its very nature, this issue is not as acute as in relation to private entrepreneurs, or less responsible state bodies, cooperatives, artels, etc.”

Trotsky especially protested against the fact that the inspection was carried out by the forces of the People's Commissariat of the RKI, headed by Stalin. Trotsky only agreed to provide the Supreme Council of National Economy or the RCT with the opportunity to “observe the observance of the technical and economic conditions of the contract by the leased enterprises.” He insisted on postponing the inspection until the necessary regulatory framework (decrees, instructions, etc.) was created, arguing that there was no danger of wasting time. Moreover, Trotsky frightened the members of the Politburo that the check of the IWC by the RKI would mean nothing more than the disruption of the NEP:

“It would be, however, the greatest disaster if the competence of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee, as such, were extended to these enterprises. This would mean a failure of the New Economic Policy, because with the threat of such inspection, no one will

invest capital. Objectively, behind this thesis lies the desire to get private capital out of the control of the Soviet state, which could not but weaken those very "commanding heights", in the preservation and strengthening of which Lenin saw the guarantee of the future victory of socialism over capitalism."

It is clear from Trotsky's argument that the point, of course, was not the fundamental inadmissibility of such an inspection, but that the Politburo intended to put him, Trotsky, under control of economic activity, which, as he understood, did not bode well for him.

Despite Trotsky's protests, the verification was carried out in February 1922. *

In April, the conclusions of the commission were discussed twice at meetings of representatives of the NK RKI and the IWC [568]. The main conclusions reached by the inspectors of the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Studies were known to both Lenin and Trotsky even before the start of the 11th Party Congress.

On May 31, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, in pursuance of the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of May 16, 1922, sent out for familiarization to all members of the Central Committee the material on the results of the check of the ICC. They also entered the Lenin secretariat [569]. In the "Conclusion" it was shown that the "Regulations" on the Moscow Combined Bush, which could not pass by Trotsky as its actual creator and official leader, were "entirely built on negative definitions" and did not give "an idea of the legal nature of Moscust." This, it turns out, is "not a state organization", and not private capitalist. It was supposed to be under the RVSR, but it was made independent "from military science." As a result, no one knows it and it remains outside the state system**. In the "Regulations" on the IWC it is not defined by whom the Council of the IWC is elected, composed of whom it consists, and also to whom the profits of the IWC belong. The conclusion of the inspectors is as follows:

the situation does not meet the conditions and requirements of the New Economic Policy "and is subject to categorical and final condemnation" [570].

Further, it was stated that the meaning of the creation of the IWC was distorted. The idea was to test the management experience in a small amount. In fact, the main idea—combination—is not being implemented; the enterprises included in the MCC are separated from each other.

"The idea of combining was the guiding one when the bush rented one or another enterprise. All of them were recruited without a system, and this was done for the sake of giving universality to the trading activities of the Moskust "(our italics. - BC) [571].

Normally operating enterprises were leased, but now, six months later, financially, and technically, they are "in a miserable state" and require huge funds for their restoration. The large enterprises of the MCC are "certainly unprofitable." They can be exploited profitably "only because of the speculative market opportunities." This fundamentally important circumstance was recognized by the Chairman of the Board of the IWC, i.e., Trotsky himself [572]. Meanwhile, the MCC received funds for conducting operations from the state, the state bank opened three accounts for it [573]. "The economic benefit of all these operations for Moscust is obvious, and their non-economic nature from the state point of view is just as clear" [574].

Thus, the parasitic essence of the economic offspring of Trotsky was revealed. In the "Regulations", the IWC set the goal - "to place at the disposal of the state an increasing number of products." "The task," the inspectors of the NK RKI record, "remained not only unfulfilled, but facts and figures indicate that the trade turnover of Moskust had completely the opposite results of pumping state stocks to the free market." And again, it was stated:

"This is not denied by the Chairman of the Board of Moscow" (i.e. Trotsky) [575].

The mechanisms of abuse were revealed. "The material p / department was not in the best condition. There was no systematization of requirements and monitoring of their use. Accounting was extremely primitive, and the accounting did not give confidence that all business transactions were at least recorded in a timely manner. Big doubts were caused by the organization of accounting.

"The position of the Central Accounting Department is such that its criticism should be reduced to listing what is not being done ... In general, the accounting department of the ICC in its present form is an empty place, which, with its illiterate reports, can only mislead enterprises about the actual state of affairs". The lease is set up in such a way that the IWC robs the Moscow Economic Council, i.e. state [576]. MMK used illegal methods of commission awards. This experience from the "production" sphere, the IWC is now trying to "extend" to the trade sphere [577].

The results of the check allowed the inspectors of the NC RCT to draw the following conclusions and suggestions. Firstly, MCC "by its legal nature appears to be the most unfortunate economic neoplasm" (italics ours. - V.S.) [578]. Since its work violated the most important condition of the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of August 21, 1921 - no privileges for the sake of observing the "purity" of experience, it was proposed to bring it into line with common practice.

Secondly, from the point of view of state interests, the choice of enterprises is extremely unfortunate and needs to be reviewed.

Thirdly, trading activities were carried out to the detriment of the state and in violation of the laws. It was proposed to change the Charter of the IWC and the composition of its enterprises, as well as to approve the charter of the "Vnutrtorg" of the ICC [579].

The general conclusion is: "The whole experience of running industrial and agricultural enterprises ... proved to be a failure" (our italics. - BC) [580]. The validity of the observations and the conclusions drawn

were recognized by the leading economic and financial workers of Moskust.

There are no markings on the document made by Lenin, but this does not mean that Lenin did not personally get acquainted with him at that time or was not familiar with the essence of the conclusions and proposals contained in it. In addition, Lenin's archive contains other materials about violations in the work of the ICC, related to employment, wages, etc. guess. This question remained in Lenin's field of vision almost to the very end of his active political activity, as evidenced by a letter sent to him by Trotsky (November 24, 1922), in which he again raised the question of inspecting the ICC [582].

The history of Trotsky's management in the IWC could only serve Lenin as an additional argument in favor of the conclusion that Trotsky's experiment was ineffective and strengthened doubts about Trotsky's ability to do serious economic work. The results of the check gave Lenin and his supporters serious grounds and arguments for building up the struggle against Trotsky, which were used during the internal party discussion at the end of 1923. Members and candidate members of the Politburo in a statement sent to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on December 31, 1923, wrote:

"Even when it came to the attempt of comrade Trotsky to create for himself a surrogate for economic work in the form of the famous Moskust, comrade Lenin struggled for months even against this small "economic idea" of Comrade Trotsky and dozens of times in the presence of comrade Trotsky, and in his absence comrade Lenin argued in detail that with the approach to economic issues that Comrade Trotsky, the economy can only be destroyed"[583].

One way or another, the second half of 1922 was marked, on the one hand, by the almost complete cessation of Lenin's contacts with Trotsky, and, on the other hand, by such steps towards Trotsky that cannot be assessed otherwise than as aimed at ousting him from the sphere of economic management. M.I. Ulyanova, recalling Stalin's first visit to Lenin after his first stroke on July 11, 1922, wrote:

“On this and subsequent visits, they talked about Trotsky, talked in front of me, and it was clear that here Ilyich was with Stalin against Trotsky. Once the question of inviting Trotsky to Ilyich was discussed. It was in the nature of diplomacy.”[584]

Lenin sent an invitation to Trotsky, indicating how to get to Gorki by car [585]. Trotsky did not take advantage of this invitation and in the summer of 1922 did not visit Lenin in Gorki. Ulyanova's information is supported by documents.

“In July 1922,” writes Volkogonov, “Lenin, while convalescing in Gorki, wrote a note to Stalin asking him to express his and Kamenev’s opinion on Trotsky. It is not clear what is at stake, but it is clear that a line is being worked out on some question of at least three people: Lenin, Stalin, Kamenev, in opposition to Trotsky, or about him. And again, about Trotsky, behind Trotsky's back ... Probably, it came to radical proposals, perhaps even to the point of dismissing Trotsky from office or positions. This, in particular, is evidenced by Lenin's note to Kamenev. Lenin wrote:

“... I think exaggerations can be avoided. "Throws out (the Central Committee) or is ready to throw a healthy cannon overboard," you write. Isn't this an immense exaggeration? Throwing Trotsky overboard - after all, you are hinting at this, it cannot be interpreted otherwise - the height of absurdity. If you don't think I'm stupid to the point of hopelessness, then how can you think that? The boys are bloody in their eyes...”[586].

Volkogonov assumes that Stalin was the author of the unknown proposal, and on this basis, he concludes that Kamenev occupied more moderate positions in relation to Trotsky than Stalin, while Lenin stood up for Trotsky. However, Volkogonov himself is not sure of his assumption and states:

“But the fact remains: Lenin was not always open and sincere with Trotsky” [587].

This is true. In war as in war. Everything known about the relationship between Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky at this time allows us to consider another assumption more justified: Lenin, seeing that Kamenev objected to radical measures (perhaps introduced by himself or together with Stalin), tried to calm him down.

Perhaps at the same time, it was also about the proposal to Trotsky to become Lenin's deputy for the Council of People's Commissars, which Lenin made in September 1922. Trotsky and the historiography following in his wake regards this proposal of Lenin as an attempt to strengthen Trotsky's political positions, making him his first deputy and thereby ensure his further promotion to power and becoming "successors" as chairman of the government. However, there is no basis for such assertions.

On September 11, 1922, through Stalin, Lenin submitted to the Politburo a proposal to increase the number of deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO. He proposed, in addition to the two deputies, Rykov and Tsyurupa, to appoint two more, Kamenev and Trotsky. He wrote:

"In view of the fact that Comrade Rykov received leave from the arrival of Tsyurupa ... and the doctors promise me (of course, only in case that nothing bad happens) to return to work (very moderate at first) by 1/10, I think that for one comrade, It is impossible for Tsyuruup to charge all the current work and I propose to appoint two more deputies (Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Deputy Chairman of the STO), namely: comrades Trotsky and Kamenev. Distribute work among them with the participation of mine and, of course, the Politburo, as the highest authority.

It can be seen from the text that Trotsky (the first on the list) was assigned the first of the posts - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Outwardly, it looks more important than the one that was intended for Kamenev: SRT is just a commission of the Council of People's Commissars. But in economic matters, everything was the other way around: all economic issues went not through the

Council of People's Commissars, but through the STO. Trotsky himself admitted that he, as deputy for the Council of People's Commissars, was asked to take control of "non-economic people's commissariats, primarily Narkompros" (see Appendix No. 7). This document also crushes the legend that Lenin proposed to Trotsky to become the first deputy and, thus, to take the second post in the government. The post of first deputy did not yet exist at that time, and Lenin did not propose to create it.

Having received Lenin's letter, Stalin informed Trotsky about it by telephone (possibly on the same day), who refused this proposal. The next day, September 12, Stalin was in Gorki with Lenin. M.I. Ulyanova, who witnessed the conversation between them, reports that "the proposal made to Trotsky that he be Lenin's deputy for the Council of People's Commissars" had the "character of diplomacy"[589]. Subsequent events speak in favor of this. After Trotsky's refusal to accept Lenin's proposal, it was put up for discussion at the next meeting of the Politburo (September 14), the minutes of which read:

"a) The proposal of comrade. Lenin on the appointment of two deputies. Chairman SNK and STO - accept.

b) The Politburo of the Central Committee notes with regret the categorical refusal of Comrade Trotsky" [590].

Trotsky was not present at the meeting of the Politburo, but since copies of the protocols were sent to all members of the Politburo, he, naturally, was familiar with this decision, not objecting either to the wording or to the resolution on the merits.

What was the reason for Trotsky's refusal? In a letter on January 15, 1923, he wrote to the Central Committee:

"A few weeks after his return to work, comrade. Lenin suggested that I take the place of deputy. I replied that if the Central Committee appoints, then, of course, as always, I will obey the Central Committee, but that I will look at such a decision as

deeply irrational, completely going against all my organizational and administrative views, plans and intentions. The reasons for the refusal are as follows: "I consider the very existence of a collegium of deputies to be harmful, since, by removing the most responsible comrades from certain administrative and administrative posts, the collegium of deputies creates an indefinite position for them, in which they are all responsible, as it were, for everything and at the same time as for nothing. I thought and still think that it is necessary and sufficient to have a permanent deputy for the Council of People's Commissars and, perhaps, another for the SRT with their correct relationship (STO - Commission of the Council of People's Commissars) ... The second reason that I pointed out to Comrade Lenin, is the policy of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Orgburo and the Politburo in Soviet questions, "leading to the adoption of decisions that ignore the opinion of the heads of the departments concerned, which violates the possibility of their correct and planned work. Naturally, that in this situation "I did not consider it possible to take responsibility also for other institutions."

In other words, Trotsky was dissatisfied with the fact that state and economic issues were considered and resolved in the Central Committee of the party. Lenin replied,

"that against my will, he would not offer me as a deputy" (see Appendix No. 7).

Five days later, on January 20, in another letter, Trotsky added another argument:

"At this time, I myself asked for a four-week vacation (and received it) - mainly to prepare for the reports scheduled for me at the then forthcoming International Congress. Thus, quite independently of even my fundamentally negative attitude towards the expansion of Zemstvo, it is quite obvious that the practical problem that Comrade Lenin wanted to solve in view of the release of Comrade. Rykov, was not at all resolved by the appointment of me as a deputy, since for the coming weeks I

myself received a leave, and later the Congress came, which completely swallowed me up”(see Appendix No. 9).

The problems pointed out by Trotsky could indeed be the reasons for the refusal. But the main thing, apparently, is not in them. Trotsky understood the real course of Lenin's thought, his intention to "load" him with work outside the economy and thus oust him from this sphere of activity.

Did Lenin allow such a refusal? Volkogonov believed that since Trotsky refused, and Lenin did not insist, therefore, he did not want Trotsky to agree, and in support of his thought he pointed to the facts that when Lenin wanted to accept his proposal, he always insisted. Volkogonov gives an example: Trotsky was asked to get involved in the work of checking the Gokhran - he refused. Lenin wrote about this refusal:

“Trotsky's letter is unclear. If he refuses, the decision of the Politburo is needed. I am for not accepting the resignation (from this Trotsky affair)”[591].

We also think that Lenin tolerated Trotsky's refusal, since it was not difficult to foresee. Receiving a voluntary refusal from Trotsky relieved Lenin of the reproaches that Trotsky was being "rubbed over", "offended", etc. *** and, in addition, relieved Lenin of the painful need for him to have constant working contact with Trotsky, often leading to sharp conflicts.

Moreover, Lenin, apparently, made his proposal precisely in the expectation of a refusal. This is indicated by the fact that Lenin did not first speak with Trotsky, but sent his proposals directly to the Politburo, apparently instructing Stalin to negotiate with him. Trotsky's reaction to how this decision was carried through the Politburo speaks in favor of our assumption: in a letter to the Central Committee of the party dated January 20, 1923, he expressed his dissatisfaction:

"If you still wanted to resolve the issue now or fix the opinion of the Politburo, then you need to be to convene a meeting of the Politburo. After a brief conversation with Comrade Stalin on the phone, I was convinced that the question itself was being removed, at least until my return. But no. Voting (by telephone or in writing with my note on the document) was nevertheless carried out, and I first learned about its results only now from a letter from Comrade Stalin ****. It turns out that Stalin and Rykov voted "for", Tomsky and Kamenev "abstained", Kalinin "no objection".

After that, the Politburo, at its meeting on September 14, issued a resolution in which "the categorical refusal of Comrade Trotsky is stated with regret

" ... I was already on vacation. Nevertheless, despite the practical irresistibility of my arguments, at least in favor of postponing the question, the Politburo "regretfully notes" in my absence, and so on. I absolutely do not enter into an assessment of this entire episode ... But I once again state that the issue was never submitted to the Politburo and was not discussed at it - at least in my presence. And I think that my presence would not be superfluous since it was about my appointment"(see Appendix No. 9).

The last reproach is unfounded, since in the practice of the work of the Politburo, the solution of important political and personnel issues by questioning was a common thing.

As for working contacts on current issues, from June to September 1922 there were no contacts at all between Lenin and Trotsky (although Lenin at that time met and corresponded with many other members of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the party and people's commissars), in October-December they were episodic.

With such a baggage of relations between Lenin and Trotsky came to the end of 1922. In mid-December, there was a surge in business contacts on one, but politically important issue - the monopoly of

foreign trade. Trotsky tried to squeeze everything he could out of this story in order to present it as a manifestation of Lenin's truly comradely, respectful attitude towards him and the establishment of a political alliance between them against the Central Committee of the party. Since this story is also organically connected with the relations between Lenin and Stalin, we will consider it in the corresponding paragraph. We only note that this correspondence does not indicate a political conspiracy, but only a short-term and limited to one issue intensification of their business relations while maintaining confrontation on all fundamental issues of economic policy.

* The Politburo finally decided the issue of the legal status of the ICC on January 11, 1923. It did not decide the way Trotsky wanted: "To recognize that Moskust, as a private legal enterprise, is subject to revision by the RCT, in accordance with the rights granted by the RCT with respect to private legal enterprises "(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 329. L. 3).

** There is reason to believe that this was not done by accident but was aimed at getting the IWC out of control. This, apparently, is indicated by Trotsky's attempts to substantiate the impossibility of conducting an inspection, which consisted precisely in pointing out the peculiar position of the ICC, that the NC RCT does not have instructions for its inspection, etc.

*** And this moment was taken into account by Lenin. This is evidenced by Molotov's letter to Lenin (July 30, 1921) regarding Trotsky's possible places of work outside Moscow. It hints that Trotsky was being "offended" were heard at the 11th Party Congress and were addressed primarily to Lenin.

**** This refers to Stalin's letter dated January 6, 1923 (see Appendix No. 6). Trotsky is not telling the truth, and Stalin caught him in this. On January 24, 1923, he wrote to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) that "Comrade. Trotsky had these protocols in his hands back in September last year, and if he found the behavior of the Politburo wrong, he could, of course, protest it in the Plenum for more than four months, or demand a new discussion, which, however, he did not do

for some reason. then. Stalin obviously has nothing to do with it" (see Appendix No. 10).

Notes:

[555] Trotsky L. Portraits of revolutionaries. S. 284.

[556] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 373. L. 2.

[557] Trotsky L. Lenin's testament // Trotsky L. Portraits of revolutionaries. pp. 270, 277.

[558] See: Vasetsky N.A. Trotsky. The experience of political biography. M., 1992. S. 173-174.

[559] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 27. L. 78, 79, 81.

[560] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 284.

[561] Ibid. T. 45, pp. 86, 95, 108–109, 110–111, 123.

[562] Trotsky L. My life. Autobiographical experience. T. 2. M., 1990. S. 215-217.

[563] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 71. L. 1.

[564] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 84.

[565] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 279. L. 4.

[566] Ibid. D. 265. L. 3.

[567] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 300. L. 1.

[568] Ibid. D. 27. L. 56.

[569] Ibid. L. 10, 19, 21, 56–72.

- [570] Ibid. L. 56, 57.
- [571] Ibid. L. 58.
- [572] Ibid. L. 59.
- [573] Ibid. L. 59–60.
- [574] Ibid. L. 60.
- [575] Ibid. L. 61.
- [576] Ibid. L. 63–64.
- [577] Ibid.
- [578] Ibid. L. 64.
- [579] Ibid.
- [580] Ibid.
- [581] Ibid. L. 70–72.
- [582] Ibid. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 71v.
- [583] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 213.
- [584] Ibid. 1989. No. 12. S. 198.
- [585] Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 23.
- [586] Ibid. S. 24.
- [587] Ibid. pp. 24–25.
- [588] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 275. L. 4–6.
- [589] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 198, 200.
- [590] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 275. L. 4–6.
- [591] Cit. by: Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 24.

9. LENIN AND STALIN: THE TIME OF THE GREATEST POLITICAL PROXIMITY

The relationship between Lenin and Stalin after the latter was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which has always been the subject of political speculation, has been and remained the focus of attention of historians. Conceptually, traditional historiography in its coverage of this issue follows Trotsky, who set the general tone and direction of research. In the article "What do I think about Stalin?" (March 1, 1929) Trotsky wrote that in the middle of 1922, Stalin

"had developed a feverish activity, putting his friends in all the important posts of the party. When Lenin recovered from his first bout of illness and returned to work, the bureaucracy was well established and Stalin gained great influence. [592]

From him comes the statement accepted in traditional historiography about the aggravation of political contradictions between Lenin and Stalin regarding the work of the latter in the RCT, the formation of the USSR, the conflict in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, the growth of bureaucracy in the state and party apparatus.

M.I. Ulyanova, being an active supporter of Bukharin and, accordingly, a political opponent of Stalin, specifically sought confirmation of Lenin's dissatisfaction with Stalin. The list of facts she collected turned out to be very meager. As additional, she could only point to dissatisfaction associated with Stalin's refusal to provide funds for the treatment of O. Yu. Martov, who was abroad, and to insult the "young" members of the Central Committee, who did not always heed Lenin's opinion [593].

Documents paint a very different picture. Let's start with the small facts given by M.I. Ulyanova.

Lenin's complaint expressed in a letter to G.L. Shklovsky to "young members of the Central Committee", cannot be attributed to Stalin *,

since it is impossible to rank him among the "young" members of the Central Committee and, in addition, the documents say that he always met Lenin's wishes in personnel matters, including regarding Shklovsky, who was satisfied with the decision on his work. Lenin knew about this [594]. Reported by M.I. Ulyanova, the fact that Lenin asked for money for Martov and Stalin refused, unfortunately, cannot be verified.

The documents speak of the maintenance of good personal and normal business relations and political closeness between Lenin and Stalin, and the absence of any serious manifestations of Lenin's dissatisfaction with the general secretary.

Their personal relationship during this period is most clearly characterized by the story of poison. At the end of May, Lenin suffered his first stroke, which forced him to turn to Stalin with a request to fulfill his earlier promise and give him poison in order to commit suicide due to the threat of paralysis and loss of speech [595]. M.I. Ulyanov memories left this.. They are presented in two versions, a lengthy [596] and a short [597], differing in detail, but coinciding in the main, so we will try to reconstruct what happened on the basis of both options.

May 30 V.I. Lenin "decided ... that everything was over for him, and demanded that Stalin be summoned to him for the shortest possible time." "Kozhevnikov's persuasion to refuse this meeting, as this could harm him, had no effect." "Vladimir Ilyich said that he needed Stalin for a very short conversation, became worried, and had to fulfill his desire.

They called Stalin, and after a while he arrived with Bukharin. Stalin went into the room of Vladimir Ilyich, tightly closing the door behind him, at the request of Ilyich. Bukharin stayed with us and somehow mysteriously declared:

"I can guess why Vladimir Ilyich wants to see Stalin." But this time he did not tell us about his guess" (apparently, Stalin did not make a secret of this request of Lenin for the leadership of

the party). "St[alin] stayed with V.I. really 5 minutes, no more. "A few minutes later the door to Vladimir Ilyich's room opened and Stalin, who seemed somewhat upset to me, came out. After saying goodbye to us, both of them (Bukharin and Stalin) headed past the Big House through the garden of the sanatorium into the yard to the car. I went to see them off. They were talking to each other about something in an undertone, but in the courtyard Stalin turned to me and said: "She (he meant me) can be told, but Nadia (Nadezhda Konstantinova) does not need to." And Stalin told me that Vladimir Ilyich called him in order to remind him of the promise he had made earlier to help him leave the stage in time if he had paralysis. "Now the moment I told you about earlier," said Vladimir Ilyich, "has come, I am paralyzed and I need your help."

Vladimir Ilyich asked Stalin to bring him poison. Stalin promised. He kissed Vladimir Ilyich and left his room. But then, during our conversation, Stalin had a doubt: did Vladimir Ilyich understand his consent in such a way that the moment had really come to end his life, and there was no more hope for recovery?

"I promised to reassure him," said Stalin, "but if he really interprets my words in the sense that there is no more hope?

Stalin should once again go to Vladimir Ilyich and say that he spoke with the doctors and the latter assured him that the situation of Vladimir Ilyich was not at all so hopeless, his illness was not incurable, and that it was necessary to wait with the fulfillment of Vladimir Ilyich's request. And so it was done." "Stalin returned again to V.I. He told him that, after talking with the doctors, he was convinced that all is not yet lost, and the time has not come to fulfill his request."

"Stalin stayed this time even less than the first time, and, going out, told Bukharin and me that Vladimir Ilyich had agreed to wait and that Stalin's report on his condition, according to the words of Vladimir Ilyich's doctors,

apparently pleased." " V.I. noticeably cheered up and agreed, although he said to Stalin: "Cunning"? "When did you see that I was cunning," Stalin answered him. "And Stalin's assurance that when, they say, there really is no hope, he will fulfill his promise, reassured Vladimir Ilyich somewhat, although he did not quite believe him:" You are diplomatic, they say. "They broke up and did not see each other until V.I. did not begin to recover and he was not allowed to meet with his comrades.

The fact of this visit and conversation is confirmed in his notes by prof. A.M. Kozhevnikov: "Stalin came. Discourse on suicidium", i.e. about suicide [598].

Apparently, Stalin's words did not dispel Lenin's doubts. After his departure, Lenin was examined by doctors when he found himself in a room alone with Professor M.I. Averbakh, then excitedly grabbed his hand and asked: "They say you are a good person, tell the truth - after all, this is paralysis and it will go further? Understand why and who needs me with paralysis?" But at that moment my sister came in and the conversation was interrupted. [599]

In the historical literature, the meaning of this appeal of Lenin is presented as evidence that Lenin saw in Stalin a man capable of killing his comrade, who interfered with the accomplishment of his ambitious plans. This version also goes back to Trotsky, but it does not find any support in the documents and in the memoirs of people close to Lenin.

Against this version of Trotsky is also the fact that the agreement on the poison and the **first appeal to Stalin** for poison date back to the time of the greatest political and personal closeness between Lenin and Stalin. This is recognized by almost everyone who has tried to analyze the dynamics of their relationship. So, M.I. Ulyanova, in a statement to the joint (1926) Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, wrote:

“In general, during the entire period of illness, while he had the opportunity to communicate with his comrades, he most often called Comrade Stalin to himself, and in the most difficult moments of the illness he did not call any of the members of the Central Committee at all, except for Stalin. [600]

It may be said that this assessment has been disavowed by other memoirs, written apparently in the early to mid-1930s and containing critical assessments of Stalin. This is true, but only in part. Ulyanova later wrote that in 1926 she did not say everything, and further reports on several facts of Lenin’s dissatisfaction with Stalin, on the latter’s negative character traits, etc., but it does not follow from this that what she said in her statement to the Plenum is not true. On the contrary, she confirmed everything written in 1926, stating that “**V.I. appreciated Stalin.** This, of course, is true.”[601]

Some improvement and stabilization of the state of health that soon followed, apparently again allowed Lenin to postpone the fatal step. **Stalin was the last person Lenin spoke** to before, at the request of the doctors, he stopped all political activity and contacts with his comrades. He also became the **first person** Lenin wanted to see after the permission of the doctors to visit. Recalling the conversation, M.I. Ulyanova wrote:

“Ilyich met him in a friendly manner, joked, laughed, demanded that I treat Stalin, bring wine, etc.”[602].

This first left documentary traces. On July 14, 1922, Stalin communicated his impressions by telegram to Ordzhonikidze:

“Yesterday (the time is inaccurate. - BC) for the first time after a month and a half break, doctors allowed Ilyich to visit friends. I visited Ilyich and found that he had completely recovered. Today we already have a letter from him with directives. The doctors think that in a month he will be able to return to work in the old way. And Professor A.M.

Kozhevnikov wrote that their meeting “was longer than expected, because it was difficult to interrupt it” [604].

The next day, Lenin sent Kamenev a letter with directives (Stalin mentioned him in a telegram to Ordzhonikidze):

“12/VII. Comrade Kamenev In view of the extremely favorable fact that Stalin told me yesterday from the field of the internal life of our Central Committee (what exactly was discussed, it has not yet been possible to establish. - BC) I propose to reduce the Central Committee to Molotov, Rykov and Kuibyshev, with candidates Kam[enev], Zin[oviev] and Tomsk[y]**. All the others will rest, to be treated. Stalin is allowed to come to the August] conference. To slow things down is advantageous, by the way, from a diplomatic] point of view.” This was followed by an invitation to Kamenev to visit him in Gorki [605]. Kamenev, like Stalin, found Lenin's condition little different from what it was in the winter [606].

Since that time on, constant personal and political contacts resumed between Lenin and Stalin. He visited Lenin in Gorki much more often than others - 11 times (July 11 and 30, August 5, 9, 15, 19, 23 and 30, September 12, 19 and 26, 1922), Kamenev - 4 times (July 14, August 3, 27, September 13), Bukharin also 4 times (July 16, September 20, 23, 25), Zinoviev only 2 times (August 1 and September 2) [607]. In the first letter sent to Stalin on July 18, 1922, Lenin wrote:

“Comrade Stalin! I have carefully considered your answer and do not agree with you. And further: “Congratulate me!”

Lenin happily turns to the person to whom he is located and from whom he is glad to accept congratulations, with the knowledge that the next news about the permission to read newspapers will please Stalin [608].

Unfortunately, we know little about the content of most of their conversations. On August 12, 1922, Stalin in Gorki talked with Lenin about the RKI [609]. The meeting on September 15 is described by Stalin in an article published on September 24 in Pravda [610].

Stalin takes part in organizing the treatment of Lenin, who turns to him with some "delicate" questions, for example, writes him a letter asking him to "get rid of some foreign doctors, leave domestic ones"[611]. Lenin, in turn, as before, shows concern for Stalin's health, for organizing his rest in order to support his ability to work. On June 24, 1922, after a medical consultation, he passed through Semashko to Dzerzhinsky a proposal for the Politburo:

"To oblige Comrade Stalin through the Politburo to spend one day a week, except Sunday, entirely at a dacha outside the city"[612].

Here is another note:

Stalin. I don't like your look. I propose to the Politburo to decide: to oblige Stalin to spend in Zubalovo *** from Thursday evening to Tuesday morning ... "[613].

July 13, 1922 The Politburo considered the issue of Stalin's rest and ordered him to "spend 3 days a week outside the city" [614]. August 5, 1922 People's Commissariat of Health NA. Semashko wrote to M.I. Ulyanova to pass on to Lenin:

"Please tell Vlad[imir] Ilyich on occasion that Comrade Stalin recently looked around prof. Foerster; he is prescribed 2 days a week of rest, that in general , he does, "and also that, according to his external observation, the condition of all comrades is better. So don't let Vlad[imir] Il[ich] worry"[615].

In general, the range of issues on which Stalin contacted Lenin remained the same, but due to Lenin's illness, the intensity of all Lenin's contacts, including with Stalin, decreased. The period after Lenin's return to work, October-December, was marked by the same normal business work and good personal relations. This was not hindered by disagreements on issues of nation-state building and the monopoly of foreign trade. M.I. Ulyanova recalled that "returning to work in the autumn of 1922, Lenin arranged meetings in the evenings

with Kamenev, Zinoviev and Stalin, violating the work schedule established by the doctors” [616].

In these months, in addition to the questions of the formation of the USSR and the monopoly of foreign trade, which will be discussed later, Lenin was worried about a number of other issues in which he and Stalin noted normal cooperation, mutual understanding, unity of positions. This applies to the reorganization of the RKI (which was discussed above), as well as the formation of the 1923 budget, during which the question arose of reducing the shipbuilding program and channeling the saved funds to the needs of education. On this issue, Lenin found himself in opposition to Trotsky. Stalin supported Lenin [617].

At the end of September 1922, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission Pyatakov signed a military estimate that exceeded the amount proposed by the People's Commissar of Finance by 26 trillion rubles. On October 28, the Council of People's Commissars, under the chairmanship of Kamenev, approved it in Lenin's absence, about which Kamenev informed Lenin, at the same time indicating that that “this amount is clearly unbearable for the state” and proposing to cancel the decision of the Council of People's Commissars, and to create a commission to study this issue [618].

On October 30, 1922, Lenin invited Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Molotov to his place to discuss this question. It is noteworthy that Lenin did not invite Commissar Trotsky to discuss the estimates of the military department in a narrow circle. This meeting assessed the mistake made as a “dangerous path” and proposed not to make such mistakes in the future [619].

On November 30, the Politburo decided to cut spending on the shipbuilding program to 8 million gold rubles[620]

The autumn of 1922 brought to Stalin an expansion, if not of power, then of his own political influence, which could not have happened without Lenin's knowledge. On the eve of the start of the IV Congress of the Comintern, on November 2, 1922, the Politburo approved

Zinoviev's proposal, adopted the day before by a "poll", to increase the number of representatives of the RKGb (b) in the Comintern by including Stalin, Kamenev, Lunacharsky, Pyatakov, Manuilsky [621] . And on November 30, 1922, on the eve of the end of the Congress of the Comintern, the Politburo approved the new composition of the representation of the RCP (b) in the Comintern: members - Bukharin, Radek, Zinoviev ("the former" troika ") and candidates - Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin [622]. But this was already after the well-known discussion between Stalin and Lenin about the foundations of building the USSR, i.e. on a question of fundamental importance to the Comintern.

On the other hand, there is **no reason to believe** that Lenin was worried about the strengthening of Stalin's political positions. We are not aware of documents that would testify that Stalin expanded his power beyond the established (if there were any) limits or abused it, showed rudeness, "disloyalty", i.e. what was reproached to him in the Letter to the Congress. On the contrary, he kept himself emphatically modest, which surprised those who knew the true alignment of forces in the leadership of the party. Mikoyan, who was critical of Stalin, left curious memories of this. Talking about the work of the XII Party Conference (August 4-7, 1922), he writes that he was struck by Stalin's modest behavior, which he and other delegates "caused bewilderment.

"At first I thought if this was a manifestation of his excessive modesty ... But in this case, such modesty already went beyond the limits of the necessary ... such behavior of the general secretary, as I understood it, did not interfere, but rather contributed to the consolidation of the established leading core of the party. It increased Stalin's personal prestige in the eyes of the delegates.[623]

Stalin's modest behavior was conspicuous and surprised by the discrepancy between his authority and position in the party.

This, of course, does not mean that there were no problems in relations between Lenin and Stalin at that time. There were problems,

it would be naive and wrong to deny or ignore them. Stalin had his own established political views, his own political style, his own ideas of what should be done and how. On this basis, disagreements arose that did not go beyond the normal friction that arises in the process of work. Indicative, for example, is Stalin's telephone message to Lenin (May 6, 1922), caused by misunderstandings in connection with the sending of a telegram to Chicherin and Krasin, members of the Soviet delegation at the Genoa International Conference.

"The draft reply from Comrade Rykov to the telegram from Chicherin and Krasin about fuel was sent as a reply from Comrade Rykov signed by him. I did not object to your proposal to send a telegram to Chicherin and Krasin in the Soviet order, Although neither essentially nor formally I agree with you. I did so because the answer was required immediately and it was impossible to postpone the matter.

After a telephone conversation with you, I put Rykov's draft reply to the vote, having your consent to learn the opinion of the members of the Politburo on the question of interest to Krasin and Chicherin: I could not allow the reply to be sent in the Soviet order, without the knowledge and control of the Politburo. This is, firstly, secondly, it is clear that no matter who sent the telegram, it will be regarded as a response authorized by the Politburo, and, thirdly, Chicherin and Krasin's request was sent to the Politburo, and the latter could not answer silence. I know of no other means of determining the opinion of the members of the Politburo on a telegram sent, let us say, in the Soviet order, other than questioning the latter.

It turns out that you reproached Comrade Manucharyants for interrogating the members of the Politburo and advised her not to interrogate the members of the Politburo on questions of the Soviet order. If there is someone else's fault here (I do not see it), I take it entirely on myself, for Manucharyants is only the executor of my orders. I think that on questions concerning the direction of affairs, one should make

comments or give advice not to the executor of the orders, but to the author of the latter, i.e. to me. Otherwise, we risk destroying all discipline in the technical apparatus of the Politburo.”[624]

Here is another similar document. On November 13, 1922, Stalin wrote to Lenin that political problems had arisen in connection with one of his speeches.

“I received a number of statements from practitioners of the Moscow party organization and from members of the Russian faction of the Congress of the Comintern about some inconvenience created by your interview with the Observer correspondent about left and right communists”[625].

The statements indicate that the interview with Comrade Lenin sanctifies the existence of left communism (perhaps the workers' opposition) as a legal party phenomenon. Practitioners believe that now that left communism in all its forms (not excluding the workers' opposition) has been eliminated, it is dangerous and inappropriate to speak of left communism as a legitimate phenomenon that can compete with official party communism, all the more so since at the Eleventh Congress we stated the complete unity of our Party, and the period following the Eleventh Congress speaks of the further strengthening of the Party in the sense of its unity and cohesion. I think that if in the diplomatic respect the emphasis on the existence of left communism can be useful, then in the party respect this emphasis leads to certain negative results to the detriment of the party and to the benefit of the workers' opposition, creates confusion and ambiguities. It would be good to correct this shortcoming in the future. [626]

On the substance of the issues raised, Stalin, I think, was right. There was no negative reaction from Lenin, although it can be assumed that Lenin did not like these letters. But in any case, they cannot be regarded as an abuse of the power of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), a manifestation of rudeness, etc. These letters remained without visible consequences, as well as

manifestations of other disagreements in current political work. Moreover, in the measures that Lenin proposed at that time to improve the work of the Central Committee and its apparatus. This, for example, was manifested in the "Proposals to the Plenum Concerning the Regulations for the Work of the Politburo" sent by Lenin on December 8, 1922 to the Central Committee of the Party [627].

It is also indicative that it was to Stalin that Lenin sent his last business letter on December 15, 1922, informing him that he had completed the "liquidation" of his affairs and could leave in peace.

"There is only one circumstance left that worries me to an extremely strong extent - this is the impossibility of speaking at the Congress of Soviets" [628].

In this speech, as far as one can judge Lenin's intentions from the prepared materials and plan, he was not going to touch on a single issue on which there had previously been some disagreement with Stalin, including issues of nation-state building and the monopoly of foreign trade [629]. Both the very fact of this letter, and the questions posed in it, and its tone indicate that the trusting political and personal relations between Lenin and Stalin, despite the disagreements that took place, continued to be preserved.

D. A. Volkogonov published a letter of Lenin to Stalin, which is very important for our topic, without dating it. We will first reproduce its text, and then try to determine the time to which it refers.

"Comrade Stalin! Doctors, apparently, create a legend that cannot be left without refutation. They were taken aback by a strong fit on Friday and did a purely stupid thing: they tried to ban "political" meetings (themselves, poorly understanding what this means). I became extremely angry and reprimanded them. On Thursday Kamenev visited me. Lively political conversation. Great sleep, great feeling. Friday paralysis. I demand you urgently in order to have time to tell in case of an exacerbation of the disease. Only fools can blame political talk

here. If I ever worry, it is because of the lack of timely conversations. I hope you understand this and the fool of the German professor and Co. will be sent away. Be sure to come and tell us about the plenum of the Central Committee or send one of the participants..."[630].

The exact binding of events to the days of the week, the mention of the upcoming Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the fact that doctors forbade "political meetings", as well as the state of health and working capacity of Lenin, allow us to confidently date this letter on the eve of the December (1922) Plenum. December 14 marked as Thursday. The Diary of Duty Secretaries on that day does not record Kamenev's visit to Lenin in his office [631], but it cannot be ruled out that Kamenev was at Lenin's apartment. The published "Diary of doctors on duty" does not contain entries for December 15, 1922, however, the entry for December 16 suggests that on the eve of the 15th (that is, on Friday), Lenin really had an attack of paralysis:

"Yesterday, the whole day there was a feeling of heaviness in the right limbs. He can hardly make small movements with his right hand. I tried to write. But with great difficulty I wrote a letter, which the secretary could not make out, and Vladimir Ilyich had to dictate it. [632]

In this entry there is another indication of December 15 - about the text written by Lenin so badly that it had to be rewritten. It is known that starting from December 15, Lenin could no longer write himself. On that day, he was unable to write a letter to Trotsky and was forced to resort to the help of Fotieva, who wrote it down under dictation [633].

Thus, the letter was written no earlier than December 16 and no later than December 18, 1922, since the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was working on that day.

This letter "in the bud" kills the legend about Lenin's cooling towards Stalin, about distrust of him, etc., etc. As of December 16, between Lenin and Stalin, all the same close, good business and close, trusting human relations, familiar from the previous time, remain. .

Whether Stalin was with Lenin is not known****. What Lenin wanted to talk to him about "in case of an exacerbation of the disease", we also do not know, but we can make a reasoned assumption based on the memoirs of L.A. Fotieva and M.I. Ulyanova. On December 22, after the second stroke, the threat of paralysis and loss of speech arose again****, i.e. the state with which Lenin associated suicide. He again turned to Stalin for poison. Fotieva wrote:

"On December 22, Vladimir Ilyich called me at 6 o'clock in the evening and dictated the following: "Do not forget to take all measures to get and deliver ... in case the paralysis turns into speech, potassium cyanide, as a measure of humanity and as an imitation of the Lafargues .. And he added at the same time: "This note is outside the diary. Do you understand? Do you understand? And I hope that you will fulfill this." I couldn't remember the missing phrase at the beginning. In the end - I didn't make out, because. spoke very quietly. When asked again, he did not answer. He ordered to keep it in absolute secrecy." [634]

M.I. Ulyanova, in a statement to the joint (1926) Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, wrote that during the second strike in December 1922 "V.I. summoned Stalin to himself and turned to him with the most intimate assignments ... And at the same time, **Ilyich emphasized that he wanted to talk specifically with Stalin**" (emphasis added. - V.S) [635]. "Called" and "converted" - that means that Stalin was with Lenin in the period from 16 to 22 or 23 December.

An analysis of the documents and memoirs available to historians leads us to the conclusion that in the middle - the end of 1922, the personal and political relations between Lenin and Stalin were of a calm, businesslike, comradely character. The political storms of the last months of 1922 did not fundamentally change Lenin's attitude towards Stalin. Nothing we know for sure indicates any extreme political tension between them or a chill in their personal relationship.

There is nothing suggesting that Lenin suddenly began to fear his ally, who began to concentrate "immense power" in his hands, while due to illness he increasingly lost the ability to influence current affairs.

There is nothing indicating that Lenin was disillusioned with the system of power he created to carry out his own political course, so much so that that he decided to break the political balance in the Central Committee of the party, without which this system could not exist and the political course developed by him could not be carried out.

Until December 22-23, 1922, there is nothing to indicate that Lenin saw something in Stalin's activities and behavior that made him regret that Stalin became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). The existing disagreements were not of a fundamental, but of a tactical nature, and did not reach the brink of a political or personal conflict. They were resolved in the usual "working" order and could not serve as a reason for Lenin to radically change his previous assessments of Stalin as a politician and a person.

Let us now turn to the history of the most important disagreements between Lenin and Stalin on the questions of the formation of the USSR and the monopoly of foreign trade. Let's start with the last one. Anticipating the analysis of the material on these issues, let's say that they did not affect their relationship in the way it is usually imagined - in a dramatic way.

* Volkogonov pointed out the inconsistency of attributing this reproach to Stalin (Volkogonov D.A. Lenin. Political portrait. Book 2. P. 36-37).

** Obviously, we are talking about the organization of the work of the Politburo. Members of the Politburo Kamenev, Zinoviev and Tomsky were supposed to take part in its work at that time only to replace Molotov, Rykov and Secretary of the Central Committee Kuibyshev, i.e. in such a regime in which candidates for members of the Politburo were involved in its work.

*** In the summer of 1922, four dachas were built nearby in Zubalovo: for Lenin, Stalin, Kamenev, and Dzerzhinsky (See: Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book 2, p. 34).

**** The "Diary of Duty Secretaries" does not record Stalin's visit, but he could have been at Lenin's apartment. This dating is indirectly confirmed by M.I. Ulyanova, who, like Lenin, wrote in this letter that the initiative to restrict Lenin on political information after December 16 came from doctors (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. P. 198).

***** Lenin's forebodings were not deceived. A few hours later, on the night of December 23, doctors recorded the onset of persistent paralysis: in the morning, "there were absolutely no movements in either the arm or leg" (Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1991. No. 9. P. 45).

Notes:

[592] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 373. L. 2.

[593] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 197.

[594] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54, pp. 59–60, 246–247, 640.

[595] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 197–198.

[596] Ibid. 1991. No. 3. S. 188.

[597] Ibid. 1989. No. 12. S. 198.

[598] Ibid. 1991. No. 3. S. 198.

[599] Ibid. pp. 188–189.

[600] Ibid. 1989. No. 12. S. 196.

[601] Ibid.

[602] Ibid. S. 198.

[603] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2397. L. 1.

[604] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 181.

[605] Ibid. S. 188.

[606] Ibid. S. 181.

[607] Ibid. 1989. No. 12. S. 200–201.

[608] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 273.

[609] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 9. S. 5.

[610] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 134–135.

[611] Document from APRF. See: Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 329; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 191–192.

[612] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 185.

[613] Lenin's collection. T. XL. S. 100.

[614] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 303. L. 5.

[615] Ibid. F. 14. Op. 1.D. 409. L. 1–1 rev.

[616] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 198; 1991. No. 5. S. 186.

[617] Ibid. 1991. No. 5. S. 196.

[618] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1043. L. 1–2.

- [619] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 302, 304–305, 663.
- [620] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 324. L. 2.
- [621] Ibid. D. 320. L. 7.
- [622] Ibid. D. 324. L. 1.
- [623] Mikoyan A.I. In the North Caucasus // New World. 1972. No. 12. S. 202.
- [624] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 270. L. 1.
- [625] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 237–251.
- [626] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 272. L. 1.
- [627] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 327.
- [628] Ibid. S. 338.
- [629] Ibid. pp. 440–441.
- [630] Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 329.
- [631] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 471–472.
- [632] Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1991. No. 9. S. 43–44.
- [633] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 472; T. 54, pp. 325–326.
- [634] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 6. S. 191.
- [635] Ibid. 1989. No. 12. S. 196.

10. LENIN, STALIN, AND TROTSKY IN THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE

In historiography and public consciousness, at the suggestion of Trotsky, the idea was firmly established that the discussion on the issue of maintaining the regime of the monopoly of foreign trade contributed, on the one hand, to the strengthening of Lenin's political alienation from Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev, and on the other hand, to his political rapprochement with Trotsky and the establishment of between them is a political bloc directed against the majority of the Politburo and the Central Committee. This version conveys real events in a distorted form.

A sharp discussion about the fate of the monopoly of foreign trade and the improvement of the mechanisms and methods for its implementation was carried out in the leadership of the RCP (b) from the end of 1921, when this regime, established on April 22, 1918 [636], began to be criticized as a relic of the times of "war communism ". Lenin immediately advocated the inviolability of this monopoly. On March 3, 1922, he wrote to Kamenev:

"For quite a long time I thought about our conversation (with you, Stalin, and Zinoviev) about Vneshtorg and the line of Krasin and Sokolnikov. My conclusion is that Krasin is certainly right. We cannot now retreat further from the monopoly of foreign trade... Otherwise, foreigners will buy up and take out everything of value" [637].

As can be seen, disagreements in the Leninist group on this question were already evident even before the Eleventh Congress. They did not affect the political relations between Lenin and Stalin, Stalin became the general secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). This discussion, which gave rise to uncertainty in an important political issue, was known abroad and had a negative effect on the development of contacts with Germany - the only industrially developed capitalist state that politically recognized Soviet Russia and

expressed readiness for broad economic cooperation with it (Rapallo Treaty of April 10, 1922 G.).

This circumstance gave the question of monopoly a new twist and additional poignancy. In an effort to remove obstacles to the development of foreign economic relations with Germany, on May 15, 1922, Lenin submitted to the Politburo a draft resolution confirming the monopoly of foreign trade [638], and on the same day he wrote to Stalin and M.I. Frumkin: "I think that all conversations, negotiations, and commissions, etc. should be formally banned. on weakening the monopoly of foreign trade"[639].

In a letter to Lenin, Stalin wrote:

"I have no objection to the formal prohibition of steps towards weakening the monopoly of foreign trade at this stage. I think, nevertheless, that weakening is becoming inevitable. [640]

Similar views were held by most members of the Politburo, including Kamenev, Zinoviev, Trotsky, People's Commissar for Finance G.Ya. Sokolnikov and N.I. Bukharin. Thus, three positions took shape in the Politburo. The discussion continued. Sokolnikov continued to insist on a revision of the foreign trade regime. By the autumn of 1922, this issue became even more acute due to the inability of state bodies to ensure the export of grain, which had a negative impact on the flow of foreign currency. At the insistence of Sokolnikov, the issue was submitted to the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which on October 6, in the absence of Lenin, according to the report of Sokolnikov (M.I. Frumkin, P.A. Bogdanov and L.M. Karakhan took part in its preparation) considered the issue "On the regime of foreign trade". Unfortunately, the protocol did not record the course of the discussion; only a resolution is known that corresponded to the position of the majority of the Central Committee:

“a) Without declaring any changes in relation to the monopoly of foreign trade, to pass a number of separate resolutions of the CTO on the temporary permission of import and export for certain categories of goods or in application to certain borders.

b) Propose to the CTO to immediately begin the implementation of these measures, without postponing them until the development of a common list of goods to be imported or exported, as well as ports and borders through which import and export must be carried out. At the same time, the composition of the commission was determined to carry out this decision through the CTO (Sokolnikov, Frumkin, Pyatakov, Bogdanov, Lezhava). It was decided to discuss the list of goods allowed for import and export with local authorities [641].

On October 12, the chairman of the Centrosoyuz, L.M. Khinchuk sent Lenin a letter criticizing the decision of the Plenum. On the same day, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade L.B. Krasin spoke in the press against the decision of the Plenum, arguing his objections with the fear that the export of wealth would begin from the country, and so on. Lenin regarded the decision of the Plenum as an attempt to preserve the foreign trade monopoly regime. On the same day, he talked with Stalin about the measures that were to be taken to implement the decision of the Plenum, in particular on the opening of the Petrograd and Novorossiysk ports. Lenin believed that the desire of the peasants to sell grain abroad would push them to fight against the Soviet regime, and foreigners would take out all the surplus grain, while the stock in case of war was still small [642].

Obviously, **Stalin did not agree with Lenin**. He, like most members of the Central Committee, believed that the permission to trade not only through Foreign Trade, but also through other state organizations, as well as the improvement of the apparatus of Foreign Trade, do not destroy the regime of foreign trade monopoly. But the proposals of the supporters of the abolition of the monopoly—Bukharin and

Sokolnikov—were rejected*. A situation of certain misunderstanding arose between Lenin and the majority of the Central Committee.

In a letter to Stalin (for the Politburo)* written on October 12–13, 1922, Lenin criticized Sokolnikov's argument and the decision of the Plenum, which "establishes an apparently unimportant, partial reform ... But in reality this is a disruption of the monopoly of foreign trade".

Lenin believed that it was impossible to establish effective control over the activities of purchasing offices, which were granted the right to export. A situation will arise incomparably more complicated than that which smuggling can create. He proposed to improve the existing system of foreign trade, and not to abandon or destroy it, leaving complete chaos in its place.

Lenin expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that this question was introduced at the Plenum "hastily", without a careful study of all the consequences and without a preliminary serious discussion.

"Where is there even a shadow of a correct attitude to the matter? Tired people will vote in a few minutes and that's it. We weighed less complex political questions many times and often took several months to decide."

Referring to his absence from the meeting of the Plenum due to illness, Lenin asked for "a certain exception to the norm" and suggested "postponing the solution of this issue for two months, i.e. until the next plenum, and until then to put together the consolidated and verified documents on the experience of our trade policy" [643].

On October 12, the Politburo, after discussing Krasin's article and Lenin's proposals, decided to instruct the Secretariat to question all members of the Central Committee in Moscow regarding postponing the final decision on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade to the next Plenum, and in the event that there was not a majority of the respondents in favor of this proposal, to refer the question to the decision of the next meeting of the Politburo. Krasin was instructed to

provide the members of the Central Committee with all the materials within two days[644].

A number of written replies to the Secretariat's inquiry have been preserved, indicating that almost all of the respondents agreed with Lenin's proposal to postpone the final decision of the issue, without changing, however, their opinion on the merits. Only Zinoviev opposed Lenin's proposal. On October 14, he wrote to Stalin:

"I am strongly against reconsidering the decision ... both for formal reasons and in substance. In the article T. Krasin (apparently, he believed that it was she who embarrassed Lenin. - BC) I see nothing but demagoguery. I vote against any revision."[645]

Interestingly, the most active and principled opponents of Lenin - Sokolnikov and Bukharin - took a more flexible position than Zinoviev: they agreed with a second discussion of this issue. On October 14, Sokolnikov, in a letter to Stalin, supported "Comrade Lenin's proposal to postpone the decision on the monopoly of foreign trade"[646].

Bukharin, in principle, was against reconsidering the decision, but agreed to meet Lenin halfway for tactical reasons. On October 17, he wrote to Stalin that he considers the fears of Lenin and Krasin unfounded, since they ignore the losses that the country suffers due to the inability to "mobilize the peasant commodity fund", which is the fault of the poor apparatus of the Foreign Trade. He thought it would be better if the partner capitalists make a profit, than agricultural products will remain unsold. While agreeing to postpone the final decision for another two months, he noted that this would lead to additional financial losses. Bukharin explained his consent to wait by the fact that such an important issue could not be resolved if the Central Committee of the party wavered [647].

On October 14, Kamenev informed Stalin that he "agreed to revise it at the first meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee"[648].

Stalin also agreed to a second consideration of the issue, declaring that he remained committed to the decision: “

Letter from Comrade. Lenin did not dissuade me of the correctness of the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of the 6/10 on foreign trade ... Nevertheless, in view of Comrade Lenin's insistent proposal to postpone the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee by execution, I vote for the postponement of so that the question would be again brought up for discussion at the next plenum with the participation of Comrade Lenin” [649].

On October 16, based on a poll, the Politburo decided to postpone the issue of the monopoly of foreign trade to the next Plenum of the Central Committee [650]. Trotsky's answer is not at the disposal of historians. Either he was not asked (he was on vacation), or he evaded answering.

Having received the consent of the members of the Central Committee to return to the question at the next plenum, Lenin began to prepare for the struggle for a revision of the decision taken, to collect material in favor of a decision on maintaining the regime of monopoly of foreign trade intact. The most weighty arguments were presented by the Trade Commissioner of the RSFSR in Germany, B.S. Stomonyakov [651]. Until December 12, Lenin did not feel any need for Trotsky's help to resolve the issue of maintaining the monopoly of foreign trade.

On December 12, Lenin sent Trotsky for review a letter he had received from N.N. Krestinsky, in which he reported that the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade would have a catastrophic effect on the development of economic relations with Germany. Lenin asked Trotsky whether he agreed with Krestinsky and informed him that he would "fight at the plenum for monopoly" [652].

On the same day, Trotsky replied to Lenin, formulating his attitude to this problem:

"The preservation and strengthening of foreign trade monopoly is a matter of absolute necessity... On the other hand, modifications, and improvements in the methods of foreign trade monopoly are absolutely necessary."

The last statement is rather vague and in general corresponds to the decisions of the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). It turns out that Trotsky seemed to agree with Lenin, but immediately stipulated that he was not against any change. Why did he take this position? Perhaps the answer lies in the statement that followed immediately, which can be regarded as an attempt to sow distrust in Lenin towards the members of the Central Committee, to present them as double-dealers:

"But now even the actual opponents [of the monopoly] of foreign trade are not conducting frontal offensives against it, but are acting with complex roundabout maneuvers ... There is a danger, that under the guise of improving the methods of exercising a monopoly, measures can be slipped in that essentially undermine the monopoly" [653].

Declaring that he finds it difficult to choose between the options of the Deputy People's Commissar of the RCT V.A. Avanesov (the largest economic organizations - syndicates, concerns - trade under the control of Vneshtorg), on the one hand, and on the other - N.N. Krestinsky and B.S. Stomonyakov (trade missions trade as specialized economic bodies), Trotsky brought the question of monopoly to the problem of restructuring the entire economic mechanism, which Lenin opposed.

"The most important issue, however, has been and remains the regulation of our foreign trade from Russia in connection with all economic work in general. Someone needs to know and decide what can be imported and what cannot, what needs to be exported and what needs to be kept for oneself. Solutions are needed here not in terms of legislative regulation, immovable nomenclature, but practical, changing, always adapted to economic needs, taken in their entirety. This, obviously, should have been the work of the State

Planning Commission, which, in turn, stands under the sign of the development of state industry. But this is a special topic, about which I have written more than once. [654]

As can be seen, Lenin and Trotsky, considering the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, agreed in its general formulation, disagreeing on the same point in which Lenin disagreed with the Plenum of the Central Committee, but, more importantly, Trotsky entered this monopoly into a completely different scheme than Lenin. economic mechanism. As a result, there was a coincidence in the approach to solving a particular (albeit important) issue, while maintaining the confrontation in the main one. In addition, if Lenin was worried about how to export, then Trotsky was worried about what to export and who decides.

The next day, December 13, in a letter to Frumkin and Stomonyakov, Lenin announced that he had received a letter from Trotsky and that he agreed with him

“in everything essential, with the possible exception of the last lines about the State Planning Commission. I will write to Trotsky about my disagreement with him and about my request to take upon myself, in view of my illness, the defense of my position at the plenum”.

Agreement on everything essential meant that Lenin, in principle, accepted the variants of both Avanesov and Krestinsky and Stomonyakov, that between them one could and should choose the best one. Consequently, Lenin took a definite step towards the position taken by the Plenum of the Central Committee, including Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. Here, for the first time, Lenin suggested that this issue could be brought up for discussion by the communist faction of the Congress of Soviets and the upcoming party congress if the Plenum “does not get agreement”[655].

Indeed, at the same time, Lenin writes to Trotsky:

“I think that you and I are getting the maximum agreement, and I think that the question of the State Planning

Commission in this formulation excludes (or postpones) the dispute about whether administrative rights are needed for the State Planning Commission"[656].

It is noteworthy that the dispute is withdrawn or postponed only when the question is "posed in this way", and it consisted in a proposal to resolve it in a practical, and not legislative, plan. It means, that the question of reorganizing the system of administration in this case is not on the table, and in this situation (with the "present formulation of the question") Lenin could find a common language with Trotsky on one, separately taken question. In a letter to Trotsky, he repeated his proposal to transfer the question to the faction of the Congress of Soviets and the Party Congress in the event of a defeat at the Plenum. The fact that Lenin only repeated this proposal makes it **impossible to regard it as an offer** to Trotsky of an alliance against the Central Committee of the Party.

On the same day, December 13, Trotsky sent a note to Lenin, in which, for his part, he recorded agreement on a particular issue, while maintaining disagreements on the main one:

" within the limits of the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, I think that we have complete agreement ... On the question of the State Planning Commission, I retain my old point of view, but this question does not, it seems to me, violate the unity of position on the question of foreign trade. [657]

On the same day, Lenin received a letter from Frumkin, in which he expressed "concerns that the question of the monopoly of foreign trade could be removed from discussion at the Plenum because Lenin could not participate in it.

"I would consider it absolutely necessary to put an end to this matter. The further uncertainty of the situation disrupts all work,"

writes Frumkin and asks Lenin:

"Would you find it possible to discuss this issue with Stalin and Kamenev" [658].

Lenin complied with this request. On December 13, he had a long conversation (2 hours 5 minutes) with Stalin, during which the question of discussing this issue at the Plenum of the Central Committee [659] was also touched upon.

The next day Lenin spoke with Kamenev. On the morning of December 15, Lenin wrote to Trotsky:

"I believe that we have completely come to an agreement. I ask you to declare at the plenary session our solidarity. Hope our decision goes through for a part of those who voted against in October are now going over partly or completely to our side"[660].

There is every reason to believe that when Lenin spoke of the members of the Central Committee who revised their positions, he also had in mind Stalin. Intrigue (in the spirit of Trotsky's stories) is introduced into this text by the words "on our side." It turns out that Stalin (according to Trotsky, fearing his bloc with Lenin) went over to their side. However, it turns out that the words "on our side" are inscribed in the text of Fotieva's Lenin manuscript***. In this letter, Lenin proposes for the third time to appeal to the faction of the Congress of Soviets and the Party Congress if "our decision" does not pass at the Plenum. In the context of the letter, "our decision" can no longer be regarded as a bloc of Lenin and Trotsky directed against Stalin and the Central Committee.

After dictating the letter, Lenin then asks Fotieva to contribute to it, an addendum, not yet sent to Trotsky, containing a request to protest if the question of postponing the discussion arises [661]. And after that he sends another letter with an urgent request to oppose attempts to postpone the solution of this issue due to the absence of Lenin himself and again expresses the idea of the expediency of raising the question of monopoly at the party congress [662].

Trotsky, and after him the literature following in his wake, fix their attention and their readers only on that part of the correspondence between Lenin and Trotsky, in which they declared the unity of their positions regarding the preservation of the monopoly of foreign trade. But, as can be seen, it also contains another part that is organically connected with the first - statements about the persistence of the previous disagreements on the question of the State Planning Commission. True, in correspondence it occupies a smaller place, but it plays an equally important role. Having achieved unity of position on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, Lenin made no attempt to bring his positions closer to Trotsky on the question of the State Planning Commission. And this is understandable. Here is a situation of choice. Either a change in the "legislative" capabilities of the State Planning Commission as a commission of experts, or an expansion of the administrative ("administrative") rights of the State Planning Commission as an operational planning body.

The positions of Lenin and Trotsky on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade converged exactly as far as their differences on the fundamental issues of the NEP allowed. It should also be noted that Lenin and Trotsky fit the question of the monopoly of foreign trade into completely different ideas about the NEP. For Lenin, it is an effective way to protect the socialist economy and a sufficient condition for its growth. And for Trotsky, this is just a step towards creating conditions for establishing a planned economy and for the functioning of the economic mechanism built according to his scheme, but the condition is not sufficient to ensure its development and the victory of socialism.

Trotsky tries to present these contacts as an offer by Lenin to him of a political alliance, directed with its edge against Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev.

In historiography, most often this statement of Trotsky is accepted as corresponding to the truth and not in need of verification and proof. So, E. Radzinsky believes that this alliance predetermined the inevitable defeat of Stalin [663]. Critical attitude is rare. H.A.Vasetsky calls Trotsky's statements "a clear exaggeration of Lenin's favorable

attitude towards him" [664], nevertheless recognizing, in this way, the fact of "favor".

Lenin, however, clearly shows a **political calculation**. In Lenin's letters it is impossible to find traces of a proposal to Trotsky for a political alliance directed against the Central Committee of the party and, in particular, against Stalin [665]. This is the conclusion made on the basis of the analysis of the texts of Lenin's letters. To establish whether Trotsky is right, one must find out, first, what the political conditions were at the moment when Lenin turned to Trotsky to clarify his position. Secondly, did Trotsky really share Lenin's views on the monopoly of foreign trade. Thirdly, did Lenin need a political alliance with him against Stalin and other members of the Central Committee.

Due to the aggravation of his illness, Lenin could not take part in the work of the December (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and again could not personally influence the course of the discussion, therefore every extra vote "for" the preservation of the monopoly was important for him. Trotsky's position was also important. He also did not participate in the work of the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee and **did not reveal** his attitude to the decision. For this reason alone, there are no grounds for presenting Lenin's written question about Trotsky's position as an offer to him of a political alliance.

In addition, Lenin could not have been unaware that Trotsky was not opposed to changing the foreign trade monopoly regime. For example, at a meeting of the Politburo on June 26, 1922, he did not object to Zinoviev's proposals aimed at limiting it [666].

In different ways, they assessed the effectiveness of the monopoly as a means of protecting the economic interests of the state. Lenin believed that it makes it possible to fight against smuggling, which he wrote to the members of the Central Committee (**through Stalin**) on October 13, 1922, challenging those who argued that "it doesn't matter, they say, and smuggling against the monopoly is also in full swing" [667].

Trotsky belonged precisely to the number of those with whom Lenin argued. He made no secret of his skepticism about the possibility of a foreign trade monopoly becoming a reliable barrier to smuggling. It is no coincidence that at the Twelfth Party Congress, in a report on the work of industry, Trotsky "sang out" both "for the health" of monopoly and "for the repose" of it: having declared himself as a **principled supporter of monopoly** [668], he immediately began to assert that

"smuggling ... will break barriers, and no monopoly of trade, no border guard will protect us from the pressure of the world market" [669].

Such a statement means that he actually took a position much closer to Bukharin's than to that held by Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev.

All this testifies to the politically **opportunistic nature** of Trotsky's position and behavior. In correspondence with Lenin, he was clearly cunning. Rather, he tried to play in his favor the contradictions that arose between Lenin and the majority of the Central Committee, including his closest associates. However, be that as it may, Trotsky was among those whom Lenin could rely on in the fight against his irreconcilable opponents - Bukharin and Sokolnikov. Trotsky's voice here, of course, was useful, it could and should have been used. But not for the political struggle against Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. December 13, i.e. at a time when not only the closeness, but also the difference between their positions was fully revealed, Lenin sent a lengthy letter to Stalin for the Plenum of the Central Committee with a detailed argumentation of his position in favor of maintaining the monopoly of foreign trade. His blow is directed against Sokolnikov and Bukharin, and not against Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. Not a word about Trotsky, about his position, authority, and the importance of his support [670]. And not because the negotiations with Trotsky were conducted in secret. Lenin did not hide them, and Stalin knew about them.

On the other hand, by the time Lenin and Trotsky reached an agreement on their position on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, the moods of parts of the members of the Central

Committee had also changed. Additional material and conversations with Lenin prompted Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev to change their previous position and speak out **in support of Lenin's position** before the Plenum of the Central Committee [671]. On December 15, Stalin informed the members of the Central Committee of the Party by letter:

“In view of the new materials accumulated over the past two months on the question of foreign trade (materials of the commission of comrades Yaroslavsky and Avanesov, on the one hand, and materials of comrade Stomonyakov on the revival of negotiations with interested capitalists on the organization a number of large mixed foreign trade companies - on the other hand), speaking in favor of maintaining the monopoly of foreign trade, I withdraw my objections to the monopoly of foreign trade, which I communicated in writing to the members of the Central Committee two months ago. [672]

The removal of disagreements with Stalin meant that Lenin no longer had any significant disagreements with him on questions of economic policy.

Trotsky claims that Stalin, on the issue of monopoly in December 1922, "sensing danger, retreated without a fight" [673]. The entire proof of this thesis rests on the fact that Stalin's statement about changing his former position followed only on December 15, i.e. following the agreement reached between Lenin and Trotsky.

But, firstly, the date of the letter does not mean that Stalin changed his mind precisely on the date indicated, this could have happened a little earlier. Secondly, there is no reason to believe that Stalin was more amenable to political pressure than, for example, Bukharin and Sokolnikov, who did not change their views. Thirdly, it is unlikely that Stalin had to be afraid of creating a political alliance between Lenin and Trotsky, while maintaining disagreements on more important issues of the NEP and the principles of building an economic mechanism.

Trotsky hints that it was his agreement to support Lenin that allowed the latter to insist on considering the issue of monopoly at the December Plenum and not allow a new postponement (it is not clear who made such a proposal) under any pretext [674].

This point of view is not well founded. From Lenin's letter to Trotsky of December 15, it is clear that it was not Trotsky's support that allowed him to put the question in this way, but other circumstances:

“the most important thing: further hesitation on this most important issue is absolutely unacceptable and will disrupt all work” [675].

In addition, Lenin's statement about the inadmissibility of postponing the discussion to the next Plenum because of his illness was made when an understanding was reached among the main supporters of Lenin in the Politburo on this issue, therefore, the acceptance of Lenin's proposal was secured. The question has matured, the conditions for the victory of Lenin's point of view have developed. I had to make a decision. Trotsky's position was important, but not decisive.

Negotiations with Trotsky took the form of correspondence only because **Lenin avoided personal contact with him**. And conversations with Stalin and Kamenev did not leave written traces precisely because they were conducted in the course of personal meetings. Thus, the correspondence itself speaks not so much of Lenin's political closeness to Trotsky (even on this separate issue), but of Lenin's **distancing from him** even in the situation when he was interested in his support.

This is also evidenced by Lenin's appeal on December 14, 1922 to Em. Yaroslavsky**** with a request to record the discussion at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) [676].

“Lenin called me to his office,” he recalled, “and talked with me about raising the question of maintaining the monopoly of foreign trade in the Plenum of the Central Committee. At that

time he was very worried that this question would not be revised in the sense desired by Lenin, that is, in the sense of canceling the previous resolution of the Plenum, and he was especially worried about the position of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Sokolnikov.

Lenin therefore sought to secure support for his proposal. Lenin knew that Stalin had already expressed himself in a letter to the Politburo that he was in favor of maintaining the monopoly. He asked me to come to terms with Comrade. Trotsky and jointly defend the issue in the Plenum of the Central Committee, and if necessary, then transfer it to the faction of the Congress of Soviets ... To speak on the basis of such an agreement on this issue with Comrade Trotsky about a bloc against Zinoviev and Kamenev Lenin with Trotsky in general it would be completely wrong. During my almost hour-long meeting with V.I. Lenin, he never hinted to me about his fundamental differences with the Politburo on other questions, although Lenin, I remember, spoke not only about the monopoly of foreign trade, I can least of all admit that Lenin had in mind some kind of stable "bloc" with Trotsky. He, in my opinion, treated him **precisely as a former Menshevik** ... and only defended with the help of Comrade Trotsky a certain line on the issue of maintaining the state monopoly of foreign trade ... I think that Lenin would not have limited himself only to the advice to come to an agreement with Trotsky on this issue, if I had in mind a longer "bloc": after all, I was then a member of the Central Committee, and, indirectly, though, Lenin would have initiated me into the emerging combination" [677].

On December 16, a sharp deterioration in the state of health of V.I. Lenin, and in the evening N.K. Krupskaya asked Yaroslavsky at the Plenum of the Central Committee to record for Lenin the speeches of Pyatakov, Bukharin, and, if possible, others on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade [678]. Apparently, Lenin did not expect information about the discussion at the Plenum on this issue from Trotsky (there is no direct appeal with such a request in

correspondence with him), but from Yaroslavsky, who was Trotsky's political opponent. This fact gives additional grounds for doubting Trotsky's interpretation of his contacts with Lenin regarding the forthcoming discussion at the Plenum of the Central Committee.

In this context, Lenin's statements that his absence from the Plenum is not an obstacle to discussion, as well as his words in a letter to Stalin for members of the Central Committee that "Trotsky will defend my views no worse than I" [679], should be perceived. It is of fundamental importance that he writes to Stalin about this, not hiding from him, as his like-minded person, the agreement reached with Trotsky and acquainting him with his plan of action.

It is clear from Lenin's letter that Stalin for Lenin is not an adversary against whom Trotsky must act, but an ally whom Lenin introduces to the battle on his side another major political figure, about whom Lenin intended to fight at the Plenum is well known from Lenin himself - against Bukharin, Sokolnikov and Pyatakov. There was no anti-Stalinist orientation in this correspondence between Lenin and Trotsky.

On December 18, 1922, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) considered the question of the monopoly of foreign trade and adopted decisions agreed with Lenin. V.A. Kumanev and I.S. Kulikov argue that the decisions Lenin insisted on were made thanks to Trotsky, since he was able to prove "the fallacy of the previous resolution" and "get it canceled." The authors do not provide any evidence to support the formulated thesis; moreover, they ignored the obvious facts. They take away from Lenin his victory, secured by his efforts and his authority, and pass it on to Trotsky. It turns out that it was not Lenin's preliminary work that ensured that the Plenum changed its previous decision, but Trotsky's argumentation at the Plenum[680]. Radzinsky goes further and turns Trotsky into the main speaker on the question of monopoly at the December Plenum [681].

A handwritten draft of the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade has been preserved, the very decision that some historians associate with

Trotsky's activity. The draft shows that the preparation of the draft decision proceeded without the participation of Trotsky. The draft was written in ink, judging by the handwriting, by Stalin and signed by Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. The first is Stalin's signature, it was made in the same ink as the text was written, which also testifies in favor of the Stalinist authorship of this document. The signatures of Zinoviev and Kamenev are in different inks. The draft was amended by Zinoviev's hand, he also wrote paragraph "1a" of the resolution [682].

The resolution was introduced in the name of Zinoviev, who, as everyone knew, had previously opposed concessions to Lenin on this issue. This could achieve a demonstration of the unity of all members of the Leninist group on this issue. However, the signatures under the draft resolution prepared by Stalin mean that, if not formally, then in fact it was introduced on behalf of the "troika" - Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.

The document is not dated. Correspondence between Lenin and Stalin dating back to the same time on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, their negotiations in personal meetings, Stalin's statement about withdrawing his objections, Lenin's confidence that the question was ready and should not be postponed, as well as the fact that Lenin was satisfied with the adoption of this project (and it was he who was accepted) gave grounds for the assumption that this document could have been drawn up on December 13-15 and, perhaps, shown to Lenin at the same time [683]. Since no questions regarding the preparation of a draft decision were discussed with Trotsky, there is therefore reason to believe that the approval of the draft went around it. In any case, it is clear that under these conditions there was **no political need for Lenin to conclude a political alliance with Trotsky** in order to fight his supporters in the Politburo,

This question was considered at the morning session of the Plenum of the Central Committee on December 18, 1922 [684] The minutes of the meeting do not contain information about the progress of its discussion, but there is a story by Zinoviev at the XII Party Congress:

“ such, but that this should not prevent the largest regional units from conducting foreign trade a little more independently”[685].

The draft prepared by Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev was unanimously adopted by the Plenum. It said:

“Adopted the resolution proposed by Comrade Zinoviev, with some amendments from Comrade Frumkin's resolution. Further, “the unconditional need to preserve and organizationally strengthen the monopoly of foreign trade” was confirmed, and it was proposed “to issue, in the party order, a strict instruction explaining this resolution of the Central Committee and forbidding, under pain of severe punishment, speeches against the monopoly of foreign trade in negotiations with representatives of foreign capital in Russia and abroad and with an indication of the serious harm of discussions on the question of monopoly, which give the capitalist world an idea of our instability on this issue. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade was required to establish strict control over the observance of the monopoly regime, to bring to trial the tribunal of its violators and report to the Central Committee on cases of violation of the monopoly of foreign trade. The decision of the previous Plenum to weaken this regime was canceled, it was instructed to “establish a fixed list” of economic agencies, which were granted the right to “direct trade on the basis of Decree 16/X under the control of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and Trade (with the right of veto of the latter)” [686].

Both in the draft prepared by Stalin and in the resolution adopted by the Plenum, the emphasis was placed on the fact that the rejection of the monopoly could disrupt agreements with Western firms, which indicates the influence of those materials that VS Stomonyakov sent to Lenin and to which Stalin referred in his statement of 15 December [687].

The issues that separated Lenin from Bukharin, which he pointed out in his letter to Stalin ("they," they say, they can ruin us) [688], were not reflected either in the draft or in the decision of the Plenum, perhaps because the fundamental decision on the preservation of the foreign trade monopoly regime made the arguments against them unnecessary. Since the decision adopted corresponded to what Lenin wanted, we have every reason to believe that he was satisfied with it. In any case, at the Twelfth Party Congress, when Zinoviev, in the political report of the Central Committee, announced the victory of the point of view advocated by Lenin [689], no one objected to him, no one protested this statement. Including Trotsky. Some information about the discussion is given by Yem's memoirs. Yaroslavsky:

"Lenin's proposal was adopted by the Plenum of the Central Committee, although there were debates; and it was accepted, if my memory serves me correctly, unanimously. In any case, there was nothing in the speeches of Zinoviev and Kamenev that would indicate their serious differences with Lenin. Therefore, writing down briefly the course of the debate for a note to Lenin (which he agreed with me the day before, that I would send him such a secret note), I tried in every possible way to reassure Ilyich, pointed out in a note that he had no fundamental differences with the Plenum of the Central Committee. I remember that I wrote the note itself under the impression of the agitated state in which I left with Ilyich. [690]

The minutes of the meetings of the Plenum (both the manuscript and the official typewritten copy) and other documents do not record any activity of Trotsky when discussing the issue of the foreign trade monopoly [691]. Trotsky himself, nowhere in his numerous memoirs, also said anything about exactly how he defended Lenin's position at the Plenum, nor did he state that thanks to his activity, the decision that pleased Lenin so much was made. There is no reason to believe that Trotsky somehow influenced the decisions made. It is not surprising, therefore, that **he was not assigned** any special role in the implementation of the decisions of the Plenum.

Further events developed, judging by the information of Yaroslavsky (his letter to Fotieva and Volodicheva of January 22, 1924), as follows. Yaroslavsky gave his note to Lenin's secretaries.

"Volodicheva gave someone to copy my note, and the typist, imagining for some reason that it was Comrade Stalin's manuscript, turned to him for information about the word that was not clearly written"[692].

Here it was revealed that Lenin, bypassing the Central Committee, was sent another document - Yaroslavsky's "secret note". Obviously, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) at the next meeting was acquainted with Lenin's request and adopted a special resolution on the conditions for informing him about the decisions
****.

"In the event of a request from Comrade Lenin about the decision of the Plenum on the issue of foreign trade, by agreement between Stalin and the doctors, inform him of the text of the resolution with the addition that both the resolution and the composition of the commission were adopted unanimously." [693].

With regard to Yaroslavsky's notes, it was decided:

"The report of Comrade Yaroslavsky should not be transmitted in any case now and kept in order to be transmitted when the doctors allow it **by agreement with Comrade Stalin**" (our italics. - V.S.) [693].

Apparently, the ban concerned only Yaroslavsky's notes, and not the decision of the Plenum. It is clear that this "agreement" does not mean Stalin's conspiracy with the doctors against Lenin, but the clarification of the opinion of the doctors, obtaining permission from them to transfer documents.

The first part of the resolution may have been prepared by Stalin and printed in advance, before being submitted for consideration by the Plenum. The second part of it (the last paragraph (indent)) has a

completely different character. Firstly, it is entered into the typewritten text of the original by Fotieva's hand:

"Comrade Stalin is to be personally responsible for the isolation of Vladimir Ilyich, both in relation to personal relations with employees and correspondence"[694].

There is also her note:

"Not a written solution."

It is not clear why this decision was not recorded in the minutes, why, by whom and when it was decided to enter it. A possible answer is that after this resolution was edited and printed, it was announced at the Plenum and it was also decided to place personal responsibility on Stalin. Yem. Yaroslavsky confirms these assumptions, reporting (in a letter to Fotieva and Volodicheva dated January 22, 1923) that the first part of the decision was adopted first (although it is not very clear what is considered the first part, but it can be assumed that this is a printed text) [695].

Secondly, this point cannot be explained, like the previous ones, by a sharp deterioration in the state of Lenin's health, since it did not refer to Lenin himself, but to those who could come into political contact with him. Its wording indicates that the Central Committee feared a violation of the ban by someone from Lenin's inner circle. This could be expected either on the part of the secretaries (it was difficult for them to resist Lenin), or on the part of N.K. Krupskaya, who, due to her position, could neglect the usual ban or inadvertently violate it, since she did not always control herself in conversations with Lenin. About the presence of this "weakness" in Krupskaya M.I. Ulyanova wrote:

"Most of all, it was necessary to fear that V.I. didn't tell anything to N.K., who was so accustomed to sharing everything with him that sometimes, completely involuntarily, without wanting to, she could let it slip"[696].

This decision could not have been intended to conceal the essence of the decision taken and the results of the vote, since this information should have been communicated to him immediately. Two extracts were made from the minutes of the Plenum of the Central Committee, one - for Lenin - was handed over to Fotieva (registered with the Lenin secretariat in December 1922), the second - for Stalin [697] *****.

It is believed that further events developed as follows. On December 21, Krupskaya told Lenin about the decision of the Plenum and, under his dictation, wrote a letter to Trotsky:

“It was as if we had managed to take a position without firing a shot with a simple maneuvering movement. I propose not to stop and continue the offensive, and to this end, to carry out a proposal to raise at the Party Congress the question of strengthening foreign trade and measures to improve its conduct. Announce this at the faction of the Congress of Soviets. I hope you won’t object and won’t refuse to make a report to the factions”[698].

This letter is perceived as Lenin's. However, it raises a number of **source-related questions**. The absence of a manuscript and a signature under it is easily explained by illness, but it is more difficult with other issues. Firstly, for some reason it was not registered with the Lenin secretariat. In addition, and secondly, in the published version of this letter, the postscript allegedly made by Krupskaya is omitted. Of interest is not its text itself (“V.I. also asks to call him an answer”), but the signature placed under it - “N.K. Ulyanov”. This is surprising, since Krupskaya always signed with her last name - “Krupskaya”. This is how she signed other documents written these days [699].

Thirdly, there is not even an original written by her hand, there is only **a copy from a copy**. Is it possible in this case to treat such a letter with confidence? I think not! In any case, it cannot be made the basis of judgments, giving it priority over the totality of other documents, the authenticity of which is beyond doubt.

In addition, the content of this letter is in clear contradiction with the well-known documents on the preparation of the discussion at the Plenum of the issue of the monopoly of foreign trade and the course of its discussion: the concern about the decision, which Lenin allegedly expressed [700], is unclear. The letter contains a proposal to transfer this question to the faction of the Congress of Soviets and to the Party Congress. Lenin expressed these thoughts several times in the course of his correspondence with Trotsky, but in a different context - in the event that the Plenum did not support the proposal to preserve the monopoly of foreign trade. But the Plenum supported Lenin's proposal, and Lenin was completely satisfied with the decision. It is unclear what now was driving this proposal. It is curious how Trotsky himself interprets this letter: after reading the decision of the Plenum, Lenin proposed to him a political bloc against the Central Committee:

“he insisted that I should appeal against the Central Committee to the party and the congress”[701].

Let us ask ourselves the question: why did Lenin need to make an alliance with Trotsky against his supporters and plan a fight against the Central Committee of the RCP (b) at the party congress for maintaining the monopoly of foreign trade? Why "break through the open door"? Maybe because the members of his group in the Politburo and the Central Committee did not immediately identify with him? Well, what about Trotsky? Didn't he consider it necessary to record the difference between his views and Lenin's on a question that was more general and important in relation to the question of monopoly?

These doubts, at first glance, are removed by Kamenev's letter to Stalin, in which he reports that Trotsky received this letter from Lenin.

“Tr[otsky] called me last night. He said that he had received a note from Starik, in which Starik, expressing his satisfaction with the resolution on Vneshtorg adopted by the plenum, nevertheless asks Tr[otsky] to make a report on this issue to the faction of the congress and thereby prepare the ground for raising this issue at the party congress. The point, apparently, is to consolidate this position. Trotsky did not express his

opinion, but asked that this question be referred to the commission of the Central Committee for holding the congress. I promised him to hand it over to you, which I am doing.”[702]

However, not everything is clear with this letter of Kamenev. Three members of the Politburo are aware of Lenin's written proposal to put the question of the monopoly of foreign trade on the agenda of the faction and the party congress, but this question is never discussed in practical terms. Suppose Stalin and Kamenev did not want to stage it, but why didn't Trotsky insist? Why not only did he not come out in the faction, but did not respond at all to the call for help contained in the letter?

It is not only documents that are silent about Trotsky's activity, Trotsky himself is also silent: often telling about this story, he never spoke about any actions taken by him in this direction. Further, the document is not dated, not registered (there are no traces of registration on it) either in the secretariat of Kamenev or in the secretariat of Stalin). Is it possible to be sure that it belongs to this time? There is no reliable evidence. Moreover, there is a strange typo in the text - instead of the words "the resolution adopted by the plenum" it was first written "the resolution adopted by the congress."

It is strange only if the letter was written immediately after the plenum. If we assume that this note was created later (and we have the right to do this), then the passage of time easily and naturally explains not only the strange "mistake", but also the lack of registration, and the contradictory combination of satisfaction with the decision and fear for its fate, and ignoring The Politburo of Lenin's proposal to discuss the report at the faction of the Congress of Soviets and at the XII Congress of the RCP (b).

Kamenev's letter seems to receive confirmation of its authenticity in a note that Stalin replied to him:

"I received the note. In my opinion, we should confine ourselves to a statement in your report, without

demonstrating to the factions. How could the Old Man organize some correspondence with Trotsky with the absolute prohibition of Foerster"[703].

It cannot be concluded from this note that it is a response to this particular letter from Kamenev. For now, this is just a guess. Stalin is talking about correspondence, about the organization of correspondence. Let's accept the version that the letter of December 21 really belonged to Lenin. Still no correspondence. One letter is not some correspondence. Maybe we are talking about some part of Lenin's heritage that is **still inaccessible to researchers?** It is also unclear what report Kamenev is referring to. It can be assumed that the report in the com-fraction is meant. Unfortunately, this report (if it took place) is still unknown to historians.

To summarize; the activation of Lenin's contacts with Trotsky in December 1922 is a fact. But the fact is that these contacts did not go to the detriment of Lenin's contacts with Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. At the final stage of preparations for the discussion of the question of the monopoly of foreign trade at the Plenum of the Central Committee, **Lenin acted jointly with Stalin**, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky. The established contact between Lenin and Trotsky did not have the character of a political alliance, much less an alliance directed against his supporters in the Central Committee.

* Later, at the Twelfth Party Congress, Zinoviev characterized these disagreements as follows: "There was not the slightest dispute in the Central Committee about the inviolability of the monopoly of foreign trade. At one time there was a dispute in the Central Committee about whether, as the Central Committee expressed it, Vneshtorg could, or should, trade for all of Russia, including for all our own economic Soviet bodies "(Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Verbatim report, Moscow, 1923, p. 188).

** B.N. Kasyanenko believes that Lenin in this letter reproached Stalin for insufficient preparation of the issue of monopoly (Kasyanenko V.I. V.I. Lenin and business America (Realities and lessons in the history of Soviet-American relations) // Issues of the history of the CPSU.

1989. No. 4 pp. 17). This is not so, because, in accordance with the practice of that time, Lenin sent a letter to Stalin as general secretary for members of the Politburo. Consequently, reproaches were addressed to all its members, who approved the agenda of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).

*** This letter was first published by Trotsky in 1927 with distortions. The tag "PS" was omitted, indicating Fotieva's addition to the main text of the letter, as well as an indication of her insertion into the Leninist text (Trotsky L. Letter to the Eastpart of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. (On the forgery of the history of the October Revolution, the history of the revolution and the history of the party) / / Stalin's school of falsifications, Corrections, and additions to the literature of epigones, Berlin, 1932, pp. 74-75).

**** He was the chairman of the commission of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on the revision of trade missions abroad (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. P. 188-189).

***** In the protocol, before its text, it is written in the same hand with which the draft protocol was written: "Do not write in the protocol."

***** Trotsky was not involved in informing Lenin about the decisions of the Plenum. Nor were these extracts sent to Krupskaya, who, according to the generally accepted version, informed Lenin of the decision.

Notes:

[636] History of the socialist economy of the USSR. M, 1976. T. 1. S. 223.

[637] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 427.

[638] Ibid. T. 45. S. 188, 549.

- [639] Ibid. T. 54. S. 260.
- [640] Ibid. T. 45. S. 548.
- [641] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 84. L. 1.
- [642] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 222, 562.
- [643] Ibid. pp. 220–222.
- [644] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 36. L. 3; Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 562.
- [645] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 36. L. 7, 8.
- [646] Ibid. L. 9.
- [647] Ibid. L. 14.
- [648] Ibid. L. 7.
- [649] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 693. L. 79, 80.
- [650] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 36. L. 7.
- [651] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 43. L. 43–54.
- [652] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 323.
- [653] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 35. L. 48.
- [654] Ibid. L. 48–49.
- [655] Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 26116. L. 3.
- [656] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 324.
- [657] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 35. L. 51.

[658] Ibid. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 75.

[659] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 471.

[660] Ibid. T. 54. S. 325.

[661] Ibid.

[662] Ibid. S. 326.

[663] Radzinsky E.S. Stalin. S. 206.

[664] See: Vasetsky N.A. Trotsky. The experience of political biography. S. 173.

[665] Trotsky L. My life. Autobiographical experience. T. 2. S. 215-217.

[666] See: Kasyanenko V.I. IN AND. Lenin and Business America (Realities and Lessons from the History of Soviet-American Relations) // Issues of the History of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 17.

[667] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 221.

[668] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. M., 1922. S. 305–306.

[669] Ibid. S. 294.

[670] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45, pp. 333–337.

[671] Ibid. S. 339.

[672] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 35. L. 58.

[673] Trotsky L. Lenin's testament // Trotsky L. Portraits of revolutionaries. S. 279.

[674] Ibid.

[675] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 339.

[676] Ibid. S. 471.

[677] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 188–190.

[678] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 473.

[679] Ibid. pp. 338–339.

[680] Kumanev V.A., Kulikova I.S. Confrontation: Krupskaya - Stalin. S. 14, 15.

[681] Radzinsky E.S. Stalin. S. 211.

[682] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 86. L. 7–7 rev.

[683] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 471.

[684] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 86.

[685] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 188.

[686] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 86. L. 1–2.

[687] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 43. L. 43–54.

[688] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45, pp. 333–337.

[689] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 17.

[690] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 188.

[691] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 86. L. 1–7.

11. LENIN AND STALIN: TACTICAL DIFFERENCES ON QUESTIONS OF UNION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS

One of the key problems of Lenin's "Political Testament" is the problem of nation-state construction in connection with the formation of the USSR. Therefore, it is important for us to find out Lenin's views on those problems that were reflected in the texts of the Testament, as well as to study the nature and dynamics of his relationship with I.V. Stalin in connection with the discussion that arose about the construction of the USSR.

First of all, let us clarify Lenin's views on the goals of nation-state building in the conditions of the socialist revolution, in particular, his attitude to unitarism, federation and confederation, his attitude to those forms in which the state unification of the Soviet republics was conceived.

It is known that the Bolsheviks initially focused on a unitary socialist state with the provision of compactly living peoples with the rights of regional (local) autonomy. It was these views that formed the basis of the decisions of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR (January 1918) [704].

The question of the realization of the right of nations to self-determination, up to the state secession, was decided in each individual case, taking into account various circumstances and only from the point of view of creating better conditions for the development of the revolution that had begun in Russia [705].

Lenin considered federalism only as a necessary stage on the way to the creation of a unitary socialist state [706]. Stalin held the same views. Based on this idea of the fate of federalism, he formulated the General Provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic [707], agreed with Lenin and approved by him, which the constitutional commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR took as the basis of its work [708].

The "Basic Provisions" formulated by Stalin served as the basis for the fundamental provisions of the second section of the Constitution of the RSFSR, adopted by the Fifth Congress of Soviets on July 10, 1918 [709]. This assessment of the Federation was later enshrined in the Program of the RCP(b), adopted by the VIII Party Congress [710], as well as in the decisions of the Second Congress of the Comintern (1920) [711]. Lenin did not recognize confederations as a form of unification of the Soviet republics acceptable to the Comintern [712].

From these fundamental views on the goals and methods of nation-state building, the 10th Congress of the RCP (b) proceeded, pointing to the "experience of Russia" (i.e., the RSFSR) as a model that should be the basis for further nation-state building [713]. Such an assessment is nothing more than the approval of the principle of "autonomization", which allows, without breaking the existing realities (the fact of the existence of republics and the development of national self-consciousness among the peoples), but using them, to ensure the evolution of the union of states within the framework of a federation into a union of peoples within a unitary states. The fundamental orientation towards the unification of the republics, given by the 10'th Congress of the RCP (b), immediately began to be translated into the plane of practical decisions [714].

However, this course met with strong opposition from the party and Soviet leadership of Georgia. Already in April 1921, they began to fight against the unification of the railways, in the summer - over the representation of the Cheka in Tbilisi, and after that, in August 1921 - the economic association of the Transcaucasian republics [715].

In addressing issues of nation-building in the Caucasus, Lenin used the knowledge, experience, and authority of Stalin [716], who in practical matters was more cautious than Lenin, taking into account local features more fully. This was most clearly manifested in the history of the discussion in the Politburo of the issue of creating an Economic Bureau to coordinate the economy of the Transcaucasian republics, which was put forward by the Transcaucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). This plan was opposed by some of the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of

Georgia and Azerbaijan, saw in it a threat to the independence of their republics. The Politburo, with the active participation of Lenin, supported the proposal for the economic integration of the Transcaucasian republics [717]. Lenin proposed that this decision be put into practice in an accelerated regime, while Stalin pointed out the impossibility of this. Lenin accepted Stalin's remarks and his proposals [718].

At the beginning of 1922, the process of unification of the Soviet republics entered a new phase. Work in this direction was stimulated by the invitation of the Soviet republics to take part in the international Genoa Conference. And again, Stalin took a position that denied any speeding up of the unification process without proper political preparation. January 12, 1922 I.V. Stalin submitted a proposal to the Politburo to begin preparations for the unification of the republics into a single state:

“In connection with the question of the composition and powers of our delegation to the European conference, the question arises of our independent republics (both Soviet and the Far East).

At the conference, for the first time, the question of the borders of the RSFSR and the legal relations between the independent republics and the RSFSR will have to be dealt with. Undoubtedly our opponents will try to reveal all the uncertainty and inconsistency in these relations, find gaps and try to make it impossible for the unity of the diplomatic front between the RSFSR and the independent republics, bypass the question of the FER ... not considering it connected with the RSFSR, and generally try to use all legal inconsistency in our relations with the independent republics in order to put us in an awkward position.

Considering the undesirable prospect outlined above and proceeding from the need to establish unity on the diplomatic front, some comrades propose that all independent republics be united with the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy in the

shortest possible time. While fully sharing this point of view, I consider, however, that in order to put it into practice, serious preparatory work will be required, requiring a more or less long period of time (I mean especially the Far East, Khorezm, Bukhara, Ukraine), while we need to be ready to in a month. In view of this, I consider it necessary to suggest another way:

- 1) Create as soon as possible a conference of chairmen of the Central Executive Committees of the independent republics (the chairman of the government must be invited from the Far East) to establish a united diplomatic front with the RSFSR and finally determine the composition of the delegation;

- 2) Ensure that the mandates of all members of the delegation are signed by all the chairmen (Central Executive Committees) of the Soviet republics, as well as by the chairman of the government of the Far East.

This way out is expedient in the sense that, while creating a united diplomatic front, it also saves us from raising delicate questions about the borders of the RSFSR, relations with the republics, the withdrawal of troops from Georgia, and so on.

It may be useful to report that Comrade. Lenin expressed full agreement with the proposed plan. [719]

The plan proposed by Stalin and agreed with Lenin included not only measures to formalize the diplomatic union of the Soviet republics, but also the preparation of their unification on the basis of autonomy. Trotsky reacted to Stalin's letter with a note:

“Comrade's proposal. Stalin seems very tempting in terms of simplicity. On January 16, the Politburo decided: “To accept the proposal of Comrade Stalin with the addition of Comrade Trotsky: “to oblige the chairmen of the Central Executive Committees to stock up on the powers of their Central Executive Committees for signing treaties, agreements, etc.” [720].

Thus, in January 1922, no one in the leadership of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) considered the idea of autonomization untenable in principle, and no one objected to Stalin's proposal - the same proposal that sparked a sharp controversy in September. Only the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine Kh.G. Rakovsky [721].

The interaction of the republics in the diplomatic sphere, achieved by the beginning of 1922, did not affect their daily economic interaction, either in principle or in connection with the creation of a mechanism for ensuring it. Meanwhile, in the context of the dismantling of the old economic system and the creation of a new one based on the NEP, due to the legal unsettledness of relations, they began to escalate, threatening to develop into a complex political problem that could weaken the international positions of the Soviet republics and damage the development of their economies. The greatest tension was observed in the relations of the RSFSR with Georgia and Ukraine.

New disagreements with the Communist Party of Georgia were added to the previous ones: on the issue of the creation of the Georgian Red Army, on the implementation of a monetary reform in the Transcaucasus, on the entry of Georgian trade unions into the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, etc. [722]

In mid-1922, the Central Committee of the KKE took steps that could be assessed as a reorientation of Georgia towards economic relations with the capitalist countries. He allowed the Ottoman Bank (Anglo-French capital) to open its branch in Tiflis, which, in the conditions when the Turkish lira was ousting Georgian and Soviet money from the market in Batum and Tiflis, would inevitably lead to the financial subordination of Transcaucasia to Turkey and through it to the developed capitalist countries...The ban, adopted by the Central Committee of the RCP(b) at the insistence of Sokolnikov, caused a "storm of indignation" in the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia [723]. The absence of a formal settlement of interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR forced the Politburo to act as an arbitrator, which could not be considered normal [724].

The need to urgently resolve the issue of a formal settlement of relations between the Soviet republics in one form or another became more and more obvious. Under these conditions, work intensified in Georgia and Ukraine on schemes for the unification of the Soviet republics, excluding the formation of one state and preserving the independence of the republics to the maximum. Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia P.G. Mdivani, A.S. Svanidze justified the need to unite the republics into a union of states that does not have supranational authorities and administration [725]. Mdivani's supporters had quite strong positions in the Communist Party of Azerbaijan [726].

Part of the leadership of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, in particular Rakovsky, advocated a federation with the weakest possible center. This activated supporters of the creation of a strong centralized state in the republics. L.M. Kaganovich recalled that

“in the middle of 1922, representatives of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b) went to Moscow and raised the general question of the need to strengthen federal ties with the RSFSR” [727].

Thus, in August 1922, against the backdrop of growing problems and discussions about the principles of unification, the question of regulating relations between the Soviet republics entered a decisive phase. On August 10, 1922, the Politburo heard a report by H.G. Rakovsky and D.Z. Manuilsky “On Relations between the RSFSR and Ukraine” and decided:

“To propose to the Orgburo to form a commission with an instruction for the next plenum of the Central Committee to prepare the question of relations between the RSFSR and the independent republics, for later processing it in the Soviet order” [728].

The next day, August 11, the Orgburo created such a commission consisting of I.V. Stalin, V.V. Kuibysheva (Chairman of the

Commission), H.G. Rakovsky, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, G.Ya. Sokolnikov and representatives of the republics [729].

For this commission, Stalin wrote the first document that argued for the need to create a federation of Soviet republics. Stalin himself spoke about the circumstances of his appearance and assessment of his role in the formation of the USSR in a letter to Fotieva (dated February 27, 1923) in response to her request to send the text of his initial proposals on the formation of the USSR:

“According to your request, I am sending you my outline of theses on the question of the unification of the republics. It cannot be called theses, because it has not been developed, not polished, and I never called it theses either. This sketch received its development and formalization first in the well-known resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1922, and then in my theses, adopted as a basis by the Plenum of the Central Committee in February (1923 - BC) and subject (by decision of this Plenum) to a decisive assessment of Comrade Lenin. I made this sketch, I think, in August 1922 at the request of Comrades. Ordzhonikidze, Kirov, and Myasnikov in the presence of these comrades. It is known to Comrade. Lenin and approved by him when I was with Comrade Lenin in "Gorki", it seems, at the end of August p / y. "[730] *.

This document was not introduced into scientific circulation, apparently because it destroys the legend accepted in traditional historiography. Its full text is placed in Appendix No. 1, and here we note that in it Stalin, describing the stages in the development of relations between the Soviet republics, stated:

the collapse of the Genoa and The Hague international conferences showed that, “on the one hand, to attract foreign capital to Russia is almost impossible, and, on the other hand, the possibility of intervention is not deprived. Therefore, to defend external security and to preserve and increase the material wealth of the Soviet republics in the present

conditions is possible only through a closer military-economic alliance of all Soviet republics. Such an alliance will ensure the revival of the economy and the rational use of the resources of the Soviet republics as a whole.

And he concluded:

“It is necessary to complete the process of ever-increasing rapprochement of the republics by uniting them into one federation, merging military and economic affairs and external relations (foreign affairs, foreign trade) into one whole, while maintaining independence for the republics, complete autonomy in internal affairs” [731]**.

Stalin raised the question of the formation of the USSR in the context of the tasks facing the socialist revolution and taking into account international relations. These theses became the basis for further development of various options for uniting the Soviet socialist republics into a union state. The idea of federation is not yet associated specifically with any organizational form. **This question is left open.** It is clear, however, that it was proposed to create a federation on the basis of those principles on which the RSFSR was created. This is the same principle that underlay Stalin's proposal to prepare for the unification of the Soviet republics, with which he addressed the members of the Politburo in January 1922 and which was agreed with and approved by Lenin. The principle that underlay the policy of the Bolsheviks in the field of nation-state building in 1917-1921 and assumed the preservation of the autonomy of the regions in resolving issues of their internal life***.

Having received Lenin's approval, Stalin took the next step - he developed a draft document for discussion in the Commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). Stalin called it the "Initial Project" (see Appendix No. 2). He proposed:

“The unification shall be based on the principle of voluntariness and equality of the republics, with each of them retaining the right to freely secede from the union”

He proposed to form "corresponding allied legislative and executive bodies", to "merge" the commissariats of the naval, communications, foreign affairs, foreign trade, posts, and telegraphs; to subordinate the republican People's Commissariats of Finance, Food, Labour, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Supreme Council of National Economy "to the directives of the corresponding Commissariats of the Union." As a principle of unification, the following provision was formulated:

"full provision of the interests of the national development of the peoples of the contracting republics." The creation of the Union was to take place after the approval of the "Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee" at the First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [732].

Here, more definitely than in the original draft, the nature of the federal formation is indicated - "one union state", but the form of federation has not yet been indicated. The evolution of a number of the most important provisions in these first documents of Stalin testified to the fact that he was looking for the most acceptable solutions in the face of opposition.

In the third document in a row****, Stalin takes one more step: he proposes to create not just one union state, but a single state through the so-called "autonomization" of the republics:

"To recognize as expedient the formal entry of independent Soviet republics ... into the RSFSR" . Accordingly, the thesis about the federation as one union state, which has lost its relevance, disappears. The proposal for the entry of the Transcaucasian republics into the USSR as part of the Transcaucasian Federation, which greatly irritated the leadership of the Communist Party of Georgia, loses its meaning."

Stalin, in full accordance with the principle of "autonomization", offers them to join the Union each separately. The question of the Far

Eastern Republic, the democratic republics of Bukhara and Khorezm, he thought to leave "open", "limiting himself to the adoption of agreements with them on customs, foreign trade, foreign and military affairs, and so on." He proposed:

"To recognize as expedient the formal extension of the competence of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the RSFSR to the corresponding central Soviet institutions listed in paragraph 1 of the republics." "The foreign affairs (Indel, Vneshtorg), military affairs, railway, financial and sweat ...
***** independent republics should be united with those of the RSFSR ... People's Commissariats: food, labor and the national economy formally subordinate to the directives of the relevant RSFSR people's commissariats." Organs for the fight against counter-revolution - "subordinate to the directives of the Code of Civil Procedure of the RSFSR." The rest of the People's Commissariats (Justice, Education, Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, public health, and social security) should have retained their independence. The decision to unite was supposed to be "carried out in the Soviet order through the Central Executive Committees or Congresses of Soviets" of the republics, and at the All-Russian Congress to declare the creation of the USSR "as a wish" of the republics [733].

The scheme proposed by Stalin for the unification of the Soviet republics made it possible to avoid a complex hierarchical structure of nations and peoples, whose declared equality turned into their actual inequality, enshrined in the Constitution: in fact, only those republics and their "titular" nations and peoples that were directly part of the Union of Republics were recognized as equal. The equality of others was limited by the rights only to this or that autonomy.

Stalin's new project was sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The Central Committees of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and Armenia spoke out in favor of unification on the basis of "autonomization". The Central Committee of the Communist Party

of Georgia considered the state association "premature" and spoke in favor of an economic association. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus called for the establishment of relations between the BSSR and the RSFSR on principles similar to those that would be established between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR [734]. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine delayed the answer and asked to postpone the meeting in the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the issue of relations with the RSFSR, scheduled for September 22, until October 15 [735].

On the eve of the start of the work of the commission of the Orgburo, Stalin wrote to Lenin his arguments in favor of his plan. On September 22, 1922, in response to Lenin's note, the content of which is still unknown to historians, Stalin replied with an extensive letter in which he developed the argument in favor of the proposal to federate the republics **on the principle of autonomization** as the most fully responsive to the task of creating a convenient, and therefore effective, control system national economy in the interests of socialist construction. There is nothing in this letter to indicate that they have disagreements.

"We have come to a situation," he wrote,

"when the existing order of relations between the center and the outskirts, i.e. the absence of any order and complete chaos (it is unlikely that Lenin could have liked such a statement. - BC), becomes intolerable, creates conflicts, resentment, and irritation, turns the so-called unified federal national economy into a fiction, slows down and paralyzes all economic activity on an all-Russian scale ". "Formally, the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars, the STO and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR are not binding on the independent republics, and these institutions very often cancel the decisions of the central institutions of the independent republics, which causes protests by the latter against the "illegal actions" of the central institutions of Moscow ... The intervention of the Central Committee of the RCP in such cases usually occurs after the central institutions

of the border regions had already issued their decrees, later canceled by the central institutions of Moscow, which creates red tape and a brake on economic affairs and causes bewilderment among the non-party people and irritation among the communists in the border regions.

From this, Stalin drew the conclusion:

“One of two things: either real independence and then non-intervention of the center, its own People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, its own Foreign Trade, its own Concession Committee, its own railways, moreover, common questions are resolved through negotiations on an equal footing, by agreement ... or a real unification of the Soviet republics into one economic entity with the formal extension of the power of the Council of People's Commissars, the STO and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR to the Council of People's Commissars, the Central Executive Committee and the economic councils of independent republics, i.e. replacement of fictitious independence by real internal autonomy of the republics in the sense of language and culture, justice, internal affairs, agriculture, and so on. “

A significant place in the letter was occupied by an analysis of opposition to the unification of the republics.

“During the four years of the civil war, when, due to intervention, we were forced to demonstrate Moscow's liberalism on the national question, we managed to educate among the communists, against our will, real and consistent social independents who demand real independence in every sense and regard the intervention of the Central Committee of the RCP as deceit and hypocrisy on the part of Moscow... We are going through a period of development when the form, the law, the constitution cannot be ignored, when the young generation of communists on the outskirts refuse to understand the game of independence as a game, stubbornly recognizing words about independence at face value and also

stubbornly demanding from us the implementation of the letter of the constitution of the independent republics."

From this, Stalin drew the conclusion in favor of decisive, offensive tactics:

"if we do not now replace formal (fictitious) independence with formal (and at the same time real) autonomy, then in a year it will be incomparably more difficult to defend the actual unity of the Soviet republics. Now we are talking about how not to "offend" the nationals; in a year, it will probably be a question of how not to cause a split in the party on this basis, because the "national" element does not work in the border regions in favor of the unity of the Soviet republics, and formal independence favors this work. [736]. The letter ended with a summary of Stalin's plan.

A not quite correct understanding of the role of "autonomization" in Stalin's plans has been established in the literature. It is presented as a way of restricting the rights of the republics, concentrating power in the center and, consequently, concentrating it in Stalin's hands. The above letter shows that **Stalin was guided by** completely different considerations. Proceeding from the recognition of the obvious - the absence of actual independence of the republics - he proposed only to legitimize the existing state of affairs, to formalize it, but at the same time clearly designate the sphere of independence of the republics. Therefore, "autonomization" acted not as a way to limit the rights of the republics, but as a way to combine the power of a strong center with real power remaining in the localities, and also as a way to simplify administrative structures. Finally, as a way to ensure the transition from a federation to a unitary state, a transition carried out not on the basis of a violation of the right of nations to self-determination, but on the basis of its implementation and on the condition that it is especially important, providing them with a new law for the theory and practice of the socialist revolution - the right free exit from the Union.

The Commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), with the participation of all interested parties, discussed Stalin's draft on September 23 and 24 with a number of changes and clarifications that are not of fundamental importance. It was adopted and formalized as "Resolution on the relations of the RSFSR with the independent republics in the final version, adopted by the commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)". The resolution was sent to all members and candidates of the Central Committee of the party.

The Commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) actually proposed to move on to the implementation of the scheme for the unification of the republics, which was proposed by Stalin in January 1922, and met with no objections either from Lenin or from other members of the Politburo. It must be assumed that Stalin could expect continued criticism from Rakovsky, Mdivani and others, but he had the right to expect support from members of the Politburo. However, life (itself) made serious amendments: Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Kalinin, Bukharin criticized the autonomization plan. Trotsky silently waited.

It is sometimes claimed in the literature that in the early phase of the discussion of Stalin's proposals, Lenin was isolated from information about the ensuing discussion. It is implied, if not explicitly stated, that Stalin was responsible for this isolation. **This is not true.** The available documents (including the registration logs of the Lenin secretariat) indicate that in August-September 1922 V.I. Lenin received the entire stream of fundamentally important documents related to the formation of the USSR, which were sent by the secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to all members of the Central Committee, and, moreover, he received information sent to him personally, both in writing and orally [737].

At this time, Lenin was relatively active, dealing with issues of party work, the organization of concessions and foreign trade, the problems of Donbass, the conflict in the NKPS, under the concession of L. Urquhart and others. But in the most important political issue - the unification of the republics - until September 26, he did not show any

visible activity. This may indicate that until the mid-20s of September, the formation of the USSR on the basis of autonomy did not cause him any concern or protest.

On September 26, 1922, Lenin wrote to Kamenev about his opinion on the Stalinist project:

"In my opinion, the question is paramount. Stalin has a little tendency to hurry. It is necessary for you (you once had the intention to do this and even did a little) think carefully; Zinoviev too.

He further writes that

"Stalin has already agreed to make one concession. In § 1, instead of "joining" the RSFSR, say "Formal unification together with the RSFSR into a union of the Soviet republics of Europe and Asia."

The spirit of this concession, I hope, is understandable: we recognize ourselves as equal in rights with the Ukrainian SSR and others, and together and on an equal footing with them we enter a new union, a new federation, the "Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia."

In accordance with the new construction, Lenin proposes the creation of a federal state body - the "All-Federal All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia." Lenin also explains his motivation:

"It is important **that we do not give food to the 'independents'** (highlighted by us. - BC), did not destroy their independence, but created another new level, a federation of equal republics.

Lenin's other proposals - regarding the right of "central institutions" to appeal to the federal Central Executive Committee against the decisions of the federal Council of People's Commissars and the STO,

without suspending their implementation, as well as regarding the structure of the central government, the mechanism for the creation, functioning and powers of their regional representative offices - did not change the concept proposed by Stalin .

The nature of a fundamental change was Lenin's proposal (presumably) to "merge" the people's commissariats of finance, food, labor, and the national economy of the republics, that is, to turn them, like those listed above, into union, federal departments, liquidating them in the republics. Stalin, on the other hand, suggested that these republican people's commissariats "formally subordinate to the directives of the corresponding people's commissariats of the RSFSR", i.e. he proposed to create a floor of the union-republican departments. Lenin did not consider this to be expedient, and thereby proposed that much more executive power be withdrawn from the republics than Stalin did. Consequently, the degree of centralization of executive power in **Lenin's version was much greater than in Stalin's version**, and they had much less real independence.

"This is my preliminary draft," wrote Lenin.

- Based on conversations with Mdivani and other comrades, I will add and change. I beg you to do the same and answer me." [738]

He also reported that Stalin agreed to postpone the submission of the resolution to the Politburo of the Central Committee until his return, and about his desire to meet with Kamenev and Rykov.

Let's pay attention to the fact that in this letter there is no criticism of "autonomization" as a principle of unification. It appears only among the interpreters of Lenin's text. It is only a matter of tactical expediency.

The next day, September 27, Stalin sent Lenin, as well as Zinoviev, Kalinin, Kamenev, Molotov, Rykov, Tomsy, Trotsky, a reply to Lenin's letter. He agreed with the replacement of the principle of autonomization, which implied the "entry" of the republics into the

RSFSR, with "the formal union of the Soviet socialist republics of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia with the RSFSR into the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia. "

Stalin objected to the proposal to create a federal Central Executive Committee for reasons of political and organizational-administrative inexpediency: it would lead "to the mandatory creation of a Russian Central Executive Committee with the exclusion of eight autonomous republics ... that are part of the RSFSR, to the declaration of the latter as independent along with Ukraine and other independent republics , to the creation of two chambers in Moscow (Russian and federal), and, in general, to deep restructuring, which at the moment is not caused by either internal or external necessity and which, in my opinion, is inappropriate under the given conditions and, in any case, premature."

In his opinion, such a reorganization "will give nothing but conflicts and friction." Stalin proposed to transform the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR into a federal Central Executive Committee. He also objected to the liquidation of the union-republican people's commissariats and their transformation into allied (all-federal) ones, noting that "it can hardly be doubted that this" haste "will give food to the "independents" to the detriment of Comrade Lenin's national liberalism." He referred to Lenin's other amendments as "purely" editorial or "superfluous" [739].

It is usually noted that Stalin easily agreed to a concession. This is true, but only in part. As you can see, Stalin easily made a concession only in relation to paragraph 1 - in terms of formal recognition of the preservation of the state independence of the uniting republics. The reason for compliance is seen in Lenin's authority and unwillingness to go into conflict with him, which could damage his political career. **It is impossible to agree with this**, since Stalin did not yield on other important issues and, in harsh terms, challenged Lenin's proposals. The reason for the concession, I think, is that, as was shown above, in principle he allowed the version of the Union of Republics, stipulating only that this union should be "**one union state**." The equality of the republics under Stalin was stipulated in the "Initial Project" (end of

August - beginning of September 1922) as a principle. Lenin's proposal on the 1st paragraph did not deal with fundamental disagreements with Stalin. Hence Stalin's compliance. It is noteworthy that Lenin did not reply to Stalin on the substance of his objections. In addition, in the works of October 1922 - March 1923. Lenin did not criticize any of those who advocated the creation of an effectively working mechanism of control. Moreover, he emphasized in every possible way the importance of its creation and did not offer to sacrifice it to the "independents".

Stalin's concession and stubbornness will be clearer if we consider that the thesis of "autonomization" occupied an important place in his project, but still it was not the main one. He pointed to the most advantageous, in Stalin's opinion, way of solving the problem. The main thing is the idea of a Union of Republics as a single state with a strong central authority capable of developing towards a unitary socialist state of a union of peoples. "Autonomization" in this case was only one of the acceptable options for solving the problem, but not the only one. It was possible to go to it through a union of equal states, so Stalin, having conceded on paragraph 1, tried to maintain the management scheme that he proposed. This is also understandable: the formal recognition of the equality of the republics in the Union is not an insurmountable problem on the way to achieving the main goals in the field of nation-state construction of a unitary socialist state. The development of the Union and its future will be largely determined by the system of power and administration.

The question arises: why did Lenin, who previously did not object to "autonomization" as a form of federation with a strong center, suddenly come out against it at the end of September? It is not possible to obtain an unambiguous satisfactory answer on the material available to historians. One has to choose between two main options: firstly, he changed his fundamental approach to issues of nation-state building, and secondly, he abandoned it for tactical reasons. In traditional historiography, the first version of the explanation is accepted. A powerful argument in favor of him are the notes "On Nationalities or on "Autonomization"".

A letter from Lenin to Kamenev dated September 26 (which was discussed above), as well as a number of other facts, testifies in favor of the second option. It is believed that Lenin sent a letter to all members of the Politburo [740]. However, it is not. The office documents of the Lenin Secretariat show that Lenin sent this "secret letter" "on autonomous republics" only to his supporters in the Politburo: Kamenev, Zinoviev, Stalin, Kalinin, Tomsy, Rykov, Molotov. **It was not sent to Trotsky** [741]. By including Trotsky among the addressees, the PSS publishers **created a distorted picture of Lenin's relationship** not so much with Stalin, but with Trotsky as well. Apparently, Trotsky was bypassed not by chance.

True, on September 7, the Politburo granted him leave from September 13, 1922 [742], but he was in Moscow, and, moreover, the leave did not mean removal from political life, but only release from the current work. Kamenev, to whom the letter was addressed, had also been on leave since September 14 [743]. On the other hand, Stalin, answering Lenin, sent his letter to all members of the Politburo, **including Trotsky *******.

Therefore, there is every reason to assume that **Lenin decided not to involve him** in the discussion of the issue, on which there were disagreements among supporters. This assumption is also supported by the fact that in the course of the discussion no significant documentary "trail" emerged, even remotely resembling the one left behind by another acute issue of that time - the monopoly of foreign trade. Such an assumption fully corresponds to what we know about Lenin's political style and fits into the course of the political struggle that was then unfolding between Lenin and Trotsky. This may indicate Lenin's desire to limit the discussion of the disagreement that had arisen to a narrow circle of the immediate political environment. The leaders of the nationalist deviators were not acquainted with this letter, which may indicate that his support for their demands was caused not by a commonality of views and not by Lenin's revision of his principled positions, but by tactical considerations.

Kamenev's note to Lenin of September 27 also indicates that we are dealing with tactical differences. Kamenev wrote:

"In my opinion, either do not touch the question of "independence" at all (which, apparently, is no longer possible), or conduct the Union in such a way as to preserve formal independence as much as possible, i.e. approximately according to the proposed scheme"[744].

Again, everything is "revolving" around how to extinguish the activity of the "independents". The short notes exchanged between Stalin and Kamenev on September 28***** also point to Lenin's tactical maneuvering. Kamenev wrote:

"Ilyich is going to war in defense of independence. Offers me to see the Georgians. Refuses even yesterday's amendments. Maria Ilyinichna called. Stalin replied: "We need, in my opinion, firmness against Ilyich. If a couple of Georgian Mensheviks influence the Georgian communists, and the latter on Ilyich, one asks, what does "independence" have to do with it?

Kamenev shares his thoughts:

"I think, since Vladimir Ilyich insists, it will be worst resist ."

Stalin defines his position:

"I don't know. Let him do as he pleases."[745]

On September 27, Lenin met with a supporter of autonomization - the secretary of the Zakkraykom of the RCP (b) G. K. Ordzhonikidze, as well as the leader of the Georgian national deviators P. G. Mdivani. The next day - with supporters of Mdivani, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia M.S. Okudzhava, L.E. Dumbadze, K.M. Tsintsadze and with a supporter of the Stalin project, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Armenia A.F. Myasnikov [746]. Unfortunately, there is almost no reliable detailed information about these conversations in the hands of historians. It can be assumed that Lenin decided to maneuver in order to ensure the unification of the republics with a concession, not to delay it, but to

speed it up, without getting involved in a political struggle. He put the question before them like this:

"If "autonomization" is bad, what about the "Union"?
Supporters of Mdivani were delighted: Georgia and Russia are equal in the Union, and agreed [747].

True, they agreed, as it soon became clear, insincere.

The essence of tactical differences, obviously, is that Stalin was determined to stand firm in the face of the onslaught of national deviators in the RCP (b), while Lenin considered the tactics of maneuvering and finding compromises to be more expedient. The question arises as to why they chose different tactics. Two main reasons can be pointed out. The first consisted in a different assessment of the political strength and capabilities of the national deviationists. Stalin did not evaluate them as significant. Obviously, Lenin was not worried about Mdivani, Rakovsky and their like-minded people themselves, but that they could express (they assured!) the moods of the broad masses. **To what extent was Lenin right** in making a concession to the national deviationists?

In Georgia, all the tricks of Mdivani and his supporters to raise the party organization against the course of creating a lasting alliance with other Soviet republics did not bring them success - their influence, as the next congress of the KKE showed, it was rapidly falling. The same was in Ukraine. Rakovsky later, at the 12th Congress, expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that in Ukraine it was difficult "for us to make them (the party organizations. - BC) understand the significance of the national question." With displeasure, as a dangerous phenomenon, he fixes "the calmness with which, in particular, the Russian part of our party relates to disputes, which, unfortunately, have taken on too local coloring"[748]. So, in Ukraine, a lot of party members are against Rakovsky, which means they are for Stalin.

The second reason was the different arrangement of priorities in the question of the immediate tasks of the socialist revolution. Stalin believed that

"in Georgia they made a fetish of the tactics of concessions, meanwhile, now is the time not for political concessions, but, on the contrary, for a political offensive, as in Russia. The class struggle is sharpening on the national question, and most of the party (meaning the KKE - BC) and the old Central Committee persist in this and do not want to understand this." [749]

Hence his attention was to the problems of management. To the task of creating a management system capable of ensuring the creation of a powerful economic organism as a guarantor of the victory of the socialist revolution, he was ready to sacrifice the interests of the nationalist-minded part of the population and their defenders in the ranks of the Communist Party.

Lenin, apparently, tried to avoid even a slight aggravation of the internal party struggle and to provide opportunities for political maneuver within the country and thus get the time needed for economic construction. This position fit perfectly into the general scheme of the NEP. In this case, he preferred a political maneuver to political pressure on opponents. Besides, apparently, the old scheme of the United States of Europe was still on the minds of people. No wonder he suggested changing the name of the state accordingly. It is possible that Lenin's assessments of the expediency of this or that form of federal association were influenced by the **hopes for** a relatively close victory of the world revolution, to which his thoughts about the "Union of the Republics of Europe and Asia" **were oriented**. The "Union of equals" in these conditions could seem more preferable to him from the point of view of his growth at the expense of the new socialist states.

The scheme of the "Union of equals", allowing to strengthen propaganda outside the country and fight the propaganda of nationalists, demanded as a payment for this complication of management processes and an increase in the cost of the management apparatus. The "Union of equals" also led to the legalization of the formal and actual inequality of different peoples and republics. Some received the right to form union republics and become subjects of the

USSR. Others received the right to form only autonomous republics and joined the USSR as part of the RSFSR or ZFSR. Still others have not yet received such rights. Satisfying the demands of some, this scheme caused an aggravation of dissatisfaction among others, who considered themselves infringed in their rights. Such a situation promised in the future not an end to the contradictions, but their aggravation, the replacement of old "fronts" with new ones. The rejected autonomization plan, with its well-known shortcomings, made it possible to avoid these contradictions, to make all peoples really equal in rights and to organically merge two different processes - the unification of states and **peoples**. But it was precisely the latter that was the main task in the field of nation-state construction from the point of view of the interests of the socialist revolution.

Stalin perfectly understood this concern and Lenin's calculations, but did not share them. Within the framework of the "Union of Equals", national-state formations, instead of evolving towards integration within a single organism to a unitary state, received a consolidation of their status, which made it difficult to overcome national differences and gave them a political character, instead of translating relations between peoples exclusively within the framework of economic, cultural relations, etc.

Thus, there are sufficient grounds to say that on the issue of the unification of the Soviet republics, the **disagreements between Lenin and Stalin were not of a fundamental, but of a tactical nature**, they did not go beyond the search for the most appropriate ways and methods of their solution. Naturally, if different positions or interests are chosen as a "reference point", then different solutions will seem appropriate. Between Lenin and Stalin there was a discussion about the most acceptable solution to the problem of the unification of the republics under the given conditions. At some point, it became tense. Tactical differences, like any other, could, of course, grow over time. But that did not happen. The discussion did not turn into a fight.

After an exchange of views, the draft commission of the Orgburo was finalized and the revised text was sent to members and candidate

members of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in a letter signed by Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov, and Molotov with a warning:

"We believe that the resolution of the Central Committee Commission on the issue of relations between RSFSR and the independent republics (it was distributed to the members and candidates of the Central Committee) on the basis of a correct and, of course, acceptable, some points need to be clarified, mainly concerning the structure of the all-Union central bodies and partly their functions. We were convinced of this by our conversations with some members of the Central Committee and with a number of local nationals. Accordingly, we submit to the Central Committee the following, slightly modified, more precise formulation of the decision of the Commission of the Central Committee.

A comparison of Lenin's proposals with the revised draft resolution shows that that not all of his proposals were accepted. The first paragraph was revised in the spirit of Lenin's proposal:

"1. To recognize as necessary the conclusion of an agreement between Ukraine, Belarus, the Federation of the Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR on their unification into the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" with the reserving of each of them the right to freely secede from the "Union" [750].

Paragraph 2 was adjusted in connection with the creation of a federal level of power in accordance with Lenin's proposals. But his proposal regarding the name of the Union was rejected and the **Stalinist version, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**, was retained. Paragraph 3 took into account the new principle of forming the Union, but **Lenin's proposals** to eliminate the union-republican level of government and the editorial changes he proposed **were rejected**. Lenin's proposals regarding paragraphs 4 and 5 were also rejected*****.

The nature of the concessions to Lenin made in the final version of the draft theses "On the relations of the RSFSR with the independent Soviet Socialist Republics" also indirectly testifies in favor of the version of Lenin's tactical maneuvering. A kind of compensation for the rejection of "autonomization" was the provision that federal authorities are formed from representatives of the republican CECs "in proportion to the population they represent" [751].

This meant the recognition of the need to strengthen the role of the RSFSR in the formation of federal authorities. Lenin accepted this addition. And this is natural, because he was not a principled opponent of a state with a strong central government, and in the USSR the center of gravity, the main base of socialist construction was just the RSFSR.

It was this project that was proposed to the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) (October 5–8, 1922). The question of the unification of the Soviet republics was discussed on October 6. The minutes of its meetings have not been published, so the analysis of the discussion that took place at it is extremely difficult. The plenum heard the "Report of the commission on the relationship between the RSFSR and the independent republics," delivered by Stalin. When this issue was discussed at the meeting of the Plenum, Mdivani [752] was present, who left a small sketch of what was happening:

"I am very sorry that I cannot personally report on the debate on this issue, but one thing is interesting that the debate lasted for 3 hours - this is something monstrous at the Plenums, where issues are resolved with cinematic speed. The debate showed that a certain part of the Central Committee directly denies the existence of the national question and is entirely infected with great-power tendencies, but this part received such a slap in the face that it will not soon decide to return again from the hole where LENIN drove it (learn about his moods from his letter, which was read out at the end of the meeting after solution of the question *****), look, do not lose the letter, I begged to Kamenev.

Yes, the atmosphere has dissipated a little, but it may thicken again if we fail to put the matter of information well ... We must seriously prepare and gather all our strength, both for the Transcaucasian congress and for the all-Russian congress. "At first (without Lenin) we were beaten in a Mordovian way, ridiculing us, and then, when Lenin intervened, after our meeting with him and detailed information, the matter turned towards the communist mind ... On the question of relations, a voluntary alliance was adopted on the basis of equality, and as a result of all this the suffocating atmosphere against us dissipated; on the contrary, the Great Powers were attacked in the plenum of the Central Committee—that is what Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others said. The project belongs, of course, to Lenin, but it was submitted on behalf of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and others, who immediately changed the front" [753].

This letter, which has a number of inaccuracies and, moreover, reproduces the point of view of only one side, cannot serve as a reliable source of information. Nevertheless, there are interesting confessions in it, indicating that Mdivani and his supporters received support from Lenin only after they complained to him and exerted psychological pressure. The available information about Lenin's work on that day allows us to conclude that Lenin was not absorbed in the issue that was discussed at the Plenum. There are four notes by Lenin to Kamenev dated October 6 and dating back to the time of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), but only one of them is devoted to issues of national construction, the other two to the issues of the Urquhart concession, another one to the state of health and a request to invite Chubar to Lenin [754].

Perhaps it was to them that Kamenev answered Lenin, and Mdivani perceived this as Lenin's feverish work in support of the Georgian national deviationists. The note devoted to the issue discussed at the Plenum is well known:

"I declare a fight to the death against Great Russian chauvinism.".[755]

This is followed by a proposal for the alternate chairmanship of the Union Central Executive Committee of a Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, etc.

It is believed that, speaking of the Great Russian chauvinists, Lenin had in mind Stalin and his supporters. But Stalin had already conceded on that main point, which, in principle, could give rise to such an accusation. The disagreements that emerged in matters of designing the organs of power and administration did not give grounds for reproaching him for "Great Russian chauvinism."

Moreover, with regard to the concentration of power in the center due to its reduction in the localities, **Lenin went much further than Stalin**, therefore, he himself, with no less reason, could be included in the "Great Russian chauvinists", "great powers", etc. In addition, the thesis about Great Russian chauvinism in the note is organically linked to the discussion about the functioning of the highest authority, about how to organize the work of the Central Executive Committee. Nothing is known about his disagreements with Stalin on this issue. **Nothing indicates that that this accusation was directed against Stalin.** The question of whom Lenin had in mind remains open.

The plenum adopted a draft resolution, revised taking into account Lenin's proposals. It was decided to create the USSR as a "Union of equals". For reasons that are still not entirely clear, the resolution lacked the important provision that the new federation was **one allied state**, which allowed the Union to be interpreted as a federation with a weak central authority, not much different from a confederation. It was indeed a fundamental concession to the "independents".

Stalin had to give in at this stage of the struggle, but, apparently, only in order to prepare a new offensive and ensure victory in the struggle for the creation of **a federation as one union state** - the goal that he had formulated from the very beginning. For the preparation of draft documents that were to be considered by the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR ("with preliminary submission for approval by the Central Committee"), a commission of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) was created consisting of Stalin, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Rykov,

Chicherin, Kalinin and representatives of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Belarus. Stalin became its chairman [756].

This indicated that the Plenum of the Central Committee expressed political confidence in him, and he got the opportunity to actively influence the further process of the formation of the USSR. Lenin saw no danger in this.

* Stalin visited Lenin on 19 and 30 August. Obviously, on one of these days, Lenin was acquainted with Stalin's proposal and approved it.

** In the typewritten text, the last phrase looks like this: "into one whole, preserving autonomy for the republics in internal affairs" (RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 278. L. 2; F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 266-267).

*** Neither in January 1921 (letter to the Politburo) nor in August-September 1922 did Stalin use the term "autonomization". Lenin did not use it either during the discussion of the principles of the unification of the Soviet republics. There is not this term in official documents. Who is the "author" of it is unknown. For the first time, this concept entered the political life of the party in the title of the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"", which, as will be shown below, **there are no sufficient grounds** to associate with the name of Lenin

**** Publishers in Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU date it "not earlier than August 11" (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. P. 192). Unfortunately, the material available to historians allows us to establish the time of creation of this version of the draft resolution only approximately. If we consider that the first document of Stalin was created and agreed with Lenin at the end of August (presumably on the 30th), and the second - in the first days of September (September 12, Stalin was with Lenin), then the third version, apparently, appeared no earlier than the first days September (2-3rd) and no later than September 10-11, since the protocol of the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan on September 11 definitely speaks of Stalin's

proposal to hold a federation on the basis of autonomy (Ibid., pp. 19, 196).

**** People's Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs

***** The inclusion of Trotsky in the list of addressees at first glance contradicts what we said about the reasons for Lenin's exclusion of Trotsky from the list of addressees of the letter. However, **this fact confirms our assumption rather than rejects it**. Stalin, as the actual head of the commission and the author of the draft, agrees to amend the draft, which has already been sent out as an official document to the members of the Central Committee, so he, of course, could not ignore Trotsky. Lenin's letter, on the other hand, pursued a different goal - to outline his own position in the face of his supporters and to argue his amendments to the submitted draft resolution.

***** The notes are not dated and do not have traces of registration in the secretariats of Stalin or Kamenev (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 1-1 rev.), therefore, one cannot be sure that they were indeed written at this time.

***** According to paragraph 4, instead of formally subordinating the republican People's Commissariats of Finance, Food, Labor, and the National Economy to "the directives of the relevant People's Commissariats of the RSFSR", it was proposed to "merge them upon agreement of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee". In paragraph 5, Lenin proposed adding: "with the establishment of purely deliberative (or only deliberative) conferences or congresses (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. P. 205; Lenin V.I. Full. sobr. soch. T. 45. S. 212).

***** This is a note to Kamenev dated October 6, 1922.

Notes:

[704] See: Formation of the USSR. Sat. documents. 1917–1924 M.; L., 1949. S. 29–35.

705] Ibid. S. 25, 34.

[706] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 36. S. 73.

[707] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 4. S. 72–73, 79–80.

[708] See: Sakharov V.A. Formation of Soviet federalism // International scientific conference. Public Administration: History and Modernity (May 29–30, 1997). M., 1998. S. 162–164.

[709] Formation of the USSR. Sat. documents. 1917–1924. S. 54.

[710] CPSU in resolutions... T. 2. S. 79.

[711] Second Congress of the Comintern. M., 1934. S. 492.

[712] RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24248. L. 1–2.

[713] The CPSU in resolutions... Vol. 2, pp. 363, 364–365.

[714] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 43. S. 198–200, 256–257; T. 52. S. 135–136; Education of the USSR. Sat. documents. pp. 227–230.

[715] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 7–17; D. 102. L. 3.

[716] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 193. L. 2; F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 165; Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 95–97.

[717] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 227–230.

[718] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 255, 565–566; He is . Op. Ed. 3. T. XXVII. S. 94; Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 229; Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 184; RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24204. L. 1–1 rev.

[719] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1954. L. 1–1 rev.

[720] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 159, 160.

[721] Ibid. L. 272–274.

[722] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 7–17.

- [723] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 199.
- [724] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 290. L. 2; F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 19–23.
- [725] Domestic history. 1992. No. 4. S. 90.
- [726] Chivadze Sh.I. Along the path indicated by V.I. Lenin (On the 60th anniversary of the XII Party Congress) // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1983. No. 4. S. 69.
- [727] Kaganovich L.M. Aide-memoires of a worker, Bolshevik communist, trade union, party, and Soviet state worker. M., 1996. S. 297.
- [728] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 306. L. 1.
- [729] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 191.
- [730] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 278. L. 2.
- [731] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 262–265 (manuscript-autograph).
- [732] Ibid. L. 241.
- [733] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 192–193.
- [734] Ibid. pp. 195–197.
- [735] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 183–185.
- [736] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 198–200.
- [737] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 8. L. 159v.; D. 9. L. 2v–15v; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989 No. 9. S. 198–200, 206–208.
- [738] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 211–213.

- [739] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 208.
- [740] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 213.
- [741] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 8. L. 159v.
- [742] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 311. L. 2.
- [743] Ibid. D. 312. L. 4.
- [744] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 206–207.
- [745] Ibid. pp. 208–209:
- [746] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 686–687.
- [747] Harmandaryan S.V. Lenin and the formation of the Transcaucasian Federation. 1921 - 1923. Yerevan, 1969. S. 344.
- [748] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 528.
- [749] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 66.
- [750] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 205.
- [751] Ibid. S. 206.
- [752] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 84. L. 1.
- [753] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 26. L. 29–29 rev.
- [754] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 214; T. 54. S. 293–295.
- [755] Ibid. T. 45. S. 214.
- [756] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 84. L. 1.

12. "GEORGIAN CONFLICT" IN THE HISTORY OF RELATIONSHIPS LENIN AND STALIN

Contrary to Lenin's expectations, the concessions to the national deviationists, which he himself made and forced the Central Committee to accept, did not lead to an end to the struggle, or even to its weakening. Success only whetted their appetite, and they began to struggle for new concessions, now at the expense of the Leninist scheme of the "Union of Equals", using its inherent internal contradictions. The political meaning of their new demands was to transform the USSR from an instrument for mitigating interethnic and interstate contradictions into an instrument for preserving and strengthening existing interethnic and interstate relations. Obviously, not understanding the political meaning of Lenin's concession and exaggerating their ability to influence him, Mdivani and his supporters in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia went to exacerbate the political situation in the Communist Party of Georgia. The immediate goal was to disrupt the decisions of the October (1922)) Plenum on the formation of the USSR. The means was the demand for Georgia to join the USSR directly, and not as part of a special subject of the federation - the Transcaucasian Federative Soviet Republic. The meaning of the creation of the ZFSR was to ensure the integration of economic and political structures at the regional level, in an effort to muffle or circumvent some of the acute problems that divided the Transcaucasian republics (border, for example) and to ensure the strengthening of internationalist sentiments over nationalist and separatist ones.

In traditional historiography, this phase of the struggle is usually viewed as a continuation of the struggle of Mdivani and his supporters against the course pursued by Stalin and Ordzhonikidze. However, this is not the case, since in the Stalinist version of the creation of the USSR on the principles of autonomization, there was no ZFSR, and Georgia, along with other republics, was part of the RSFSR, which at the same time turned into a new state - the USSR. ZFSR as a subject of the USSR appeared only because the Georgian and Ukrainian national deviators **forced Lenin** to abandon the autonomization plan. And this is understandable: as part of the

RSFSR, which turned into the USSR, all the republics acquired the same status, those problems that the ZFSR was called upon to solve on a regional scale were solved within the framework of the new federation, so the preservation of the ZFSR lost its meaning.

Now Mdivani and his supporters have opened a front of struggle precisely against Lenin, and precisely because he made a concession to them on the question of the form of the federation. True, in Lenin's letter of September 26, the method of entry of the Transcaucasian republics into the USSR was not specified in any way, Lenin ignored this issue.

Stalin's letter of September 27, 1922, in which he agreed to accept the Leninist scheme, explicitly stated that each of the three Transcaucasian republics would enter the USSR independently. Consequently, Stalin did not offer to return to the scheme of the inclusion of the Transcaucasian republics within the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Republic, which Mdivani and his supporters rebelled against. For the first time, a proposal for the entry of the Transcaucasian republics into the USSR as a "Union of equals", as part of the ZFSR, appears in a note by Kamenev to Lenin (no later than September 27). And that itself became a response to Lenin's proposal to join him in this work. Apparently, Kamenev's letter preceded the appearance of an updated version of the decision of the Orgburo commission, and, perhaps, his proposal influenced the formulation of this thesis [757]. ZFSR in the Leninist scheme for the formation of the USSR acquired meaning, so the commission of the Organizing Bureau accepted it.

By forcing Lenin to abandon the autonomization plan, the Georgian national deviators doomed themselves to join the USSR as part of the ZFSR. Their like-minded people in the Central Committee of the CP(b)U found themselves in a better position: Ukraine joined the USSR on its own, so they limited themselves to fighting for a relative reduction in the rights of federal authorities and a corresponding strengthening of republican ones. Perhaps this explains the fact that in the following months it was the Georgian national deviators who became the main, most active, and irreconcilable force opposing the decision of the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP

(b) on the formation of the USSR, and therefore against Lenin. The united front of the national deviationists has cracked and, consequently, weakened. It became easier to fight against them.

Mdivani "thanked" Lenin for his compliance, starting to put his plan into action, as he had planned, with the help of "a well-organized business of information." Lenin received a political blow from Mdivani's supporters in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia unexpectedly*, two weeks after the end of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). They launched an attack on the decisions of the Plenum of the RCP (b) through criticism of Ordzhonikidze.

On October 21, 1922, at 2:55 am, Kamenev, Bukharin and Yenukidze were invited from Tiflis by direct wire to the apparatus. In Moscow, Yenukidze approached the apparatus**. The apparatus tapped on the tape:

"Please pass on Comrades. Kamenev and Bukharin the following note. Text followed: "The hopeless situation that has arisen here in Georgia forces us to disturb you. We ask you to convey all of the following to Comrade Lenin: We are convinced that his and your absolutely authoritative decision will put an end to the anarchy and devastation that is now taking on a catastrophic character. There is no limit to Ordzhonikidze's tyranny. In connection with the question of the decision of the Central Committee of the RCP on the Union of Republics, large meetings began. On October 19 there was a meeting of responsible comrades. The convened Bureau of the Tiflis Committee, at which the Central Committee of the KKE welcomed the decision of the Central Committee of the RCP, expressed a desire to file a petition with the Central Committee of the RCP on revising the point on the entry of the Transcaucasian Federation into the union in the sense of extending the provision on Ukraine and Belarus to Georgia and Azerbaijan. In view of the special political conditions, this served as a pretext for the most unacceptable expressions of Ordzhonikidze against the

Central Committee of the KKE and the old workers with vulgar abuse and threats of merciless reprisals. Today, October 20, Zakkraykom, headed by Ordzhonikidze, has already begun to rout, starting with the Central Committee of the KKE. The most authoritative comrade Okudzhava was removed from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee and expelled from his Presidium. The same threatens everyone, according to Ordzhonikidze's loud statement at a meeting of the Zakkraykom, that he will crush the entire party and create a new one from the young ones. These attacks, completely undeserved, are made available to anti-Soviet elements, the authority of the Soviet government and the prestige of the party are declining, the comrades are bewildered, confusion and disorganization begin, which tomorrow will continue to assume terrible forms and dimensions. We are placed in a position where we are no longer able to bear responsibility. Therefore, finding no other way out, we decided - tomorrow, 21, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE to announce this. The situation is the same in the Georgian trade union council. Responsible comrades heading the commissariats declare the impossibility of their further work. In a word, Soviet power in Georgia has never been in such a threatening position as it is at the moment.

We urgently ask Comrades Kamenev and Bukharin to take the most active part in the situation that has arisen. In a day or two everything will be known in the province. There, the devastation can take even more horrifying forms. All this was created by Ordzhonikidze, for whom persecution and intrigue are the main weapon against comrades who do not servile him. It became unbearable to live and work under his Dzhimordovsky regime. Do we really not deserve a better leader in the Marxist and comradely sense and are doomed to be the object of Ordzhonikidze's tyranny. Please kindly notify us with a response."

Then followed the signatures of the members of the Central Committee of the KKE K. Tsintsadze, S. Todria, V. Dumbadze, Eliava, Makharadze, Kavtaradze, Sabashvili.

This text gives an idea of the form in which the Georgian national deviators under the guise of "informing" exerted psychological pressure on Lenin. They frighten Lenin with the threat of a split in the party, the loss of Soviet power.

Yenukidze replied:

"Everything that you have reported, at a later time, I will pass on tomorrow morning to the comrades you indicated, also to Stalin. I hope that a proper answer will be given to you tomorrow. Everything you say is very sad, and I can see from the tone of the telegram that relations between the top workers have become extremely aggravated. Personally, I think that if you really see confusion and disorganization among our party organizations and among the working masses, then the ground for this was prepared by the efforts of the majority of members of the Central Committee of the KKE (i.e., the Mdivani group. - V.S) "***" .

Thus, Yenukidze, who knew perfectly well all the underlying motives of the political struggle in the leadership of the KKE, but did not personally participate in it, declared that he was not deceived by the words of the authors of the note handed over to Lenin and did not share their assessment of the causes of the crisis.

An answer followed from Tiflis:

"If you personally think that the ground for this disorganization has been prepared by the majority of the Central Committee of the KKE, then the Central Committee does not belong here in Georgia and we ask you to put an end once and for all to the inquisition to which we have been subjected for a year and a half by Ordzhonikidze. We affirm that this soil, if it was prepared by anyone, was by

Ordzhonikidze. Until now, we have not raised the question of anyone personally. Now our cup of patience is overflowing, and in order to save our party and Soviet power from the final disintegration in Georgia, in this politically scandalous country, we are already raising this question. If anyone doubts our correctness, then we ask our higher organizations and our old comrades to transfer the question of our relations to the higher Party investigation.

You, Abel, cannot imagine to what monstrous proportions the persecution of old comrades in Georgia reaches, and not only in Georgia, but also in Russia. Yenukidze retorted: "I repeat that everything I conveyed to you is my personal opinion, and the members of the Central Committee of the RCP are not in the least responsible for my words. No matter how much I respect my old comrades, I am obliged to tell you the truth, which I felt and which I observed when I was in the autumn (1922 - V.S.) in Georgia. Goodbye". The apparatus finally chimed from Tiflis: "Goodbye" [758].

On October 21, Lenin sent a telegram in cipher to the members of the Central Committee of the KKE with such an answer that they did not expect:

"I am surprised by the obscene tone of the note by direct wire signed by Tsintsadze and others, handed over to me by Bukharin for some reason, and not by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. I was convinced that **all disagreements had been settled** by the resolutions of the plenum of the Central Committee with my indirect (our italics. - BC) participation and with the direct participation of Mdivani. Therefore, I strongly condemn the abuse against Ordzhonikidze and I insist on transferring your conflict in a decent and loyal tone for the permission of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), to which I am transmitting your message by direct wire. A copy of this telegram was sent to the Zakkraykom member of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) Ordzhonikidze and the secretary of the Zakkraykom Orakhelashvili [759].

There is no price for this document. It shows, firstly, that Lenin personally took Ordzhonikidze as a politician under his political protection. But, most importantly, this story once again convinces us that Lenin's concessions to the national deviationists were exclusively tactical in nature and that Lenin, having already understood their game, did not want to indulge it. An indication of the need to contact him only through the secretariat of the Central Committee, i.e. through Stalin, who oversaw all Caucasian issues, showed them that the establishment of the truth in this dispute Lenin handed over to the decision of the secretariat of the Central Committee (again, **to Stalin** in the first place). It can be argued that **Lenin showed everyone** that Stalin retains complete confidence in his eyes. Consequently, the disagreements that arose between them at the end of September 1922 on the question of the unification of the republics did not have any serious impact on their political relations.

Further, Stalin acted based on the opinion and authority of Lenin. On the afternoon of October 21, he telegraphed Ordzhonikidze and Orakhelashvili to Tiflis:

"The Clerk received in the Central Committee through Yenukidze ... **** with a complaint and swearing at Ordzhonikidze, who allegedly tavyzhe***** the Central Committee of Georgia, and accusing him of squabbling deepening conflicts. The Central Committee asks Ordzhonikidze and Zakkraykom to report separately their ... ***** code in a nutshell. The answer is urgent." [760]

Following the first, Stalin sent another telegram to Ordzhonikidze*****, which, in particular, said:

"We intend to put an end to the squabble in Georgia and thoroughly punish the Georgian Central [Central] Committee. Tell us who else we should transfer from Georgia besides the four withdrawn ... In my opinion, we need to take a decisive line. Expel from the Central Committee all [and] all remnants of nationalism. Did you receive Lenin's telegram? He is

furious, **Ekdini dissatisfied with ******* Georgian nationalists (emphasis added. - BC)"[761].

Meanwhile, on 21 October in Tiflis, Mdivani's supporters continued to escalate the conflict. They encouraged their supporters with Lenin's support and declared their readiness to demonstrate "strength" and use underground methods to defend their position. Prior to receiving Lenin's answer, a meeting of the Central Committee of the KKE was held, which was attended by Ordzhonikidze and other members of the Zakkraykom of the RCP (b), as well as a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) A.I. Rykov, who was at that time in Tiflis. The plenum by a majority of votes adopted a decision that ran counter to the decisions of the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - on the independent entry of Georgia into the USSR, rejected the need to create the ZFSR and introduce the Transcaucasian banknote [762].

This decision was a flagrant violation of the Party Rules and Party discipline, expressed not only in direct disobedience to the decisions of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (which is usually noted in the literature), but also in open confrontation with it (which is silent in the literature). Such an act entailed expulsion from the party. Under these conditions, the Presidium of the Zakkraykom proposed to the Central Committee of the KKE to resign. Lenin was informed about what was happening in Georgia, including the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia:

"The Plenum (Central Committee of the KKE. – B.C.) accepted the proposal of the Presidium (Zakkraykom of the RCP (b. – B.C.) on resignation in view of the discrepancy between its [political] line and the line of the Zakkraykom", "the Presidium of the Zakkraykom, stating an unprecedented case in the history of our party of the resignation of the Central Committee because of the unwillingness to carry out the decisions of the party" [763].

It is impossible to imagine that the actions of Mdivani and his like-minded people set Lenin up for their political support.

Kamenev and Bukharin, avoiding getting involved in this conflict on the side of Mdivani, whom they supported in this conflict, turned to the rebellious Central Committee of the KKE very late - on October 23. Outwardly, their answer was quite in the spirit of Lenin, but contained a barely hidden advice on how to behave further, so as not to expose yourself to organizational measures for violating party discipline and preserve the possibility of continuing the struggle:

“You must know that the decision of the Plenum on the entry to the Union of the Transcaucasian Federation must be strictly implemented and can only be reconsidered by a new Plenum if it so desires. The tone of your open note is a gross violation of party morals. We advise an end to the squabbles and work on the basis of the decisions of the Central Committee” [764].

On October 24, 1922, Bukharin wrote a note to Lenin:

“You have probably read “Georgian Conversation by Direct Wire”. In my opinion, it is necessary to ban or deactivate the question for the time being. A softening of morals or appropriate] gestures should be made during the Congress of the Comintern, when an authoritative Georgian delegation will be present here. Expecting in a short time” [765].

This proposal by Bukharin betrays in him the defender of Mdivani and others. Lenin did not accept this advice. The composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia was changed.

After resigning, Mdivani and his supporters did not stop fighting against the decisions of the October (1922) plenum. The materials of the Lenin Secretariat testify that Lenin received all the main materials on the development of the conflict in a timely manner and was aware of everything that was happening in the Caucasus. Documents came not only from the Central Committee, but also from the Mdivani group. They made it possible to get an idea of the development of the conflict and said that the nationalist deviators, despite the difficult political situation in Georgia, took a course to further aggravate it, launching agitation against the decision of the Central Committee of

the RCP (b) in party organizations and among the non-party masses [766]. Lenin could not have any doubts about the disloyalty, moreover, the double-dealing nature of the political position of Mdivani and his supporters.

It was under these conditions that the well-known incident occurred with the slap that Ordzhonikidze inflicted on the old (with pre-revolutionary experience) party member Akaki Kabakhidze. The incident, which is considered in traditional historiography, was the reason for the creation of Lenin's notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"", the main accusation against Stalin and Ordzhonikidze and one of the reasons that prompted Lenin to radically change his assessment of Stalin as a politician and his attitude to him.

In describing the history of this conflict, two or three accidental or **deliberate distortions** are usually allowed. Firstly, they directly connect him with the ongoing political struggle over the formation of the USSR, and secondly, all the blame for him is shifted to Ordzhonikidze, and his assault is characterized as an act of political reprisal [767]. In general, much more is said and written about this episode than is actually known about it. It is unclear even the exact time when the conflict occurred. In the literature, the question of time is bypassed, it was not even raised. Based on the available archival documents, it can only be established approximately - the third week of November 1922. On November 24, the Secretariat of the Central Committee considered the issue of sending a special commission to Tiflis.

Information about the conflict is contained in the testimony of two eyewitnesses, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) A.I. Rykov and member of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of Georgia Rtveladze. Records of their stories are kept in the materials of Lenin's secretariat. Rykov, in a note dated February 7, 1923, wrote:

"In Tiflis, at the apartment of Comrade Ordzhonikidze, the following incident broke out in my presence: A member of the

Russian Communist Party and my comrade in exile in Siberia Akaki Kabakhidze came to see me at Comrade Ordzhonikidze's apartment. During a general conversation, Comrade Kabakhidze reproached Sergo Ordzhonikidze for having some kind of horse and that the comrades standing at the top, including Comrade **Ordzhonikidze, were much better off materially** than other party members. In particular, there was some talk about the impact of the new customs policy in Batumi on the increase in high prices. One of the phrases, apparently, Akaki Kabakhidze said to Sergo in his ear, regarding the fact that Sergo **Ordzhonikidze feeds some horse** at the state expense. Following this, a verbal squabble broke out between them, during which Comrade Ordzhonikidze hit Kabakhidze.

With the intervention of my wife and I, the incident was stopped and Comrade Kabakhidze left the apartment. After that, Sergo Ordzhonikidze experienced a very strong nervous shock, which ended in hysteria. "On the merits of the incident," Rykov wrote, "I believe that Comrade Ordzhonikidze was right when he interpreted the reproaches that Comrade Kabakhidze made to him as a cruel personal insult." He saw the reason for the breakdown in the extreme exhaustion of the nervous system of Ordzhonikidze as a result of a long and acute intra-party conflict [768].

Rtviladze confirms Rykov's conclusion:

"The incident with the slap given by Comrade Ordzhonikidze to Comrade Kabakhidze is of a private nature, not related to factionalism (there was no written statement to the KK ***** Georgia [Kabakh]idze and this incident was not considered in the Central Committee of Georgia)"[769].

Ordzhonikidze himself also denied the political nature of the conflict. Pleading guilty to assault, he stated that it was caused not by a political dispute, but by a personal insult[770].

It is believed in the literature that Lenin was very disturbed by this incident. **This is not a fact.** Nothing is known from Lenin's documents about his reaction to this story. As a manifestation of Lenin's concern and his political distrust of Stalin and the majority of the Politburo, the history of the creation of a commission sent to Tiflis to investigate this incident is presented. The main arguments are seen in the fact that Lenin did not vote for the composition of the commission [771], as well as in the assessments of its work contained in the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"".

At the XII Congress, Yenukidze spoke about the circumstances of the creation of this commission. Unfortunately, this evidence was not claimed by historians, although any of them could use the published transcript of the congress. Yenukidze said: "

The Central Committee decided to send a commission there. At first it was suggested that I go there as a chairman or a member of the commission, but I stated that I had recently returned from Georgia, I knew the state of affairs, I knew these comrades ... I am a politician, etc. deviators considered wrong. I then refused to go there and raised some personal considerations against my trip. Another commission was elected under the chairmanship of comrade. Dzerzhinsky. Lenin specifically then asked me: "In your opinion, is this commission suitable?" I answered frankly and now I confirm that the commission was very suitable and authoritative"[772].

No one challenged Yenukidze's words, therefore, there is no reason to doubt the correctness of his story. deviators considered wrong. I then refused to go there and raised some personal considerations against my trip. Another commission was elected under the chairmanship of comrade. Dzerzhinsky. Lenin specifically then asked me: "In your opinion, is this commission suitable?" I answered frankly and now I confirm that the commission was very suitable and authoritative"[772].

What about documents? They do not provide any basis for the traditional historiography version of the history of the creation of this commission and Lenin's attitude towards it.

On November 24, Stalin sent Lenin material from Tiflis, as well as a draft resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in connection with the conflict in the KKE, prepared "according to the statement of Philip Makharadze and other members of the old Central Committee of Georgia." This material was reported to V.I. Lenin, as evidenced by the corresponding note in the log of incoming documents (marked with the "D" icon), Lenin himself looked at the draft resolution of the Secretariat (there is a mark "VM") [773]. There were no objections. Lenin's "Diary of Duty Secretaries" records the arrival of the Politburo protocol for voting by poll on the evening of November 24, "by telephone", and then the entry follows:

"Vladimir Ilyich did not vote" [774].

Publishers interpret this in such a way that Lenin "abstained from voting" [775], but this is a free interpretation of the diary entry. If you didn't vote in the evening, it doesn't mean you abstained. There could be other reasons. The question for voting came in the evening of the 24th, the Politburo meeting was to be held the next day. Apparently, this protocol was not handed over to Lenin. November 24 was a difficult day for him. The secretary on duty began his diary entry with the words:

"Vladimir Ilyich is unwell, he was in the office for only five minutes, he dictated three letters by phone, to which he wanted to ask for answers later. Maria Ilyinichna (Ulyanova) said not to bother him with anything..."[776].

It was only in the evening of the 25th that Lenin got acquainted with this protocol, sent for voting [777]. He returned to work on the evening of the 26th. But the decision of the Politburo by that time had already taken place without his participation. It did not cause any negative reaction in Lenin. And it is understandable, because the discussion of the issue took place with his participation, and the

Politburo could have voted without him. There was no point in voting "for" "after".

On November 25, the Politburo accepted the proposal of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to create a commission for "urgent consideration of the application" and "outlining the measures necessary to establish a lasting peace in the Communist Party of Georgia." It included F.E. Dzerzhinsky (chairman), D.Z. Manuilsky, BC Mickevicius-Kapsukas.

Lenin was aware of the matter, and if he had been against the decision, he could and should have made a definite protest. There was time for this, since the results of voting by "poll" by telephone were subject to approval at the next meeting of the Politburo, and only after that it was drawn up in a special protocol. The approval took place at a meeting of the Politburo on November 30 in the presence of Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Kalinin, Molotov, Stalin, Trotsky. Considering that on November 30, Lenin worked, and the day before, on November 29, he received the minutes of the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party dated November 25 with proposals regarding the goals and composition of the commission [778], then there are no grounds to believe that Lenin was against the composition of the commission or that he was bypassed in solving this issue.

The assertion that the commission was unable to conduct an objective investigation, that it had appropriate instructions from Stalin, do not receive confirmation in the documents. On the other hand, a document of a different kind is known: during the work of the Dzerzhinsky commission in Tiflis, Stalin telegraphed Ordzhonikidze:

“ **Check again** (our italics. - BC) reports of the aggressive actions of the Georgians and give an official statement on this case, signed by all people familiar with the case. Be careful and don't exaggerate the danger." [779]

It is believed that the acquittal of the commission's conclusion aroused Lenin's anger against its chairman, Dzerzhinsky. Historians

unanimously condemn the conclusions of the commission, but no one bothered to pick up and study its documents. There is nothing to indicate that the Dzerzhinsky commission concealed any critical material regarding Ordzhonikidze. The minutes of the commission's meeting (Nos. 1-6 for December 4-7, 1922) contain a lot of information about the facts of his rough treatment of people and that this met with condemnation among his political associates. Nothing indicates that Lenin was suspicious of the commission's work. The reproach of her bias, therefore, remains unfounded.

The opinion was also firmly established in the literature that Lenin was impatiently awaiting the results of the commission's work in order to use the brought material to strike a political blow at Stalin and Ordzhonikidze.

The main argument in favor of this thesis is usually seen in his showing interest in the time of Rykov and Dzerzhinsky's return to Moscow. For confirmation, the entries of the "Diary of secretaries on duty" for December 2-4, 1922 are used. [780] Indeed, the records of the secretaries record an increased interest in Rykov, but they do not note such interest in the return of Dzerzhinsky.

From December 2 to 9 (when Rykov's first conversation with Lenin took place), the "Diary" of the secretaries records that Lenin asked about Rykov's return five times, and Dzerzhinsky for the period from December 2 to 12 (when Dzerzhinsky visited Lenin) only twice. It is wrong Lenin's expectation of Rykov and Dzerzhinsky to associate exclusively with the Georgian incident. Lenin had a direct wire to Tiflis at his disposal. He could send and receive telegrams. He could receive all the necessary information first hand in any volume, at any time convenient for him. But he did not resort to this remedy. Moreover, when it became known that Dzerzhinsky was in no hurry to return to Moscow, and on the way he would stop to make revisions on the railway (he was People's Commissar of Railways), Lenin did not worry and did not rush him [781].

If one adheres to the traditional point of view, then one must admit that for Lenin the revision of the railway was more important than the

formation of the USSR. Of course not. It was just that at that time, Lenin was not concerned about the problem of the formation of the USSR to the extent that it appears in the literature.

Rykov was supposed to come to Moscow when Lenin was already in Gorki, so he asked him to call there [782]. However, the conversation did not take place (Rykov did not call Gorki or called, but could not talk because of Lenin's poor health). The first telephone conversation between them took place only on December 9, after Lenin's return to Moscow. Indeed, Lenin was looking forward to Rykov, but this can be explained not by interest in Georgian affairs, but by the need to urgently resolve economic issues and the question of organizing the work of the deputy chairmen of the STO. This assumption is supported by the fact that on December 12, Lenin met with his deputies - Rykov, Kamenev and Tsyurupa and discussed with them the issue of organizing their work [783]. Perhaps the conflict in the KKE was also discussed. What could Rykov say to Lenin? Obviously, the same as later, February 7, 1923, wrote for the commission created by Lenin to study the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia:

“On the merits of the incident, I believe that Comrade Ordzhonikidze was right,” and the nervous breakdown occurred as a result of a long and acute internal party conflict that developed not along the Mdivani-Ordzhonikidze line, but along the line of the Central Committee of the KKE against the Central Committee of the RCP (b), in which Ordzhonikidze was no more guilty than Lenin himself [784].

On the same day, December 12, in the evening, Lenin talked with Dzerzhinsky for 45 minutes in private. The conclusion reached by his commission was in complete agreement with Rykov's opinion. Was Lenin upset as a result of the negotiations with Rykov and Dzerzhinsky? We do not know this for certain, but it is known that on the evening of December 13, Lenin was in a good mood, he was cheerful, joking, worried only about the liquidation of affairs before rest [785].

As for the material compromising Stalin, the Dzerzhinsky commission did not find it. Many prominent party figures (Secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee A. Yenukidze, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia S.L. Lukashin), who knew about the events that took place in the Communist Party of Georgia in connection with the unification processes, said that Stalin's activity was aimed at seeking reconciliation of the opposing sides on the basis of accepted general party decisions [786]. "Lenin," Yenukidze said,

"really believed these comrades (Georgian national deviationists. - BC), supported them, in his attitude towards them in this way, a large share (guilt, influence. - BC) belongs to Comrade Stalin"[787].

That's what Stalin's supporters said. But the most interesting thing is that they were echoed, confirming these testimonies, by the national deviationists themselves:

"A group of responsible workers, headed by the old Central Committee of the KKE, based on his knowledge of local conditions and on the directives received from Comrades Lenin and Stalin (letters, conversations) considered it necessary to pursue a line of some concessions to the national aspirations of the masses and on this basis diverged from the Caucasus Bureau (later the Zakkraykom) headed by Comrade Ordzhonikidze "[788].

The news report from the Georgian Cheka dated December 14, 1922, which came to him from the Georgian Cheka, could set Lenin in a calm mood with regard to the development of events in Georgia. In Batumi there was "complete indifference", the reason for which the Chekists saw in the weak work of the KKE and the strong propaganda of the Mensheviks, whom the workers, however, do not support. The attitude of the peasantry towards the Soviet government is sympathetic, good, although there are also those who are dissatisfied [789]. There are text underlining on the document, indicating that Lenin got acquainted with it.

The question of the formation of the USSR was resolved in principle on the terms Lenin insisted on. Of course, it still remained the subject of discussion and did not lose its political relevance. But it was not the fate of the Georgian nationalist deviators or the unpleasant incident with the slap that interested Lenin at that time. In the period from December 12 to 16, 1922, when his political work in the previous regime finally ceased, Lenin did not show any concern for Georgian problems and dealt with other issues (foreign trade monopoly, the budget of 1923, etc.).

Continuing to work actively and making a number of public speeches, he only once (and even then on behalf of the Politburo) touched on the formation of the USSR. On December 10, 1922, Lenin sent congratulations to the All-Ukrainian Congress [790]. He did not intend to address the problems of nation-building in his speech at the X All-Russian Congress of Soviets either - this problem was not in the plans of his speech [791]. Nor was it reflected in the materials prepared on behalf of Lenin by N.P. Gorbunov for his speech at the 10th All-Russian Congress of Soviets [792]. True, the "Diary of Duty Secretaries" in the entry for December 14 records Lenin's intention to dictate "To Kamenev - about the Union of Socialist Republics", but nothing is known about the content of the alleged dictation [793].

But something else is known. In mid-November, work began on the commission, created by the decision of the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), to prepare documents for the 1st Congress of the USSR, the work of which was led by I.V. Stalin. Before starting his work, on November 18, 1922, he gave an interview to a correspondent of the newspaper Pravda, in which, dwelling on the reasons for the unification of the republics, he repeated the main arguments of his letter to Lenin of September 26, 1922 [794] Speaking about the future federation, Stalin described it as one union state:

"The unification of the Soviet republics into one union state (emphasis added. - BC) undoubtedly creates a form of all-round military-economic cooperation" that will ensure their success [795].

In connection with the need to build a federation according to the scheme proposed by Lenin, Stalin raised the question of an upper chamber created on a parity basis by all union republics. It was new. The RSFSR was a union, but **not of republics, but of Soviets and peoples**. The second chamber within the framework of the former system of the international Republic of Soviets, which was built on the basis of the unification of all Soviets into a single state, was not needed. For the same reason, it was not needed in the case of the unification of the republics in the USSR on the principle of autonomization. The USSR as a union of equal republics, representing an association of different-sized states that made different contributions to the common budget and made different demands on it.

Since we had already chosen the path of creating nation-states and their federation, it became necessary to represent and defend not only the social interests of the international population of individual regions, but also individual nationalities, and, therefore, to create an appropriate political mechanism that did not exist before. National representation ran counter to previous ideas about the principles of building the Soviet state.

The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies are bodies that **ensure social, and not national**, representation. National representation was reminiscent of the practice of bourgeois parliamentarism (Switzerland) and aroused mistrust and skepticism. Perhaps that is why Stalin posed the question in an interview in such a way that it is difficult to understand whether he is a supporter or opponent of this idea [796].

It seems that Stalin took into account the experience of the discussion about autonomization and decided to launch a "trial balloon".

One way or another, but the proposal for a second chamber is evidence that Stalin seriously accepted the Leninist scheme for the formation of the USSR and conscientiously engaged in its refinement and implementation. Stalin, it was he, and not someone else, who did

everything to eliminate the problems associated with the creation of the USSR as a union of equal republics.

The provisions on the Union as one state and on the second chamber were of a fundamental nature and went beyond the framework of the scheme adopted by the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). They led to a revision of the previous views and assessments that had taken shape in the Party. We do not know whether Stalin agreed with Lenin on these issues prior to the interview. Considering the caution with which Stalin raised the question of a second chamber, one can assume that such an agreement took place. In any case, Lenin could not pass by these proposals if he did not share them. In reserve, he still had a few more days of active work, including a public speech in the Moscow City Council. And then there were still three weeks before the second stroke. Lenin did not consider it necessary to object. This circumstance gives reason to believe that Lenin agreed with Stalin. This means that the previous disagreements have been exhausted, if not completely, then on the most important issues.

It should also be taken into account that this interview, in a certain sense, set the tone for the entire work of the Commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which began its work on November 21. The commission decided that the republics

“are united into **one union state** called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (our italics - V.S.) [797].

Stalin's most important proposal, which determined the character of the USSR for decades, about the Union as one state, was accepted. Lenin was aware of the work of this commission. He met with Stalin and its other members, received letters from them, he was sent the protocols of the commission and sub commission, draft documents being prepared [798]. All the basic materials related to the preparation of the formation of the USSR continued to come to Lenin until the second stroke [799]. **There were no objections from him.**

On November 30, 1922, the Politburo heard the report of the Central Committee commission "On the Union of Republics" made by Stalin, and decided:

"The main points of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should be basically adopted, including in it at the beginning of paragraph 10 "k" "approval of the unified state budget of the USSR."

As a result, the Leninist scheme of the "Union of Equals", which could be interpreted in a wide range - from a federation with a strong central government to the most "loose" confederation - was refined, received the necessary clarity on the main issue. At this meeting, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Kalinin, Molotov, and Trotsky were present and voted for the prepared project for the formation of the USSR [800]. Lenin knew about this decision and did not object. He also knew about the results of voting at the Politburo of the draft resolutions of the X All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It was at this meeting that the Politburo instructed Lenin to send a greeting to the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets [801]. The written greeting expressed support for the desire of the republics to unite and did not contain any criticism of how and in what direction preparations were made for the formation of the USSR [802].

Further work on the preparation and holding of the congresses of the Soviets of the republics and the USSR took place without the direct participation of Lenin.

To Summarize, after the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), **Lenin never once called into question the line that Stalin**, on the basis of the decision of this Plenum, pursued on the issue of the formation of the USSR and in the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia. Having all the information about the preparations for the formation of the USSR, Lenin did not say a single word either in favor of the position of the national deviationists - members of the old Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, or against those documents on the formation of the USSR that were prepared by the Central Committee Commission under the

chairmanship of Stalin. He didn't find it necessary. In the light of the material known to us, Lenin's silence could mean only one thing - complete agreement! This means that by the time of the second stroke, mutual understanding had been established between Lenin and Stalin in matters of the formation of the USSR. All this deprives those provisions that are formulated in the notes "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization" of any support in the events of the previous time, which supposedly caused their appearance.

* Of course, Lenin received information about the development of the situation in the Communist Party of Georgia even before Mdivani's speech. So, on October 18, 1922, he received a letter from G.K. Ordzhonikidze "on Russian chauvinism" (RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 31).

** Interestingly, they chose Kamenev and Bukharin as conductors of pressure on Lenin, who, at the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), already showed a tendency to listen to them and meet their demands. Kamenev and Bukharin did not come up. Maybe they did not want to get involved in Caucasian affairs, knowing Lenin's position, or they understood that Mdivani was trying to use them in his own interests? It is significant that Mdivani and his supporters did not address Trotsky, which is obviously not accidental, since at that time he did not declare his political position on this issue. And he himself, right up to the beginning of February 1923, did not support them. At least openly.

*** At the XII Congress, Yenukidze said that at that time in Georgia they talked and wrote a lot about the ongoing G.K. Ordzhonikidze's policy as a "policy of the mord". "But really, was this policy like that? Comrade Ordzhonikidze pursued the policy of the Central Committee. According to Yenukidze, Ordzhonikidze was compliant and, in order to alleviate the situation, hindered the implementation of many orders (Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Verbatim report. April 17-25, 1923, p. 539).

**** Claire - i.e. in clear text, which allowed interception and leakage of political information.

**** So in the text.

***** There is a gap in the text.

***** There is no date on the telegram. Her outgoing number is 5940/sh. The date of October 21 is established on the basis of the outgoing number of one of the previous documents (No. 5937), registered on December 21, and the mention of Lenin's telegram (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2441. L. 1).

***** So in the text. "Ekdini is dissatisfied" - apparently, "extremely dissatisfied" (?).

***** QC - Control Commission.

Notes:

[757] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 206.

[758] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 26. L. 10–12.

[759] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 299–300.

[760] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2441. L. 1–2.

[761] Ibid. D. 2491. L. 1–1 rev.

[762] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 26. L. 20–21.

[763] Ibid.

[764] Ibid. L. 14.

[765] Ibid. Op. 1. D. 935. L. 1.

[766] Ibid. Op. 2. D. 2. L. 22–28; D. 26. L. 15–18, 20–21, 29–29v., 37–39; D. 68. L. 56; D. 102. L. 5; Op. 4. D. 1. L. 86; D. 9. L. 68, 73, 77, 78, 79, 88v.; D. 26. L. 37, 79; Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 541.

[767] See: Antonov-Ovseenko A.V. Stalin and his time // Questions of history. 1989. No. 1. S. 97; Volkogonov D.A. Stalin ... Book. 1. S. 140; Gerasimenko A. Riddles of a small note // Young Guard. 1992. #1-2. S. 236; Zhuravlev V.V., Nenarokov A.N. "Georgian Incident" // Pravda. 1988. 12 Aug.

[768] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 43-43 rev.

[769] Ibid. L. 44-44v., 60.

[770] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 246 (IV issue). S. 58.

[771] See: Antonov-Ovseenko A.V. Stalin and his time. S. 97; Nenarokov A.N., Zhuravlev V.V. Decree. op.; Tucker R. Stalin. Path to power. 1879-1929. History and personality. S. 239.

[772] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. pp. 541-542.

[773] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 71; D. 26. L. 37.

[774] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 459.

[775] Ibid. S. 603.

[776] Ibid. S. 459.

[777] Ibid. S. 463.

[778] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 77-80. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 324. L. 1, 5.

[779] Cit. by: Nenarokov A.N., Zhuravlev V.V. Decree. op.

[780] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 464-466.

[781] Ibid. S. 465.

[782] Ibid. S. 466.

[783] Ibid. S. 469.

[784] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 43–43 rev.

[785] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 471.

[786] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
Stenographer. report. pp. 541, 551.

[787] Ibid. S. 541.

[788] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 53.

[789] Ibid. Op. 1.D. 2657. L. 1, 3.

[790] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 330.

[791] Ibid. pp. 440–441.

[792] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1867.

[793] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 472.

[794] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 140.

[795] Ibid. S. 144.

[796] Ibid. S. 143.

[797] Domestic history. 1992. No. 4. S. 93.

[798] Ibid. pp. 91–106, 112–116; Source. 1993. No. 1. S. 56; Lenin V.I.
Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 462; RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 1. L. 85v.

[799] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 1.

[800] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 324. L. 4.

[801] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 469.

[802] Ibid. S. 330.

13. MYTH ABOUT LENIN'S HELP TO TROTSKY

In the system of evidence of Lenin's authorship of the "article" "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"" an important place is occupied by the story with the transfer "of it to Trotsky, as well as Lenin's letter to him dated March 5, 1923 and the transfer of a letter to him for Mdivani, Makharadze et al. (hereinafter: Mdivani's letter), on March 6.

These letters are united by a history of origin, as well as a single political position. They are dedicated to the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia and appeared, according to the traditional version, as a result of Lenin's long study of this issue and the preparation of a "bomb for Stalin" *.

The archival version of Lenin's letter to Trotsky, dated March 5, 1923 [1043], exists in one copy and is a typewritten text printed as a carbon copy ("leave")**. It has an inscription: "True: M. Volodicheva" made on a typewriter. The archive version of Lenin's letter to Mdivani (copies to Trotsky and Kamenev) is dated March 6, 1923 [1044] The letter is presented in two carbon copy copies***. There are no traces of work on the texts of the letters. Archival texts fully correspond to published ones [1045]. There are **no traces** of registration on them, there is **no registration** in the book of outgoing documents of the secretariat of V.I. Lenin [1046]. There is no information about their registration in the secretariats of Trotsky and Kamenev or about the presence in them of texts received from Lenin. **Also missing** are the envelopes in which documents were usually sent and which were returned to Lenin's secretariat with a receipt for receipt. All this makes the question of proving their belonging to Lenin relevant.

The memoirs of Trotsky, Volodicheva, Fotieva, Glyasser and Kamenev contain information about the transfer of these letters to their destination. There is not much of it, but it often repeats and **varies**, which, on the one hand, creates the illusion of a wide source base, and on the other hand, it makes it possible to reveal a lot of contradictions. In the fabricated part of the "Diary of secretaries on duty" there is an entry by Volodicheva for March 5:

"Vladimir Ilyich called about 12. He asked me to write down two letters: one to Trotsky, the other to Stalin; hand over the first personally by telephone to Trotsky and informed him of the answer as soon as possible... I felt unwell" [1047].

Doctors confirm that on March 5, Lenin once spoke with his secretaries and dictated something to Volodicheva. The same version is set forth in the so-called "Help" Volodicheva, dated March 5, 1923, which says that in response to Lenin's proposal, made on his behalf on Volodicheva's phone, Trotsky said that he could not take it upon himself to "defend the Georgian cause." And on March 6, Volodicheva wrote in the Diary of Duty Secretaries, without indicating the exact time, that Lenin called her and "asked about the answer to the first letter (the answer was taken down by phone)" [1048]. Consequently, Trotsky's answer was received by Lenin****.

So, there was one meeting with the secretary, the letter to Trotsky was read over the phone, nothing is said about its dispatch. The publishers of the Complete Works of Lenin accepted Volodicheva's version and accompanied the text with the following explanations:

"Dictated by telephone on March 5, 1923." and "Printed from a typewritten copy" [1049].

On March 6, Volodicheva, according to her, wrote down a letter for Mdivani [1050]. An important role in substantiating the Lenin's authorship of this letter belongs to the entry in the Diary of Doctors on Duty, which records Lenin's dictation to Volodicheva on the morning of March 6, "a few words, only 1 1/2 lines." There is nothing similar in the previous records of doctors - no one calculated the lines of Lenin's letters and notes. **Why such precision?** Previously, as a rule, they did not even indicate the topics of dictations; at best, sometimes they did not fix their duration very clearly. And how did they get such accurate information? Have you seen the recording? Were they shown a secret document? Hardly. Or were they looking over Volodicheva's shoulder? It's hard to believe they were allowed to. For some reason, an insignificant detail turns out to be necessary when they talk about Lenin dictating Mdivani's letter. One way or another, but perhaps Lenin really dictated something that fit into two lines. But what is

important for us is that this record of the doctors destroys Volodicheva's version of Lenin dictating a letter to her for Mdivani and others, which in printed form takes 4-5 lines. Trotsky also testifies against the identification of the dictation recorded by the doctors with the letter for Mdivani, who wrote that on "the last day before Lenin's second decisive illness", i.e. March 5, received a letter from Lenin to hand over to Mdivani [1051].

The question arises: how could he get a letter that has not yet been written? One of them - Trotsky or Volodicheva (perhaps both) - is telling lies. You can't take Volodicheva's word for it, Trotsky even more so. Without limiting himself to the story of the receipt of the still unwritten letter (it is dated March 6), Trotsky states that the handover of the notes "On the Question of Nationalities ..." took place two days before "the situation of Comrade Lenin worsened", therefore, approximately March 2-3. And the handover of the letter for Mdivani took place on March 5th. In his "Letter to Eastpart" he, contradicting himself, asserts that the notes on the national question and the letter for Mdivani were given to him on the same day.

Obviously, noticing this "overlay", Trotsky in his memoirs "My Life" corrects the situation - he dates the delivery of the letter for Mdivani to March 6 [1052].

An analysis of the content of these letters only **reinforces doubts** about their Lenin's authorship.

In a letter to Trotsky dated March 5, its Author "very much" asks him "to take upon himself the defense of the Georgian case on the Central Committee of the Party", since it is under the "persecution of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky", on whose impartiality the Author of the letter could not rely - "even quite the opposite". Trotsky's consent meant for him the opportunity to "be calm." In case of disagreement, the author asked to return "the whole file"[1053].

Judging by the text of the letter, it is an accompaniment to this "whole business" sent to Trotsky. Volodicheva, in Spravka, which records this conversation****, recorded that she had read a letter to Trotsky over

the phone, he "asked me to send him materials (if no one needs them) for review." An agreement was reached, and at the end of the "information" it is reported:

"Materials with a letter from Vladimir Ilyich will be sent to him today" [1054].

This entry is important for traditional historiography, as it is used as documentary evidence confirming the stories of Trotsky and Fotieva about the transfer of Lenin's notes to him "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"".

But it is difficult to imagine these notes as "the whole thing", especially since, according to Trotsky, the condition for handing it over was the prohibition to show it to anyone [1055]. "The whole thing", on the contrary, should have been used by him. In addition, Trotsky in April 1923 **denied** receiving this "case", but spoke of sending him "notes "On the question of nationalities ..."[1056].

Consequently, he himself claims that this entry by Volodicheva is not evidence that Lenin's dictation on the national question was sent to him. So, the documents of the Leninist secretariat do not confirm the fact that notes on the national question were handed over to Trotsky.

The incomprehensible story with "the whole thing" ***** cannot be attributed to poor wording or a defect in the recording. It finds its continuation in a letter to Mdivani, which says:

"I follow your case with all my heart. Outraged by the rudeness of Ordzhonikidze and the indulgence of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I'm preparing notes and a speech for you."

This phrase provides arguments in favor of the assumption that the letters of March 5 and 6 to Trotsky and Mdivani **do not belong to Lenin**. Lenin's state of health at the beginning of March precluded his work on "notes" and "speech"*****. We have to reject the assumption that we are talking about a document that was prepared by the "Leninist Commission": they can hardly be characterized as

"notes", especially since there is nothing resembling a "speech" in them.

Finally, it is impossible without argument to correlate with Lenin the statement that the most important question of changing the leadership of the Communist Party of Georgia and the formation of the USSR is "your business", i.e. the case of Mdivani, Makharadze and others. The same should be said about the story of the assault on Ordzhonikidze.

All this makes it impossible to accept on faith the Leninist authorship of the letters to Trotsky, as well as Mdivani. It is impossible to prove it on the available material. This gives us the right to consider these **letters as not belonging to V.I. Lenin.**

It would seem that a simple matter is to pass a letter or text of an article from hand to hand. But here, too, the participants in this story are confused in the testimony, they contradict each other and themselves.

Volodicheva records only one - her own - contact with Trotsky: she handed over the text of the letter to Trotsky by phone and took shorthand of his answer [1057].

Volodicheva does not say anything about the fact that the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"" were handed over to Trotsky, as well as about Fotieva's participation in contacts with Trotsky about letters and "notes". And Fotieva herself "in hot pursuit" of these events - in letters to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on April 16, 1923 - talking about sending Trotsky notes "On the question of nationalities or about "autonomization"", she also did not say anything about her participation in contacts between Lenin and Trotsky on March 5-6. Consequently, the only clerical document of the Leninist secretariat devoted to contacts with Trotsky testifies that Trotsky did not receive the text of Lenin's letter from the Leninist secretariat. Or, at least, does not confirm this transfer.

Only Fotieva and Trotsky testify to the fact that letters and notes on the national question were sent to Trotsky. But their evidence is full of

contradictions. Fotieva in a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated April 16, 1923, for the first time informing the Central Committee of the party about the existence of these notes (she called them an article), uses a very vague wording: "the article" "was communicated to Comrade Trotsky" [1058].

What does "reported" mean? Read out? Given for reading? She also does not indicate the exact time of the "message". Trotsky on the same day, in a letter to the Central Committee, on the contrary, definitely states that on March 5, 1923, he negotiated with Lenin through Fotieva and from her he received the text dictated by Lenin on December 30, 1922. [1059] But even after Trotsky's direct instructions about the time and the fact of the transmission of Lenin's article to him, Fotieva, in the course of the ensuing correspondence, never confirmed either the time of transmission (March 5) or her involvement in this act [1060].

Later, Trotsky, speaking about this story, kept silent about any contacts with Volodicheva regarding Lenin's orders and worked out the version of mediation in his contacts with Lenin on March 5-6, Fotieva and Glyasser. One of them (from the context it can be understood that it was Fotieva) brought a letter addressed to him from Lenin. Having received the letter, Trotsky suggested:

"shouldn't you show" this letter to Kamenev? Fotieva replied: "I don't know ... but I can ask him." "A few minutes later she came back saying, 'No way.'"

Consequently, on March 5, Fotiyeva had a second meeting with Lenin shortly after the first, which contradicts the doctors' records, which rule out a second meeting between Lenin and the secretaries shortly after the first [1061]*****.

But this is not enough for Trotsky, he claims that having conveyed this instruction from Lenin to him, Fotieva left, "however, after a few minutes, or maybe half an hour, Fotieva came from Vladimir Ilyich with a new version. According to her, Vladimir Ilyich decided to act immediately and wrote (**wrote again** ! - BC) ... a note to Mdivani and Makharadze with a copy of it handed over to Kamenev and me

"[1062]. Thus, Trotsky declares that there was a third meeting between Lenin and Fotieva, that Lenin wrote a letter on that day and had in his hands a text written by Lenin on March 5! There is something to be surprised. At the same time, Trotsky begins to get confused: he began the story about March 5, and ends on the 6th, **since** Mdivani's letter is dated on this date.

The same version, but more extensive, with a mass of details that make it even easier to analyze, is repeated in the autobiography of L.D. Trotsky "My Life"[1063].

According to her, Fotieva and Glyasser no longer act simply as messengers, but as a constantly and long-functioning channel of communication between Lenin and Trotsky. Moreover, **they acted as political advisers to Lenin*******, suggesting to him moves and exits in the inner-party struggle, measures that must be taken to fight Stalin. And Lenin willingly accepted their political advice, or rather, is **guided by them**. At the same time, the political sympathies of the secretaries are completely on the side of Trotsky, which, apparently, is true for this period.

Everything becomes more "solid". Fotiyeva's first short absence from Trotsky's apartment for a question to Lenin turns into a 15-minute one, and the second - in the hour. Lenin's letter, which he showed Kamenev, **turns into** "Lenin's manuscripts", and the meeting itself takes place on March 5, so Kamenev also reads Lenin's handwritten letter, dictated, according to Volodicheva, to her only the next day. Interestingly, Trotsky did not say a word about Lenin's handing over to him of the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"".

In general, there is much less clarity with the transfer of these notes to Trotsky than even with the transfer of letters to him, although there is no clarity with them either. Neither Fotiyev nor Volodichev tell **anything definite** about the circumstances of the transfer of the article to Trotsky. It is not known who handed it over, under what circumstances it was handed over.

It may be said that Kamenev, who met with Trotsky and saw his notes on the national question, testifies in favor of this story. This is a serious argument, and it should be considered separately.

We note right away that Kamenev, speaking in a letter to the Central Committee dated April 16, 1923, about this meeting with Trotsky *****, firstly, did not say anything about Lenin's letters to Trotsky and Mdivani, but in secondly, he attributed it to a later time ("it was, in my opinion, already when Vladimir Ilyich was **deprived of** the opportunity to give new orders") [1064], i.e. he excludes that the conversation with Trotsky took place on March 5, and claims that Trotsky showed him the article after March 6-7*****, and possibly **even after March 10**, 1923, when Lenin couldn't confirm or deny anything.

Consequently, Kamenev, while confirming the very fact of Trotsky's informing him of the existence of Lenin's notes "On the Question of Nationalities...", does not confirm exactly the date Trotsky insists on - March 5, 1923, which is important to him, obviously because that after it no business contacts with Lenin were any longer possible.

The very fact that Lenin's letter to Mdivani existed at that time is beyond doubt. It was known to Stalin, who informed Ordzhonikidze about it on March 7, 1923 [1065] However, this is not enough to recognize it as a Lenin's document, since Kamenev and Stalin did not witness Lenin's dictation.

Both letters (March 5 and 6, 1923) were sent on April 17, 1923 by Trotsky to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) [1066], which, at his request, sent them to all members of the Central Committee. They were also sent to Lenin. Thus, the **only trace** of the passage of these letters through the Leninist secretariat is the texts received by the Central Committee of the party from Trotsky.

All of the above leads us to the conclusion that there is no direct and reliable evidence that Lenin sent Trotsky the "article" "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"", as well as letters dated March 5 and 6, 1923 (to Trotsky and Mdivani). Without

exception, all indirect evidence carries extremely **contradictory** information. The circumstances of the inclusion of these documents in political use not only do not remove doubts about Lenin's authorship, but even strengthen them.

* For the first time this wording ("a bomb for Stalin"), it seems, was introduced into political circulation by Trotsky **in 1927** in his "Letter to the Eastpart of the VK VKP(b)". He assured that the secretaries "most often" repeated "the expression of Lenin himself": "Vladimir Ilyich is preparing a bomb against Stalin" (Trotsky L. Letter to the Eastpart of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks .. (On the falsification of the history of the October Revolution, the history of the revolution and the history of the party) // Stalin's school of falsifications. Corrections and additions to the literature of epigones. Berlin, 1932. P. 87).

** It differs from the published one in that in the original after the address "Trotsky" there is a comma, and not an exclamation point (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch. Vol. 54, p. 329).

*** According to historical legend, there should have been **5 copies** of the letter in total: two remained in the Lenin archive, one was sent to Mdivani and others, and two more to Trotsky and Kamenev). However, none of the addressees ever presented the originals of the letter.

**** Verbatim record is either unavailable or missing.

***** The original of Volodicheva's "Information" (typewritten text without a signature) dated March 5, 1923 has no traces of registration (RGASPI. F. 35. Op. 2. D. 34. L. 3). Lenin's letter to Trotsky of March 5 and Volodicheva's "Reference" (addendum to this letter) were registered as a document included in the Lenin secretariat only on June 15, 1923 (No. 16/12) (RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D 34. L. 15; Inv. 4. D. 11. L. 89). It is interesting that at the same time (under the same number) the notes "On the Question of Nationalities ..." received by the Lenin Secretariat were registered. All these documents were received as an annex to Trotsky's letter of April 16, 1923 (RGASPI.F. 5. List 2, file 34,

pages 7–14, List 4, file 11, L, 89, Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1991, No 9, page 58).

***** As "the whole thing", perhaps, the materials developed by the "commission" could appear. Trotsky says so in his memoirs . But in the documents of the Leninist secretariat there is no information about their transfer to Trotsky, and these materials in themselves could not be of any interest to Trotsky, since all the information collected in them was not new to the members of the Politburo.

***** "I watch with my soul" is something new for Lenin.

***** D. Volkogonov, who had access to Lenin's materials inaccessible to other researchers, definitely declares that he does not know the text of the "notes and speech" referred to in this letter (Volkogonov D.A. Stalin. Political Portrait, Moscow, 1991, book 1, p. 142).

***** Only in the evening of this day does the later insertion into the "Diary of Duty Secretaries" clearly refer to information about the second summons of Fotieva with her name, unusual for this document and those years, "L.A. Fotieva".

***** Quite in the spirit of the documents prepared by them as members of the "commission" to study the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia.

***** It is clear from Trotsky's memoirs and Kamenev's letters that at that time (immediately or shortly after Lenin's third stroke) they had only one meeting.

***** According to Kamenev's letter to Zinoviev dated March 7, on that day he was to leave for Tiflis for the Second Congress of the KKE. On March 8, Kamenev did not attend the meeting of the Politburo. The Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia has been working since March 12. On March 17, 1923, Kamenev was already in Moscow (News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. P. 150; Volkogonov D. A. Lenin. Political portrait. Book 2. P. 347).

Notes:

[1043] RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 25737. L. 1.

[1044] Ibid. D. 25738. L. 1, 2.

[1045] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 329, 330.

[1046] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 1, 10, 11.

[1047] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 486.

[1048] Ibid.; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 149.

[1049] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 229.

[1050] Ibid. T. 45. S. 486.

[1051] Trotsky L. Letter to the Eastpart of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. (On the falsification of the history of the October Revolution, the history of the revolution and the history of the party) // Stalin's school of falsifications. S. 83.

[1052] Ibid.; Trotsky L. My life. Autobiographical experience. T. 2. S. 220-221.

[1053] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 329.

[1054] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 149.

[1055] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. P. 160.

[1056] Ibid. No. 9, pp. 160–161.

[1057] Ibid. S. 149.

[1058] Ibid. S. 156.

[1059] Ibid. pp. 158, 160; No. 10. S. 172.

[1060] Ibid. No. 9, pp. 155–162.

[1061] Ibid. S. 108.

[1062] Trotsky L. Letter to the Eastpart of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. S. 83.

[1063] He is . My life. Autobiographical experience. T. 2. S. 220-225.

[1064] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 157.

[1065] Ibid. pp. 151–152 .

14. OUTLINES OF TROTSKY'S NEW TACTICS

In the course of preparations for the 12th Congress, in the context of Lenin's ongoing illness, the question of leadership in the party came to the fore. It seemed the time had come for "Leader No. 2" - Trotsky - to move into first place. But Stalin* was already standing in his way. Attacking him as a supporter of Lenin is a hopeless exercise since a direct attack on Lenin has repeatedly demonstrated its inconsistency. The experience of the pre-Congress discussion on questions of the reorganization of the system of administration of the national economy, the place and role of the RCP(b) in solving economic problems, and the reorganization of the party's central organs showed this with all clarity. In order to count on success in the struggle for leadership, it was necessary to go to the party congress not as beaten, but as a winner. At the same time, it was necessary to weaken the political positions of their main opponent and rival, Stalin. The first task was easy. It was enough to organize an "advertising" campaign. And he started.

It began immediately, as V.I. Lenin suffered a third stroke, which put an end to the remnants of hopes for any kind of return to his former political activity. The party faced situations of choosing a new leader.

The most striking manifestation of this advertisement, which not only promoted Trotsky, but also pushed Lenin as the leader of the Great October Socialist Revolution into the background, was K. Radek's article "Leo Trotsky - the organizer of victory", published in the newspaper Pravda on March 14, 1923, as well as a series of articles by Trotsky under the general title "On the Party"**, also published in Pravda. In Radek's article, practically all aspects of the activity of the Soviet government were assessed extremely low. In particular, they pointed to the unsatisfactory situation in the field of diplomacy (here, a clear contrast with the assessments contained in Lenin's article "How do we reorganize the Workers' Committee"). On the front of economic construction, in Radek's opinion, the situation was beyond all criticism. The only bright spot seemed to be the work of the military department, in which all achievements were associated with the name of Trotsky and the laurels of all past victories were given to him:

"And what we did really well is the Red Army. Its creator, its strong-willed center is Comrade. L.D. Trotsky": he is also "the first leader, the first organizer of the first army of the proletariat!". Its construction "expressed the organizational genius of Trotsky, the wisdom of his thought."

"Only a man like Trotsky", Radek assured,

"could become the standard-bearer of the armed working people. He was all rolled into one."

In it there was a "unification of a strategist and military organizer with a politician." Radek assured that it was

"Trotsky who, with the help of the entire apparatus of our Party, managed to inspire the peasant army", "that it is fighting for its own interests". True, from this fame and merit something fell into the hands of the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky would not have accomplished his mission "but without him, the creation of the Red Army and its victory would have required many times more victims," so if the RCP goes down in history as the creator of the Red Army, then inextricably linked with the name of Trotsky [1374] .

We must agree with N. Valentinov, who considered this article to be evidence that Trotsky and Co., are making demands on the authorities:

"Radek hinted clearly: Lenin is gone and only Trotsky can replace him"[1375].

Let us only clarify that Trotsky also hinted this in his articles. "On the Party", the first of one appeared on the same day as the article by K. Radek, in the issue dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the Bolshevik Party appeared. Banal in content, not giving any solutions to the problems raised, at the same time it presented its author as a person capable of understanding and solving the most important questions of the development of the party and ensuring the implementation of a

correct policy. For us, it is interesting only because in it Trotsky decided to publicly address the issue in which he had previously, as a rule, not interfered - in the affairs of the party. And this is understandable, because now he was fighting for leadership in the party. As long as Lenin, its creator and leader was, working, there was no point for Trotsky to invade this area. Now the situation has changed. One could not become a party leader without demonstrating one's knowledge of its problems and how to solve them.

Both articles, Radek's and Trotsky's, complemented each other, so their appearance in Pravda in the same issue can hardly be considered accidental. Radek's article seemed to say to the reader that all the most important things worthy of attention and memory in the past of our revolution are connected exclusively with Trotsky.

Trotsky's own articles inspired the idea that he knew what and how to do in the future. Both articles appeared on the day when, by decision of the Politburo, the first bulletin on Lenin's illness was published in Pravda. For the party, the seriousness of Lenin's illness became apparent only now. This is evidenced not so much by the bulletin as by the telegram (obviously circular), which Stalin, on behalf of the Politburo, sent on March 14 to Tiflis G. K. Ordzhonikidze:

"The current state of health of comrade LENIN entails, in the opinion of doctors, his long non-participation in leadership work. The temporary absence of Comrade Lenin can create complications in the country, the seriousness of which must be taken into account by the party with all care. [1376].

According to N. Valentinov, the notification of the country and the party about the sharp deterioration in Lenin's health led the masses to the realization of the fact that "Lenin can no longer be the leader and leader of the state. In the light of this fact, the whole political situation changes" [1377]. Under these conditions, readers of Radek's and Trotsky's articles must have had the idea or affirmation that the future must be connected with Trotsky, and only with Trotsky.

One way or another, Trotsky thought, of course, we do not know, but the steps taken by him since the end of December 1922 indicate that he began to work on creating his new image - a like-minded and ally of Lenin, who defended his political course from those who were considered his closest associate in the party - Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev.

When and how a new tactic appeared, we also do not know, but nevertheless we can talk about it with confidence, since it left its mark on the documents. These are, first, Trotsky's attempts, noted above, to portray his relationship with Lenin in a new light; secondly, attempts to present himself as Lenin's like-minded on those issues on which an irreconcilable struggle was waged between them; thirdly, they reveal themselves in the involvement and (or) interest of Trotsky in the introduction into the political life of the party and the country of those texts of the Testament, the authorship of Lenin which cannot be considered proven; fourthly, in the coincidence of Trotsky's views with the views of the author of these texts.

Lenin "beat" Lenin and his supporters! This is not fiction, but the reality of Trotsky's actions.

For the first time, he used this technique to fight the Leninist system of managing the national economy at the end of 1922. In 1921-192. Trotsky, as shown above, did not show any concern for Lenin and, characterizing his work, emphasized real or imagined shortcomings or miscalculations in it. The situation suddenly changed at the end of December 1922. In a letter to the members of the Central Committee dated December 24, Trotsky expressed regret about Lenin's loss of health, for which, however, he immediately reproached him, emphasizing his previous criticism of him:

"The connection of these uncoordinated, uncoordinated central institutions with each other and with the Central Committee was achieved through the personal mediation of Comrade Lenin. This provided protection from major errors. But this result was achieved by the personal efforts of Comrade Lenin, aimed at mastering all the details and

particular questions that did not go through the correct system of institutions, were not worked out and unprepared.

I think that one of the reasons for the extreme overwork of Comrade. Lenin was the wrong organization of the work of the central economic institutions. Meanwhile, the binding and unifying personal role of Comrade Lenin, which in most cases ensured us from major mistakes, did not at all free us and could not free us from private inconsistencies ... Under the current situation, when Comrade Lenin's working time must be strictly limited, it is more necessary to replace the personal connection with the right organizational connection. In order for the general economic leadership to remain in the hands of the Central Committee, primarily Comrade Lenin, a correct system of day-to-day functioning institutions directing the economy is necessary" (see Appendix No. 4).

From a historical perspective, the letter signifies that Trotsky has begun to rehearse a new role for himself - the caring for comrade Lenin. In accordance with this, the arguments of their own proposals were also given. They were no longer simply opposed to Lenin's proposals as fundamentally wrong, unsuitable, and dangerous for the revolution. They were now presented as measures necessary to compensate for the losses caused by Lenin's withdrawal from practical work***.

Trotsky's sharp turn could mean one thing - a tactical step, pursuing the goal of demonstrating his caring comradely attitude towards him. Formerly it was to Trotsky's advantage to emphasize shortcomings and to attribute mistakes and difficulties to Lenin. Now the situation has changed - Lenin retired. And now Trotsky is already asserting that in order to partially replace Lenin, a serious reorganization is required not only of the highest bodies of management of the national economy, but of the entire management system. In the context of the letter, these insincere praises of Lenin's ability to manage the economy are needed by Trotsky only as a way to re-raise the question of the State Planning Commission, to make a new application for resolving this issue according to his own variant. To use Lenin as an argument in favor of the destruction of the system of proletarian dictatorship

and management of the national economy that he created, as a new and strongest argument (others no longer "work") in favor of his, Trotsky's, proposals.

There is no need to talk about the moral and ethical side of this method.

From that time on, Trotsky began to systematically praise Lenin, contrast him with supporters in the Central Committee and the party, and present himself as the spokesman and defender of his interests, his cause and heritage.

However, Trotsky was not going to dress up in the toga of Lenin's "companion". He begins to work out a version that represents him as an ally of fundamental importance to Lenin, who always turned out to be right in controversial issues. Trotsky is trying to present Lenin as the initiator of the creation of a political alliance, with its edge directed against the Leninist majority of the Central Committee and the Politburo, primarily against Stalin.

It was shown above that the political relations between Lenin and Trotsky after the transition to the NEP were very complex and tense. Therefore, Trotsky's attempt to "grab" Lenin - his main political opponent - in order to fight his supporters, in our opinion, testifies not to the consciousness of his own political strength, but to the understanding of his political weakness. It is not surprising, therefore, that he eventually lost this phase of the struggle, as well as the previous ones. The new tactics did not save him from political defeat.

New opportunities for the use of this tactic were revealed by the history of the January 1923 discussion in the Politburo of the issue of publishing the article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin", which was mentioned above. At the time when the members of the Politburo were gathering and by ear (the text was read by Kamenev) they got acquainted with the text of the article, expressed surprise at some of its provisions, especially in connection with the indication of the danger of a split, Kuibyshev suggested that Lenin's illness "reflected" on his article and suggested that, in order to calm Lenin down, a

single copy of the newspaper with his article [1378] should be printed especially for him.

This discussion showed that the Politburo found itself in a difficult situation: on the one hand, Lenin dictates something, on the other hand, there is no contact with him and it is impossible to ask him about this or that position formulated by him, which causes misunderstanding. It is impossible to check the very fact of dictation and the correctness of the recording.

There was a potential possibility of falsification of "Lenin's will". But it did not immediately become a reality. Only a month and a half later, after the third stroke, which finally deprived Lenin of the gift of speech, it became possible to speak on behalf of Lenin. Is it a coincidence that all the documents whose **Lenin's authorship cannot be confirmed** appeared after this date?

Shortly after the third stroke, and in direct connection with it, Lenin's "dictation" "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"" first appeared, as well as Lenin's letters to Trotsky (March 5), Mdivani and others (March 6). These documents were devoted to criticism of Stalin and the course pursued by the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in matters of building the USSR. Obviously, this is not accidental, since the continued stubborn opposition to the process of building the USSR made it possible, firstly, to give the conflict in the CP of Georgia the character of a principled struggle on issues fundamental to Marxism, which it did not have.

Secondly, put Stalin in the center of the conflict and sharpen the blow personally against him. Thirdly, to use a strong trump card on our side - the well-known disagreement between Stalin and Lenin on the issue of the formation of the USSR, which took place in September 1922. Fourthly, take advantage of the lack of unity among Lenin's supporters on this issue. Fifthly, to get a lot of allies in the person of national deviationists. Finally, it served as the basis for political generalizations designed to prove the failure of Stalin as the leader of the party.

Shortly after the 12th Party Congress, "characteristics" and an "addition" to them surfaced from the depths of the Leninist secretariat, long before the XIII Congress of the RCP (b), to which they are believed to have been intended. Trotsky and his supporters were the political force that most benefited from their appearance and most of all tried to give them wide publicity.

The decisions of the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR did not stop the discussions and the sharp struggle on the problem of the unification of the republics, but only transferred it into a new direction. For the supporters of the federation as one state with a strong center, they provided a good basis for ensuring the accepted course. Their opponents tried to achieve their goals by redistributing power between the federation and the republics during the preparation of the Constitution, using the inevitable difficulties in the process of unification of the republics. In the party and state leadership of the autonomous republics of the RSFSR, a desire immediately arose to liquidate the RSFSR, and to turn the autonomous republics into union ones. What happened was what Stalin warned Lenin about in a letter on September 27, 1922:

Lenin's proposal "should lead to the mandatory creation of a Russian Central Executive Committee with the exclusion of eight autonomous republics ... that are part of the RSFSR, to declaring the latter independent along with Ukraine and other independent republics" [1379].

On December 25, 1922, 31 representatives of the autonomous republics and regions - delegates to the X Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR sent a letter to Stalin in the Central Committee, in which they supported the idea of forming the USSR and proposed creating such a union in which the autonomous republics and regions would be equalized in rights with the union republics " in the general federation of the SSR. They proposed to introduce representatives of all autonomous units into the allied CEC [1380].

The situation was aggravated by the contradictions that existed in the group of Leninists. The leaders of the Georgian national deviationists

tried to aggravate the conflict to the utmost in order to force the Central Committee to make concessions. Their hopes were fed by the position taken by a number of authoritative members of the party leadership - Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin. The telegram of G.K. Ordzhonikidze sent from Tiflis to Rostov-on-Don by K.E. Voroshilov and A.I. Mikoyan. Informing them that Zinoviev was coming to see them, Ordzhonikidze wrote:

“He apparently gives in to the deviators a little, but more than him is Kamenev, who gives various advice to the deviators. I spoke with Zinoviev. Talk to both of you. Any attempt by them at the moment will not give them anything, and will turn our comrades against Kamenev and split the Transcaucasian delegation at the party congress” [1381] ****.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that that Lenin, due to the aggravation of his illness, did not have time to speak publicly about the decisions taken by the December (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR. All this created conditions for the revision of the decisions taken on the formation of the USSR with the hope of success.

A new phase of the struggle took place within the framework of the pre-Congress discussion before the 12th Party Congress. At this time, the Central Committee of the party made significant efforts to remove the sharpness of the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia. On December 21, 1922, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), following the discussion of the report of the Dzerzhinsky commission, decided to approve the conclusion presented by it and recognize it as inappropriate to leave Makharadze, Mdivani, Kavtaradze and Tsintsadze in Georgia, recalling them to the disposal of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) *****.

The conclusion of the Dzerzhinsky commission was edited and approved by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on January 13, 1923, after which it was submitted to the Politburo [1382]. A copy of the "Conclusion" was sent to Lenin. Whether Lenin was acquainted with it is unknown. On January 18, the

Politburo (Kamenev, Rykov, Stalin, Trotsky, Tomsky) decided to postpone its discussion for a week, "providing Comrades. Mdivani and Kavtaradze the opportunity to get acquainted with the materials of the commission"[1383].

This fact shows the groundlessness of the assertion that Stalin forced the discussion of the report of the Dzerzhinsky commission[1384]. On January 25, 1923, the Politburo (Stalin, Trotsky ***** , Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, Kalinin, Tomsky with the participation of invited members of the Mickiewicz-Kapsuskas commission, as well as Mdivani and Kavtaradze [1385]) considered the "Conclusion" of the Dzerzhinsky commission , which said:

"The political line, carried out first by the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP, and then by the Zakkraykom, and in particular comrade Ordzhonikidze, fully met the directives of the Central Committee of the RCP and was quite correct. Caucasus Bureau and Zakkraykom, following the directives of the Central Committee of the RCP, in particular comrade Lenin, taking into account the special conditions of the Transcaucasian Republics, especially Georgia, quite deliberately made some temporary concessions in relation to the nationalist-minded masses and intelligentsia, but at the same time they fought against those Georgian communists who, having embarked on the path of concessions, themselves succumbed to the pressure of the onslaught of petty-bourgeois nationalism and made a fetish of the tactics of concessions. *****.

The Central Committee of the KKE of the old composition, "in words accepting this association, in fact resisted it with all its might" for a year and a half. The commission found that "the accusations of the Zakkraykom, in particular Comrade. Ordzhonikidze [that], allegedly, he applied the tactics of war communism, hastily, from above, completely disregarding local party organizations, without preparing public opinion, pursued a line that often did not coincide with the line of the

Central Committee of the RCP, or did not have a line at all, does not correspond reality."

The accusations of the Zakkraykom and the new composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia of "Russian typism", insufficient attention to the national question in Georgia, etc. were rejected. The "Conclusion" contained a specific criticism of the actions of the old composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia in the field of national policy, noted the weakness in the organization of party work in Georgia, nepotism, communication between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, etc. "Taking all this into account," the commission recognized that "Zakkraykom, on the whole, did the right thing in fighting against the line of the Central Committee [of Georgia] of the old composition, accepting his resignation and nominating such a composition of the [Georgia] Central Committee, which, striving to come closer to the broad workers and peasant masses will certainly follow the line of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the Zakkraykom. At the same time, the commission stated that the new composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia is pursuing the correct policy.

As for Ordzhonikidze, the commission assessed him as "quite suitable for the responsible work that he has to do in the Transcaucasus. Comrade's accusations. Ordzhonikidze in intrigue, adventurism, careerism, settling personal scores, etc., the commission resolutely rejects" [1386].

The Politburo approved the change in the composition of the Central Committee of the KKE and the Soviet institutions of the republic, as well as the decision of the Orgburo of December 21, 1922[1387] Following this, the Politburo discussed an informative letter for provincial and regional committees with information about the conflict in the Georgian Communist Party. Trotsky did not vote for it.

Bukharin and Zinoviev abstained; Tomsky voted against. "For" votes were by Stalin, Molotov, Rykov and Kalinin[1388].

Information about the decisions taken was sent to Lenin. At the same meeting, the Politburo considered the application of Fotieva, Glyasser and Gorbunov on the issuance of the materials of the Georgian commission to them for study on the instructions of Comrade Lenin and decided:

"To allow the Secretariat of the Central Committee to issue materials ... the issue of reporting the results to Lenin should be postponed until the conclusion of prof. Foerster"[1389].

On the same day, January 25, 1923, The secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) considered the issue of the disappearance of the cipher telegram of Lenin and Stalin from the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia to the Central Committee of the KKE (old composition) and the transfer of the secret report of Makharadze abroad, to the editors of the Menshevik journal Socialist Vestnik. Materials about this were sent to Lenin [1390]*****.

The decisions of the Politburo on January 25, 1923 indicated that by the end of January a certain opposition had been overcome among the members of the Leninist group of the Politburo. Although for different reasons, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev advocated finding a compromise between the warring parties. The center of gravity of the struggle over the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia shifted to the republic itself, where the 2nd Congress of the KKE was being prepared. But here, too, events developed in such a way that they contributed to the weakening of the contradictions within the Leninist group.

On February 21, the party conference of the Tiflis organization of the KKE opened, in which 250 delegates participated. During the discussion, no one spoke out in support of the deviators., and during the voting, except for 5 abstentions, all supported the line of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).

"The mood of the conference is firm and calm," G.K. Ordzhonikidze to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and Lenin[1391].

The deviators tried to present the matter in such a way that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) supported them, but, of course, they could not support this statement with any arguments. Was it not this circumstance that contributed to the appearance of the supposedly Leninist letter to Mdivani, Makharadze and others?*****

Under these conditions, Stalin was of the opinion that it was necessary to reach a compromise with those who supported Mdivani. This compliance in traditional historiography is associated with the fact that after Stalin learned from Kamenev on March 7 about Lenin's intention to oppose him in support of the national deviationists, he was in disarray. **This is not so**, since even before that, on March 1, 1923, Stalin, having discussed with Kamenev the current situation and Kamenev's line of conduct at the congress of the KKE (he, together with Kuibyshev, was to attend this congress as a representative of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)), sent a telegram to Ordzhonikidze:

"Don't place any pressure on the will of the majority of the Communist Party of Georgia to the Zakkraykom, let this will, finally, be fully manifested, whatever it may be." The task was to "achieve a compromise, such a compromise, which can be carried out without brute pressure on the majority of responsible officials in Georgia, i.e. compromise natural, voluntary" [1392].

At the same time, Trotsky informs Kamenev about the receipt of Lenin's letter with a request to support the Georgian national deviators, and Kamenev himself receives Lenin's letter to pass on to Mdivani and others. The appearance of the letters can be regarded as a means of putting pressure on Kamenev in order to **disrupt the impending compromise**. Obviously, this attempt did not bring about the expected effect*****.

At this stage, when the Georgian national deviators suffered defeat after defeat, Trotsky openly entered the struggle on their side, and this immediately breathed a "second life" into it and gave it a new edge. Trotsky, who did not think of the proletarian revolution except on a world scale, was indifferent to the national interests of the national deviationists. This circumstance makes it possible to understand both the reason for the explosion of Trotsky's activity in the discussion of the national question on the eve of the 12th Party Congress, and its peculiarity - an interest exclusively in the conflict in the KKE. The reasons for this sudden and purposeful activity, I think, was that the conflict turned out to be very convenient for launching an attack against Stalin and launching a struggle for leadership in the party. Trotsky needed him only as a "starter" to launch a new attack against the Central Committee, and first of all personally against Stalin.

Obviously, it is no coincidence that it was precisely on March 6-7 and in the days following them that Trotsky became more active in matters of nation-state building (this will be discussed in the next paragraph).

The change was so striking that it was immediately noted in the party [1393]. Moreover, it happened not in fundamental problems, where it was difficult to "warm one's hands" and strike at Stalin—principal decisions had already been made and Stalin was protected by them—but in issues related to the conflict in the Georgian Communist Party, where questions of principle were closely intertwined with personal conflict, there were mistakes, excesses, etc., where it was possible to "unwind" them into a major political problem, update it, under the guise of correcting mistakes, demand an adjustment of the political course, personnel changes, etc., where the opportunity arose, criticizing Ordzhonikidze to beat Stalin.

On March 6, 1923, Trotsky sent to the Politburo his amendments to Stalin's theses on the national question, the main of which was to indicate the presence of two deviations in the party: Great Russian and nationalist, the conflict between which leads to factional struggle. At the same time, it was emphasized that the bias towards nationalism is a reaction to manifestations of great power [1394]. Stalin replied to Trotsky (in a letter to all members of the Politburo):

"Your amendments to the theses of comrade Stalin on the national question I consider to be undisputable and entirely coinciding with the main tone of these theses. "[1395]

The justification of nationalism by great-power chauvinism is a characteristic feature of the tactics used by the Georgian national deviationists. Trotsky's defense of the Georgian national deviators turned out to be directly connected not only with the condemnation of certain actions of Ordzhonikidze or the Secretariat of the Central Committee, but also with an attack on one of the basic principles on which the USSR was based *****.

In full agreement with Mdivani and his supporters, Trotsky began to attack the ZFSR. He believed that the Transcaucasian Federation "represents a distortion of the Soviet federation in the sense of excessive centralism," that Mdivani's supporters "do not represent a 'deviation' from the party line on the national question," and explained their speeches as a reaction "against the wrong policy of comrade Ordzhonikidze", whom he proposed to recall from the Zakkraykom [1396]*****.

These proposals and assessments immediately revealed **Trotsky's confrontation with Lenin**, who proposed the idea of the ZFSR and defended it in October 1922 against encroachment on it precisely by Mdivani and his supporters. Thus, Trotsky found himself in the same ranks as the opponents of a federation with a strong center, in other words, he declared himself to be an **opponent of the USSR**, created on the basis of the scheme proposed by Lenin.

One can see in Trotsky's actions the desire to bring the issue of the conflict in the KKE to a higher political orbit, which is quite consistent with the attitude that the members of the "Commission of the Council of People's Commissars" formulated in one of the first versions of the document they were preparing:

"Comrades from the old composition of the Central Committee of Georgia incorrectly raise the issue and weaken their position when they say that they have no fundamental

disagreements with the Zakkraykom group, but only tactical ones ... it seems to us ... the disagreements are political in nature and should be put forward at the upcoming congress of the Communist Party " [1397].

The Congress of the KKE, which opened on March 14, was held in bitter struggle. Stalin was sure of victory in the telegram sent on March 16, 1923 to G.K. Ordzhonikidze, wrote:

"I think that things will go well at the congress no matter what. I have no doubt that the Georgian Congress and the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party will support the policy of the Zakkraykom [1398].

An agreement was reached, and Stalin welcomed him *****.

Kamenev spoke at the congress against the expansion of the foreign economic rights of the union republics and supported Stalin against the Georgian, Ukrainian and all kinds of national deviators in the main issue - he emphasized the legitimate and natural continuity between the current national policy in connection with the formation of the USSR and the program guidelines of the party of the pre-October period [1399]. The year that has passed since the First Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, despite all the efforts of the national deviationists, showed a weakening of their influence. At the First Congress of the KKE, 18 out of 122 delegates voted for Mdivani's position, at the 2nd - about 20 out of 144 delegates. At the all-Caucasian congress, Mdivani received the support of only 10 delegates out of 244. Things got to the point that the Central Committee of the RCP (b) had to insist that 8 national deviationists be included in the new Central Committee of the KKE (25 people) [1400].

The consciousness of rightness and strength allowed Stalin to boldly compromise and take a more flexible position than Ordzhonikidze, as well as Kamenev and Kuibyshev. This is evidenced by the telegrams that Stalin sent to Tiflis. Here, for example, is his telegram dated March 20, 1923:

"I did not send any list. Kamenev made a mistake, I made only one of the possible assumptions about the Zakkraykom, while I must say that I am resolutely against the reorganization of the Zakkraykom in the spirit of turning it into a Bureau of the Central Committee (this would mean curtailing democratic principles compared to what was achieved and what, apparently, Ordzhonikidze wanted. - B.C.) Hardly anyone will dare to openly defend the idea of depriving the national communist parties of the right to elect the Zakkraykom. We must postpone the decision of this question until your arrival. I have no objection to the increase in the composition of the Zakkraykom, also against replenishing it with young people.

The next day, Stalin telegraphs G.K. Ordzhonikidze:

"I learned from Kuibyshev and Kamenev that [you], when organizing the Zakkrairepublik and ZaksSNK, took almost all the commissariats from the national SNK, except for five or six domestic commissariats. I consider this combination... wrong and illegal. The federation of Zakrespubliks should be formed in such a way that, in addition to six domestic ones, the national Council of People's Commissars would have five more household ones together with the RCT. It is impossible to put the national republics of Transcaucasia [in] a worse position than the Crimean or Yakut. This mistake must be corrected without fail and immediately. [1401]

Of course, Stalin's maneuvers were partly forced. The position and actions of Trotsky ***** were taken into account. So, for example, in a telegram to Ordzhonikidze sent to Tiflis on March 21, he wrote:

"In connection with the report of Kamenev and Kuibyshev (who returned to Moscow from the Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia. - BC) and in view of some considerations of a pre-Congress nature, it is possible that it will be necessary to withdraw not only Mdivani, Kavtaradze,

but also Gegechkori (a supporter of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze. - BC), and it is possible that Tsintsadze (who was earlier decided to be recalled from Georgia as a supporter of Mdivani. - BC) will be introduced to the Central Committee of Georgia. I will let you know the circumstances of the case upon your arrival in Moscow. The main circumstance of the People's Commissariat of War (i.e. L.D. Trotsky. - BC). I beg you to treat such opportunities calmly and prepare Gegechkori. Confirm receipt" [1402].

On March 26, 1923, the Politburo heard and discussed the report of Kamenev and Kuibyshev, who had returned from the II Congress of the KKE. They suggested that Mdivani and Gegechkori be recalled from Georgia because these "comrades are most inclined to aggravate relations in the party and thereby create an atmosphere of factional struggle and an insurmountable obstacle to peace in the Communist Party of Georgia"[1403].

In general, their report was sustained quite in the spirit of the assessments of the Dzerzhinsky commission [1404]. Kamenev and Kuibyshev, together with Zinoviev, were instructed by the Politburo to "work out a draft letter to the members of the Georgian Communist Party, in which it was necessary to point out the mistakes of both (!!! - BC) sides and, based on an assessment of these mistakes, insist on the need for cooperation between both groups" [1405].

In a note sent to members of the Politburo, Trotsky argued that many issues of a fundamental nature, including questions of the formation of the USSR, were being resolved bypassing the Politburo, through the Secretariat and the Organizing Bureau. In particular, he wrote that "until very recently, no one knew in which direction this work (i.e. the process of formation of the USSR. - BC) was headed: towards clamping down on the minority or, conversely, towards increasing their state role . The party and Soviet coup in Georgia took place completely behind the back of the Central Committee and appeared before the latter as a fait accompli. It is obvious that this thesis of Trotsky's letter echoes the recognition of the author of the notes "On

the question of nationalities or "autonomization"" that the question of the formation of the USSR "almost completely passed him by."

Trotsky deliberately distorted the true state of affairs. His letter did not go unanswered. On March 29, all members and candidate members of the Politburo (except Lenin) signed a letter - a **collective response to Trotsky *******. In it, point by point, the lies contained in Trotsky's statements were noted, and, in particular, it was emphasized that

"Comrade Trotsky was elected to all the decisive commissions of the Tenth Congress of Soviets on this issue. If he did not work for them, the responsibility falls entirely on Comrade Trotsky." Trotsky "himself formulated the Politburo's resolution on Georgia, of which he now accuses the Politburo." Despite Bukharin's request, he voted against postponing the discussion of the situation in the KKE at a meeting of the Politburo until Zinoviev returned from vacation, who considered it necessary to listen to the deviationists, therefore, at this moment, Trotsky was objectively working towards a decision directed against the national deviators. "

In addition, the letter noted,

"the very decision of the Politburo to recall the leaders of the 'deviators' was adopted 'unanimously'", i.e. Trotsky voted for him [1407].

We add to this that even if Trotsky was not at a particular meeting of the Politburo or the Central Committee, he could not be unaware of the issues being prepared for discussion and discussed, as well as the decisions taken, since each member of the Politburo was sent both the agenda and the projects decisions, and protocols, etc. If we talk about issues of principle, they were discussed at the October and December (1922) Plenums of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), at the republican congresses of Soviets and at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR.

All this speaks of Trotsky's true attitude to the problems and concerns of the Georgian national deviators - they were deeply indifferent to him, as well as the use of this conflict only as a political mine, which it turned out to be possible and convenient to blow up to defeat Stalin.

The Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) held on March 31 supported the decisions taken by the Politburo on the Georgian conflict. The minority of the Central Committee of the KKE was condemned for fighting against the federation. Mdivani was recalled from Georgia, Gegechkori (a supporter of Stalin) and Tsintsadze (a supporter of Mdivani) were left in Georgia.

Trotsky's proposal to recall Ordzhonikidze from the Caucasus was rejected by the majority (against two) of the members of the Central Committee [1408]. This meant the full support of the Central Committee of the Party of the course in nation-state building, which was associated with Stalin, and the conclusions of the Dzerzhinsky Commission.

This was the end of this attack by Trotsky, formally directed primarily against Ordzhonikidze, but in fact against Stalin. There was only one way left for Stalin's opponents - to come to the congress with new arguments, stronger than those that had already been used.

A.P. Nenarokov was right in arguing that Trotsky was conducting an active attack against Stalin using the problems of national politics, that by the end of March 1923 he had exhausted everything he had at hand, and something extraordinary was needed to continue the attack. Developing this idea, Nenarokov writes that

"Trotsky, as is known, had in reserve the dictation of the speech that Lenin was going to deliver at the 12th Congress precisely on the national question, but he failed to dispose of it in the right way"[1409].

Disagreeing with the assessment of this "dictation" as Lenin's, it must be admitted that that the assessment of the situation in which Trotsky and the Georgian national deviationists find themselves is correct.

True in the sense that in order to continue the struggle, **they needed** something much more serious than their own authority.

Trotsky launched his next attack just before the 12th Party Congress. This time, notes "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"" were put into action.

* The publishers of Trotsky's article "Lenin's Testament" (see: *Gorizont*. 1990, No. 6, p. 35) believe that Trotsky had no less reason than Stalin to consider himself the first contender for Lenin's legacy. Of course, Trotsky himself apparently thought so. He fought for power. Another question was what his chances were. The question was difficult. And it was decided not by comparing the qualities of Stalin and Trotsky, but by the fact that Stalin and Trotsky were the leaders of two political currents, far from being equal in strength. Trotsky's supporters had a much less powerful position. I.V. Startsev, in the preface to the publication of Trotsky's work "Stalin's School of Falsifications", wrote in this connection: "The critical phase of the struggle that shook the party until the end of the 1920s occurred at the beginning of 1923." (*Questions of history*. 1989. No. 7. P. 135). I think we have to agree with this.

** In traditional historiography, the recognition of the fact that the initiative to develop the struggle for power came from Trotsky and belonged precisely to this time is rare. For example, E. Radzinsky believes that Trotsky began the struggle for power on March 13, 1923 and connects it with Radek's article (Radzinsky E.S. Stalin. M, 1997, p. 218).

*** Later, in a letter to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on October 23, 1923, Trotsky conveyed the meaning of his position outlined in this letter in this way: "As long as Comrade. Lenin, he himself was largely his own headquarters, and the question of the role of the State Planning Commission could not have the decisive importance that it received after Comrade Lenin's illness ... Comrade Lenin's long departure from leadership work can to some extent be compensated only by organizational proper management of the economy. Meanwhile, we have taken a step in this

direction not forward, but backward" (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1990, No. 10, p. 170).

**** This telegram confirms the observations we made regarding Kamenev's behavior in September-December 1922 in the previous sections of the work. On the one hand, Kamenev signs all the documents, on the other hand, he incites the Georgian national deviationists against them. Obviously, he is for the USSR as one state, secretly he is for a confederation or a federation with a weak center.

***** The transfer of personnel to defuse conflict situations in party organizations was a common practice. As a rule, the most restless, disorganizing and opposed to party policy elements were transferred. This is evidenced, for example, by A.I. Mikoyan (see: Mikoyan A.I. In the North Caucasus // Novy Mir. 1972. No. 12. P. 195).

***** It is important to note that Trotsky, despite his vacation, took part in these meetings of the Politburo, which he usually did not do under such conditions. He was granted leave for six weeks by decision of the Politburo (interrogation by telephone) on January 6, 1923, on the basis of the conclusion of doctors (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. Z. D. 329. L. 5).

***** The last phrase (about the fetish) echoes the characterization of the policy of national deviationists given by Stalin (Lominadze spoke about it at the plenum of the KKE on November 2, 1922), which gives grounds for the assumption of Stalin's participation in editing this document.

***** It is interesting that information about him was not included in the final document of the "commission of the Council of People's Commissars" that prepared materials for Lenin on the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia. This fact is carefully circumvented in traditional historiography. If this document was really prepared for Lenin, then we have before us an attempt to deceive him by his secretaries, an attempt to shape his opinion. There was something to fear: for much smaller omissions and misdemeanors, he more than once demanded the use of severe penalties. If their document was

prepared not for the acquaintance of Lenin, but for use in the interests of the national deviationists, then the absence of this material becomes understandable.

***** At that time, Lenin's secretariat received all the necessary official documents, which in their totality did not give any grounds for Lenin to take extraordinary steps in support of the Mdivani group against the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and against the clearly expressed will Communist Party of Georgia.

***** On March 7, 1923, Kamenev wrote to Zinoviev (we will discuss the unresolved source problems of this letter below): "I will do my best to achieve peace in the Caucasus on the basis of a solution that would unite both groups. I believe that this can be achieved "(Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. P. 151).

***** At the IV meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with senior officials of the national republics and regions, Manuilsky noted that "on the part of Comrade. Trotsky's interest in the national question arose from the moment of the Twelfth Party Congress, and before the Twelfth Congress we were especially beneficially influenced by Comrade. They didn't feel Trotsky in the fight against Great Russian chauvinism "(The Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with senior officials of the national republics and regions in Moscow on June 9-12, 1923. Stenograph. Report. M., 1923. P. 76). A letter from members and candidate members of the Politburo dated December 31, 1923 said: "... as soon as it seemed to Comrade Trotsky that in the national question large discrepancies are created, he hastened to use the opened gap here too. Everyone who followed the speeches of Comrade Trotsky at that time knows that Comrade Trotsky was very much not averse to "taking advantage" of differences on the national question in order to restore the young sections of the communist-nationalists against the main core of the same Bolshevik-Leninists "(Izvestia Central Committee of the CPSU, 1991, No. 3, pp. 211-212).

***** Ordzhonikidze was a convenient figure for deploying a political attack against Stalin. In addition, since the defense of the

Georgian national deviationists was difficult due to their active use of factional methods of struggle, criticism of Ordzhonikidze could justify them to some extent and switch the attention of the party from problems related to the essence of the unification process to questions of methods of political support for it. . Perhaps that is why Trotsky did not support Mdivani and his supporters directly, but indirectly - by bringing down criticism on Ordzhonikidze.

***** In the telegram of G.K. Ordzhonikidze, sent to Tiflis on March 13, 1923, Stalin wrote: "The state of Ilyich's health is unchanged. Doctors are hoping for some improvement. We decided to publish a health bulletin every day. I welcome the agreement. Communicate the terms of the agreement ." (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 3329. L. 1).

***** Kaganovich testifies that Trotsky actually supported the Georgian national deviators in their struggle against the Zakkraykom (Kaganovich L.M. Aide -memoires of a worker, communist Bolshevik, trade union, party and Soviet state worker, M, 1996, p. 282).

***** A.P. Nenarokov made a reasonable assumption that Stalin was its author (Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago: the national question at the XII Congress of the RCP (b) // Otechestvennaya istoriya. 1993. No. 6. P. 120).

Note:

[1374] True. 1923. March 14.

[1375] Valentinov N.V. Lenin's heirs. M., 1991. S. 13–14.

[1376] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2516. L. 1.

[1377] Valentinov N.V. Decree op. S. 13.

[1378] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 11. S. 189.

[1379] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 208.

[1380] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 226–227.

[1381] Ibid. F. 85. Op. 24. D. 148. L. 1–1 rev.

[1382] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 148.

[1383] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 330. L. 3.

[1384] Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago: the national question at the XII Congress of the RCP(b) // Domestic History. 1993. No. 6. S. 114.

[1385] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 331. L. 1; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 148.

[1386] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 30. L. 2.

[1387] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 331. L. 1; see also: News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 14.

[1388] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 341. L. 6, 9–15.

[1389] Ibid. D. 332. L. 5.

[1390] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 31. L. 1.

[1391] Ibid. L. 3, 4.

[1392] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 152.

[1393] The fourth meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with senior officials of the national republics and regions in Moscow on June 9–12, 1923. Stenograph. report. M., 1923. S. 76.

[1394] Proceedings of the Central Committee of the CPSU 1990. No. 9. P. 158.

[1395] Nenarokov A.P. Decree op. pp. 118 - 119.

[1396] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 152–154.

[1397] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 33. L. 50.

[1398] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2518. L. 1.

[1399] Cit. Quoted from: Nenarokov A.P. Decree op. S. 119.

[1400] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 31. L. 5–8.

[1401] Ibid. D. 2519. L. 1–2; D. 2522. L. 1–2;

[1402] Ibid. D. 2521. L. 1-1 rev.

[1403] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 153; see also: RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 31. L. 5.

[1404] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 343. L. 3.

[1405] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 152.

[1406] Ibid. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 412. L. 111.

[1407] Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. M, 1968. S. 818 - 819.

[1408] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 96. L. 2; F: 325. Op. 1. D. 412. L. 70.

[1409] Nenarokov A.P. Decree op. S. 121.

15. XII CONGRESS OF THE PARTY: THE CHOICE IN FAVOR OF STALIN

The XII Congress was faced with the fact of harsh criticism from Lenin in the "article" "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"" of the newly created USSR, the entire course of the Central Committee of the party in the field of nation-state building and a proposal not to delay the liquidation of the USSR. Naturally, all these questions were at the center of the discussion at the congress. Stalin made a report on the national question. The report was sustained in the spirit of the fundamental decisions of the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) and corresponded to the Leninist attitude about the factor of the East, formulated in the article "Better fewer, but better" [1433]. Stalin's report, along with the reports of Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Bukharin's speech, was noted by the XII Congress with "stormy, long-lasting applause"[1434]. Zinoviev, in the debate on the national question at the Twelfth Congress, admitted:

"The theses of Comrade. Stalin and the Central Committee are excellent, exhaustive, they are thought out to the end, completed, and no one can say that there is a mistake in them ... " [1435].

Even Preobrazhensky, a longtime political opponent of Stalin, was forced to state:

"The report of Comrade. Stalin was extremely informative - I would say that it was a very sharp-witted report"[1436].

The content of the report and the course of the discussion at the congress indicate that Stalin did not bow his head before the authority of Lenin, that he fought the author of the notes on all the fundamental provisions formulated in it.

In the discussion at the plenary sessions of the congress, the fundamental issues of national policy, as well as nation-building in Georgia and Ukraine, were discussed. More specific issues of nation-building, but very important for our topic, were raised during the

discussion at the meeting of the section of the congress on the national question, which took place on April 25, 1923. Here, **opponents of the formation of the USSR** in the form of a federation with a strong central government criticized the report. In traditional historiography, it is believed that it was they who took upon themselves the defense of the "Leninist policy" in the field of the national question, formulated in the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization". In reality, everything turns out to be more complicated since there was no unanimity among Stalin's critics in relation to these notes.

Stalin first of all turned to the **problem of confederalism**, of which the author of the notes declared himself a supporter, and showed that Lenin was an opponent of confederalism. Calling Rakovsky "an old Leninist" with frank irony, Stalin declared that "on the question of a confederation, even within the framework of international ones, comrade Lenin was resolutely opposed to it. Stalin spoke about his polemic with Lenin, which took place on the eve of the Second Congress of the Comintern. In the theses on the national question that Lenin prepared for this congress, he did not mention confederation as a possible form of unification. In a letter to Lenin, Stalin expressed his opinion: the confederation should not be abandoned as a form of unification of the socialist republics. And in response to this "Comrade Lenin sent a formidable letter - this is chauvinism, nationalism, we need a central world economy, controlled from one body.

Stalin's appeal to this story may indicate that he himself considered Lenin's authorship of the newly appeared notes to be **at least surprising, but rather doubtful**.

Stalin also noted that a number of the most important guidelines of the notes "On the question of nationalities ..." are in **no way consistent with the Leninist position of 1920** and the practice of international relations of that time. He argued that under the current conditions it is impossible to fully implement the program provision on the right of nations to self-determination, since this involves the withdrawal of troops from the republics, which is **impossible due to external threats**.

Further, Stalin entered into a direct, principled polemic with the author of the notes. And, naturally, it lead it from Leninist positions. He examined the subordination of the national and social questions in the socialist revolution:

“There are limits to the national question. This is an important question. But there is another question, more important, and the question [this one] is about the power of the working class.” “ We are obliged to put into practice the principle of self-determination of peoples.” - Of course, but, in addition, there is the right of the working class to its own power. There is a right to strengthen their power. You must honestly and openly tell all nationals (national seems to be a dirty word now),that we are **sometimes compelled to go against the right of self-determination** of nationalities, against their interests **in order to keep the workers in power**. This is not our fault, but our misfortune. And those who here willingly give out all sorts of promises must honestly say that **we are violating the right to self-determination and cannot but violate it**. For the national question is a subordinate question in relation to the workers' question. Do you need quotes from Comrade Lenin's books? I can provide as many quotes as I want. For Comrade Lenin, **the national question is a question subordinate to a higher question, the workers' question**” (emphasis added. — B.C.)[1437].

Stalin again forces the congress delegates to choose between the well-known Leninist position and the notes ("article"), the Leninist authorship of which must be taken on faith.

During the discussion, the opponents of autonomization carefully disguised their true intentions (confederation) since the inevitable consequence of the victory of their views and their systematic implementation would be the destruction of those national-state entities that had already taken shape during the socialist revolution and could become the basis for further integration of the Soviet republics. Stalin criticized P.G. Mdivani and M.Kh. Sultan-Galiev for their insincerity and demands for the disintegration of the republics,

and therefore he criticized the Author of the Notes (*supposedly written by Lenin. S.M*) for a similar demand. He also showed that Lenin did not belong to the number of supporters of disintegration [1438]. Nobody protested this criticism of Stalin.

The denial by the Author of the notes of the need to preserve the USSR in the form in which it was created also meant that the ZFSR should suffer the same fate. However, it is known that Lenin was an ardent supporter of the creation of the ZFSR, it was needed, in particular, to curb national enmity in the Caucasus. This was an urgent problem, and Stalin, in his report on the national question, showed on the facts both its acuteness and Lenin's attitude towards the ZFSR:

“It is also no coincidence that comrade Lenin was in such a hurry and pressed so hard that the federation (ZFSR. - BC) be introduced immediately. Nor is it accidental that three times our Central Committee confirmed the need for a federation in the Transcaucasus...it is not accidental that both commissions, and when they arrived in Moscow, Comrade Dzerzhinsky, comrade Kamenev and Kuibyshev, “they said **that it was impossible to do without a federation**”[1439].

Having shown that Lenin never came forward with demands to "liquidate" the RSFSR, Stalin actually made a statement that **Lenin could not be the author of these notes.**

On the question of the dangers emanating from local nationalism and great-power chauvinism, Stalin also pointed out the fundamental difference in the positions of Lenin, on the one hand, and the Author of the Notes and the national deviationists (supporters of Mdivani, Sultan-Galiev [1440]) – on the other. Lenin, as a principled position, defended the need to fight both nationalism and great-power chauvinism. At the same time, Stalin declared that **nothing separated him from Lenin on this issue**, and, as proof of his words, he referred to the resolution on the national question adopted by the Tenth Party Congress and to the history of its creation: it was written by Stalin together with Lenin [1441].

Stalin recognized the correct assessment of Great Russian chauvinism, given in the "note" of December 30-31, 1922, as a great danger and "main enemy" [1442]. But, in solidarity with it, he, unlike the national deviationists and the Author of the Notes himself, who practically ignored the danger of the nationalism of small nations, **did not idealize this nationalism**, which led not to the strengthening of internationalism at the expense of weakening great-power chauvinism, but to the **strengthening of bourgeois influence**.*.

In contrast to the national deviationists and the author of the Notes, who saw only one way to fight Great Russian chauvinism - the weakening of the federal center, Stalin proposed ways to curb great-power (including Great Russian) chauvinism **not at the expense of concessions to the nationalism** of small nations, but at the expense of: (1) the creation of a second chamber (the chamber of nationalities)**, the creation of national military formations capable of taking on at least partially the task of defending their own territory from encroachments by neighboring states, the creation of national personnel. These proposals of Stalin [1443] lay in line with the fundamental decisions of the 10th Party Congress, which focused on the transition from formal equality to actual equality.

Consequently, they fully corresponded to the principled position of Lenin. But the **author** of the notes offers something **completely different** -"go too far", i.e. move from formal equality to formal inequality and the creation of a new actual inequality. There is nothing internationalist here. **This is a manifestation of anti-Russian nationalism.**

In his concluding remarks on the national question at the 12th Congress, Stalin declared:

"They tell us that it is impossible to offend the nationalities. This is absolutely correct, I agree with this, there is no need to offend them. But **to construct from this a new theory that the Great Russian proletariat must be placed in a position of unequal rights in relation to the former oppressed nations**

is, to say, **inconsistency**. The fact that Comrade Lenin is a figure of speech in his famous article, Bukharin turned into a whole slogan "(highlighted by us. - BC) [1444].

It is clear that Stalin challenged not Bukharin, but the author of the notes on the national question. By emphasizing Bukharin, he only tried to save Lenin from the blow of this criticism.

Stalin does not say directly that these notes do not belong to Lenin. But in fact, he is doing everything to make the congress delegates think about **their conformity with Lenin's theoretical and political legacy**.

Stalin structured his speech at the Twelfth Congress in such a way that **he never unequivocally connected the name of Lenin as the author** with these notes. It seems that this is not accidental, he was not sure that they belonged to Lenin, or maybe he was convinced of the opposite. Another thing, he could not prove it. The congress delegates had no doubt that they belonged to Lenin, but at the same time, they could not agree with them on a number of issues and assessments.

Stalin had to politically neutralize the notes, not only to blunt their anti-Stalinist orientation, but also to identify opposition to their Leninist views. It was necessary to prevent the penetration of anti-Leninist views into the politics of the Bolshevik Party under the guise of Leninist theoretical innovations. For Stalin, there was only one way - to link this text and the provisions contained in it, which were unusual for Lenin, with his morbid condition.

"Comrade Lenin forgot, he forgot a lot lately***. He forgot that together with him we adopted the foundations of the Union (VOICE: he was not at the plenum). Comrade Lenin forgot the resolution adopted at the October plenum on the creation of the Union, which refers to the merger of the five commissariats, the unification of the route (People's Commissariats of Railways. - BC) and leaving six commissariats intact. This Comrade Lenin accepted and approved. Then it was submitted to the Central Committee,

which also approved it. I am ready to submit any document. ”
[1445].

The tactics adopted by Stalin were all the more expedient because they allowed, on the one hand, to ensure criticism of the main provisions of the notes, and on the other hand, to **remove Lenin himself from the “zone of criticism” and preserve his authority**. Even the history of his disagreements with Lenin in 1920, when Lenin took a much tougher position, denying the expediency of using a confederation, Stalin presented in such a way that the theoretical side of the differences was left out.

Another explanation was offered by A. Yenukidze, who, in particular, told the congress delegates:

“ Comrade Lenin became a victim of one-sided incorrect information. When a person who, due to illness, does not have the opportunity to follow his daily work, is approached and told that such and such comrades are offended, beaten, expelled, dismissed, etc., he, of course, had to write such a sharp letter. But everything attributed in this letter to Comrade Ordzhonikidze had nothing to do with either the national question or the deviationist comrades.

After all, this is a well-known fact, comrades, and why involve the question of the incident between Comrade Ordzhonikidze and one of the comrades who was not involved in the struggle between the deviators and the Zakkraykom, in questions raised by Comrade Lenin? [1446].

If we look at the discussion that took place at the XII Congress on the issues of building the USSR from the point of view of the notes "On the Question of Nationalities ..." and letters to Trotsky and Mdivani dated March 5 and 6, 1923, then a rather strange picture emerges, "strange" from the point of view of the traditional concept of "Lenin's testament". Firstly, very few of the speakers tried to rely on the provisions of these notes, although the ban was imposed only on quoting the text. Secondly, the range of political issues raised in them and in the speeches of Stalin's critics at the congress coincide little and

very badly with each other. The only exception is, perhaps, only Bukharin and Rakovsky, who actively used in their speeches the fundamental (and clearly anti-Leninist) provisions of the notes [1447].

Bukharin's speech at the congress was, to a greater extent than the others, politically **sharpened against Stalin**. He turned out to be the only delegate who supported the thesis about the negative features of the Russians, which set them apart from other peoples, as well as the need to "go too far", correcting the guilt of the tsarist and bourgeois governments, etc. Bukharin supported the criticism of the approach to the unification of the republics from the standpoint of economic expediency [1448].

Rakovsky, at the section on the national question, criticized Stalin's theses (and, consequently, the report), saying that they hit "on the shadow, not on the subject." He used the same trick as the author of the notes: he went for the substitution of problems: instead of the existing USSR, he began to criticize the very idea of autonomization". **Rakovsky, like the author of the notes**, camouflaged his confederalism by criticizing the danger posed by haste and administrative enthusiasm, departmental bureaucratic psychology****. In order to persuade the delegates to his position, which consisted in an effort to reconsider the decision to form the USSR, Rakovsky decided to "frighten" them by stating that the principles on which the USSR was created would contribute to the "emergence of all sorts of colonialist tendencies," and the process of the formation of the USSR, if not will be suspended and will go as it is going now, "promises us a civil war." "I'm starting to worry about Soviet power." Like the Author of the notes and with reference to them, Rakovsky recognizes the **formation of the USSR as a mistake** since it puts us in imperialist relations with other nations [1449].

However, this "prophecy" did not produce the desired effect on the congress delegates, since even Zinoviev, who experienced the strongest hesitation on this issue, noted that Rakovsky spoke "somewhat exaggeratedly" and that "some notes in his overly passionate speech slightly resembled an Austrian production of question"[1450].

During the discussion of the draft resolution, Rakovsky introduced an amendment, which is a fragment of the theses adopted by the party conference in Ukraine even before the notes were made public **(supposedly Leninist) on the national question** and echoing them on the most important issues. They stated that

“only the strictest coordination of our policy on the national question at home with the policy that we are pursuing on the national question...abroad can give the Union of Soviet Republics and the Communist Party that moral authority and that principled sincerity which will make of them the full support of the struggle of the world proletariat against imperialism”[1451].

The coincidence with a similar thesis in the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"" is obvious. It has been shown above that **Lenin held completely different views on this matter.**

It is noteworthy that this resolution makes no distinction between **national politics before and after the seizure of power**, within the framework of bourgeois society, on the one hand, and in the course of socialist construction, on the other.. Its political meaning lies in the subordination of national-state construction and the internal policy of the Soviet republics to the interests of the international revolution, in the desire to tie the center hand and foot in the matter of building the USSR and to secure the possibility of criticizing any measure aimed at strengthening its position. The Russian socialist revolution as a platform for the world revolution is its main purpose and destiny. **This fully corresponds to the views of the Author of the Notes.** It was shown above that **Lenin looked at this problem differently**, as evidenced by his last article “Better fewer, but better”[1452].

This provision of the resolution echoes the position of Rakovsky, set out in his comments on the draft resolution of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the relations of the RSFSR with the independent republics (September 28, 1922) and a letter from D.Z. Manuilsky dated September 29, 1922 [1453] And this is not surprising, since there are sufficient grounds to believe that **Rakovsky, if he was not the author of this resolution, at least took part in its preparation.** Thus, a

number of the most important positions of the authors of the resolution of the Ukrainian conference and the confederalist Rakovsky are practically indistinguishable from the position of the author of the notes. How can this be explained? Maybe they were written by one "hand"? Or did one "head" supervise the creation of these two documents? The section of the XII Congress of the RCP(b) **rejected** Rakovsky's amendment [1454]. It means that **Congress rejected** the corresponding positions of the notes "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"".

Unexpected and striking (if one takes the position of traditional historiography) is the **confrontation between the position of the Author of the Notes** on the national question and the speeches of the leaders of the Georgian national deviators Mdivani, Makharadze and others [1455], who ignored the arguments that **allegedly** Lenin's letters of 5 and March 6, 1923. And this is in the context of an open struggle using all possible materials and arguments, with attempts to rely in it on the authority of Lenin, on the notes "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization""! In fact, the author of the notes and letter to Mdivani dated March 6, 1923, was fighting Stalin in connection with the internal struggle within the KKE and offered his help in it, he was ready to unite various political forces for the sake of victory, and Mdivani "and others" * **** as if they didn't know about it. They did not say a word about receiving this letter from Lenin, they did not show their attitude towards it in any way. They pass over the proposals of the Author of the letter about alliance and support, as if they were politically so insignificant that they can be completely neglected. Even when they suffer a crushing defeat. Why? Didn't they need? No, this answer will have to be abandoned, since Mdivani constantly tried to rely on the text of the notes "On the question of nationalities ...". Or maybe because they were initiated into the **secret of its creation** and did not **risk drawing too much attention to it?** ..

Considering that not only Mdivani did not try to use the letter **allegedly** sent to him by Lenin on March 5, 1923, but also that neither Trotsky *****, nor Kamenev, no one else used this text and **did not mention its existence** [1456], then this circumstance can be regarded as an **indirect** argument against the Leninist authorship of the letter to

Mdivani, Makharadze and others. There will be even **less reason** to accept it as a Lenin's document.

Unlike Rakovsky and Bukharin, Mdivani, trying to rely on the text of the notes "On the Question of Nationalities ...", actually objected to their Author, i.e. supposedly Lenin.

Mdivani and Makharadze continued their attacks on the unification policy from the same positions from which they conducted it in October 1922 and for which they received from V.I. Lenin's hard and sharp rebuke. Therefore, it is not surprising that they limit themselves to only general indications of the task of combating great-power chauvinism set in it, and grossly distorting (Makharadze) the essence of the matter, stating that it was here that Lenin first set this task [1457].

This was noticed by Yenukidze:

"Now about the letter of Comrade. Lenin (from the context it is clear that we are talking about notes dated December 30-31, 1922 ***** - B.C.). Here, Comrade Mdivani, in his speech every second, declined the name of Comrade Ilyich, and he wanted to create the **impression that Comrade Lenin wrote this letter** on purpose in order to support the comrade deviators and fully justify their policy. (Bukharin: "Of course, for this purpose.") Not for this purpose, comrade Bukharin... The general policy pursued by comrade Ordzhonikidze there was outlined here" [1458].

Mdivani came up with proposals on many issues that ran counter to the proposals of the author of the "dictations" and "letters".

Stalin pointed out the **fundamental opposite** of the attitude of Lenin and Mdivani to the method of Georgia's entry into the USSR (through the ZFSR or directly, which would mean its liquidation). Mdivani, according to Stalin, demanded to begin

"an immediate transition to the system of decomposition of the RSFSR into constituent parts, the transformation of constituent parts into independent republics" [1459].

Stalin's criticism was supported by Mikoyan, who described Mdivani's proposal to destroy the RSFSR with the formation of a new Russian republic as a "reactionary" attempt to "disperse the RSFSR", leading to the destruction of the national unity that already existed, endless conflicts between individual nations [1460], which inevitably happens under the conditions of the NEP, under the dominance of the market and in the conditions of the division of property and, as a result, to undermine Soviet power.

Sh.Z. Eliava criticized Mdivani's attempts to argue against the creation of the ZFSR in favor of creating a federal council of the Transcaucasian republics instead of it (the republic). Frunze reproached Mdivani for his stereotyped, bureaucratic, administrative approach, "which Comrade V. Lenin", and also for the fact that he opposes the demands of Lenin, set out in the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"" [1461].

R.A. made the same criticism. Akhundov, who noted in this regard that Mdivani and his supporters actually represented a national deviation from the policy pursued by the RCP(b) [1462].

The XII Congress of the Party reacted positively to the speech of Ordzhonikidze, which took place after the speeches of Mdivani and Makharadze, as indicated by the applause recorded in the transcript [1463].

In a number of speeches (Yenukidze, Ibragimov) there was the idea that the acuteness of the national question at the congress was largely artificially caused by forces pursuing their own political goals, which have nothing in common with the interests of the peoples on whose behalf they are trying to speak, which is as acute as the national deviators argued that the question is neither in Georgia nor in Ukraine. A. Yenukidze refuted as factually incorrect many statements by Rakovsky, Petrovsky, Mdivani, Makharadze [1464], duplicity,

double-dealing, and unscrupulousness of which (and their supporters) at the congress were noted by many [1465].

At the congress, **no one was going to follow** the advice of the author of the notes and make Stalin "politically responsible" for the events in Georgia. The fault of Mdivani and Co. seemed to be clear to everyone. On the most fundamental issue, on which Stalin's opponents most often tried to rely on the authority of Lenin - the interpretation of nationalism and chauvinism - all the delegates of the congress demonstrated serious differences in their understanding of these problems from the author of the notes.

Even Trotsky, declaring that he was fulfilling Lenin's request to defend his views set forth in the "dictations" and in the "letter", practically did not defend a single position (neither before the congress, nor at it). Moreover, nothing in his speeches reminded of the sharpness of the pre-Congress discussion on these issues. Without knowing this, one could say that he showed solidarity with Stalin in all important issues of national politics. **It is clear that this was a tactic.** What is the reason for it? Maybe because he saw that the absolute majority of the congress, while recognizing the authority of Lenin, was inclined to Stalin's arguments? In this situation, it was unreasonable for him to impose an open battle on Stalin on these issues.

Despite the fact that the notes were consecrated by the authority of Lenin, many congress delegates entered into polemics with it, while directing their criticism at Mdivani, noting the inconsistency and unscrupulousness of his (and his supporters) position [1466]***** *.

The majority of the delegates to the 12th **Congress did not accept** the proposal of the Author of the Notes on **exaggerating Great Russian chauvinism** and **obscuring** the danger of nationalism and local chauvinism, on placing Russians in an unequal position in relation to other peoples. Even Bukharin was forced to admit this, noting the reaction of the audience to that part of Zinoviev's speech, when he spoke against local chauvinism –

"a thunder of applause was heard from everywhere. What wonderful solidarity! The picture is quite different when one speaks of Great Russian chauvinism [1467].

Opponents of the formation of the USSR in the leadership of the communist parties of Ukraine and Georgia received support from the representative of Tatarstan and some other autonomous republics, who sought to use the criticism of "autonomization" to argue their demands for the liquidation of the RSFSR, granting the autonomous republics the rights of union and establishing new relations on the basis of a confederation. Sultan-Galiev, supporting the proposals of Mdivani, demanded the formation of "immediately a Russian republic, etc.", which would mean the liquidation of the Russian Federation. Sultan-Galiyev tried to find support for these demands in the complex structure of the USSR, which was created according to the scheme of Lenin (there was no such complexity in the Stalin's scheme), and in the inconsistency of the implementation of the principle of federalism in different parts of the Union. He saw the only guarantee of the equality of the peoples inhabiting the RSFSR in the destruction of the Russian Federation and giving them the opportunity to create union republics within the USSR [1468].

These thoughts and proposals were in complete agreement with what Mdivani and the author of the notes on the national question were proposing. It is also obvious that they opposed the views that Lenin held.

A front of political forces arose, both inside and outside the RSFSR, striving (for various reasons) to eliminate it. Mdivani saw this as a pledge to eliminate the ZFSR he hated, and Sultan-Galiyev saw it as a way for the Tatars to gain an equal right with other peoples to create a national state. In fact, they proposed to go the same way that the author of the notes suggested, but frankly said what he had as an inevitable conclusion when bringing his proposals to its logical conclusion: **if autonomization is fundamentally wrong**, then the **RSFSR should also be "cassified"**.

The position of which of them was closer to that occupied by the author of the notes on the national question?

The author of the notes, although he criticized "autonomization" as a principle of the national-state construction of the Soviet republics, did not reach the proposals for the liquidation of the RSFSR, which means that he was not interested in this. Consequently, he did not express the interests of the opponents of "autonomization" from the autonomous republics of the RSFSR (Sultan-Galiev and others). At the same time, it does not require the liquidation of autonomies in Georgia and Azerbaijan (Abkhazia, Adzharia, South Ossetia, Nakhichevan). So he's not interested in that either. The position of the Author on this issue corresponded to that held by Mdivani and his supporters in Georgia and Azerbaijan, who advocated the preservation of autonomous republics within Georgia and Azerbaijan. However, he did not demand the liquidation of the ZFSR, so his views could not be identified with the views of the Georgian national deviationists.

Both, the coincidences, and serious differences in the views of them and the Author of the **notes are obvious**.

Moreover, the differences relate to issues that are politically more relevant for the national deviators (they have already abandoned the "autonomization", but it was decided to keep the ZFSR). Perhaps this explains the fact noted above that at the XII Congress of the Party, Mdivani and his supporters expressed views on the fundamental issues of nation-state building, which were very far from the views of the Author of the Notes[1469].

These contradictions are devoid of the views of the Author of the Notes and Rakovsky. Ukraine did not have autonomous entities, so for Rakovsky (and his supporters) the problem of combating "autonomization" as a principle of building a federation after the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which took a course towards the creation of the USSR as a union of equal republics, was already irrelevant domestic political issue. The issues of **distribution of power between the federal center** and the

republics became topical. However, for opponents of the formation of the USSR as a single state, the problem of "autonomization" remained relevant because it made it possible to create a common front of struggle against the supporters of a federation with a strong center and concentrate the blow on the main political figure who advocated its creation, Stalin. Stalin was the political force that interfered with many and therefore could serve as a factor in rallying supporters of the most diverse views.

The calculations of the actual authors of the notes "On the question of nationalities ..." and letters of March 5 and 6, 1923, which "thrown" them into political life on the eve of the party congress, did not materialize. It can be said that the text of the notes (let alone letters) did not have a significant impact either on the position of the congress delegates, or on the course and results of the discussion, or on their attitude towards Stalin. It did not have a noticeable influence on the policy of the RCP (b) in the field of nation-state building, which in the eyes of the congress delegates was personified by Stalin. **His authority in these matters turned out to be higher than that of Lenin.** The delegates of the XII Congress of the RCP(b) read the "article" "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"", listened to Stalin and supported him. He convinced the congress that he was right. The congress unanimously adopted the theses of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), developed by Stalin [1470], as well as the resolution "Project for the Organization of the Union of Soviet Socialist Soviet Republics", written by him[1471]. Stalin found a way out of this delicate situation. **Without dropping the authority of Lenin,** he certainly strengthened his authority and his influence. In many ways, this circumstance allowed him in the following months to complete the task of constituting the USSR as one state.

The 12th Congress of the RCP(b) was **Stalin's first triumph.** And, paradoxical as it may sound, **Trotsky himself,** having put the Central Committee of the Party and the Congress of the RCP(b) before a choice between the authority of Lenin and the authority of Stalin, did a lot to ensure that this triumph took place. The party congress ignored the criticism of Stalin contained in the notes "On the Question

of Nationalities ..." and supported the policy of which Stalin was the most active promoter in the eyes of the party.

The election of a new composition of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and its bodies recorded this victory. At its first meeting, the Central Committee, elected by the XII Party Congress (April 26, 1923), having discussed the issue "On the constitution of the organs of the Central Committee", approved the Secretariat of the Central Committee consisting of Stalin (general secretary), Molotov and Rudzutak. Stalin also entered the Orgburo (together with Molotov, Rudzutak, Dzerzhinsky, Rykov, Andreev and Tomsy), as well as the Politburo: Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Tomsy (candidates Bukharin, Rudzutak, Kalinin and Molotov) [1472].

* The thesis about Great Russian chauvinism in the Caucasus as a factor that gives rise to local nationalism was criticized by the delegate from the Communist Party of Armenia Lukashin, pointing out the significant predominance of local personnel in government and administration over the Russians, as well as the fact that local nationalism has a non-anti-Russian orientation, that it is generated by the problems that exist in relations between the peoples of the Caucasus, as well as between them and Turkey: "The entire Transcaucasian dispute, the entire dispute about Great Russian chauvinism, is at least three-quarters a dispute, if you like, inconclusive. The center of the issue is in national local relations... How is nationalism manifested in Armenia? It hates Turkey... What is Georgian nationalism? In defense of the privileged position that Georgia occupies."

** Interestingly, Lenin did not object to Stalin's proposal to create a second chamber, while the nationalist deviationists and their supporters in the Central Committee of the RCP(b) objected.

*** There is an attempt in the literature to present this as a slander against Lenin for the purpose of Stalin's political self-preservation. But this is not so, Stalin's statement corresponded to reality. For example, Professor V. Kramer noted that during the December exacerbation of the disease (December 16-17 and December 22-23) "there were

noticeable symptoms of memory loss" (Volkogonov D.A. Lenin. Political portrait. M., 1994. Book 2 pp. 337–338).

**** Stalin, who paid much attention to revealing the real position of Rakovsky as a supporter of the creation of the USSR on the principles of a confederation, did not consider it generally unacceptable, however, he believed that in this case a confederation as a way of uniting the Soviet republics was not advisable (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4 pp. 171).

***** In the summer of 1923, Mdivani continued to struggle in the course of the drafting of the Constitution of the USSR from his former positions. G.K. wrote about this. Ordzhonikidze to Stalin on June 10, 1923 (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 63).

***** Trotsky spoke only about Lenin's letter to him dated March 5 (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1991, No. 4, pp. 166, 168).

***** A. Yenukidze said about this document: "Most of the letter of Comrade Lenin known to you is devoted to general questions of our national policy, and against these general thoughts, neither comrade. Stalin, nor comrade. Ordzhonikidze, of course, they don't mind" (Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Verbatim report. April 17-25, 1923, p. 541).

***** At the IV meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with senior officials of the national republics and regions M.Kh. Ibragimov (Tatar ASSR) actually entered into a discussion with Lenin on the issue of excesses. He proposed to simultaneously fight both great-power chauvinism and local nationalism, "but neither to the left nor to the right without overdoing it" (Fourth meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with senior officials of the national republics and regions in Moscow on June 9-12, 1923. Stenographer Report, p. 24).

Notes:

[1433] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 440.

[1434] Ibid. pp. 46, 62, 279, 322.

[1435] Ibid. S. 557.

[1436] Ibid. S. 133.

[1437] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 171-172.

[1438] Ibid. S. 172; Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 257.

[1439] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 257.

[1440] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 162.

[1441] XII Congress of the RCP(b). Transcript of the meeting of the section of the congress on the national question on April 25, 1923 // News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 173; No. 5, p. 165; Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 28.

[1442] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 172.

[1443] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 59, 189–190, 242–247.

[1444] Ibid. pp. 264–265.

[1445] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 171.

[1446] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 541.

[1447] Ibid. pp. 561–564.

[1448] Ibid. pp. 451, 540, 561–563.

[1449] Ibid. pp. 529, 532-533; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 171-172.

[1450] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 553.

[1451] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 5. S. 158.

[1452] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 402-405.

[1453] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 209-213.

[1454] Ibid. 1991. No. 5. S. 159.

[1455] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. pp. 155-158, 454-459, 471-475, 541; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 170-174; No. 4. S. 162-164, 166-169, 174-175; No. 5. S. 158, 160-171, 175.

[1456] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 172-174; No. 4, p. 163; No. 5. S. 155-176.

[1457] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 474.

[1458] Ibid. pp. 540-541.

[1459] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. pp. 448-451; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 172.

[1460] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 158-159.

[1461] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 178, 179.

[1462] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. pp. 527, 558-560.

[1463] Ibid. S. 159.

[1464] Ibid. pp. 537-539.

[1465] Ibid. pp. 152, 553, 560; Izvestiya TsKKPSS. 1991. No. 4. S. 159.

[1466] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. pp. 463-465; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 175, 176, 177; No. 4. pp. 158-159, 164.

[1467] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 564.

[1468] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 161-162, 172.

[1469] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. pp. 459-461, 537-558.

[1470] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 5. S. 158.

[1471] Ibid. pp. 155-156.

[1472] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 98. L. 1

16. STRENGTHENING THE DICTATORY OF THE PROLETARIAT IS THE MAIN CONDITION FOR THE VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION

During 1921-1922 hopes were fading for the prospect of a proletarian revolution soon beginning in the developed capitalist countries of Europe. Questions about the prospects for the socialist revolution in Russia, about the possibility of its development, relying on internal forces, by the end of 1922 acquired even greater relevance than before. The development of the proletarian revolution in European countries was hampered by the fact that the victors in the First World War could use the fruits of their victory to alleviate internal social problems at the expense of the countries they defeated. On the other hand, they had enough opportunities to, if necessary, by force prevent the development of the revolutionary process in Germany. Although the population of the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East, although "in recent years has been drawn with extraordinary speed into the "struggle for their liberation," they cannot really help the Russian socialist revolution in the foreseeable future, since their forces and capabilities, Lenin believed, "do not go decisively in comparison" "with the forces of the capitalist countries" [1635].

It is not surprising that in his last letters, notes and articles, Lenin again turned to the question of what must be done to ensure the victory of the Russian revolution, which continues the struggle "alone", in the conditions of a capitalist encirclement. Success depended on whether it would be possible to ensure the necessary socio-economic development of the country.

The possibilities for the development of the country were limited by the level of its productive forces, which had significantly decreased as a result of the imperialist and civil wars, as well as by the changes in agriculture that had taken place as a result of the revolution: the elimination of landownership led to the emergence in the countryside of a huge mass of "small and smallest" peasant farms and, as result in a decrease in labor productivity.

This analysis led Lenin to raise the question of the prospects for the Russian revolution and the tasks of the revolutionaries.

“Thus, at the present moment we are faced with the question: will we be able to hold out with our small and minute peasant production, with our fragmentation, until the Western European capitalist countries complete their development towards socialism?” Which, according to Lenin, would not have happened soon [1636].

There were only two means in the hands of the Bolsheviks to use the internal resources of the country: **correct policy and good organization**. It was precisely these points that Lenin pointed out when he formulated the fundamental principles of the tactics that are "prescribed" by this state of affairs:

- 1) to exploit the contradictions between the imperialist states, as well as between them and the peoples and countries of the East exploited by them;
- 2) to ensure the strengthening of the power of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the preservation of the confidence of the peasantry in it and its ability to lead the peasantry;
- 3) at the expense of marginal savings, to provide financing for the restoration of enterprises and new construction in industry [1637].

Lenin attached particular importance to the solution of the problem of financing industry, since thanks to the development of "large machine industry" and the electrification of the country, the Soviet government should have been able to "build a state in which the workers would retain their leadership over the peasants, the confidence of the peasants in relation to themselves." Then "we'll be able to hold on for sure. And besides, we will be able to maintain ourselves not at the level of a small-peasant country, not at the level of this general limitation, but at a level that is steadily rising forward, and forward towards large-scale machine industry. Thus, Lenin actually proposed putting on the agenda the question of preparing for the start of the implementation of programs for the technical reconstruction of industry, followed by agriculture. In this development, the Soviet republics could cross the line when the fate of the socialist revolution

in them would be determined mainly not by the backwardness inherited from the past, but by a new, **higher level of economic and cultural development.**

In solving this problem, according to Lenin, the most important role was to be played **by the party and state apparatus**, which exercised power in the country and management of the national economy. The task of strengthening them as the main instrument of socialist transformation follows from the tactics proposed by Lenin. Lenin proposed a mechanism that was supposed to prepare the party and state apparatuses for the solution of these tasks - close cooperation between the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Party, the merging of the Central Control Commission with the RCT.

Historians overlook an important turn in Lenin's views on the problem of reorganizing the Central Committee, ignoring the obvious fact that the original idea of reforming the Central Committee was transformed into a project for reforming the Central Control Commission. And here was the result - Stalin, the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Party Congress are blamed for the failure to fulfill the proposal, which Lenin himself refused.

For example, V.I. Startsev reproached the Central Committee of the RCP(b) for not agreeing to increase the Central Committee to 50-100 people, but to only increase it to 40 members. In this, he sees the struggle of the Politburo, the Secretariat and the Orgburo "against those revolutionary measures for the restructuring of the party leadership", which Lenin proposed to take [1639]. Even more distorted is the question of the purpose of the reform proposed by Lenin. The versions offered sometimes have no support in Lenin's texts. So yes. Volkogonov said, that Lenin's plan was to expand democracy in the party and in the state [1640].

V.A. Kumanev and I.S. Kulikov wrote that Lenin in those days came to the conclusion that "the personal qualities of the leaders play a decisive role in the work of the collegiate body" (hence, until that time he did not know about this) and imposed on him the desire to make

the Central Committee a "collective leader" (as if it was not one under Lenin!), to overcome the ambitions and personal rivalry of the members of the Politburo, "to balance the warring factions in the main link of power", etc. [1641]

Lenin, in principle, was satisfied with the existing system of higher party bodies, including the place of the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat, therefore, speaking about their work, about the need to improve their activities, he never criticizes them and does not associate the problem with the party bureaucracy [1642].

On the contrary, he proposes to formalize those changes that occur in their work under the pressure of circumstances.

"The plenum of the Central Committee of our party has already revealed its desire to develop into a kind of supreme party conference ... current work on behalf of the Central Committee is carried out, as you know, by our Politburo, our Orgburo, our secretariat, etc. I think that we should finish the path we have thus entered. Such a development of the Central Committee was supposed to ensure an increase in "plannedness, expediency, the systematic nature of its organization and work, and in relation to communication with the truly broad masses through the best of our workers and peasants" [1643].

He was quite satisfied with the progress of the case and its direction, and therefore with those people who provided their work. It is clearly seen that Lenin was interested in the system. In principle, it suited him, he did not want it to be changed, he strived only for its improvement.

It is precisely in connection with its improvement, and not with its replacement, that Lenin raises the question of the stability and split of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and of overcoming the potential danger of a split in the party as a result of an insufficiently flexible and

balanced policy that is unable to ensure an alliance between the working class and the peasantry [1644].

No personification in posing this issue, no expectation of a split in the near future, while at the same time recognizing that the effect of reducing the risk of a split as a result of the measures he proposed could manifest itself only after years needed to improve the work of the state apparatus. The fact that Lenin, speaking about the threat of instability and split, was not inclined to dramatize them, was evidenced by the fact that there was no indication of it in the article "Pages from a Diary", in the notes "On Cooperation", "On Our Revolution", and also in the last article - ""Better fewer, but better"." Therefore, the context in which the propositions about the danger of instability and split are included - the reorganization of the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission and the RCI - suggests that the reduction of this danger was not the main goal of the reforms he proposed, but only their useful, but by-product.

Lenin put forward the idea of the need to reorganize the central organs of the party in such a way as to simultaneously solve a number of key tasks - to increase the efficiency of their own work, to provide them with the opportunity to lead the improvement of the work of the state apparatus. This, according to Lenin would make it possible to strengthen the ties with the working masses through the development and implementation, through state bodies of a policy that meets their interests. This was a general idea, originally formulated in a letter dated December 23, 1922 ("to the congress") in the form of a proposal to expand the composition of the Central Committee to 50-100 people. Noting that one cannot count on a "quite favorable" course of events, Lenin assesses the proposed reform of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) precisely from the point of view of overcoming the dangers threatening from here:

"Such a reform would significantly increase the strength of our party and make it easier for us to fight among hostile states, which, in my opinion, can and should be greatly aggravated in the coming years" [1645].

This idea was further developed in the entry dated December 26. In it, Lenin proposed that the function of checking, "improving" and "recreating" the apparatus be removed from the jurisdiction of the RCT, which turned out to be "unable to cope with it", and transferred to the Central Committee of the RCP (b). And in order to carry out the increased volume of work, he proposed to expand the composition of the Central Committee at the expense of several dozen party members, mainly from among the "ordinary workers and peasants", giving them "the right to attend all meetings of the Politburo and read all the documents of the Central Committee" [1646]. The RCT should "be used only as an 'appendage' or as an assistant, under certain conditions, to these members of the Central Committee."

This right immediately put the new, politically inexperienced members of the Central Committee in an unusual, privileged position in relation to its other members, who attended meetings of the Politburo only if the issue under discussion required it. And Lenin did not propose to abolish this practice. This initial proposal by Lenin, without solving the problem in essence, led to confusion and destruction of the old system of work of the Central Committee and discrimination of other members of the Central Committee.

December 29, 1922 Lenin continued to develop this scheme. This time, from a general formulation of the question, he proceeded to the development of a specific problem - **"how to combine these specialists** (from the RCT. - BC) in verification, who have sufficient knowledge, and these new members of the Central Committee." New members of the Central Committee "will from year to year take a course in public administration with the help of highly qualified specialists" from the RFL, which will allow "successfully" to solve the problem of "improving our apparatus, which was no good at all." This is all the more justified because, in his opinion, the RKI in its development

"resulted in ... a transitional state from a special people's commissariat to a special function of members of the Central Committee; from an institution that audits everything and everything, to a collection of numerically small, but first-class auditors" [1647].

Therefore, Lenin plans the joint use (as assistants, or "appendage") of the members of the RKI with a new and special contingent of members of the Central Committee.

After December 29, the development of this theme was suspended for about ten days. We can only speculate about the reasons. Perhaps Lenin was dissatisfied with what was happening. A number of unanswered questions arose. Why will the new members of the Central Committee not yet known to anyone have better personal and business qualities than other members of the Central Committee? Why are they guaranteed against bureaucratization? How many party members who possessed all these remarkable qualities remained "at the bottom", "at the bench", "at the plow" during the five years of the revolution? Why didn't they come out before? And how to find them? It is impossible to make a mistake, since the fate of the revolution will depend to a large extent on them. Will they strengthen this party headquarters by constituting a majority in the Central Committee? Is not that a fact. Will they weaken it? Not ruled out. In addition, it is known that in itself, work at the bench or the plow does not guarantee against hesitation in the direction of opportunism. The history of the Bolshevik Party knows many examples of this. In the old composition of the Central Committee there were people who showed themselves as economic organizers, propagandists, and theoreticians. In the new composition, their share will sharply decrease, and in the main political organ of the party, a completely different category of party members will have to gain a dominant position - those who during the years of the revolution did not prove themselves to be organizers, who had neither experience in economic, ideological work, nor proper theoretical and often general education. How will their predominance in the Central Committee affect the development of policy, the quality of decisions made, and the level of organization of the work of the Central Committee? Will the party, the country, the revolution benefit from this? Will not the Central Committee's ties with the masses be strengthened by reducing the efficiency and quality of work of this body, which immediately deprives the planned reform of any sense?

The variant proposed by Lenin, removing some problems, put in their place a host of others, led the Central Committee of the Party away

from some conflicts and confronted others, no less complex, in the place of some groupings, threatened to bring new ones. We do not know whether Lenin asked himself these or similar questions and how he answered them. On the other hand, it is known that in the future, while developing this problem, he no longer returned to the idea of granting the new members of the Central Committee a privileged position. This fact allows us to assert that **Lenin was dissatisfied with his original project.**

In the first ten days of January 1923, Lenin dictated the plan of the article "What shall we do with the Workers' and Peasants' Committee?", in which the first serious turn in the outlined scheme was made. Now he proposed that

members of the Central Committee from workers and peasants are not to be placed in a privileged position in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the party, but should be placed under the tutelage of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (and, **therefore, Stalin as general secretary**) for "organizing the training of new members of the Central Committee in all the details of management", which already by itself should provide "greater streamlined Politburo meetings" [1648].

This partially removed the previous contradiction: the new members of the Central Committee, if they constitute a special part of the Central Committee, then only in the sense that they are given to the training of the main part of the members of the Central Committee and its apparatus. This proposal **strengthened** the position and authority of the Secretariat and **Stalin as general secretary** in the Central Committee of the party.

In the original version of the article on the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection ("What shall we do with the Rabkrin?"), Lenin clarified his position regarding the size of the Central Committee and the position of its new members from workers and peasants:

"Several dozen (from 50 to 75 people) **workers and peasants are elected to The Central Committee** of the party in addition

to other members of the Central Committee " (our italics. - V.S.).

What follows is an important correction of the previously formulated sentence:

"The new members of the Central Committee are completely equal in rights with other members of the Central Committee."

Equal in rights, but do not stand above others and do not control them! This provision actually means the final renunciation of their privileged position and the completion of the revision of the original scheme in one of its most important points. The special function of the members of the Central Committee, about which Lenin spoke on December 29, remains assigned to a special group of members of the Central Committee who did not have any advantages over others:

they are tasked with "long and hard work to study and improve our state apparatus. These members of the Central Committee are considered to be temporarily assigned to the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, all of whose employees "receive the task of helping them in this" [1649].

The special status of this group of members of the Central Committee is now emphasized not by the expansion of their rights in comparison with other members of the Central Committee, but, on the contrary, by the establishment of restrictions for them. The condition is set that these members of the Central Committee must be replaced in a few years. There were never such conditions for other members of the Central Committee; the question of their stay in the Central Committee was decided strictly individually, based on completely different criteria. Consequently, the "new" members of the Central Committee are turning from a privileged part of it into a discriminated part in some respects.

However, the variant with the infringement and restriction of the rights of members of the Central Committee could not be accepted, as

well as the variant with the expansion of rights. Work on the first version of the article continued until January 13, 1923, therefore, until that time, Lenin failed to find a satisfactory solution to the problem: the new members of the Central Committee with their specific tasks, functions and, consequently, rights did not fit into the existing mechanism of the work of the Central Committee and in the framework of the Party Rules. The result was the destruction of the established system of leadership of the party, which Lenin did not want. He sought to strengthen it. Lenin was **dissatisfied with** the original version of the article on the RCT ("What should we do with the Rabkrin?"), as evidenced by the very fact of stopping work on it and starting to develop a fundamentally new scheme for implementing his idea. He was now trying to solve the set tasks not by reorganizing the Central Committee of the Party, but by reorganizing the Central Control Commission of the RCP(b).

In all the texts preceding the article "How do we reorganize the Workers' Committee," which was a revision of its original version ("What shall we do with the Workers' Committee?"), it refers only to the new members of the Central Committee and there is not a word about the Central Control Commission. Ten days later, on January 23, Lenin finished dictating the article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin", which dealt only with the reorganization of the Central Control Commission. There was no longer a word about the reorganization of the Central Committee, about the expansion of its composition.

For some reason, the literature does not attach due importance to this turn of Lenin's thought, and, speaking of the reform he proposed, historians pile up quotation upon quotation from different works, in which, in fact, completely different reforms are proposed. Lenin found a version of the reform of the central organs of the party that satisfied him, which was reflected in the title of the article prepared for publication: the uncertainty in the very formulation of the question (what to do with the RCT?) disappeared from it and a subtitle appeared, speaking of the completion of work on the problem, - "Proposal to the XII Congress parties."

In the article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin" there is a proposal to increase the Central Control Commission by 75-100 people with the same functions that were previously assumed for the new members of the Central Committee. The same range of tasks that they have to solve. The same rights to attend meetings of the Politburo and get acquainted with the documents. The same condition of their regular change. The same social environment from which they must be recruited. The same calculation that this measure will ensure the strengthening of the stability of the Party Central Committee. The same connection between the party bodies and the employees of the NC of the RCT, the same consequences for the RCT - an increase in its authority and capacity [1650].

In the article "Better fewer, but better" Lenin continued the development of this problem, detailing the scheme of work of the Central Control Commission—RKI [1651].

With the transfer of the task of organizing the work of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectors from the Central Committee to the Central Control Commission, there was no need to replenish the Central Committee of the Party with workers and peasants up to 50-100 members. And we see that **Lenin did not return to this proposal** in his last articles.

Lenin's proposal to give the Central Control Commission the right to control the raising of questions and their discussion in the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Politburo of the Central Committee, for any party functionary [1652] in the literature is sometimes interpreted as establishing control over the Central Committee and the Politburo, limiting their rights. But it's not so. Control over the preparation of questions for discussion and over the course of their discussion did not mean limiting the right of the Politburo to form the agenda, the right to adopt solutions. This was the main thing. Defining the tasks and functions of the members of the Central Control Commission who are present at a meeting of the Politburo, **Lenin does not say a word** about granting them a deliberative or even a decisive vote.

Consequently, its functions **remained within the limits determined by the Charter of the Party**, the power of the Central Committee was not diminished. Only what was required was achieved - an increase in the efficiency of the work of the Politburo, which means that the position of the Central Committee was not weakened, but strengthened. At the same time, there was an increase in the political strength and capabilities of the Central Control Commission, but not at the expense of the prerogatives of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). This ensured the strengthening of the entire system of central organs of the party and its position in the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the course of developing plans for the reorganization of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in connection with the reorganization of the RCT, Lenin came to the fundamentally important problem of interaction between party and state bodies [1653]. Nevertheless, in historiography this most important aspect of Lenin's last works **did not attract due attention**, apparently because the thoughts expressed by Lenin contradicted the views adopted later in the CPSU. Everything was limited to a particular case - the merger of the Central Control Commission and the RKI, attention was concentrated on solving very important practical problems: the fight against bureaucracy, the democratization of inner-party life, and so on. This approach **not only narrowed the problem, but grossly distorted Lenin's position**.

Lenin regarded the reorganization of the Central Control Commission and the RCT as merely another step in the solution of a more general task—the creation of a system of power and administration that would meet the needs of the socialist revolution. Completing the development of this problem, in the article “Better fewer, But Better,” Lenin substantiated his vision of the main direction in the development of the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The reorganization of the Central Control Commission-RCI was supposed to prepare a solution to a more fundamental task - the further integration of the party and the state, which he considered both as a goal and as a way to replace the existing which remained

from the old system to a new state apparatus and thereby create the prerequisites for further steps in this direction.

For Marxists, such a formulation of the question was not unexpected. True, the founders of Marxism did not give **any detailed study** of this issue, but the general guidelines were quite definite. The task of using the state by the Communist Party for the purpose of realizing the program of the proletarian revolution was already set forth in the Manifesto of the Communist Party. It also formulated the idea that in the process of establishing the political domination of the proletariat and carrying out a program for the transformation of society on the basis of public ownership of the means of production, the state undergoes a certain evolution up to the point of disappearance. Developing this idea, F. Engels formulated the position that the socialist state is no longer a state in the former sense of the word. Thus, the **"party-state" system was conceived not as static**, but as dynamic, constantly, and rapidly changing primarily due to its "state" component. Based on this understanding of the essence of the relationship between the party and the state in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Bolsheviks built a new state from the very beginning. In notes dated December 26, 1922, Lenin noted that during the five years of the revolution, the Bolsheviks

"created a new type of state (our italics. - BC), in which the workers are ahead of the peasants against the bourgeoisie"[1654].

The Bolsheviks adopted and put into practice* the idea of a definite coalescence of all organizations of the proletariat. Practical experience corrected the initial ideas, caused discussions, in the center of which was the problem of finding appropriate organizational forms and methods of work, the interaction of the main institutions of the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The **struggle on these questions reached its greatest acuteness** in the course of the "discussion about the trade unions."

In the process of developing his plan for the reorganization of the Central Committee—Central Control Commission—RCI, Lenin

outlined in detail his views on the problem of interaction between the party and the state in the socialist revolution. Already in the dictation of December 29, 1922, it was said that the RKI

"as a result of its development resulted in a **transitional state from a special people's commissariat to a special function of members of the Central Committee**"(our italics. - BC) [1655].

Needless to say, the evolution of the RCI could have such a "result" only if a certain integration of the relevant parts of the party and state apparatuses had actually already taken place. In terms of the article "What should we do with the Workers' Peasants' Committee?" Lenin already proposes to extend to the NK RKI the experience of subordinating the NKID to the Central Committee of the Party, including the selection of personnel for it [1656]. In the article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin" this topic is developed. Lenin, in the experience of state building during the Civil War, singled out the saturation of the most important institutions of power with reliable party cadres as the main lesson. He offered to rely on this experience, starting the reorganization of the state apparatus [1657].

In the article "Better fewer, but better" " he summarized his views on this issue. It speaks not only of the admissibility and expediency, but also of the need for a certain connection, a merger of the party and the state. How serious Lenin attached to this question is shown by the fact that he devotes a whole section of this article to it. In view of the fundamental importance of the provisions formulated by Lenin and the **frequent distortions of Lenin's views on this issue**, let us quote at length:

"How can Party institutions be combined with Soviet ones? Is there anything unacceptable here?

I am raising this question not on my own behalf, but on behalf of those whom I hinted at above, saying that we have bureaucrats not only in Soviet, but also in Party institutions. Why, in fact, not to combine both, if this is required by the interest of the case? Hasn't anyone ever noticed that in such a people's commissariat as the People's Commissariat of

Foreign Affairs, such a connection is extremely beneficial and has been practiced from the very beginning? Aren't the Politburo discussing issues from the Party point of view, many small and big questions about "moves" on our part in response to the "moves" of foreign states ... Isn't this flexible combination of the **Soviet and the Party a source of extraordinary strength in our politics** ? I think that what has justified itself has become stronger in our foreign policy and has already become a custom in such a way that **there is no doubt in this area that it will be at least as appropriate (and I think it will be much more appropriate) in relation to our entire state apparatus...** Moreover, **I think that such a connection is the only guarantee of successful work**" (highlighted by us. - BC).

Lenin concludes these arguments with the following remark:

"I think that **all doubts on this score** come out of the dustiest corners of our apparatus and that they should be answered with only one thing - **mockery**" [1658].

The italicized text is the quintessence of Lenin's views. To see their essence more clearly, let's present a part of the selected text as a single sentence. It turns out that the flexible combination of the Soviet and the Party is a source of extraordinary strength in our politics; it has justified itself, established itself in our foreign policy and will be much more appropriate in relation to our entire state apparatus; in such a connection is the only guarantee of success.

At the same time, it can be seen from the above quotation that V.I. Lenin did not pose the question of merger, unification as a matter of principle, in accordance with which **relations between the party and the state were to be restructured**. For Lenin, this was a matter of expediency and tactics.

In the light of Lenin's intentions, the reorganization of the Central Control Commission-RKI, which he proposed, also looked different. It created the mechanism necessary for the implementation of plans for

"union", "merger" of certain parts of the party and state apparatuses. In this case, through the reorganized Central Control Commission, there is a formal, and not only actual, subordination of the entire system of state inspection and control to the central leadership of the Bolshevik Party. The state body - RKI - not only in fact, but also formally turned into the eyes and hands of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the party, allowing control, purge, and reorganization of the entire state apparatus, identify promising cadres of managers, ensure their training and distribution. Finishing on March 2, 1923, his last article "Better fewer, but better", V.I. Lenin dictated:

"Here are the lofty tasks I dream of for our Workers' and Peasants' Committee. That's why I plan for them to merge the most authoritative party elite with the "ordinary people's commissariat" [1659].

* In the article "Our Differences" (published in Pravda in January 1921), Stalin wrote: "No one disputes that trade unions and state bodies should and will penetrate each other mutually ("merging")" (Stalin I. V. Op. V. 5. P. 4). Lenin could not have been unaware of it and did not object, although the term "merging" referred to a fundamentally important issue around which passions were seething. Somewhat later (1921), in a draft plan for the brochure "On the Political Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists," Stalin formulated his vision of the integration of the party and the state in the following way : organs of the latter and inspiring their activity" (Stalin I.V.Op. T. 5. S. 71). Who knows, perhaps such a vision of this problem by Stalin played a role when Lenin thought about a policy that could take a key place in the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Notes:

[1635] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 402-404.

[1636] Ibid. S. 402.

[1637] Ibid. pp. 403–405.

[1638] Ibid. pp. 404–406.

[1639] Startsev V.I. Political leaders of the Soviet state in 1922 - early 1923 // History of the USSR. 1988. No. 5. S. 118, 119.

[1640] Volkogonov D.A. Stalin. Political portrait. Book. 1. S. 150.

[1641] Kumanev V.A., Kulikova I.S. Confrontation: Krupskaya - Stalin. S. 20.

[1642] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 385, 386-387:

[1643] Ibid. S. 384.

[1644] Ibid. pp. 346–347, 387, 449–450.

[1645] Ibid. pp. 343, 344.

[1646] Ibid. pp. 347–348.

[1647] Ibid. pp. 354–355.

[1648] Ibid. S. 443.

[1649] Ibid. S. 445.

[1650] Ibid. pp. 343, 347, 348, 383–387, 445.

[1651] Ibid. pp. 393–394, 396, 405–406.

[1652] Ibid. pp. 348, 386, 387.

[1653] Ibid. pp. 343, 347–348, 354, 384–386, 391–398, 399–400, 445.

[1654] Ibid. S. 347.

[1655] Ibid. S. 354.

[1656] Ibid. pp. 442–443.

[1657] Ibid. S. 384.

[1658] Ibid. S. 398.

[1659] Ibid. S. 406.

17. COOPERATION AS A WAY OF INVOLVING THE PEASANTS IN THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

The main problem that stood in the way of building socialism in the USSR was the problem of drawing the peasantry into the socialist revolution as a politically, economically, and socially interested participant in this process. The problem for Marxist revolutionaries, although not new, was extremely difficult to solve in practice. An attempt to apply the classical scheme proposed by K. Marx and F. Engels ended in failure. The forced transition to a new economic policy is evidence of this.

The NEP created conditions that were very different from those in which the use of cooperation was previously thought (the rapid pace of development of the world proletarian revolution, the dominance of large-scale forms of organization of production in industry and agriculture, the absence of commodity-money relations). The admission of the market, the need to adapt state industry to the possibilities and needs of the peasant economy led to concessions to the principle of private property, to the development of commodity-money relations, which unleashed the petty-bourgeois element. These were the conditions under which cooperatives were to develop in the USSR.

Lenin, having turned in his Testament to the problem of the socialist transformation of agriculture, begins the development of the problem of cooperatives by ascertaining the possibility of using it to draw the masses of the peasantry into the process of socialist construction. At the same time, he relied on his previous developments in the field of the new economic policy, developed the ideas embedded in them, and did not oppose them with new ones. Lenin initially viewed the **tax in kind not simply as a concession to capitalism**, but as a step towards socialism:

“In the tax there is a particle of the former apportionment and there is a particle of that order, which alone seems to be correct: namely, the exchange of the products of large socialist factories for the products of the peasant economy through the

food organs of state power belonging to the working class, through the cooperation of workers and peasants "(our italics. - B.C.) [1660].

With this he connected the process of the formation of socialism in peasant Russia.

"When can the foundation of a socialist economy be considered laid ! When the exchange of products (emphasized by us. - BC) with the peasantry* is ensured. When the peasant is economically satisfied!!" [1661].

Thus, the problem of combining the state socialist industry and the peasant petty-bourgeois economy in the conditions of the NEP and thanks to it had a fundamental solution.

Nevertheless, it remained unclear how the transformation of the old peasantry into a new class of socialist society would be accomplished with the help of "commercial" cooperation, if it "inevitably gives rise to petty-bourgeois, capitalist relations, promotes their development, puts the capitalists in the forefront, gives them the greatest benefit." There was no answer. There was a general idea that

"'cooperative' capitalism ... is, under Soviet rule, a variety of state capitalism, and, as such, it is beneficial and useful to us now", since, firstly, it "facilitates accounting, control , supervision, contractual relations between the state ... and the capitalist "and, secondly," facilitates the unification, organization of millions of the population, then the entire population without exception, and this circumstance, in turn, there is a gigantic plus from the point of view of the further transition from state capitalism to socialism" [1662].

This was said almost two years before Lenin's dictation of the notes "On Cooperation".

In the first version of his notes "On Cooperation", Lenin draws attention to the following:

cooperation makes it possible to place the private initiative of the peasant in conditions that objectively contribute to the development of a collectivist psychology in the peasantry.

Lenin saw in it, on the one hand, a way to limit the petty-bourgeois elements and the economic connection of the individual peasant economy with the private capital of the city and countryside, and on the other hand, a means of switching it to the development of ties with the socialist sector of the economy. Therefore, Lenin believed that with the concentration in the hands of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat

"all means of production", with the establishment of "an alliance of the proletariat with many millions of small and tiny peasants", as well as "providing leadership for ... the proletariat in relation to the peasantry", the success of socialism depends from "maximum cooperation of the population."

In his opinion, the importance of cooperation in solving the problem of involving the mass of the peasantry in the process of building socialism has increased, since within the framework of the NEP a concession was made to the peasant, "as a merchant, to the principle of private trade", it became possible to ensure "combination of private interest, private commercial interest, verification and control by the state, the degree of subordination to the common interest.

It is also important that it made it possible to ensure the transition "to a new order (i.e., to collective farms, to socialism. - B.C.) through the simplest, easiest, and most accessible way for the peasant" and allowed learning to build socialism in such a way that

"every small the peasant could participate in this construction. Therefore, the most important task, Lenin believed, is to "cooperate sufficiently widely and deeply among the Russian population" [1663].

Further, Lenin formulated the proposition that

"the system of civilized cooperators with public ownership of the means of production, with the class victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie - **this is the system of socialism**" [1664].

This position is sometimes regarded as evidence that Lenin changed his previous ideas about socialism and the methods of its construction, and became a supporter of cooperative socialism. **Such a conclusion is unfounded**, since in this case Lenin is not talking about cooperation in general, but about the cooperation of the peasantry. No wonder he constantly talks about the work of cooperators in the countryside, about the need to use the method of material incentives to involve peasants in cooperation, about the need to raise the level of culture of the peasant ("civilize"), so that he can "be an intelligent and competent merchant." Talking about the population about the Russian people, he also means **precisely the peasants** " ("let the Russian people or just peasants wrap it around themselves") [1665].. This circumstance does not allow one to interpret Lenin's words about the role of cooperation broadly - in relation to **the whole of society**, and, therefore, deprive the attempt to substantiate the thesis that Lenin became a supporter of cooperative socialism, which presupposes the preservation of commodity-money relations, the market, etc.

The conclusion that the system of civilized co-operators under political conditions, already secured by the success of the socialist revolution, "**is the system of socialism**", ends the first version of the "article" "On Cooperation". Everything seems to be clear.

Nevertheless, Lenin begins to develop this problem again (the second version of the "article"). What could make him postpone or stop working on this first version of the text? What could cause discontent or dissatisfaction? It can be assumed that the reason was some contradictions that were discovered in the course of the work. What exactly? At present, this question can only be answered tentatively.

First, the question remained unanswered as to how and why state control over private commercial interest would ensure the transformation of the old peasantry into a class of socialist society.

Secondly, if socialism is a system of civilized co-operators, and the cooperation itself develops as a commercial one, if a "civilized co-operator" is a smart and competent merchant, then it turns out that under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the system of merchants is socialism.

In other words, the first version of the notes "On Cooperation" actually proclaims that socialist Russia is the Russia of the triumphant NEP. We will not find anything similar either in Marxism or in Lenin's previous works. Lenin said that the **NEP could serve the establishment of socialism**. Marx, Engels, and Lenin saw **socialism as a system that had overcome commodity-money relations**, and did not turn the masses of the population into merchants**. Lenin, even after the transition to the NEP, continued to believe that socialism is such an organization of society that will overcome not only commodity production and trade, but also commodity exchange, a society where product exchange will be carried out ***.

Trade and marketing ("merchant") cooperation, connecting the peasant economy with the state (socialist) sector of the economy, thus limiting the possibilities for the development of the private capitalist sector, made it possible to take a certain step in strengthening the political, social, and economic positions of the dictatorship of the proletariat and therefore could play important role in the development of the revolution. But in principle it could not solve the problems of the socialist transformation of agriculture and the change in the social nature of the peasantry.

Moreover, its consequences from the point of view of the interests of the socialist revolution were contradictory, since it would strengthen the petty-bourgeois nature of the peasantry, and not weaken it. Lenin counted on the fact that cooperation would allow the peasant economy to somehow develop, in the worst case, to keep afloat, avoiding impoverishment. But in this case, firstly, all agriculture was mothballed on the old social and technical base, having no prospects for rapid development.

Secondly, it became a stumbling block in the way of the development of large modern forms of organization of agricultural production, based on the use of modern and rapidly developing technology, and the transformation into highly productive production, since it hindered the development of industrial cooperation (collective farms), and kulak farms (the process of growth of the poor and laborers has been slowed down).

Thirdly, the question of the incentives for the transition of peasant farms involved in "merchant" cooperation to production cooperation (collective farms) remained unanswered: why should a peasant part with his property if it provides him with some growth, development, future? The experience of history has shown that production co-operation, necessary for the socialist transformation of the peasant countryside, does not grow out of "commercial" co-operation****.

Consequently, the "cooperative plan", as it was outlined in the first version of the notes "On Cooperation", **did not solve** the fundamental issue - the socialist transformation of agriculture in the conditions of the USSR in a historically short period of time. Small-scale agriculture, unable to provide funds for large-scale investments in industry, unable to accept from industry and use on a mass scale highly productive expensive agricultural machinery, such agriculture could not be a solid basis for the development and victory of the socialist revolution in the USSR. **NEP Russia "did not want" to turn into socialist Russia.**

Perhaps that is why V.I. Lenin made a second attempt to substantiate the answer to the question: how to build socialism in a country with a predominance of the peasant population without help from the victorious proletarian revolutions in industrialized countries, using bourgeois methods of farming.

Unlike the first, the second version of the notes (the second part of the "article") "On Cooperation" is devoted to how to use cooperation to ensure the transition from a capitalist to a socialist form of organization of production. Now Lenin is talking about "**cooperative enterprises**" located on land owned by the state [1666]. Consequently,

he has in mind production cooperation on land, i.e. collective farms****. For "commercial" cooperation, the question of land, of its ownership, was of no essential importance.

Lenin begins his analysis of the possibilities of production cooperation under the conditions of the New Economic Policy to ensure the transition of the peasantry to socialist production relations by determining its place in the existing economic system. He assessed "our existing system", "our present economic reality" as a combination of private capitalist enterprises ("but no other than **on public land**, and not other than **under the control of state power** belonging to a workers' state") with enterprises of a "consistently socialist type", i.e. those in which "both the means of production belong to the state, and the land on which the enterprise stands, and the entire enterprise as a whole." Lenin distinguished this system from state capitalism. Under existing conditions, "**cooperative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises**, on the ground, with the means of production **belonging to the state**, i.e. working class" (emphasis added by us. - BC). In this case, cooperative enterprises "very often **coincide completely with socialism**" [1667]. There were no such enterprises yet, they had to be created.

The proposal to combine the means of production owned by the state with the labor of peasants united in a production cooperative (kolkhoz) was new to the Bolsheviks. Combining the cooperative labor of the peasants with advanced agricultural technology made it possible to increase the attractiveness of the collective farms in the eyes of individual peasants and create better conditions for the development of the collective farm movement. Such collectivization turned out to be the only means of transforming the petty-bourgeois peasantry, constantly and on a massive scale generating capitalism, into a class of socialist society, **no longer reproducing** bourgeois, but collectivist social relations. Therefore, the success of the collective-farm movement, by solving the most difficult task of the Russian socialist revolution, ensured its victory.

Thus, in the second version of the notes "On Cooperation" V.I. Lenin formulated the fundamental position on which the Stalin's

collectivization plan was based: production cooperation (collective farm) has a socialist character if, under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the state owns, firstly, the land (nationalized) and, secondly, the means of production (for example, in the form machine and tractor stations - MTS).

Lenin's appeal to the problems of industrial cooperation made it possible in the second version of the notes "On Cooperation" to better substantiate the conclusion that "cooperation in our conditions quite often it completely coincides with socialism" that "the simple growth of cooperation for us is identical ... with the growth of socialism".

Based on these conclusions, Lenin makes the following statement, which gave rise to much controversy:

“ since the growth of cooperation is identical with the growth of socialism, “we are forced to recognize a radical modification in our whole point of view on socialism. This fundamental change consists in the fact that in the past we placed and had to place the center of gravity on the political struggle, the revolution, the conquest of power, and so on. Now the center of gravity is changing to the point that it is transferred to peaceful organizational "cultural" work, if we have in mind "internal economic relations", and apart from the tasks facing the country and the revolution on an international scale" [1668].

In historical and social science literature, especially during the years of Gorbachev's "perestroika", the thesis taken out of context about "a radical change in the whole point of view on socialism" was interpreted as a rejection of the revolutionary nature of socio-political and economic transformations, as a rejection of public property in favor of cooperative, as their identity from the point of view of the socialist organization of society, as recognition of the need to preserve the regulatory role of the market and commodity-money relations under socialism. However, such a conclusion is based on **an arbitrary interpretation** of one phrase and on the substitution of concepts*****.

Since this phrase is an organic part of a large text, we will quote it, omitting fragments that do not carry an essentially important semantic load, and highlighting the key words for understanding Lenin's thought:

“ Since state power is already in the hands of the working class, since the political power of the exploiters has been overthrown, and since all the means of production ... are in the hands of the state. .. we have the right to say that the simple growth of cooperation is identical for us. ... **with the growth of socialism**, and at the same time we are forced to recognize a radical change in our whole point of view on socialism. This fundamental change consists in the fact that we used to place the center of gravity ... on political struggle , revolution, the conquest of power, and so on. **Now the center of gravity is changing to the point** where transferred to peaceful organizational "cultural" work "(emphasis added. - BC) [1669].

The very construction of Lenin's phrase (the list of points separated by “ times ”) suggests that changes in the approach to the problem are **associated with the conditions for building socialism**, and **not with a change in the idea of it**.

It is obvious that Lenin speaks of the **role of cooperation not** in the functioning of socialist society, **but in solving the problems** of building it . Cooperation does not appear to be an all-encompassing and all-exhaustive task. It is an important, but only a particular task, in a certain sense, **“residual” (“we are left with “only ” one thing...”[1670])**. It is also clear that Lenin is not talking about the identity of cooperation with socialism, but about the identity of the growth of cooperation with the growth of socialism. In other words, the more cooperation there is now instead of the private trader, the more socialism there is now. And by the growth of socialism Lenin in 1923, as in 1918, understood the overcoming of multiformity. Consequently, Lenin speaks of the identity of cooperation and socialism, not in the sense of complete correspondence of cooperation to socialism, but **in the sense of coincidence** (Lenin uses these words

in the same sense and context, as synonyms). Otherwise, cooperative socialism is obtained, but this construction contradicts the conditions that Lenin spoke of: the cooperative enterprises themselves are socialist only on condition that the land and means of production are owned by the state.

In addition, a **"point of view on socialism" is not at all the same as a "view", "concept", or ideas about socialism**. The change in "point of view" is not associated with a change in all ideas about socialism, but **about its laws and patterns of development**. It is definitely associated by Lenin with the peculiarities of the course of the socialist revolution, with its entry into a new phase and with the change in ideas about the means, methods, rates of work dictated by this circumstance, which, in turn, change the work plan, place, time, sequence of application of the main efforts (i.e. **"center of gravity of the work"**). These changes do not necessarily have to change the idea of the society being created, although they will inevitably leave some kind of imprint on it. Lenin is not talking about socialism itself, but about **the process of building socialism**. This becomes clearer if we consider that for Lenin, socialism is not a construction that has yet to be created, but **a process** that is already happening today. Therefore, Lenin said that

"going to the very core of everyday issues", "we dragged socialism into everyday life and we must figure it out" [1671].

For Lenin, as well as for K. Marx and F. Engels, **socialism is not a state, but a process** [1672]. This is the point.

So, what we have before us is not a change of problems, but a change **in the approach to solving** the same problem in new conditions, from a new perspective. This is not about changing ideas about the principles and mechanisms of functioning and the structure of a socialist society, but about **a maneuver in achieving this society**.

The meaning of Lenin's phrase is this: there was a time when emphasis was placed on political issues related to the provision of state power, on the appropriate forms and methods of work and struggle. Now we have entered a new phase of development, when

economic activity comes to the fore, which at the moment and in this situation largely rests on “culturalism”.

In addition, supporters of the concept of Lenin's revision of his former point of view on socialism ignore the fact that the thesis formulated here **is not at all new for Lenin**. At the very beginning of the first version of the notes, Lenin unequivocally speaks of the connection between the views expressed here and the views of 1918 :

“It is unlikely that everyone understands that now since **the time of the October Revolution** (emphasis added by us. - B.C.) and regardless of the New Economic Policy ... cooperation has become absolutely exceptional in our country.”

And a little further he clarifies:

they thought about it before, and then they forgot to think about it. Now again it is necessary to remember [1673].

Consequently, the proposal for the all-round development of cooperation in the new conditions of the NEP cannot serve as evidence of a radical revision of the previous **ideas about socialism**. Conditions are changing, and with them the ways of using cooperation. Here it is the meaning of this key phrase for understanding the further course of Lenin's reasoning, which does not give any grounds for the conclusion that Lenin radically changed his ideas about the socialist revolution and socialism.

The idea that over time there would be just such a **change in priorities**, which is mentioned in the notes "On Cooperation", was also not new. Lenin said more than once, the fact that **after the conquest of political power**, the main task lies **in the field of management, economics, culture, etc.** Thus, in a speech at the Moscow Provincial Conference of the RCP(b) on November 21, 1920, he argued that in connection with the transition to peace,

“ instead of the methods of revolutionary overthrow of the exploiters and rebuffing the rapists, we must apply the

methods of organization, construction", we must give the peasantry "a model and the practice of such economic relations, which will be higher than those where each peasant family manages in its own way [1674].

And in the report of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR "On the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the Republic" on December 23, 1921, Lenin again returns to this thought:

"History has now entrusted us with the work: to complete the greatest political revolution with slow, hard, difficult economic work, where deadlines are outlined very long." "Here is the work of whole decades"[1675].

The list of such statements can be continued, we only note that Lenin paid great attention to this problem in his political report to the XI Congress of the RCP (b) [1676]. It is not surprising that this found a place in Lenin's last works.

Concluding the second version of the notes, Lenin wrote:

"If we had full co-operation, we would already have both feet on socialist soil. But this condition for complete cooperation includes such a cultural level of the peasantry that it is "impossible to ensure without a whole cultural revolution" [1677].

As you can see, again Lenin connects the problems of production cooperation precisely with the peasantry. The same idea was repeated by him in his last article, "Better fewer, But Better":

there are "political prerequisites" for a "direct" transition to socialism, only civility is lacking, which should open the way to cooperation [1678] **** **.

Thus, from the standpoint of Marxism, Lenin substantiated the fundamental **possibility of a "non-standard" path of development** of the Russian revolution. But there was still no answer to the cardinal

question - how to build socialism **in a peasant country** under the conditions of the NEP, which developed the instincts of the owner in the peasantry. The poor could ensure the involvement of approximately 30% of the peasantry in production cooperation, which means that only partially, to an insignificant extent, solved the economic, political, and social tasks of the socialist revolution in the countryside. It was necessary to accept as inevitable the low rate of restoration of the national economy and, consequently, of socialist construction. As a result, the process of revolutionary transformation of society acquired **a protracted character**, and this, in turn, doomed the peasantry to be for a long time the object of political and ideological struggle both on the part of the socialist proletariat and on the part of the bourgeoisie, which retained political positions and ideological influence. The process of development of collectivist psychology and the assimilation of socialist ideology would be difficult and slow. Under these conditions, the class struggle must inevitably acquire a more acute character. All that remained was to hope for a favorable outcome.

Lenin's work on the text stopped for reasons that we can only guess at, but in the following dictations (articles devoted to the reform of the Central Control Commission-RCI) we again encounter this formulation of the problem and a new attempt to solve it. This suggests that Lenin, even in the second version of the notes "On Cooperation", **has not yet found a satisfactory answer**. Indirect evidence of this can be the fact that in his last notes and articles, Lenin, referring to the question of the prospects for the Russian socialist revolution, speaks only of the **political aspects of** the participation of the peasantry in it, but bypasses the socio-economic problems posed and developed by him in the notes "About cooperation". Thus, in the article "How can we reorganize the Rabkrin," Lenin wrote that we must ensure that so that the

*"peasant masses **will stand by the working class**, loyal to their alliance, or whether they will permit the "Nepmen", i.e., the new bourgeoisie, to drive a wedge between them and the working class, to split them off from the working class. (our italics. - BC) [1679].*

Here Lenin comes to precisely the problem we mentioned above—the problem of the class struggle, on which the outcome of the struggle for the peasantry depends. In fact, **Lenin outlined a new front in the class struggle** that arose at a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution—on the economic front of the struggle against the bourgeoisie for the peasantry. Lenin hoped for a positive outcome of this struggle for the revolution. But the support of his faith was not the peasantry itself, but **the Bolshevik Party**, its ability to develop the right political course, to carry it out and to ensure the effective management of society. This is also evidenced by his article "Better fewer, but better." In it, Lenin again returned to this problem and noted that

"the small and smallest peasantry" "follows the proletariat out of confidence in the results of its revolutionary work", but on this trust alone "it is not easy for us to hold out until the victory of the socialist revolution in more developed countries" [1680].

It's not easy, **which means it's possible**. It is possible, but if certain conditions are provided: the dictatorship of the proletariat is preserved and **"under its authority and under its leadership"** the "small and smallest peasantry" is retained for so long that it has time to reach such a level of "civilization" that would allow it to "go directly to socialism" [1681]. Again "if". If for a long time it will be possible to keep the peasants from speaking out against the dictatorship of the proletariat. The question of how to ensure this has so far remained unanswered. Or rather, Lenin **proposed the only answer that could be given** at that time: to increase the efficiency of the work of the state apparatus as the main instrument for transforming society, using for this the reorganized Central Control Commission-RCI.

* Under the product exchange, Lenin also meant trade in products owned by the state ("the state product - the product of a socialist factory, exchanged for peasant food, is not a commodity in the political and economic sense, in any case, not only a commodity, no longer a commodity, ceases to be a commodity") (Lenin V.I. Complete collection of works. T. 43. P. 276).

** Later, the idea of the possibility and desirability of using commodity-money relations under socialism changed. But this was connected with a different stage in the development of the socialist revolution, with a different experience in building socialism, with the name and work of Stalin.

*** " Tax in kind is one of the forms of transition from a kind of "war communism", forced by extreme poverty, ruin, and war, to a correct socialist product exchange. And this latter , in turn, is one of the forms of transition from socialism with features caused by the predominance of the small peasantry to communism "(our italics. - BC) (Lenin V.I. Full. sobr. op. T. 43. C 219).

**** I.A. Kurtov, who studied the dynamics of the development of various forms of cooperation in the 1920s, came to the conclusion that, in practice, the transition from one form of cooperation (trading, marketing) to others (production) was practically not observed. Therefore, the thesis that the commercial cooperation, which Lenin spoke about, in its development will turn into production cooperation, socialist in essence, does not receive confirmation in historical practice. Only the simplest forms of it have evolved into the highest forms of industrial cooperation (I.A. Kurtov. On the interpretation of some provisions of the Leninist cooperative plan // Issues of the history of the CPSU. 1989. No. 11. S. 66–76).

***** Lenin clearly avoids using the term "collective farm". The reason for this, perhaps, is that, in his opinion, the experience of collective farm construction during the years of the civil war failed. The mass of peasants did not accept him (see: V. I. Lenin , Complete collection of works, vol. 45, pp. 44, 45, 46, 54, 132, 268). In the conditions of the NEP, he avoided everything that could interfere with the establishment of relations with the peasantry.

***** In the literature of those years, the inconsistency of attempts to build a whole concept of Lenin's rejection of his former ideas about socialism on the basis of a phrase taken out of context and of the entire Leninist legacy was pointed out more than once. The position of S.P. Makarov, who believes that "the recognition by Vladimir Ilyich of a

radical change in the point of view on socialism means, first of all, a change in the tactics of the struggle for building a new society, and not a change in views on the nature of socialism,” and draws the correct conclusion: “Lenin’s views on the essence of socialism represent a single, integral system” (Makarov S.P. Lenin’s theoretical heritage and modernity // Issues of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. P. 156).

***** Such a formulation of the question, by the way, means that Lenin did not reject the idea of a direct transition to socialism as incorrect, but only recognized that in the specific conditions of Russia it would not be possible to implement it: years should be spent on economic and cultural development. construction, to create the base that can become the basis of the socialist organization of society.

Notes:

[1660] Ibid. T. 43. S. 149.

[1661] Ibid. T. 44. S. 502–503.

[1662] Ibid. T. 43. S. 225–226.

[1663] Ibid. T. 45. S. 370.

[1664] Ibid. S. 373.

[1665] Ibid. pp. 371–373.

[1666] Ibid. pp. 374–375.

[1667] Ibid.

[1668] Ibid. pp. 375, 376.

[1669] Ibid. S. 376.

[1670] Ibid. S. 372.

[1671] Ibid. S. 309.

[1672] See: Marx K., Engels F. Selected. op. T. 6. M., 1987. S. 511.

[1673] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 369, 371.

[1674] Ibid. T. 42. S. 27-28.

[1675] Ibid. T. 44. S. 326–327.

[1676] Ibid. T. 45, pp. 110–112.

[1677] Ibid. S. 376.

[1678] Ibid. S. 401.

[1679] Ibid. pp. 387–388.

[1680] Ibid. S. 401.

[1681] Ibid. pp. 403, 404.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION

How To Turn Nep Russia Into Socialist Russia

His confidence in the possibility of a successful completion of the Russian socialist revolution V.I. Lenin expressed in his last public speech at the plenum of the Moscow Soviet on November 20, 1922:

"Socialism is no longer a question of the distant future ... We dragged socialism into everyday life and we must figure it out. This is what constitutes the task of our era ... no matter how difficult this task may be ... we all together, not tomorrow, but in a few years, we will all solve this problem at all costs, so that from Russia NEP will be socialist Russia "[1682].

All the last letters, notes and articles of Lenin are a manifestation of purposeful work to accomplish this task. Work started but not finished.

The above analysis of the history of creation and content of the last letters, notes and articles of V.I. Lenin leads us to the conclusion that the widespread opinion that in them Lenin completed development of a plan for the construction of socialism in the USSR, has no sufficient grounds. If we remain on the traditional point of view, i.e. that Lenin's last letters, notes and articles are a "Political testament" and the completion of his development of a plan for building socialism, then it will be necessary to admit that this plan does not answer a number of questions of paramount importance, without which this plan loses its practical significance. Moreover, in these works of Lenin, a number of important political problems were not even raised, which were then relevant for the party and the state, without the solution of which the preservation of political power by the Bolsheviks was not guaranteed. For example, the prevention of an economic crisis, the approach of which was discussed at the XI Congress of the RCP (b) and which broke out in the second half of 1923. The question of its nature was debatable, the answer to which depended on the way to prevent it.

The same can be said about the problem of strengthening the Party's ties with the working class, which was not achieved only by including its representatives in the Central Committee or the Central Control Commission, and so on.

Everything falls into place if this complex of Lenin's texts is judged not by the name it received later (obviously, not earlier than January 1924), but by the content and history of their origin. The history of Lenin's work on the problems posed in the "Testament" suggests that he did not set himself the task of completing developing a plan for building socialism in the USSR and, therefore, did not solve it. He simply continued to work on topical issues of party-state building, economic and social policy. Naturally, the solutions he proposed, firstly, were based on the then existing ideas about the ways and means of building socialism, and secondly, enriched these ideas with new observations, assessments, and conclusions. Therefore, Lenin's "Political Testament", which summarized the new experience of socialist construction, became an important contribution to the development of a plan for the construction of socialism in the USSR. But it was not the completion of this work, if only because it is obviously impossible to complete it at all, because such a plan must be constantly refined, corrected, adapting to new conditions, opportunities, and tasks. Nor were these works a "Political testament" in the true sense of the word since they were not conceived and executed as guidelines that the party had to fulfill without fail after the death of the leader. They can be regarded as a "Testament" only in the sense that they turned out to be (contrary to hopes) the last works of Lenin, **his last advice**, his last search for the solution of some important theoretical and political problems.

The main problem was that the classical schemes for the development of the proletarian revolution in Russia **under the conditions of the capitalist encirclement** did not allow answering a number of vital questions. A theoretical breakthrough was required. Already the views that Lenin presented to the 11th Congress of the RCP(b), as well as subsequent speeches, letters, and articles, went far beyond the previous ideas of Russian Marxists at the beginning of the century. They went beyond what seemed possible to the Bolsheviks themselves

on the eve of taking power and in the first years of the revolution. It was shown above that Lenin was developing a new concept of the socialist revolution in Russia (USSR), but a number of fundamentally important issues within its framework had not yet been worked out either theoretically or politically. This applied, for example, to the problem of accumulations (it is not enough to state the presence of various wealth in the country, it was necessary to find a mechanism to use them in the interests of the socialist revolution). The question of the nature, forms, and methods of industrialization of the country remained undeveloped. But the main stumbling block remained as the peasant question. Meanwhile, it was precisely in it that there was a "key" to solving other "intractable" practical issues. Without his decision, Lenin's faith in the successful completion of the socialist revolution would lose a significant amount of persuasiveness, if it were to develop based on its own strength and in the conditions of a capitalist environment.

Trotsky did not share Lenin's views, mainly for doctrinal reasons. As it soon became clear, Zinoviev and Kamenev were skeptical about them, but already mainly for practical reasons. While the proletarian revolution in Germany appeared to be a reality in the short term, there was hope that the internal difficulties of the Russian revolution would be overcome with the technical, economic, and financial assistance of Germany. But at the end of 1923 it became clear that this help could no longer be counted on. The most important success factor in the previous theoretical and political constructions has disappeared. 1924 brought new doubts. The stabilization of capitalism that had begun (temporary and partial as Stalin believed; firm and long-term, as Zinoviev and Kamenev believed) pushed back the prospect of a European revolution even further. On the other hand, the campaign for elections to the Soviets, held at the end of 1924-beginning of 1925, showed that, despite the successes of the NEP and the restoration of agriculture, and even thanks to them, dissatisfaction with the size of agricultural taxes, the ratio of prices for industrial and agricultural products was growing in the countryside, and against this background, the political influence of the rapidly growing rural bourgeoisie - the kulaks was increasing.

Extraordinary measures had to be taken: on the one hand, to cancel the election results, to carry out re-elections, etc., and on the other hand, to take a number of steps towards the demands of the peasantry (permission to lease land, hire labor). These steps made it possible to improve the conditions for managing the masses of peasants and the conditions for hiring farm laborers, but at the same time they created still greater scope for the development of the kulaks. The danger that Lenin spoke of in his article "How We Can Reorganize the Workers' and Peasants' Committee" became real; if the peasants follow the bourgeoisie, there will be a threat of breaking the class alliance of workers and peasants.

For the attitude of the leaders of the "new opposition" to the Leninist concept of the socialist revolution in Russia, it is significant that Zinoviev considered it possible in the process of building socialism to confine itself to pursuing a policy of "neutralizing" the middle peasantry [1683]. And this was in the conditions of the NEP, when Lenin developed views that went in a diametrically opposite direction.

The peasant question became decisive for the fate of the socialist revolution in the USSR. This or that answer to it either gave hope, or mercilessly took it away.

The problem of the participation of the peasantry in the socialist revolution (the agrarian-peasant question) for Russian Marxists turned out to be the most difficult theoretical and practical task of the socialist revolution. Lenin solved the issue of the peasantry in the Russian socialist revolution on the basis of those theoretical developments that were known from the works of K. Marx, dating back to the 50-60s of the XIX century, and mainly from the works of F. Engels, which were based on the study of the peasantry of Europe. However, the experience of the Russian socialist revolution showed that the possibility of interaction with the peasantry was chronically underestimated. The impossibility of solving the problem within the framework of traditional assessments and schemes became more and more obvious. Some non-standard solution was required. A situation arose when a theoretical breakthrough was needed, capable of

providing a solution to the problem of building socialism in the Soviet Union under conditions of a capitalist encirclement.

Help came in the form of a theoretical hint from K. Marx. In December 1924, in the 1st volume of the "Archive of K. Marx and F. Engels", draft drafts of a letter from K. Marx to V. Zasulich (March 1883) were published. In them, Marx formulated a fundamentally important proposition about two schemes (paths of development) of the socialist revolution. The first is proletarian, developed for England and other countries that do not know public ownership of land; the second is a communal-peasant (conditionally), **developed by him specifically for Russia**, where the vast majority of the population is engaged in work on land owned by rural communities. Within the first the formation of a socialist collectivist society was ensured by the new collectivism inherent in the factory and rural proletariat. **Collectivism, which develops as capitalism** develops and in the course of the struggle of the proletariat for its social liberation from exploitation. The slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" - a derivative of the achieved level of development of this collectivism and the next step in its further development. Within the framework of the second path, the formation of **a socialist collectivist society was ensured** by the development of peasant collectivism, which persisted in a huge mass of the population due to the existence of a rural community, which K. Marx considered not as a manifestation of backwardness and a relic of feudalism, but as a manifestation of the specific features of the development of agriculture in Russia in the difficult bioclimatic conditions of Eastern Europe.

Marx explicitly stated that the scheme of socialist revolution, which he justified in Capital, **applies only to the countries** of Western Europe:

"Analyzing the origin of capitalist production, I say: "At the basis of the capitalist system lies ... the complete separation of the producer from the means of production. ... the basis of this whole process is the expropriation of farmers ... Private property based on personal labor ... In this process taking place in the West, the point is, therefore, of the transformation

of one form of private property into another form of private property.

The Russian peasants, on the other hand, would have had to turn their common property into private property... But the special research that I made on the basis of materials I gleaned from primary sources convinced me that the community is the fulcrum of the social revival of Russia... [1684].

In draft drafts, the letter varies many times and this position is substantiated from different angles. Let us designate the main, fundamentally important ideas for our topic.

“In Russia, thanks to an exceptional set of circumstances, the rural community still existing on a national scale can gradually free itself from its primitive features and develop directly as an element of collective production on a national scale”[1685].

“Russia is the only country in Europe in which communal land ownership has been preserved on a broad national scale, but at the same time Russia exists in a modern historical environment, it is a contemporary of a higher culture, it is connected with the world market dominated by capitalist production.

Assimilation of the positive results of this mode of production, it gets the opportunity to develop and transform the **still archaic form of the rural community, instead of destroying it** (I note in passing that the form of communist property in Russia(*italics ours.* - BC) is the most modern form of the archaic type, which, in turn, has gone through a series of evolutions). The Russian rural community belongs to the newest type in this chain. The landowner already owns the house in which he lives and the garden, which is his appendage, on the basis of private ownership. Here is the first decomposing element of an archaic form not known to older types. On the other hand, the latter rest entirely on the

relations of consanguinity between the members of the community, while the type to which the Russian community belongs is already free from this narrow connection. This opens up a wider scope for its development "[1686].

From this, Marx concluded:

"Theoretically speaking, the Russian "rural community" can still preserve, by developing its base, communal ownership of land and, by eliminating the principle of private property, which is also inherent in it, become the direct starting point of the economic system towards which modern society is striving. society (that is, towards socialism. - BC): without resorting to suicide, it can start a completely new life, it can, bypassing the capitalist system, appropriate the fruits with which capitalist production has enriched humanity; a system which, if considered solely from the point of view of the possible time of its existence, is hardly worth taking into account the life of society. **But you need to descend from the heights of pure theory to Russian reality.**(highlighted by us. - BC). First of all, it is necessary to preserve the community, and "in order to save the Russian community (and, consequently, save the peasantry from ruin, i.e. from proletarianization. - BC), writes Marx, a Russian revolution is needed"[1687].

Marx believed that the prospects for the victory of the Russian revolution were opened by the fact that capitalism had already entered the stage of crisis:

"Another circumstance favorable for the preservation of the Russian community (through its development) is that it is not only a contemporary of capitalist production, but also survived the period when this social system was still intact... In a word, capitalism is in front of it - in a state of crisis that will end only with the destruction of capitalism, the return of modern societies to the "archaic" type of common property ...

So, one should not be especially afraid the words "archaic"
[1688] (italics ours. - BC).

Marx also expressed ideas that were accepted and embodied in terms of building socialism in the USSR:

"Common ownership of land provides it (the rural community. - BC) with a natural basis for collectivist appropriation, and its historical environment - the existence of capitalist production simultaneously - provides it with ready-made material conditions for cooperative labor organized on a large scale. It can, therefore, take advantage of all the positive gains made by the capitalist system without having to go through its *Kavda* gorges. With the help of machines, for which the physical configuration of the Russian soil is so favorable, it will be able to gradually **replace parcel cultivation with combined cultivation**. Having previously been brought back to normal in her current form, she can directly become the starting point of the economic system to which modern society aspires, and start a new life without resorting to suicide (...) The habit of the Russian peasant to the *artel* it will especially facilitate the transition from parcel labor to cooperative labor, which, however, he already uses to some extent when mowing communal meadows and in such collective enterprises as draining marshes, etc. ". "It can **gradually replace parcel farming with large-scale farming** with the use of machines, for which the physical relief of the Russian lands is so favorable [1689].

"If the revolution occurs at the proper time, if it concentrates all the forces of the country to ensure the free development of the rural community, the latter will soon become an element in the rebirth of Russian society and an element of superiority over countries that are under the yoke of the capitalist system." "In order for collective labor to be able to replace in agriculture itself small-scale labor, the source of private appropriation, two things are needed: the economic need for

such a transformation and the material conditions for its implementation.”

According to Marx, the Russian peasantry has an economic need for cooperation; the capitalist world can also provide material conditions for its implementation.

“As for the initial organizational costs, intellectual and material, Russian society is obliged to provide them to the “rural community”, at the expense of which it has lived for so long and in which it must still seek its source of rebirth” [1690].

Marx, on the basis of an analysis of some features of the historical development of Russia 35-40 years before the Russian socialist revolution, pointed to the presence of socialist potential in the Russian peasantry through the preservation of communal traditions and institutions as **essential conditions for survival**. The Bolsheviks moved towards the recognition of this fact from practice*. The generalization of experience led them to reconsider their previous views and assessments: from recognizing the need to neutralize the middle peasant in the socialist revolution — to recognizing the necessity and possibility of a strong alliance with them in the political field — further, to recognizing the possibility of cooperating with him in the economic field in building socialism. Each step in this direction was based on accumulated experience and stimulated by the acute political need to solve the next problem in relations with the peasantry. Gradually, the ground was being prepared for the emergence of the idea of the possibility of expanding and deepening cooperation with the peasantry in the socialist revolution.

Initially, the originality of the Russian socialist revolution was explained by the socio-economic and political backwardness of Russia. But over time, the understanding began to come that backwardness itself was generated not only by the policy of tsarism, that it had deeper roots in the **specific conditions** of the historical path of Russia.

Lenin connects one reason for the uniqueness of the Russian socialist revolution with Russia's middle position between the developed capitalist countries of Europe and the countries of the East. And in this regard, Lenin formulates a fundamentally important proposition:

the farther the revolutionary process spreads to the East, "the more diversity (and therefore originality), in comparison with European models, social revolutions will show."

Accounting for this peculiarity and this regularity seems to Lenin to be decisive to evaluate "our revolution". Since he associated one of the reasons for the success of the revolution with the fact that during it conditions were created under which the Bolsheviks were able to "implement precisely that alliance of the "peasant war with the workers' movement", about the desirability and possibility of which Marx wrote [1691], then we can suggest that Lenin associated this ability of the Russian peasantry **not only** (or not so much) with the remnants of feudalism in society, but also with the peculiarity of the historical development of Russia, located at the junction of Europe and Asia.

New approaches to the solution of the peasant problem of the Russian socialist revolution are read in Lenin's formulation of the question that in the socialist revolution the

"political and social revolution" may turn out to be "the forerunner...of the cultural revolution ... of the cultural revolution, in the face of which we ... now standing"[1692].

Here, for the first time, Lenin, proceeding from an analysis of the experience of the revolution, approached the idea expressed by K. Marx in a letter to V. Zasulich (March 1881) that the creation of the necessary material and technical base of a socialist society in Russia could be completed after the revolutionaries captured political power, in the course of their implementation of their socialist program, provided that they receive material, technical and cultural assistance from the developed capitalist countries (and not the revolution that

won them, as F. Engels and what was perceived by Russian Marxists)[1693].

Marx made this conclusion on the basis of an analysis of the peculiarities of the historical path of Russia's development. Lenin, apparently, did not know this letter from Marx**. He approached the problem from a different side than Marx, **not from an analysis of the uniqueness of the country's historical development**, but from an understanding of the practice of the socialist revolution. But it is all the more significant that he came to the same conclusions that K. Marx came to.

The same can be said about the recognition of the socialist potential of the Russian peasantry. Lenin, unlike Marx, does not speak about it directly and definitely, but his reasoning about the possibility of involving it in socialist construction as an active and conscious participant through production cooperation under the conditions of the NEP speaks in favor of the fact that Lenin actually recognized it, or went to this confession.

True, the **difference** between his formulation of the question and Marx's is also obvious. Marx associates it with collectivism, born and supported by the rural community, developing under the conditions of the socialist revolution, and Lenin - exclusively with the economic interest of the peasant, drawn through cooperation into a new system of economic and social relations and thanks to them imperceptibly transformed into a class of socialist society.

All this suggests that if Lenin had learned about these works of Marx, he would have been able to perceive his ideas and use them to further develop a plan for building socialism in the USSR.

The formulation of the question of the Russian socialist revolution, which Marx proposed, indicates that he was not embarrassed by the prospect of its existence in the conditions of a capitalist environment. Indeed, if the revolution in Russia can develop for some time, coexisting side by side with the capitalist states, receiving from them modern technology, cadres of specialists, etc., then, firstly, it is

sufficiently autonomous from world capitalist system and, secondly, it has (no matter how small, but it has) chances of winning. Otherwise, Marx would not have called on the Russian revolutionaries to act in this way. Naturally, forty years later there were many more grounds for an optimistic answer to this question: a different experience, a different system of international relations, a different level of Russia's development, **different prospects** for the development of the revolution in the East.

Interestingly, those political forces that did not accept Lenin's theoretical and political innovations did not accept **Marx's "hint"**. It is known that Trotsky and his supporters openly laughed at Stalin's conclusion about the possibility of building socialism in the USSR under conditions of capitalist encirclement as an attempt to grow a baobab in a mignonette pot. In the speeches of Trotsky 1925-1926. it is impossible to find anything that testifies to the perception, to the consideration of the **considerations expressed by Marx**. Not a single fresh thought compared to what was said in 1921-1922.

His response to Marx is easy to read in statements about the correctness of his theory of "permanent revolution", about maintaining adherence to his old estimates and schemes [1694]. Zinoviev and Kamenev replied to Marx, on the one hand, with the statement that the technical and economic backwardness of the country is an insurmountable obstacle to the socialist revolution [1695]; that its constructive tasks may well be solved in peasant Russia **without** the participation and even against the will of the bulk of the country's population [1696]. In this fundamental question for the revolution, they did not learn its experience.

There is reason to believe that **this "hint" of Marx influenced** a sharp change in the political position of Bukharin, who turned from the ideologist of "left communism" into the ideologist of the right, kulak deviation in the Communist Party [1697]. New views of Bukharin, the concentrated expression of which was the slogan addressed to the peasantry - "Get rich!" (April 1925) can be interpreted as a kind of (expanding and simplified) interpretation of the newly discovered assessments and ideas of Marx. **Starting from the thesis that the**

Russian peasantry has a socialist potential, he concluded that the entire peasantry, even the kulak, can peacefully grow into socialism. In Bukharin's speech at the Fourteenth Party Congress, the main provisions of his new concept of building socialism were fully defined:

"Because of class differences within our country, because of our technical backwardness, we will not perish ... we can build socialism even on this beggarly technical base ... this growth of socialism will many times slower ... we will plod along at a snail's pace, but ... nevertheless, we are building socialism and ... we will build it "[1698].

Stalin accepted Marx's hint and, in our opinion, gave it an interpretation adequate to his thoughts. He was able to do this because, in the course of the socialist revolution, together with Lenin, he went through the above-mentioned evolution towards the assessments and proposals of Marx that were still unknown to them. Stalin managed to fulfill Marx's advice –

"descended from the heights of pure theory to Russian reality" [1699].

He saw that the thesis about the preservation of the socialist potential in the Russian peasantry, preserved thanks to the rural community, made it possible to pose and solve the question of the participation of the peasantry in the socialist revolution in a completely different way. In the article "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists" (December 17, 1924) I.V. Stalin made the first correction of the previous ideas about the conditions for the victory of socialism in the USSR. He focused on the originality of the Russian revolution, rejecting the previous ideas about the ways of its development as erroneous:

"There is no doubt that the universal theory of the simultaneous victory of the revolution in the main countries of Europe, the theory of the impossibility of the victory of socialism in one country, turned out to be an artificial, unviable theory. The seven-year history of the proletarian revolution in Russia speaks not for it, but against this theory.

At the same time, Stalin drew attention to a different scheme for the development of the socialist revolution - as a process of

"revolutionary falling away of a number of new countries from the system of imperialism" with the support of both the proletariat of other capitalist countries and the USSR, with the progress in socio-economic development, which turned into everything. a more powerful "base for the further development of the world revolution" [1700].

The new scheme actually took into account **Marx's assumption** that the Russian socialist revolution could, **in principle, develop in a capitalist environment.**

The next step is related to the preparation of the draft theses "The most important results of the extended meeting of the ECCI". The "initial draft" of the theses of the report at the XIV All-Union Party Conference of the RCP (b) was compiled by Zinoviev. Zinoviev wrote:

"But at the same time, Leninism teaches that the final victory of socialism is possible only on an international scale (or in several decisive countries. From the above unconditional law of capitalism, in **no case follows the conclusion that the final victory of socialism in one country is possible**" (emphasis added. - B.C.).

This statement interprets Lenin's views in a distorted way, it is directed against what K. Marx wrote about.

Stalin strikes out the last sentence, which denies the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country***, and inserts before the word "possibly":

"in the sense of a **complete guarantee** against the restoration of bourgeois relations." The result is: "But at the same time, Leninism teaches that the **final victory** of socialism in the sense of a complete guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations is possible only on an international scale (or in several decisive countries)" [1701].

There has been a radical change in the meaning and direction of the thesis. Now it turned out to be directed against Zinoviev and Trotsky. And their associates.

Further, following Zinoviev's thesis about the emergence of a certain balance in the world between capitalism and socialism "with a clear bias towards the victory of the socialist revolution," Stalin makes a long insert in which he formulates his main conclusion:

"In general, the victory of socialism (not in the sense of final victory) is unconditionally possible in one country."

On the other hand, the existence of two diametrically opposed social systems causes a constant threat of capitalist blockade, other forms of economic pressure, armed intervention, and restoration. The only guarantee of the final victory of socialism, those. guarantee against restoration, is, therefore, a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries. However, it does not follow from this that it is impossible to build a complete socialist society in such a backward country as Russia without "state aid" (Trotsky) from countries more technically and economically developed. Stalin continued

"It follows from this, that the country of the workers' dictatorship, which is the main base of the international revolution, must regard itself as its most powerful lever and support; on the other hand, the party of the proletariat ruling in it must make every effort to build a socialist society in the conviction that this construction can and will certainly be victorious if the country can be defended against all attempts at restoration. In other words, by a correct policy, both in relation to the peasantry within the country and in the field of international relations, the RCP must overcome all the difficulties arising from the slowdown in the pace of the world revolution" [1702].

The final conclusion, only in an extremely concise form, clearly and distinctly repeats what Lenin spoke about more than once, including in the Testament. At the same time, clearly dividing the question of

the sufficiency of the forces of the revolution for the victory of socialism over capitalism within the country and the question of the victory of the socialist revolution in a number of other developed capitalist countries as a condition for the final victory of socialism in the USSR, Stalin attached to the assessments and conclusions of V.I. Lenin finished view. This is important to understand the essence of the problem. This is all the more important since this formulation was directed against those who began to **oppose both Lenin and Marx on this issue**. The front of the confrontation was clearly defined.

Soon, Stalin, using the views of Marx, **new to the Bolsheviks**, on the path of development of the socialist revolution, took an important step in the development of the Leninist concept of the socialist revolution in Russia. To Lenin's argumentation, based solely on the concept of the proletarian revolution, **Stalin adds Marx's argumentation**, based on a different understanding than Lenin's of the uniqueness of Russia's historical path, on a different vision of the possibilities for the development of the socialist revolution in the USSR. And immediately the prospect of relations with the peasantry appeared differently from what had been thought before. To understand the essence of the difference, it is enough to compare two quotes.

At the Eleventh Congress, Lenin said:

"The peasant gives us a loan... But this loan cannot be inexhaustible. You need to know this and, having received a loan, still hurry up. You need to know that the moment is approaching when the peasant country will not extend further credit to us, when it ... will ask in cash, "" now we have no other way out ... with Russian capitalism, with that which is growing out of small peasant farming. ... there will be a battle in the near future, the date of which cannot be precisely determined. Here the "last and decisive battle" is to come, there can be no more detours, either political or any other"[1703].

Lenin's last articles, dictated at the beginning of 1923, do not negate these assessments and forecasts.

Stalin now thought differently. In May 1925, summing up the results of the conference of the RCP (b), he said:

“There are two ways of developing agriculture: the capitalist path and the socialist path ... both the proletariat and , in particular, the peasantry are interested in **the development going along the second path, along the socialist one...** Hence the community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry, covering up the contradictions between them... The main thing now is not at all to kindle a class struggle in the countryside. **The main thing now is to rally the middle peasants around the proletariat, to win them over again. ..** The main thing is to build socialism together with the peasantry, necessarily together with the peasantry and necessarily under the leadership of the working class, for **the leadership of the working class is the main guarantee** that construction will proceed along the road to socialism ”(our italics. - BC) [1704].

Stalin's innovation must be appreciated. Previously, it was considered an axiom that only the proletariat (urban and rural) was interested in socialism. Its class interest leads to the socialist transformation of the countryside and agriculture. **Now Stalin declares that the peasant is interested in this no less, perhaps even more than the proletariat.** The connection with the views of Marx is obvious.

The differences in the assessment of the socialist potential of the Russian peasantry and in the views on the prospects for relations with the peasantry are so significant that one can speak of a new concept of the socialist revolution in Russia based on a creative combination of the **results of Lenin's analysis of the experience of the revolution and Marx's ideas.**

The **new concept of the socialist revolution** was distinguished from Lenin's first and foremost by a different (inherent to Marx) assessment of the socialist **potential of the Russian peasantry.** And from the ideas expressed by Marx about the socialist revolution in Russia, the new concept was distinguished by a combination of the first (proletarian)

and second (**conditionally "community-peasant"**) schemes of the socialist revolution. K. Marx suggested that Russian revolutionaries not lose sight of the opportunities that Russian Marxist revolutionaries have in the form of a rural community.

Over the past 40 years, Russia has gone very far in its development. Capitalism developed, the community weakened, but did not disappear. It became possible to organically combine proletarian socialism with the socialist potential of the Russian peasantry. However, here lay a layer of problems that **Marx did not think about**. Here were hidden new, **previously unknown** opportunities for the development of the socialist revolution in the USSR.

The task of transforming NEP Russia into socialist Russia had to be solved in harsh international conditions, so the question of the time of this transformation, the pace of socialist transformations acquired the character of a vital condition for its successful solution. Meanwhile, Marx proceeded from the recognition of the fact of the slow development of the Russian socialist revolution since it would be **based on the slow ("gradual") evolution** of the rural community in the direction of creating collective farms [1705].

The factors limiting the pace of economic development and socialist transformations were recognized as the insufficient industrial development of Russia, the technical and cultural backwardness of the Russian village, which was forced to place its hopes in technical re-equipment on the technical assistance of developed capitalist countries. We find similar assessments in Lenin. At the end of the civil war, when the full extent of the ruin was not yet realized, when Lenin hoped to quickly implement the GOELRO plan (report on concessions at a meeting of the activists of the Moscow organization of the RCP (b) on December 6, 1920), he admitted:

*"America and other capitalist countries grow in their economic and military power devilishly fast. **No matter how we gather our forces**, we will grow incomparably **more slowly**" (our italics. - V.S.) [1706].*

Like this! All conceivable high rates of development, according to Lenin, would still be lower than in the developed capitalist countries!

The mere transference through decades of Marx's advice and assessments and their mechanical application to Soviet reality by Bukharin led to the inevitable and dangerously reassuring conclusion about the admissibility of a snail's pace of development, about a kind of "doomed" country to the victory of socialism, about the participation in this process of the entire peasantry, including fist. As a result - to a deep distortion of the ideas expressed by Marx.

The high rates of development of the socialist revolution were an organic part of the first—the proletarian—scheme of its development. It is obvious that Bukharin treated Marx's thoughts with confidence, but was **unable to master** them creatively. He could not descend

"from the heights of pure theory to Russian reality"[1707].

It seems that he underestimated the opportunities that opened up for the politician in recognizing the existence of a socialist **potential in the Russian peasantry**. And this inevitably fettered, limited the use of those opportunities for the development of the socialist revolution, which were generated by the development of capitalism in Russia. Obviously, this was the "Achilles' heel" in the system of views that Bukharin developed. No wonder Lenin argued with him on this issue. In the pamphlet *The Economy in Transition* (May 1920), Bukharin, speaking of the beginning of the collapse of the world capitalist system, wrote that it "began with the weakest economic systems with the least developed state-capitalist organization." It is clear that in this case only Russia could be implied. Lenin, reading this pamphlet, underlined the words "the weakest" and made a remark in the margins relating to them:

"Wrong: with "medium weak". Without a certain height of capitalism, we would not have succeeded"[1708].

According to Lenin, the limited pace of the development of the revolution was dictated by the impossibility of increasing the burden on the peasants, not only because of the low efficiency of their small-scale individual farming, but also because of the impossibility of

increasing the withdrawal of material and financial resources from the countryside in view of the threat of breaking the class alliance with them. Bukharin agreed with this.

Stalin, in contrast to him (this is clear from the subsequent struggle between them), believed that the peasant, as long as he is interested in the victory of socialism, for the sake of his own interests, should go to the maximum mobilization of all his forces. Production cooperation made it possible to ensure both the social evolution of the peasantry and the mobilization of all its forces to ensure this evolution****.

If for the mass of peasants the mentality born, developed, and preserved by the rural community seemed vital, if the peasants were interested in the development of agriculture along the socialist path no less, and almost more than workers, then the task of preparing mass production cooperation (collectivization) became relevant.

Collectivization plans, shelved by the Bolsheviks after the transition to the NEP, received a new life. At the same time, collectivization now appeared in a different form than before, when it was believed that the collective farms were for the poor, for the middle peasant - marketing and credit cooperation. Without the middle peasant, who made up approximately 60% of the peasantry, no collectivization could be considered mass and could not radically solve those social, economic, and political problems on which the success of the socialist revolution depended. **Without the participation** of the middle peasant, collectivization could not provide the country with the volume of agricultural products and money to the treasury that was needed, could not ensure the technical re-equipment of agriculture on the required scale and the socialist transformation of the countryside. And this is understandable: outside this work, the largest and economically strongest section of the working peasantry, the middle peasant, would have remained. The necessary economic and socio-political effect could only be given by mass collectivization of the countryside. **Collectivization was the second revolution** to bring socialism to the countryside, a revolution carried out "from above" as Marx had foreseen.

The mass collectivization of the peasants, despite all the difficulties and shortcomings, and sometimes mistakes ("excesses", etc.) accompanying its implementation, has become a peaceful alternative to the

"last and decisive battle" with "capitalism... which grows out of a small peasant economy "(our italics. - AS.) [1709].

Mass collectivization prevented the process of "production" of capitalism by the petty-bourgeois countryside, isolated the kulaks from the bulk of the peasantry, and thereby facilitated the struggle against the underdeveloped rural bourgeoisie. It opened up a new perspective for the individual peasant to improve his economic and social position. An alternative to it was the struggle against the kulaks growing out of the peasantry, like the heads of a hydra. But in the countryside, in which the path to the kulaks is the only way to a better life, the "last and decisive battle" with capitalism, which is growing "out of the small peasant economy," is not just a fight against the kulaks, it is the deprivation of hope for the middle peasant (even and illusory) to a serious improvement in their life situation.

Therefore, the struggle of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the rural bourgeoisie, **without the development of mass collectivization**, would inevitably incite the middle peasants of the countryside against it, would unite them with the rural bourgeoisie in the struggle against Soviet power. The exhaustion of the political confidence of the Soviet government and the presentation by the peasantry of a "promissory note" for payment, the danger of which Lenin warned, would become a reality. As a result - the failure of the NEP, the prospect of a return to the policy of neutralizing the middle peasants and a new bloody civil war in which the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be more than doubtful.

The participation of the middle peasant in mass collectivization made it possible to make the class alliance of workers and peasants a much more durable and effective means of the socialist transformation of society than it was before under the domination of small individual farming. The **new approach to the peasantry** made it possible to solve the problem of accumulating financial resources for the

implementation of the socialist reconstruction of the national economy and the industrialization of the country. Thanks to mass collectivization, it was easier to direct the flow of financial resources coming from the countryside, from agriculture to the state bank, bypassing the pocket of the private owner, and put them at the service of socialism in its struggle against capitalism. Through the collective farms, it was easier to send a stream of new equipment to the countryside, therefore, to start raising labor productivity, marketability, to ensure the growth of production volumes, which, in turn, led to an increase in the flow of material and financial resources coming from the countryside, and expanded the possibilities for financing the national economy.

The development of relations between the state (for example, through the MTS) and the collective farms made it possible to reduce (or limit the growth) the sphere of monetary relations between them, freeing the village from some of the worries of increasing its own production capacities (horses, harness, plow, harrow, fodder grain, etc.). etc.), which also made it possible to make additional and ever-increasing withdrawals of money and grain from the countryside for the needs of the industrialization of the country and the tractorization of agriculture.

The city received funds for the development of industry, partly used to provide jobs and housing for peasant sons and daughters, whom their native village and family “squeezed out” into the city, not being able to feed and provide for them (“agrarian overpopulation”). In the city, in the conditions of industrialization, they got the opportunity not to get by somehow on a mix regular unemployment benefits, but to participate in the technical re-equipment of their own village, returning the debt of the city to their fathers and mothers, making their work easier with machines.

The village, despite the lack of funds in it, received modern agricultural machinery and could begin to build up its technical strength and increase the production of agricultural products. The problem of accumulations was also resolved, without which all

discussions about the industrialization of the country would have remained empty talk.

There was a real opportunity to ensure such high rates of economic development that had previously seemed impossible. It turned out to be possible to set and solve the problem of overcoming the 50-100-year lag behind the country in the field of technology from the developed capitalist countries in 10 years. Not for records, of course. To defend its existence among hostile states, to strengthen the positions of socialism in the world, to serve as the basis for the development of the socialist revolution in the world and to fulfill the role of the "shock brigade of socialism."

While preparing the second edition of his biography, Stalin entered the following words in italics into the text of the book.

"Based on Lenin's instructions, Stalin developed provisions (this word was inserted by him instead of the word "teaching." - BC) on the socialist industrialization of our country." "Stalin developed and put into practice the theory of the collectivization of agriculture »[1710].

This is how Stalin understood his contribution to the solution of the issue that Lenin pondered until his last opportunity to work, without solving it. As can be seen, Stalin placed his contribution to the development of the problems of the socialist transformation of agriculture higher than his contribution to the solution of the problems of the industrialization of the USSR. It seems that he was right in this assessment of his contribution to the development of this most complex theoretical and political issue.

Summing up all that has been said, we can conclude that Lenin was not mistaken in Stalin. The problem, the solution of which V.I. Lenin devoted his last letters, notes, and articles to the task of transforming NEP Russia into socialist Russia has been accomplished.

* It must be said that F. **Engels did not agree with K. Marx** on this issue (Marx K., Engels F. Selected works. M, 1986. V. 4. S. 485-509).

Since Marx's views on this problem remained unknown or little known to Russian Marxists, it was Engels who exerted a decisive influence on the formation of their views.

** The fundamental provisions and assessments of this letter by K. Marx and, what is especially important, its rough **drafts are not found** in Lenin's documents, so it can be assumed that **Lenin knew nothing about them.**

*** Initially, after the crossed-out sentence, Stalin wanted to insert the following (then he crossed out this text): "As long as the lonely country of the proletarian revolution is surrounded by bourgeois-imperialist countries, it is in danger of bourgeois restoration, it is in danger of direct or disguised military intervention, financial blockade and other economic measures of pressure of the old bourgeois states on the young proletarian state" (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 3359. L. 11).

**** It is impossible to agree with the opinion (Yu.S. Aksenov) that "the theory of the possibility of the victory of socialism in a previously backward country that broke through the "chain of imperialism" was given in the most concentrated form by N.I. Bukharin in 1929 in the report "Lenin's Political Testament". It was in it that the well-known "triad" was formulated: industrialization, population cooperation and the cultural revolution, as well as the pressing problems of building the party-state apparatus. The author hints that Stalin "stole" from Bukharin both this theory and this "triad": "All this was then included in the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" and became the theoretical foundation of the "Stalinist model of socialism"" ("Stalinskaya model of socialism ": formation, development, collapse (1920-1928). "Round table" // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 12. P. 42).

Notes:

[1682] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 309.

[1683] This was discussed in Zinoviev's article "On Bolshevization" ("Pravda", January 13, 1925), in the book "Leninism" (1925) and in the

original version of the article "Philosophy of the Epoch" (1925). See: XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b). Stenographer. report. pp. 498-501.

[1684] Marx K., Engels F. Selected. op. T. 6. M, 1987. S. 79–80.

[1685] Ibid. pp. 58–59.

[1686] Ibid. pp. 71–72.

[1687] Ibid. pp. 63, 67.

[1688] Ibid. pp. 59–60.

[1689] Ibid. pp. 76–77.

[1690] Ibid. pp. 65–66, 69.

[1691] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 379, 380, 381.

[1692] Ibid. S. 377.

[1693] See: Marx K. Engels F. Selected. op. T. 4. M., 1986. S. 493, 498–509.

[1694] Trotsky L. Towards socialism or capitalism. Ed. 2nd. M.; L., 1925. S. 65-67; He is . 1905. Twenty years later. M; L., 1926. S. 12-13.

[1695] XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b). Stenographer. report. pp. 135-136.

[1696] Ibid. pp. 498–500.

[1697] The attempts made in the literature to explain the rapid evolution of one of the ideologists and leaders of the "Left Communists" into an ideologist of the right deviation in the Communist Party cannot be considered successful (see: Gorelov I.E. Nikolai Bukharin. M, 1988; Emelyanov Yu.V. Notes about Bukharin: Revolution. History. Personality. M., 1989; Kun, M. Bukharin. His

Friends and Enemies. M., 1992; Tsakunov S. V. The development of N. I. Bukharin's economic views after the transition to NEP // Bukharin: man, politician, scientist, M, 1990).

[1698] XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b). Stenographer. report. S. 135.

[1699] Marx K., Engels F. Selected. op. T. 6. S. 63.

[1700] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 6. S. 362-375, 395, 398-401.

[1701] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 3359. L. 6.

[1702] Ibid. L. 15.

[1703] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 77, 83.

[1704] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 7. S. 111, 123–124.

[1705] Marx K., Engels F. Selected. op. T. 6. S. 63, 73, 77.

[1706] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 42. S. 61.

[1707] Marx K., Engels F. Selected. op. T. 6. S. 63.

[1708] Lenin's collection. T. XL. M., 1985. S. 425; Bukharin N.I. Problems of the theory and practice of socialism. M., 1989. S. 171, 454.

[1709] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 42. S. 83.

[1710] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 118, 120.



The book offered to the reader is an attempt at a systematic analysis of the history of the creation of the "Political Testament", its content and use in the political struggle of the 1920s.

We did not initially question Lenin's authorship of any of the texts of the Testament and therefore did not intend to prove that they do not belong to V.I. Lenin. The scientific formulation of the problem, in our opinion, consists in the need to prove that this or that document belongs to V. I. Lenin. In other words, only a document whose Lenin's authorship has been proven can be considered Lenin's.

The source base available to historians, despite certain shortcomings, makes it possible to conduct a study to establish Lenin's authorship of each of the texts of the Testament. The author considers the main condition for success to be the identification of a real connection between the content of the texts of the Testament and the political struggle that took place within the Central Committee of the RCP (b), as well as a comprehensive analysis of all available sources.

Selected Articles From
"Lenin's political testament:
the reality of history and the myths of politics"
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